Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Siluk is an indigent state prisoner who was allowed to file in forma pauperis (IFP). He currently owes a filing fee of $350 to the Clerk of the District Court and $505 to the Clerk of the Third Circuit. Siluk argued that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(b)(2), only requires a 20% deduction from his prison account each month until both fees are paid, and that the deductions should be made in the order in which they were incurred. The government argued that section 1915(b) requires that a monthly 20-percent deduction must be made concurrently for fees owed in both courts until the fees are paid, which would result in a 40-percent deduction from Siluk’s account. After noting a conflict among the circuits, the Third Circuit adopted the sequential recoupment rule: section 1915 permits the recoupment of only 20% of a prisoner’s monthly income for filing fees, regardless of how many civil actions or appeals the prisoner elects to pursue. View "Siluk v. Merwin" on Justia Law

Alvarez, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. at a young age without inspection and later adjusted to lawful permanent resident status. He married a U.S. citizen, but is now divorced; he has sons who are citizens. In 2000, while serving in the U.S. Army, he was convicted by a General Court-Martial of giving false official statements (10 U.S.C. 907), sodomy (10 U.S.C. 925), and violating the general article (10 U.S.C. 934). He served 13 months and was released in 2002. ICE agents arrested him in 2012, charging him as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for his conviction on an aggravated felony. He was ordered detained without bond under 8 U.S.C. 1226(c). The district court denied his petition for habeas corpus. The Third Circuit reversed with instructions that Alvarez must be afforded a prompt bond hearing. Beginning sometime after the six-month time-frame considered by the Supreme Court in Demore, the burdens to Alvarez’s liberties outweighed any justification for using presumptions to detain him without bond to further the goals of the statute. The statute’s goals would not have been, and will not be undermined by requiring the government to produce individualized evidence that Alvarez’s continued detention was or is necessary. View "Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York County Prison" on Justia Law

Wilson was convicted of the Swift murder in 1984 and was sentenced to life in prison. Four years later, Wilson was convicted of the unrelated Lamb murder and was sentenced to death. After Wilson exhausted direct and collateral appeals in Pennsylvania state court, he sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 claiming that the Swift jury was empaneled in violation of Batson v. Kentucky. In 2004, the district court granted the writ. The Third Circuit affirmed. The state did not seek a stay or an extension of the 180- day period, but Wilson was neither retried nor released because he was on death row for the Lamb murder. Wilson then sought to invalidate the Lamb conviction, claiming Brady violations. The Third Circuit affirmed issuance of a conditional writ. In 2010, he was re-arraigned for both murders. Wilson moved to enforce habeas corpus. The district court denied the motions, reasoning that after the 180 days passed, the government could no longer imprison Wilson for the Swift murder, but he was held for the Lamb murder. Since 2010, Wilson has been held as a pretrial defendant for both murders. Denying his Rule 60(b) motion, the court reasoned that speedy trial rights exist to protect against claimed prejudice as the result of the delay. Such claims had to be exhausted in state court and Wilson did not establish extraordinary circumstances. The Third Circuit affirmed. The district court had jurisdiction to adjudicate Wilson’s Rule 60(b) motion and did not err in requiring Wilson to exhaust the new claims in state court. View "Wilson v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Fantone was incarcerated in a Pennsylvania state correctional institution. The Parole Board granted him parole, but rescinded that decision because of pending prison discipline proceedings. Fantone sued, alleging that defendants unlawfully caused him to be confined in a prison Restrictive Housing Unit (RHU), which led the Parole Board to rescind his parole. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded a claim that correctional officer Burger unlawfully retaliated against Fantone by having him retained in the RHU after the expiration of his disciplinary confinement because Fantone would not confess to the disciplinary charges and because Fantone filed a grievance charging that Burger threatened him. The court affirmed dismissal of Fantone’s due process and conspiracy claims, agreeing that where state law provides parole authorities with complete discretion to rescind parole prior to an inmate’s release, the inmate does not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in being paroled before his actual release. In addition, an inmate does not have a right to be confined in any particular housing unit in a prison; absent significant hardship, when an inmate is placed in a restrictive custody unit, his liberty interests have not been infringed. View "Fantone v. Latini" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder. The jury sentenced Defendant to death. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the convictions on appeal, thus rejecting Defendant’s claims that the prosecution violated Brady v. Maryland. The Supreme Court subsequently denied Defendant’s application for postconviction relief. Thereafter, Defendant filed an application under 28 U.S.C. 2254 in federal district court, raising several claims. The district court granted Defendant a conditional writ of habeas corpus and directed the Commonwealth to retry Defendant or release him, concluding that the prosecution had breached its obligations under Brady by withholding three pieces of exculpatory and material information. The Third Circuit vacated the district court’s order, holding that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reasonably concluded that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his Brady claims. Remanded for consideration of Defendant’s remaining claims. View "Dennis v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Corr." on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Wright was charged with conspiracy to distribute marijuana. He moved to suppress evidence gathered from his apartment, arguing the execution of his arrest warrant was defective, entitling him to relief. The district court agreed the execution of the warrant was defective and granted defendant's motion. On appeal, a panel of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded, holding that the federal Supreme Court's decision in "Herring v. United States," (555 U.S. 135 (2009)), required an additional analytical step before the exclusionary rule could be applied. Specifically, the District Court could not suppress the evidence unless it evaluated Agent Taylor’s (the organizer of the raid) culpability and found that his conduct was at least grossly negligent. The District Court denied the motion to suppress on remand, finding that Taylor’s failure to review the warrant before executing it was a “simple mistake” that conferred no benefit on the Government and amounted at most to negligence. Defendant was subsequently convicted of drug offenses by a jury, and he appealed. The parties agreed that evidence was seized from defendant's apartment in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The sole question this case presented for the Third Circuit's review was whether the exclusionary rule required suppression. The Court concluded that the District Court was correct to hold that Agent Taylor was not sufficiently culpable for the costs of suppression to outweigh its benefits. View "United States v. Wright" on Justia Law

From 2004-2008, Georgiou and co-conspirators engaged in a stock fraud scheme resulting in more than $55 million in actual losses. The scheme centered on four stocks, all quoted on the OTC Bulletin Board or the Pink OTC Markets Inc. The conspirators opened brokerage accounts in Canada, the Bahamas, and Turks and Caicos, which they used to trade stocks, artificially inflating prices. They were able to sell their shares at inflated prices and used the shares as collateral to fraudulently borrow millions of dollars from Bahamas brokerage firms. In 2006, Waltzer, a co-conspirator, began cooperating in an FBI sting operation. A jury convicted Georgiou of conspiracy, securities fraud, and wire fraud. The district court sentenced him to 300 months’ imprisonment, ordered him to pay restitution of $55,823,398, ordered a special assessment of $900, and subjected Georgiou to forfeiture of $26,000,000. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the securities and wire fraud convictions were improperly based upon the extraterritorial application of United States law. The securities were issued by U.S. companies through U.S. market makers acting as intermediaries for foreign entities. The court also rejected claims of Brady and Jencks Act violations and of error on evidentiary and sentencing issues. View "United States v. Georgiou" on Justia Law

From 2005-2007, Wright, a real estate agent and the chief of staff for Philadelphia councilman Kelly, received gifts from Chawla, a developer, and attorney Teitelman, who got most of his work from Chawla's company, World Acquisition. Wright received a free stint in an apartment, free legal services, and was promised commissions. Wright shepherded a bill that Chawla favored through Kelly’s office, arranged meetings about a World Acquisition development, and communicated with city offices for World Acquisition. In 2008, a grand jury returned a 14-count indictment, charging honest services fraud, traditional fraud, conspiracy to commit both kinds of fraud, and bribery in connection with a federally funded program. The jury convicted Chawla, Teitelman, and Wright of: conspiracy to commit honest services and traditional fraud and honest services and traditional fraud for the apartment arrangement and convicted Chawla alone of honest services for offering Wright liaison work. It acquitted on the other counts. After remand, the defendants moved, unsuccessfully, to preclude the government from relitigating certain issues under the Double Jeopardy Clause and from constructively amending the indictment. the Third Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction because the ruling is not a “collateral” order subject to immediate review and was not otherwise a “final decision” under 28 U.S.C. 1291. View "United States v. Wright" on Justia Law

Pearson is serving a life-term and alleged, in a 2009 suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a two-year campaign of harassment against him in retaliation for the filing of a 2006 civil lawsuit and grievances in 2006-2007. Pearson claimed that he was subjected to cell searches and relocations, denied a meal, and denied a job in retaliation for the filings. The district court dismissed on the basis that Pearson’s “non-trivial” allegations occurred before March, 2007 and were time-barred under Pennsylvania’s two year statute of limitations; that Pearson’s allegation based on his termination from his position was timely, but failed to state a claim because there were no facts that allow a plausible inference that it was caused by any protected activity. Pearson objected that the judge failed to toll the limitations period while Pearson exhausted his administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a), the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and erred by not accepting the complaint’s allegations as true with respect to retaliatory discharge. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the PLRA is a statutory prohibition under Pennsylvania’s tolling statute. If the court determines that Pearson has exhausted administrative remedies with respect to the retaliatory discharge claim, it should proceed to discovery. View "Pearson v. Sec'y Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

The Special Management Unit housing unit within the Lewisburg U.S. Penitentiary houses inmates identified as having violent tendencies or having a history of gang involvement while incarcerated. Inmates assigned to the SMU are confined to their cells for 23 hours a day, but can spend the remaining hour in a recreation cage. When first assigned to the SMU, inmates are interviewed by prison officials to ensure that inmates who may be hostile to each other are not housed in the same cell. Shelton, a USP inmate, filed a purported class action, alleging that the defendants have engaged in a pattern, practice, or policy of improperly placing inmates who are known to be hostile to each other in the same cell. He also claims that the defendants fail to intervene when the predictable inmate-on-inmate violence erupts, and that defendants improperly restrain inmates who refuse cell assignments with inmates who are known to be hostile to them. The district court denied Shelton’s motion for class certification and granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of a Federal Tort Claims Act claim, but vacated the denial of class certification and summary judgment as to an Eighth Amendment claim. View "Shelton v. Bledsoe" on Justia Law