Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Carter pled guilty to conspiracy to use and produce counterfeit credit cards and armed robbery, resulting in a U.S.S.G. range of 121 to 130 months’ imprisonment. The district court sentenced Carter to 45 months’ imprisonment followed by three years’ supervised release, which began in November 2009. In June 2010, based on allegations of sexual conduct toward the 13-year-old daughter of Carter’s girlfriend, Carter pled guilty in state court to misdemeanors and was sentenced to five years’ probation. In October 2011, Carter was arrested for attempting to use stolen credit cards. He pled guilty to access device fraud and was sentenced to 9 to 23 months’ imprisonment. In revoking Carter’s supervised release, the court calculated the applicable range, U.S.S.G. 7B1.4 (2011), categorizing the credit card fraud as a Grade B violation, and, over Carter’s objection that he never touched the girl, found that Carter’s conduct amounted to a forcible sexual offense, a “crime of violence” and a Grade A violation of supervised release. The court sentenced him to 37 months’ imprisonment, four months above the Guidelines range, to run consecutively to any state sentence, stating that it would have imposed the same sentence regardless whether the sexual assault was a Grade A or B violation. The Third Circuit affirmed. Regardless of the charge, a court may consider a defendant’s actual conduct in concluding that he has violated the terms of supervised release. The court should have set out Carter’s specific crime of violence, but, because it provided an alternate basis for Carter’s sentence, any error was harmless. View "United States v. Carter" on Justia Law

The Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. 3006A(a), requires courts to furnish legal counsel to criminal defendants “financially unable to obtain adequate representation.” Konrad was appointed a federal defender based on information he provided in a financial disclosure affidavit. At sentencing, the district court found discrepancies between Konrad’s presentencing report and his financial disclosure and, after a hearing, found that Konrad had $70,463 in two individual retirement accounts so he was not financially unable to pay the cost of legal representation. Konrad had failed to disclose the value of his home , had significantly under-reported income, and had reported the value of the retirement accounts inaccurately. The court ordered Konrad to repay $6,000. The Third Circuit affirmed; individual retirement funds and jointly-held bank accounts can be available funds within the meaning of the Criminal Justice Act and the court acted within its discretion in ordering Konrad to repay the market value of his legal representation rather than the hourly rate paid to an attorney appointed under the Criminal Justice Act. View "United States v. Konrad" on Justia Law

Figueroa joined the Camden police force in 2003. In 2008, he was transferred to a new Special Operations Unit created to target guns, drugs and violence with his regular partner, Bayard. In 2011, Figueroa and Bayard were charged with a series of civil rights violations concerning falsification of evidence in drug cases. Convicted under 18 U.S.C. 241 and 242, Figueroa was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the district court erred by admitting the out-of-court statement of co-defendant Bayard; by excluding, as cumulative, police reports that Figueroa offered into evidence; by allowing improper expert opinion testimony from a prosecution fact witness on issues of constitutional law; and by refusing to give the jury a requested instruction concerning specific intent. The court properly applied the drug distribution sentencing guideline to the civil rights violations after finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Figueroa was involved in distribution of narcotics. View "United States v. Figueroa" on Justia Law

In 1998 Keitel was convicted of first degree murder, third degree murder, aggravated assault, and five counts of recklessly endangering another person. His aggregate sentence was life imprisonment plus 35-70 years of imprisonment. Keitel’s appeals of the conviction and sentence were unsuccessful, as were his efforts to seek relief under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act. The federal district court denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254. While an appeal was pending, Keitel died. His family wanted to pursue the appeal to clear his name. The Third Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot, View "Keitel v. Mazurkiewicz" on Justia Law

Small, a New Jersey state prisoner, is paraplegic and confined to a wheelchair. He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting 14 incidents involving use of excessive force, denial of medical treatment, and confiscation of his personal wheelchair and its replacement with one without leg rests. He claims that without his personal chair he was unable to brush his teeth, shower, and sometimes left to lie for days in his own excrement. The district court dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies by filing grievances, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Third Circuit affirmed in part, holding that a judge may resolve factual disputes relevant to the exhaustion issue without participation of a jury and that that Small knew of, and was able to access, the prison’s grievance procedures, but that Small did adequately exhaust remedies with respect to two incidents. View "Small v. Whittick" on Justia Law

Stock was indicted for transmitting a threat in interstate commerce 18 U.S.C. 875(c) after he posted a notice on Craig‟s List: i went home loaded in my truck and spend the past 3 hours looking for this douche with the expressed intent of crushing him in that little piece of shit under cover gray impala hooking up my tow chains and dragging his stupid ass down to creek hills and just drowning him in the falls. but alas i can’t fine that bastard anywhere . . . i really wish he would die, just like the rest of these stupid fucking asshole cops. so J.K.P. if you read this i hope you burn in hell. i only wish i could have been the one to send you there.” The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss, stating that it was satisfied that the government included sufficient context in the indictment that a reasonable jury could find that Stock’s statement expressed intent to injure in the present or future. View "United States v. Stock" on Justia Law

Rojas, a 22-year old citizen of the Dominican Republic, entered the U.S. in 2003 as a lawful permanent resident. In 2009, Rojas pled guilty to possessing drug paraphernalia and was assessed a fine and court costs by the Pennsylvania state court. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings for having violated a law “relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21),” 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Rojas argued that the offense that constitutes the basis of removal must involve a substance defined in section 802 of Title 21. The BIA ordered Rojas removed. The Third Circuit, en banc, remanded. In a removal proceeding under section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), the government must show that the conviction for which it seeks to remove a foreign national involved or was related to a federally controlled substance. In this case, the Department failed to meet its burden. View "Rojas v. Att'y Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

Stinson’s scheme began in 2006 when he founded a fund, Life’s Good, with an alleged purpose to originate mortgage loans. Stinson advertised a “risk free” 16 percent annual return to investors with individual retirement accounts. He hired telemarketers to “cold call” potential investors and later produced a fraudulent prospectus and worked through investment advisors. Stinson did not use investors’ money to make mortgage loans, but diverted it to various personal business ventures that employed his family and friends without requiring them to work. In 2010, the SEC initiated a civil enforcement action. Stinson was charged with wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343; mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341; money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957; bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344; filing false tax returns, 26 U.S.C. 7206(1); obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. 1505; and making false statements, 18 U.S.C. 1001. The SEC’s analysis showed that Life’s Good solicited $17.6 million from at least 262 investors and returned approximately $1.9 million. Many individuals lost retirement savings. Stinson entered an open guilty plea. The district court sentenced him to 400 months and ordered restitution of $14,051,246. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that the court erroneously applied U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(15)(A), which increases the offense level by two points when “the defendant derived more than $1,000,000 in gross receipts from one or more financial institutions.” The enhancement applies only when financial institutions are the source of a defendant’s gross receipts. View "United States v. Stinson" on Justia Law

Verde, a native of Mexico, became a lawful permanent resident in 1991. After several DUI convictions, he was sentenced to more than two years in prison. In 1998, Verde was charged with removability as an “aggravated felon.” He appeared before an immigration judge with seven other Mexican nationals, was deported, returned, and was removed for a second time in 2000. In 2011 the removal order was reinstated and he was charged with illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326. The government dropped that charge and allowed him to plead guilty to use of a false Social Security number, 42 U.S.C. 408(a)(7)(B). He was sentenced to time served and supervised release. Verde filed a habeas corpus petition seeking to be reinstated as a permanent resident or to be granted cancellation of removal, arguing that his initial removal was a gross miscarriage of justice because of procedural shortcomings and that, because the Supreme Court has decided that a DUI conviction is not an aggravated felony, his conviction was not a valid basis for original removal. The district court dismissed Verde’s petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning that the REAL ID Act of 2005, 8 U.S.C. 1101, eliminated habeas relief in district courts for aliens challenging orders of removal. The Third Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Verde-Rodriguez v. Att'y Gen of the United States" on Justia Law

Quinn, charged with aiding and abetting Johnson in an armed bank robbery, claimed that when he drove Johnson to the bank, he did not know that Johnson intended to rob a bank teller at gunpoint. Johnson, who was awaiting sentencing, refused to testify. The district court refused Quinn’s request to immunize Johnson so he could testify. His statement to police that Quinn was not aware of the planned robbery was excluded as hearsay. Quinn was convicted and sentence to 147 months. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of prosecutorial misconduct by postponing sentencing to induce Johnson not to testify. Quinn also argued that the court erred by not exercising its authority to immunize Johnson’s testimony. Rejecting that claim, the court stated that courts lack that authority, as immunity is a statutory creation reserved to the Executive Branch. If the accused can show a due process violation, a court has authority to vacate a conviction. View "United States v. Quinn" on Justia Law