Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

It is a violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. 16901, for individuals convicted of certain sex crimes to travel in interstate or foreign commerce and knowingly fail to register, 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). A conviction involving sex will not lead to classification as an offender under SORNA if “ [a]n offense involving consensual sexual conduct is not a sex offense for the purposes of [SORNA] ... if the victim was at least 13 years old and the offender was not more than 4 years older than the victim,” 42 U.S.C. 16911(5)(C). Brown was charged with failing to register under SORNA based on his conviction for third degree lewd molestation in Florida. He registered when he moved to New York, but failed to register when he later moved to Pennsylvania. Brown pled guilty, but the district court sua sponte expressed doubt that Brown was a “sex offender,” given that his Presentence Investigation Report indicated he was 17 years old and his victim was 13 years old at the time they engaged in the consensual sex that was the basis of the conviction. Citing “the interests of justice” the court withdrew its approval of Brown’s plea. The Third Circuit ordered the indictment reinstated, noting that Brown stipulated that he was more than 4 years older than his victim at the time of the offense. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Erie police officers Onderko and Baney responded to a call. As they approached in their marked cruiser, they spotted Jones, running from the bar. Onderko knew Jones from a prior arrest and both were aware that Jones had an outstanding arrest warrant. Onderko exited the car and Jones took off running.” Onderko pursued on foot, yelling, “stop you’re under arrest.” As Onderko closed in, he saw that Jones was reaching in his waistband, but could not discern what Jones was reaching for. Baney saw Jones retrieve a handgun from his waistband. Onderko tackled Jones. At that moment, Baney shouted, “Gun!” and the handgun flew out of Jones’s hand. In tackling Jones, Onderko suffered serious injury, but Jones escaped and continued fleeing. Baney then shot Jones with his taser, finally subduing him. Police recovered Jones’s firearm. Jones, a convicted felon, admitted that he had the gun and pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Jones appealed his 120-month sentence, arguing that his prior conviction for a second degree misdemeanor charge of “Fleeing or Attempting to Elude [a] Police Officer” under Pennsylvania law was not a crime of violence, that that his conduct in this case did not support enhancement for assault on a police officer, and that the court erred by presuming his guidelines range to be reasonable. The Third Circuit remanded, noting that the officer was unaware of the gun at the time, so that a six-level enhancement was inappropriate.View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

A joint undercover investigation determined that a single computer was sharing 1400 images or video files of child pornography. Pennsylvania State Police learned that the computer was located in the home of retired police Lieutenant Handerhan. A search warrant was executed and his computer was seized. It contained more than 6,000 images and video files of child pornography, including images of pre-pubescent children and images depicting sadomasochism and bondage. Forensic analysis revealed that Handerhan had configured a file sharing program to distribute the images. Charged with distribution of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2256(8)(A) and 2252A(2)(a), and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2256(8)(A), Handerhan pled guilty to one count of possession. The prosecution agreed to dismiss the distribution charge and recommended that he receive a three-level offense-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The probation officer calculated a guidelines range of 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment. Sentenced to 96 months, Handerhan argued that the court erred by failing to explicitly address his request for a downward departure based on mental health issues and meaningfully consider factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), including arguments regarding the unreasonable nature of U.S.S.G. 2G2.2. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding the sentence reasonable, but “reminded” the district court that motions seeking departure should be formally decided. View "USA v. Blaine Handerhan" on Justia Law

Grimes, a former professor of engineering at Pennsylvania State University and the owner of three research companies, pled guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343; false statements, 18 U.S.C. 1001; and money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957, based on his fraudulent conduct involving federal science grants. The plea agreement in indicated that his advisory sentencing range under the USSG would be 41 to 51 months and contained a waiver of Grimes’s direct and collateral appeal rights. Grimes and his attorney signed acknowledgements that they had read the agreement and that the plea was voluntary. During his plea colloquy, Grimes discussed the agreement with the judge and acknowledged that no one could guarantee how the court would sentence him. The district court sentenced Grimes to 41 months’ imprisonment, at the bottom of the Guidelines range of 41 to 51 months. The Third Circuit rejected Grimes’s argument that his appellate waiver was not knowing and voluntary because it contained a waiver of his right to collaterally challenge his guilty plea, conviction, or sentence that did not exempt Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Grimes claimed that he could not have knowingly and voluntarily agreed to waive his appellate rights because his trial counsel faced an inherent, actual conflict of interest in negotiating and advising him on the waiver. View "United States v. Grimes" on Justia Law

Orabi, an Egyptian citizen, was admitted to the U.S. in 1990. He became a lawful permanent resident without conditions in 1996. In 2010, he was convicted, in federal court, of conspiracy to commit fraud in connection with access devices, possession of counterfeit access devices, possession of counterfeit and forged checks, and aggravated identity theft, and was sentenced to 70 months in prison. Appeal to the Second Circuit is pending. DHS initiated removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) based on conviction for an aggravated felony. Orabi notified DHS and the Immigration Court that he was appealing the conviction, and DHS moved to withdraw the removal charge. At a subsequent removal hearing, Orabi appeared pro se. Following an ambiguous exchange, removal charges were reinstated, although there is no documentary evidence that Orabi withdrew his appeal. Orabi was ordered removed. The BIA dismissed an appeal. The Third Circuit reversed. A conviction does not attain a sufficient degree of finality for immigration purposes until direct appellate review of the conviction has been exhausted or waived. View "Orabi v. Att'y Gen. of U.S." on Justia Law

Andrea and Aaron lived together with their infant son from 2007 until 2009, when Andrea obtained an order of protection that described Aaron’s history of violence, including incidents of choking, slapping, and giving Andrea a black eye. Aaron had a criminal history that included check fraud, intimidation of another woman with whom he had a child, and shoplifting as a juvenile. He had also been charged with “indecent assault/rape” but found not guilty. Aaron’s father, Michael, a police officer, was aware of his son’s history and that two of Aaron’s children had died under mysterious circumstances while in his custody (he later confessed to killing them). Aaron had a room in his father’s home, drove his father’s truck, and received mail at his father’s address. Five days after the order issued Aaron returned to Andrea’s apartment and threatened to “cut her up.” An arrest warrant for Aaron issued. While Michael was on vacation, Aaron went to his home, found a copy of the criminal complaint against him, drank a bottle of 99-proof alcohol, ransacked the house and found his father’s service-issued gun, then used it to kill Andrea. Aaron was later killed by police, outside his father’s house. Andrea’s estate sued Michael for civil damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied Michael’s motion for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity and statutory immunity. The Third Circuit reversed, with instructions to dismiss, finding that Michael’s conduct fell within the immunity established by the Child Safety Lock Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. 922(z)(3). View "Estate of Arrington v. Michael" on Justia Law

George, a 21-year old U.S. citizen, was scheduled to fly from Philadelphia to California to begin his senior year at Pomona College. George claims that at the Philadelphia International Airport, he was detained, interrogated, handcuffed, and then jailed, because he was carrying a deck of Arabic-English flashcards and a book critical of American interventionism. The flashcards included every day words and phrases such as “yesterday,” “fat,” “thin,” “really,” “nice,” “sad,” “cheap,” “summer,” “pink,” and “friendly,” but also contained such words as: “bomb,” “terrorist,” “explosion,” “attack,” “battle,” “kill,” “to target,” “to kidnap,” and “to wound.” George had a double major in Physics and Middle Eastern Studies and had traveled to Jordan to study Arabic as part of a study abroad program; he then spent five weeks traveling in Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan. He was released after about five hours. In his suit against three employees of the Transportation Security Administration and two FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force members, the district court’s denied motions in which the defendants asserted that they were entitled to qualified immunity against claims that they violated George’s Fourth and First Amendment rights. The Third Circuit reversed and ordered the case dismissed. View "George v. Rehiel" on Justia Law

Ottaviano, believing himself not bound by U.S. tax law, marketed his views to others through his company, Mid-Atlantic, which offered financial products he claimed would help others avoid taxation and have the government pay their debts. Ottoviano made many representations about himself and the financial products. Customers paid Mid-Atlantic $3,500 each ($5,000 if purchased jointly) to participate. After a trial at which he represented himself, Ottaviano was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. under 18 U.S.C. 371, eight counts of mail and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1341 and 1343, money laundering under 18 U.S.C. 1957, and two counts of tax evasion under 26 U.S.C. 51. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting overwhelming evidence of guilt and rejecting arguments that the district court denied him a fair trial in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due process of law when it cross-examined him and violated his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself when it ordered him to leave the courtroom during a discussion about a letter he sent to the Treasury Secretary. View "United States v. Ottaviano" on Justia Law

U.S. Marshals discovered that Gillette had not registered as a sex offender and was living in St. Croix with a teenage boy. They arrested him for violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. 16901, and failure to register as a sex offender within 10 days of establishing residency in a state other than the state within which he was convicted, in violation of the Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. 14072(g)(3) (repealed 2009). M.B., a 15-year-old boy, stated that he had been living with Gillette since he was about 12, and that they had been sexually involved. Agents learned that Gillette had also victimized M.B.’s younger cousin, A.A. The district court dismissed the federal counts for lack of evidence of interstate travel by Gillette after SORNA’s effective date and found that Gillette’s failure to register after relocating did not violate the Wetterling Act because the Virgin Islands is not a “State” as contemplated by that law. Gillette was convicted on local charges and sentenced to 155 years. The Third Circuit affirmed the convictions: under these circumstances, the district court retained concurrent jurisdiction over the local charges after the federal charges were dismissed. View "United States v. Gillette" on Justia Law

Blair participated in the sale of guns. After his arrest, he pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). A presentence report recommended that Blair be sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Blair had pled guilty in Pennsylvania in 1987, to third-degree robbery in the form of “physically tak[ing] or remov[ing] property from the person of another by force however slight,” and to armed burglary. In 1991, he pled guilty to four counts of first-degree robbery. The 1991 charging documents state that, for each count, the “[f]elony committed or threatened” was “[a]ggravated [a]ssault.” The PSR recommended that each of the 1991 counts be treated as a separate criminal episode. Blair argued that his 1987 conviction was not for the generic offense of burglary required under ACCA; that “robbery by force however slight” is not a violent felony under ACCA; and that his 1991 convictions qualified as, at most, one violent felony because the charging documents did not conclusively establish that the crimes were “committed on occasions different from one another.” The district court determined that his 1987 convictions were for violent felonies and that the 1991 convictions “at a minimum” established three separate violent felonies and sentenced Blair to 180 months. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Blair" on Justia Law