Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

At the sentencing hearing following his conviction for his sixth illegal reentry after deportation, Mejia made a mitigation argument, based on his cooperation with the government in providing information about a homicide and prostitution ring. Sentenced to 78 months, he did not object to the court’s failure to rule on the request for variance or point out the court’s failure to explicitly address or give further consideration to that argument. He later appealed, arguing that the court committed procedural error by failing to give meaningful consideration to that argument. The Third Circuit, en banc, announced a “new rule.” Unless a relevant objection has been made earlier, a party must object to a procedural error after the sentence is pronounced in order to preserve the error and avoid plain error review. View "United States v. Flores-Mejia" on Justia Law

Cruz was arrested for assaulting, resisting, or impeding Social Security Administration employees and two counts of threatening a federal law enforcement officer. The district court granted a judgment of acquittal on Count I, and a jury returned guilty verdicts on Count II and Count III. After the court received the pre-sentence investigation report, the prosecution successfully moved for a determination of competency. A Federal Bureau of Prisons forensic psychologist concluded that Cruz was mentally incompetent and suffered from schizophrenic disorder, bipolar type. After a hearing, the court concluded that Cruz was incompetent and found that he could not proceed with sentencing. A second report concurred with the diagnosis, noted Cruz’s ongoing refusal to take anti-psychotic medication recommended by BOP personnel, concluded that without medication Cruz would remain incompetent, and stated that “there is a substantial probability that [his] competency can be restored with a period of” forced medication. The prosecution obtained an order authorizing the BOP to medicate Cruz against his will. The Third Circuit affirmed, citing the Supreme Court decision, United States v. Sell (2003), and reasoning that the government can have a sufficiently important interest in forcibly medicating a defendant to restore his mental competency and render him fit to proceed with sentencing. View "United States v. Cruz" on Justia Law

In 1993, Branch entered a Newark building, inhabited by drug dealers and addicts, just before Mosley was fatally shot. When the police arrested Branch the next day, he had the gun that shot Mosley. Branch testified that he went to the building to retrieve $50 that he had paid for fake cocaine. He encountered a lookout, and, though he claims to have been unarmed, insisted on going inside. Inside, Branch saw several people and asked who had supplied the fake cocaine. Lee produced a gun and told Branch to get out. Branch claims that in the ensuing scramble, Lee’s gun discharged, that Lee dropped her gun, and that he grabbed it and ran out. Branch called two witnesses who confirmed his account. The state called several witnesses who indicated that Branch went to the building to rob its occupants and killed Mosley. All of the witnesses had long criminal records. The arresting officer testified that Branch ran, fought him, and tried to pull a weapon. Despite apparent reservations, the jury convicted Branch. After state appellate proceedings and two remands, the trial court sentenced Branch to life for aggravated manslaughter. The appellate court affirmed. After unsuccessful state post-conviction proceedings, Branch unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief. The Third Circuit vacated, stating that it could not find any justification for trial counsel’s failure to call two potential witnesses; if they had testified consistently with their pretrial written statements, there is a reasonable probability that the evidence would not have favored the prosecution. The state courts’ conclusions were unreasonable applications of federal law, so the district court was required to hold a hearing to ascertain reasons for not calling the potential witnesses. View "Branch v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

In 2002, Thornhill pled guilty to bank fraud and was sentenced to 21 months of imprisonment and five years of supervised release. In 2007-2008, she was the subject of three petitions alleging violations of terms of supervised release and was again arrested for bank fraud. The district court considered her history of psychiatric issues, of sexual abuse by a family member and resultant placement into foster care, and of domestic violence in her marriage. With a guideline range for bank fraud of eight to 14 months, the court sentenced her to one day of imprisonment and five years of supervised release with nine months of monitored home detention. The sentence for the release violations was concurrent. Within seven months Thornhill admitted to allegations in two more petitions: tampering with her electronic monitoring transmitter and testing positive several times for marijuana. The judge imposed a within-guideline term of nine months and 24 months of supervised release. In 2009 she pled guilty to another bank fraud and was sentenced to 24 months, with four years of supervised release. Thornhill admitted to the allegations of a sixth petition, in 2013, but the probation officer acknowledged that she had witnessed her brother’s murder and had to cope with the murder of her son and another son’s serious injuries. The judge acknowledged her tragic circumstances, but referred to her need for a controlled environment, and imposed a total term of 36 months in prison with no supervised release. Thornhill argued that the judge erred by failing to articulate reasons for rejecting the guideline range, by failing to indicate how, he considered the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), and by failing to respond to mitigation arguments. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting the judge’s familiarity with Thornhill’s repeated violations of supervised release and “measured treatment of her violations.” View "United State v. Thornhill" on Justia Law

Powell, a former Pennsylvania state inmate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections violated his Fourteenth Amendment right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law when it revoked its decision to release him to a community correctional center. The DOC conceded that the revocation was based on an improper calculation of Powell’s sentence. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that Pennsylvania inmates do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the expectation of release to a community correctional center. View "Powell v. Weiss" on Justia Law

Travillion was indicted in 2004 on charges under 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii), related to drug trade in the Pittsburgh area. He argued that he was not a member of either conspiracy in two counts and that the drug at issue in one possession charge was heroin, not crack. Travillion was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 188 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed. Travillion then filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, seeking to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence by adjusting the advisory Guidelines down two levels. He alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to effectively investigate and cross-examine government witnesses; failing to effectively investigate facts made known to him by Travillion constituting the only realistic defense; failing to adequately advise Travillion of the risk in his testifying on his own behalf; and failing to adequately object to the conviction on two separate counts that comprised the same conspiracy, exposing Travillion to double jeopardy. The district court denied relief, noting that while counsel’s performance may have been deficient on certain issues, Travillion was not prejudiced, as the evidence presented against him was “overwhelming.” The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Travillion" on Justia Law

In 2008 Smith, Norman, White, and Merin were sentenced for conspiracy to commit bank fraud and aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 371. Each was also convicted of one or more substantive counts of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344, and multiple counts of aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A, based on their participation in a conspiracy to defraud banks. On direct appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the convictions, but vacated the sentences and remanded for consideration in light of a holding that account holders who suffer only temporary losses are not victims for purposes of the victim enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(2) and recalculation of a criminal history level. On resentencing, the court reduced the term of imprisonment as to each one, imposed the same special assessment, maintained or lowered the term of supervised release, and confirmed the existing orders of restitution against White, Norman, and Merin, but increased Smith’s order of restitution by $9,000, from $68,452 to $77,452. The Third Circuit upheld the lower court’s decision to allow additional evidence regarding the number of victims, finding that the defendants were not prejudiced, but vacated the order of restitution. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Pennsylvania troopers responded to a domestic disturbance involving someone “under the influence … waving a loaded firearm … dragging his daughter.” The daughter’s friend relayed information the daughter was sending by text message. The dispatcher advised that the father was believed to be White, who previously had resisted arrest. Arriving at the home, the troopers saw two individuals behind a mud room screen door. Guns drawn, the troopers ordered them out. White emerged and walked unsteadily, leading the troopers to conclude he was intoxicated or under the influence of drugs. As instructed, White went down on the ground, was handcuffed, and subjected to a pat down search. White did not have any weapon. White’s adult daughter, Samantha, emerged. Given her size and apparent victim status, the troopers decided not to handcuff Samantha. A trooper opened the door and seized two guns from the floor just inside the mud room. He walked through the home with Samantha, finding no other person but observing gun cases and a burnt marijuana cigarette, none of which he seized. An officer advised White of his Miranda rights. White stated he was a gun collector, owned firearms, had been carrying guns because he believed people were trying to kill him, and had shot at animals earlier that day. Weeks later, after obtaining a warrant based on the seized firearms, police seized 91 firearms. Indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), White unsuccessfully moved to suppress all firearms and inculpatory statements. The Sixth Circuit remanded for further proceedings regarding reasonable suspicion and exigent circumstances. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

In 1986 when the United States sought an injunction under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. 1997, and entered into a Consent Decree, under which the Virgin Islands would attempt to remedy the conditions at Golden Grove Correctional Facility with respect to unreasonable fire safety risks, physical violence by other inmates or staff, adequate sanitation, and medical care. The district court entered several additional orders when conditions at Golden Grove failed to improve according to plan. In 2011, the Virgin Islands sought to terminate prospective relief under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. 3626(b), (e). The court concluded that all but one of the orders entered after the 1986 Consent Decree constituted prospective relief under the PLRA and did not include the findings required under the statute. The court ordered a hearing to determine whether “prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of a federal right at Golden Grove … and, if so, to ensure that the prospective relief is narrowly tailored to that violation in the manner required by the PLRA.” Gillette, a prisoner at Golden Grove, was denied leave to intervene. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the United States adequately represents Gillette’s interests and that others will be prejudiced if intervention is permitted. View "United States v. Territory of VI" on Justia Law

Apple introduced the iPad in 2010. To send and receive data over cellular networks (3G), customers had to purchase a data contract from AT&T and register on an AT&T website. AT&T prepopulated the user ID field on the login screen with customers’ email addresses by programming servers to search for the user’s Integrated Circuit Card Identifier to reduce the time to log into an account. Spitler discovered this “shortcut” and wrote a program, the “account slurper,” to repeatedly access the AT&T website, each time changing the ICC-ID by one digit. If an email address appeared in the login box, the program would save that address. Spitler shared this discovery with Auernheimer, who helped him to refine the account slurper, which collected 114,000 email addresses. Auernheimer emailed the media to publicize their exploits. AT&T fixed the breach. Auernheimer shared the list of email addresses with Tate, who published a story that mentioned some names of those whose email addresses were obtained, but published only redacted email addresses and ICC-IDs. Spitler was in California. Auernheimer was in Arkansas. The servers t were physically located in Texas and Georgia. Despite the absence of any connection to New Jersey, a Newark grand jury indicted Auernheimer for conspiracy to violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2)(C) and (c)(2)(B)(ii), and identity fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(7). The Third Circuit vacated his conviction. Venue in criminal cases is more than a technicality; it involves “matters that touch closely the fair administration of criminal justice and public confidence in it.”View "United States v. Auernheimer" on Justia Law