Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Norris was arrested in 1999 for aggravated assault. Norris complained; the court appointed new counsel for post-verdict motions, but rejected claims of ineffective assistance and imposed sentence under Pennsylvania’s “three strikes” law. In 2003, Norris filed a pro se petition for collateral relief, asserting that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek dismissal on speedy trial grounds because more than three years elapsed between issuance of the criminal complaint and the trial. The state court dismissed, ruling that the issue lacked merit. On appeal, his attorney (Wolfe) abandoned that argument despite Norris’s insistence that it be included. In pro se filings, Norris presented the argument and claimed ineffective assistance. The court affirmed dismissal, holding that Wolfe had not provided ineffective assistance by declining to make the argument. Norris filed a federal habeas petition, arguing that trial and direct appeal counsel were ineffective in failing to raise the speedy trial issue. The court denied the petition because of procedural default. In 2012, Norris moved for relief from judgment invoking a 2012 Supreme Court holding that attorney error in collateral proceedings may sometimes excuse procedural default of a habeas petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim. The district court denied his motion. The Third Circuit affirmed. Norris’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was presented on initial collateral review and only waived on collateral appeal, so Martinez does not justify relief. View "Norris v. Brooks" on Justia Law

On June 16, Lokhande was found bleeding on a sidewalk in Independence Park. Lokhande could not recall being assaulted. Robles testified that on that night, he, Baldwin, and Santos drove into Philadelphia, using Baldwin’s sedan with a black hood that did not match the car. Santos and Baldwin exited the car. Robles remained inside, too drunk to walk. Three men joined them, talking and drinking. A man approached and asked for help finding his car. Robles then saw the man “being attacked,” with Baldwin and Santos were “around” the victim; he admitted that “any” or “all” of the men could have attacked the victim. Video surveillance tape showed a tan Ford with a black hood leaving the scene. On June 20, Santos and Baldwin returned to Independence Park and encountered Crumbock and his wife, D, in the same location. Crumbock testified that the men “surrounded” him, two jumped on his back and “punched him,” and his phone and wallet were stolen. A ranger heard D’s screams and ran after the man. Crumbock and D identified Santos. Two days later, police stopped the car with Baldwin, Santos, and Robles inside. The Third Circuit rejected challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, but vacated Baldwin’s conviction because the prosecution’s summation advocated a basis for conviction that was not charged. The court vacated one assault conviction as violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. View "United States v. Centeno" on Justia Law

Small, a Pennsylvania state prisoner, was sentenced by a federal court to 135 months for filing false tax returns, to be served consecutive to his state sentence. He was returned to the Correctional Institution at Huntingdon to serve the remainder of his state sentence. U.S. Marshals served the Commonwealth Department of Corrections with a detainer, which governed Small’s transfer to federal authorities upon completion of his state sentence. Huntingdon staff received documents in the mail, ostensibly from the Clerk of Court for the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, vacating Small’s federal conviction and sentence. They were actually forgeries sent at Small’s direction. They appeared to have the signatures of the clerk and judge and the court’s seal. Huntingdon officials released Small upon completion of his state sentence. Learning of his release, federal agents arrested Small, who was charged with: forging the signature of a federal judge, forging a federal agency seal, mail fraud, conspiracy, and escape. Small unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the escape, arguing that he was never in federal custody, a requisite element of the crime. He was sentenced to 60 months to be served consecutively to his tax fraud sentence. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that Small committed “escape” under 18 U.S.C. 751. View "United States v. Small" on Justia Law

Between 2007 and 2012, Fountain, an IRS employee, helped orchestrate several schemes that involved filing false tax returns, claiming refunds under the Telephone ExciseTax Refund,the First Time Homebuyer Credit, or the American Opportunity Tax Credit. Fountain employed her knowledge of IRS fraud detection to avoid detection. Fountain and Ishmael enlisted people, including Johnson, to recruit claimants to provide their personal information in exchange for part of a cash refund. A jury convicted Fountain, Ishmael, and Johnson on multiple counts of conspiracy and filing false claims to the IRS, 18 U.S.C. 286, 287. Fountain was also convicted of Hobbs Act extortion and making or presenting false tax returns, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a); 26 U.S.C. 7206. Additionally, Johnson was convicted of filing false claims while on pretrial release. The court sentenced Fountain to 228 months in prison and ordered her to pay $1,740,221 in restitution; sentenced Ishmael to 144 months and $1,750,809 in restitution; and sentenced Johnson to 216 months in prison and to pay $1,248,592 in restitution. Each sentence fell within the Guidelines range after various enhancements were applied. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Fountain" on Justia Law

Edwards was convicted of attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 21 U.S.C. 846, but was acquitted of an accompanying conspiracy charge under section 846. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that the government violated Edwards’s Fifth Amendment rights by repeatedly referring to Edwards’s post-arrest, post-Miranda silence in its case-in-chief and during closing arguments. The error was not harmless. View "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law

Philadelphia officers received an anonymous call reporting “a black male wearing a gray hoodie with a gun in his waistband talking to a female. . . 914 North Markoe Street outside,” in a “high crime area.” The officers had earlier received a call regarding an alleged gunshot “around the corner” from that address. The officers parked their police cars 50-60 feet from the house and moved towards Lowe. Lowe was speaking with Witherspoon in front of her house. Lowe was wearing a gray hoodie; his hands were in the pockets. The officers did not see a gun or any indication that Lowe had a gun, nor did they observe any disturbance. The parties dispute the events that led to the officers frisking Lowe and finding a gun. Lowe entered a conditional guilty plea to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and appealed denial of his suppression motion. On remand, neither party supplemented the record. The district court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and again denied Lowe’s motion. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that police did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop when they seized Lowe and that the court erred in identifying the moment of seizure. View "United States v. Lowe" on Justia Law

The Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. 3006A, requires each federal district court to establish a plan to furnish representation to indigent persons charged with federal crimes. In seven different Post-Conviction Review Act cases in various Pennsylvania counties, hearings were initiated to disqualify the Federal Community Defender (FCD) as counsel, based on that organization’s alleged misuse of federal grant funds to appear in state proceedings. FCD acknowledges that it sometimes appears in PCRA proceedings without a federal court order directing it to do so, but claims that it uses federal grant funds only for preparatory work that will be relevant to a federal habeas petition and only if it has received a federal court order appointing it as counsel for federal habeas proceedings or is working to obtain such an appointment. FCD removed the motions under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1), (d)(1). The Commonwealth moved, under 28 U.S.C. 1447(c), to return each to state court, claiming lack of subject matter jurisdiction. FCD argued that the Commonwealth lacked a federal private right of action and that federal law preempted the motions. The district courts split. The Third Circuit held that FCD properly invoked removal jurisdiction and that the Commonwealth’s attempts to disqualify it as counsel proceedings are preempted. View "In Re: Commonwealth's Motion" on Justia Law

Kolodesh owned a home-health services company. He approached his employee, Pugman, about starting a home-based hospice care company. Pugman's agreed. Kolodesh funded the new company, Home Care Hospice. Pugman managed the operations. Kolodesh’s wife and Pugman were listed as owning equal shares; Kolodesh was intimately involved in forming and overseeing its management. In 2000 or 2001, Kolodesh, Pugman, and Pugman's wife began giving gifts and cash “kickbacks” to doctors in exchange for patient referrals. At Kolodesh’s suggestion, Pugman placed doctors or their employees on the Hospice payroll with sham job titles and issued paychecks in exchange for patient referrals. About 90% of the revenue generated by Hospice came from Medicare reimbursements. Kolodesh and Pugman had contractors submit fake invoices Hospice would pay; the contractor would give most of the money to Kolodesh and Pugman, keeping a portion. The participants were charged with conspiracy to defraud a health care benefit program, 18 U.S.C. 1349, 21 counts of health-care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347, two counts of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, and 11 counts of money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957. Pugman testified for the government after having pled guilty. The Third Circuit affirmed Kolodesh's sentence of 176 months’ imprisonment and a restitution order of $16.2 million. View "United States v. Kolodesh" on Justia Law

Merlino, reputed former head of the Philadelphia mob, began a three-year term of supervised release in September 2011. In June 2014, law enforcement observed Merlino at a Boca Raton cigar bar with convicted felons, including Ciancaglini, Merlino’s co-defendant. The probation office presented a revocation petition. The court ordered issuance of a summons; a clerk called defense counsel in an effort to secure a mutually agreeable hearing date. Defense counsel, citing work obligations and an upcoming medical procedure, stated that he was unavailable until December. The government indicated that it was “reluctant” to accommodate substantial delay. Defense counsel then informed the clerk that he was available in October. On September 16, the clerk issued notice summoning Merlino for a revocation hearing on October 10. On October 6, defense counsel notified the court that he believed it lacked jurisdiction because no warrant or summons had issued before the expiration of Merlino’s term on September 6. The court concluded that the deadline had been equitably tolled and found that Merlino had violated the terms of his release. The Third Circuit vacated, holding that 18 U.S.C. 3583(i) is jurisdictional, requiring that a warrant or summons issue before the expiration of supervised release in order for a district court to conduct revocation proceedings. View "United States v. Merlino" on Justia Law

Alvarez, a two-year-old citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. without admission or parole. In 1989 he became a lawful permanent resident. Alvarez served in the U.S. Army, 1991-2004. Alvarez has only departed the United States as a member of the Army. In 2000 Alvarez had sexual contact with a female platoon member who was so intoxicated that she was unable to consent. He provided a signed denial to the Army Criminal Investigation Division. He eventually pleaded guilty to violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice: 10 U.S.C. 907, for making false official statements; 10 U.S.C. 925, sodomy; and, 10 U.S.C. 934, for two specifications of violating the general article. The judge sentenced Alvarez to a bad conduct discharge, to be reduced to the grade of E-1, and to be confined for 18 months. The sentence did not allocate the confinement to the convictions. In 2012, DHS agents arrested Alvarez. An IJ found him removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and 1101(a)(43)(F), as an alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony. The BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit remanded. The BIA committed legal error in concluding that Alvarez’s sodomy conviction was a crime “for which the term of imprisonment [was] at least one year,” 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F). View "Chavez-Alvarez v. Att'y Gen., United States" on Justia Law