Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Vanterpool was convicted under V.I. Code tit. 14, section 706(1) for obsessive phone calls and faxes to his ex-girlfriend Jacqueline Webster. On appeal, he argued that: Section 706 was unconstitutional under the First Amendment; that his trial counsel’s performance amounted to an ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment; and that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support Vanterpool’s multiple convictions. The Third Circuit remanded. While the First Amendment challenge would have been viable had it been raised during trial, the plain error standard precluded relief on appeal. Trial counsel’s failure to preserve the First Amendment challenge satisfied the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, but the record was insufficient regarding whether trial counsel’s performance fell below professional norms. View "Government of the VI v. Vanterpool" on Justia Law

Lewis, Shavers, and White committed an armed robbery of a North Philadelphia “speakeasy” in 2005, pointing firearms at customers and employees, ordering them to the floor, and threatening to shoot. They were charged with Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), and conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery; using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and attempted witness tampering. The district court instructed the jury that Lewis was charged with “using and carrying a firearm during the crime of violence.” The jury found the three guilty of the Hobbs Act violations and the section 924(c) violation. Lewis was sentenced to 57 months on the Hobbs Act counts and 84 months’ incarceration, the mandatory minimum, on the section 924 count, for “brandishing” a firearm. The Supreme Court remanded in light of its decision in Alleyne v. U.S., concerning imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence based upon facts that were never charged or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The Third Circuit affirmed Lewis’s sentence, reasoning Alleyne error of the sort alleged here is not structural, but is subject to harmless or plain error analysis under FRCP 52. Lewis essentially conceded that the evidence supported the finding that he brandished a firearm; other testimony clearly demonstrated that Lewis went beyond “use” of a firearm. Given “overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence” in support of the brandishing element, had the jury been properly instructed, it would have found that element beyond a reasonable doubt. Any error was therefore harmless. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Pennsylvania State Police and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration worked with confidential informants and identified Beaver County cocaine distributor, Taylor, and, through wiretaps, were able to observe part of a delivery of cocaine. According to Taylor, who later testified for the government, he drove to a hotel near the Pittsburgh Airport carrying a bag full of cash. He met with the cocaine supplier, Middlebrooks from Houston, who drove to Washington County to pick up the drugs for transfer to Taylor. The DEA obtained a “roving wiretap” on Taylor’s communications, which was used to follow a second transaction between Taylor and Middlebrooks. Agents saw Middlebrooks back his vehicle up to a tractor-trailer rig, open his trunk, and then hand the bag full of packaged cash to a man (Shannon) standing beside the rig. Taylor and Middlebrooks were taken into custody. A black bag containing a large amount of cocaine was found in the trunk of Middlebrooks’s car. Shannon was arrested at the truck stop. Agents found the bag, which contained $669,340, plus $1000 in the truck’s glove compartment. The Third circuit vacated Shannon’s conviction because the government asked inappropriate questions regarding Shannon’s post-arrest silence, in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. View "United States v. Shannon" on Justia Law

Christopher was a troubled man with a long history of mental health and substance abuse problems. He committed suicide in 2004, while in custody at the Howard R. Young Correctional Institution (HRYCI) in Wilmington, Delaware, awaiting transportation to the Violation of Probation Center in Sussex County, Delaware. He had been arrested the previous day on an administrative warrant. Christopher was on probation for a domestic abuse conviction, and had been arrested for loitering while waiting to purchase drugs. His widow and children sued. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that prison administrators are not entitled to qualified immunity from an Eighth Amendment claim that serious deficiencies in the provision of medical care by a private, third-party provider resulted in an inmate’s suicide. View "Barkes v. First Corr. Med. Inc." on Justia Law

While Husmann was on supervised release for a child pornography conviction, the Probation Office received an alert indicating that his computer had accessed pornographic websites. An agent visited his residence, seized flash drives, and referred the case to the FBI. With a warrant, FBI agents searched Husmann’s home and seized computers. Husmann admitted to downloading, saving, and viewing images stored on the seized flash drives. The FBI found 4,000 images of child erotica and peer-to-peer file sharing programs on Husmann’s computer, Limewire and 360 Share Pro, which enable users to search, browse, and download electronic files directly with other users, rather than through central servers. Users make their files accessible by placing them in a designated folder that is available to the network. Placing files into a shared folder does not automatically transmit them to another computer unless another program user downloads them. Review of Husmann’s log file revealed that child pornography files were placed in a shared folder on 360 Share Pro, allowing others access, but it was not clear when these files were loaded to the shared folder nor whether the files were ever downloaded to another machine. Husmann was convicted of knowingly possessing and distributing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a). The Third Circuit vacated the distribution conviction. A conviction for distributing child pornography requires evidence that another person actually downloaded or obtained the images stored in the shared folder. View "United States v. Husmann" on Justia Law

Mallory and Ismail, employed as emergency medical technicians, were visiting the Philadelphia home of Delaine, their mother. At about 2:30 a.m. they were standing with friends in front of a neighbor’s home. Officer Enders approached, shined a spotlight, and ordered them to disperse. Although they complied, Ismail cursed Enders, who detained Ismail for a few minutes before releasing him. Ismail walked back toward Delaine’s house, seeing police cruisers out front. Officers Hough and Lynch had received a dispatch that there was a group of men outside the address and that a black male wearing a brown leather jacket over a black hooded sweatshirt, had a gun. Delaine approached the second cruiser and asked whether they had arrested Ismail. As they were speaking, Hough noticed that Mallory, standing nearby, matched the description. As Mallory spoke with the officers, his jacket lifted to reveal a revolver in his waistband. Hough exclaimed “gun!” exited the vehicle and ordered Mallory to stop. Mallory ran into Delaine’s house, shutting the door. The officers gave chase; pushed aside Delaine’s daughter; and kicked the door open. They entered the dark house, weapons drawn; searched the house; pried open a locked bathroom door; found Mallory; arrested and handcuffed him. As the officers proceeded through the house with Mallory they recovered a revolver from under umbrellas behind the front door, which had swung open into the house. Charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, Mallory successfully moved to suppress the gun. The Third Circuit affirmed, stating that it would not: “underplay the dangers that police officers may face when pursuing a suspect into an unfamiliar building. Nonetheless, once the officers had secured the premises and apprehended Mallory, the exigencies of the moment abated and the warrant requirement reattached.” View "United States v. Mallory" on Justia Law

Salahuddin was Newark’s Deputy Mayor for Public Safety. He allegedly conspired to use his official position to obtain charitable and political contributions and to direct Newark demolition contracts to Cooper, with whom Salahuddin was allegedly in business. Both were convicted of conspiring to extort under color of official right, under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a). The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting Salahuddin’s claims that the government failed to prove that one of the alleged co-conspirators committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; that the district court erred in omitting an overt act requirement from its jury instructions; and that the rule of lenity requires that his conviction be vacated. The court rejected Cooper’s claim that the jury’s guilty verdict as to the Hobbs Act conspiracy charge was against the weight of the evidence. View "United States v. Salahuddin" on Justia Law

In 2010, while in state custody for another offense, Brown mailed a threatening letter to a federal magistrate judge, who had presided over dismissal of Brown’s habeas petition. Following an investigation, Brown pled guilty to mailing a threatening communication in violation of 18 U.S.C. 876(c). A presentence investigation report recommended that Brown be sentenced pursuant to the USSG career offender enhancement, which applies to a defendant convicted under section 876(c) if he has “at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense,” USSG 4B1.1(a). The recommendation was based on: a 1986 Pennsylvania conviction for aggravated assault; a 2004 Pennsylvania conviction for making terroristic threats; and 2005 Pennsylvania convictions for making terroristic threats and for retaliating against a judicial officer, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4953.1. The 2005 convictions arose from the same conduct. In sentencing Brown as a career offender, the district court followed the Supreme Court’s approach in United States v. Mahone. The Third Circuit vacated. Mahone is no longer controlling in light of Descamps v. United States (2013), in which the Supreme Court held that a sentencing court may not look to the facts underlying a prior conviction but instead must look to its elements.View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Pittsburgh Police Detectives Emery, Adametz, Kennedy, and Gault were patrolling in an unmarked cruiser and observed a Chevy Impala driven by Brown parking across from a nuisance bar where drug dealing and shootings regularly occur. The detectives believed the Impala was parked too close to the intersection, stopped their cruiser, and watched as Brown and three others exit the Impala. Brown appeared to recognize the unmarked cruiser, sat back down in the Impala, and made a motion consistent with removing an object from his waistband and placing it beneath the seat. Brown then stepped out and walked toward the bar. The detectives believed Brown had removed a gun from his person and attempted to conceal it under the seat. They identified themselves as police officers. Gault informed Brown that the Impala was parked illegally. Emery walked around the car, shined a flashlight through the windshield, and observed “the grip and rear slide portion of a semi-automatic firearm sticking out from underneath the driver’s seat.” The detectives asked Brown whether he had a permit to carry the firearm. Brown answered that he did not. They placed him under arrest and retrieved the gun. Charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), Brown unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence of the gun. The Third Circuit vacated the conviction. While rejecting Brown’s argument that evidence of the firearm should have been suppressed, the court found error in admitting evidence of Brown’s past firearm purchases and by overruling objections to the prosecutor’s closing arguments. The error was not harmless.View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2009 - 2010, Erwin managed an oxycodone distribution ring by obtaining medically unnecessary prescriptions for oxycodone from licensed physicians in exchange for cash. Erwin’s customers, posing as patients, filled the prescriptions at various pharmacies. The conspiracy yielded hundreds of thousands of oxycodone tablets, which were illegally sold on the black market. Erwin executed a written agreement to plead guilty to a single-count information charging him with conspiracy; the government agreed not to bring further charges. The agreement stipulated that, under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines: based on the quantity of oxycodone for which Erwin was responsible (6,912 grams), his base offense level was 38; Erwin was subject to a four-level enhancement for his leadership role and qualified for a three-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility; the total Guidelines offense level was 39. The agreement included a waiver of right to appeal the sentence if it was within or below the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. Erwin’s 188-month sentence was below that range. The Third Circuit vacated, holding that Erwin’s appeal was within the scope of the waiver, to which he knowingly and voluntarily agreed, and that he failed to raise any meritorious grounds for circumventing the waiver. The appropriate remedy for his breach was specific performance of the agreement’s terms: that is, the government is excused from its obligation to move for a downward departure. View "United States v. Erwin" on Justia Law