Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Since September 11, 2001, efforts to restructure the FBI as the “domestic equivalent” of the Central Intelligence Agency have included revising internal FBI guidelines. The Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG), released by the Attorney General in 2008, authorizes FBI agents to engage in limited racial and ethnic profiling when conducting proactive assessments of criminal and terrorist threats and allows the FBI to collect and map data related to “[f]ocused behavioral characteristics reasonably believed to be associated with a particular criminal or terrorist element of an ethnic community.” The ACLU launched an initiative entitled “Mapping the FBI,” including a series of coordinated FOIA requests (28 U.S.C. 552(a)(3)(A)) seeking records related to the FBI’s use of ethnic and racial data. One request targeted six FBI field offices in New Jersey and sought information concerning implementation of authority to collect information and map racial and ethnic demographics and behaviors in local communities. The FBI identified 782 pages of potentially responsive records, eventually released 312 pages (some of which were partially redacted), withheld 186 pages as duplicative, and withheld 284 pages as exempt from disclosure. The ACLU sought an injunction for release of the withheld records. The district court ruled in favor of the FBI. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the in camera procedure employed for determining whether reliance on FOIA exclusion provision was justified.View "Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation" on Justia Law

In 2009-2010, Delaware, Maryland, and New Jersey had a wave of pharmacy burglaries, many of which affected Rite Aid pharmacies. The FBI joined the investigation. A suspect emerged: an electrician, Harry Katzin, had recently been caught burglarizing a Rite Aid pharmacy; his brothers also had criminal histories that included burglary and theft. Over the following months, the Katzins were repeatedly seen outside pharmacies where phone lines had been cut. After consulting with the U.S. Attorney, but without obtaining a warrant, the FBI affixed a “slap-on” GPS tracker to the exterior of Harry’s van. Within days, state troopers stopped the van on a Pennsylvania highway. Local police notified the troopers that the Rite Aid closest to where the van had been parked had been burglarized. Inside the van, troopers found the Katzin brothers. From outside of the van, the troopers could see pill bottles and Rite Aid storage bins. The police impounded the van and arrested the Katzin brothers. The district court suppressed the evidence found in the van. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that police must obtain a warrant prior to a GPS search and that the conduct in this case cannot be excused based on good faith. All three brothers had standing to challenge evidence recovered from Harry’s van. View "United States v. Katzin" on Justia Law

In 2004 Manuel pled guilty to mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, and conspiracy to commit mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 371 and was sentenced to prison followed by a three-year term of supervised release. After his release from prison, Manuel repeatedly violated the conditions of his supervised release. At a parole revocation hearing in 2012, Manuel informed the district court that he wished to proceed pro se. The court engaged in a colloquy with Manuel and inquired into Manuel’s educational background, warned him of the dangers in representing himself, and asked several questions about the reason for Manuel’s desire to proceed pro se, before ultimately granting the request. Manuel presented witnesses at an adjourned revocation hearing, but the court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to two consecutive 16-month terms of imprisonment. The Third Court affirmed. In the context of a hearing regarding revocation of supervised release, the appropriate test is whether the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived representation by counsel. The totality of the circumstances showed that Manuel made a knowing and voluntary decision to represent himself. View "United States v. Manuel" on Justia Law

A search of Ward’s possessions at Dulles Airport uncovered child pornography. After Ward’s arrest, agents searched his office at the Wharton Business School and found photographs and videos of Ward engaged in sex acts with minors (J.D. and R.D.). The pictures were taken in Brazil, where the boys lived. Ward’s email included communications with the boys. in which Ward requested that the boys engage in sex with other men chosen by Ward. Ward paid J.D.’s family. Attempting to acquire a visa for J.D. to visit the U.S., Ward made false statements. He was charged in Pennsylvania and Virginia federal courts, unsuccessfully attempted to consolidate the cases, pleaded guilty, and received a sentence of 15 years in Virginia. In Pennsylvania he pleaded guilty to shipping child pornography in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(1), false statements to a federal officials, 18 U.S.C. 1001, and inducing a minor to engage in sexual conduct, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). While an appeal was pending, Ward maintained contact with J.D. and R.D., attempted to establish a relationship with their children, and attempted to use his attorneys to contact his victims for non-legal reasons. Ward indicated that he wished to make a statement at his resentencing hearing. The court insisted that his allocution be delivered under oath. Ward spoke about his contrition, his interest in rehabilitation, his struggle in accepting his homosexuality, his diagnosis of leukemia, and his hope that he would not die in prison. The court sentenced him to 300 months, with a fine of $250,000, explaining that the fine was within the advisory range and that the amount was a reasonable figure which Ward could pay. The court also ordered that Ward have no contact with minors, especially his victims’ children. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Ward" on Justia Law

Doreen Proctor’s body was found beside a Pennsylvania country road in 1992, shot in the head and chest, badly beaten, and stabbed repeatedly. She had been scheduled to testify that day as a witness against Tyler, the defendant’s brother, in state court, as a confidential informant in making four controlled buys of cocaine from Tyler and from three other individuals: Evans, Hodge, and Brooks. She had testified against the four at their preliminary hearing and her testimony at Hodge’s trial resulted in a conviction. After Proctor’s death, the remaining trials were halted. Defendant was acquitted of murdering Proctor, but convicted of witness intimidation and served a term in state prison. After his release, federal prosecutors charged him with witness tampering by murder and by intimidation, 18 U.S.C. 1512. He was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed. In 2009 the defendant filed a pro se motion, arguing that two recent Supreme Court decisions limited the scope of the witness tampering statute and rendered the acts for which he was convicted non-criminal. The district court denied relief. The Third Circuit remanded for an evidentiary hearing to give defendant an opportunity to present evidence of actual evidence. View "United States v. Tyler" on Justia Law

In 2010 the Supreme Court held, in Miller v. Alabama, that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. Three individuals, each serving a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole for offenses committed as juveniles, sought authorization to file successive habeas corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. 2254 and 2255 to raise Miller claims. The parties agreed that Miller states a new rule of constitutional law, but Pennsylvania (the state in which two petitioners were convicted) argued that Miller was not retroactive; the federal prosecutor claimed that Miller was retroactive but that the other petitioner’s sentence satisfied the new Miller rule. The Third Circuit found that the petitioners had made a prima facie showing that Miller is retroactive and authorized successive habeas petitions. View "In re: Grant" on Justia Law

Investigation of Rabbi Fish began when Dwek, charged with bank fraud, informed law enforcement that several New York and New Jersey rabbis were laundering money through tax-exempt Jewish charities called gemachs. In a sting operation, Dwek approached Fish about laundering the claimed proceeds of fraudulent schemes. The “proceeds” were actually provided by the government. Fish participated in 12 money laundering transactions involving more than $900,000. Dwek would deliver bank checks made out to gemachs and rabbis and would receive cash in exchange, less a commission of about 10 percent. Fish gave Dwek SIM cards for his cell phone and warned Dwek to sweep his car and phones for detection devices and to use code when speaking to associates. In recordings made by Dwek, Fish stated that he had several money laundering connections, knew how much cash certain individuals had available at specified times, had met the “main guy” running the network, and that the cash came from the diamond and jewelry business. Fish pled guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(h). The parties agreed that Fish’s total offense level would be at least 21; the government reserved the right to argue for a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2S1.1(b)(3) for sophisticated money laundering. The district court applied the enhancement and sentenced Fish to 46 months. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Fish" on Justia Law

Club security flagged down officers and explained that Joseph had tried to “pass” counterfeit $100 bills. The officer did not inspect the bills but asked Joseph for identification and whether he tendered them at the bar. Joseph acknowledged that he tendered the bills and explained that he had obtained them when he cashed his pay check at a racetrack. Shining his flashlight on one of the bills, an officer saw a discrepancy in the bill’s security features: the president’s face in the bill’s watermark did not match the face printed on the bill. Joseph was arrested and searched at the scene. Officers found 14 more counterfeit $100 bills in Joseph’s pocket. After waiving his Miranda rights, Joseph provided a Secret Service agent with several incriminating text messages from his cell phone and confessed to attempting to pass the counterfeit bills. Indicted under 18 U.S.C. 472, Joseph unsuccessfully moved to suppress the bills, the text messages, and his confession. The Third Circuit rejected an appeal of his conviction, finding that Joseph had not preserved his argument that probable cause to arrest was absent because the officers had insufficient evidence to establish his intent to defraud at the time he passed and possessed the counterfeit bills. View "United States v. Joseph" on Justia Law

Elonis’s wife left their home with their children. Elonis began experiencing trouble at work at an amusement park, reportedly leaving early and crying at his desk. An employee Elonis supervised, Morrissey, claimed sexual harassment. In October Elonis posted on Facebook a photograph taken for his employer’s Halloween Haunt. The photograph showed Elonis in costume holding a knife to Morrissey’s neck. Elonis added the caption “I wish.” Elonis’s supervisor saw the posting and fired Elonis. Days later, Elonis began posting statements on Facebook about having “keys for the fucking gates … sinister plans for all my friends,” and, concerning his wife, “would have smothered your ass … dumped your body … and made it look like a rape and murder” that their son “should dress up as matricide for Halloween … head on a stick” and “I’m not going to rest until your body is a mess, soaked in blood and dying from all the little cuts.” Following issuance of a state court protective order, Elonis posted statements concerning shooting at his wife’s house, using explosives, and “I’m checking out and making a name for myself … hell hath no fury like a crazy man in a kindergarten class.” After being visited by federal agents, he posted statements about blowing up SWAT members. Elonis was convicted of transmitting in interstate commerce communications containing a threat to injure the person of another, 18 U.S.C. 875(c). The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that he did not subjectively intend his Facebook posts to be threatening. A 2003 Supreme Court decision, Virginia v. Black, did not overturn its prior holding that a statement is a true threat when a reasonable speaker would foresee the statement would be interpreted as a threat. View "United States v. Elonis" on Justia Law

The U.S. Coast Guard had received information from the U.S. DEA, which learned from British Virgin Island law enforcement, which learned from Grenadian law enforcement, that the U.S.-registered vessel“Laurel” might be smuggling illegal narcotics. The Laurel, under the command Benoit, who has dual citizenship with the U.S. and Grenada, was intercepted in international waters. Coast Guard officers conducted a routine safety inspection, which the Laurel passed. They unsuccessfully attempted to conduct an at-sea space accountability inspection; rough waters made areas of the vessel inaccessible. Officer Riemer questioned Benoit and his crew, Williams, about their destination and purpose. Benoit gave inconsistent answers. Riemer conducted ION scan swipes; none came back positive for any explosive, contraband, or narcotics. The Laurel was directed to a U.S. port, where a canine boarded and alerted to narcotics. Still unable to access the entire vessel, officers directed Benoit to sail the Laurel to St. Thomas to enable a Vehicle and Container Inspection System (VACIS) search for anomalies in the vessel, which revealed anomalous masses. A Customs officer drilled a hole and found a substance that field-tested as cocaine. Officers cut a larger hole, revealing an area filled with brick-like packages. Laboratory tests revealed the bricks were cocaine hydrochloride with a net weight of 250.9 kilograms. After denial of two motions to suppress, Benoit and Williams were convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while on a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction (46 U.S.C. 70503(a)(1), 70506(a), 70506(b); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)); aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while on a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction; and attempted importation of cocaine. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Benoit" on Justia Law