Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The victim, born in Russia in 1986, was sent to study ballet at the Bolshoi Academy at age 10. When his family became unable to pay his fees, teachers introduced them to Schneider, an American lawyer living in Moscow. Schneider agreed to financially assist the family. His parents agreed to the victim living at Schneider’s apartment. Schneider began engaging in sexual activity with the victim. In 2000, Schneider told the victim that if the school nurse asked about the condition of the victim’s anus, he should say that he had used a solid stick of hemorrhoid medication. Schneider explained that if anyone discovered their sexual activity, Schneider would go to jail and the victim would not achieve his goals. In 2001, the victim and Schneider traveled to Philadelphia, where the victim resided at Schneider’s parents’ home while attending a summer ballet program. Upon their return to Moscow, the sexual activity resumed. When the victim was 16, the two moved to Massachusetts, where the victim attended school and danced professionally. In 2008, the victim filed a civil complaint, which was was stayed when Schneider was charged with traveling in foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct with another person, 18 U.S.C. 2423(b), and transporting an individual in foreign commerce with intent that such individual engage in a sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, 18 U.S.C. 2421. The Third Circuit affirmed his conviction, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings and sentencing. View "United States v. Schneider" on Justia Law

The government obtained a warrant to search the email account of Fattah, a U.S. Congressman, who is the subject of an investigation involving federal criminal laws relating to fraud, extortion, and bribery. Fattah alleged that he used the “gmail” account for both personal matters and official business relating to his congressional duties and challenged the unexecuted search warrant on Speech or Debate Clause grounds. The court declined to invalidate the unexecuted search warrant. The Third Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Because an unexecuted search warrant is not separate from the merits of the case and is reviewable on appeal, if a defendant is convicted, it does not qualify for review under the collateral order doctrine. View "In the Matter of the Search of Elec Commc'ns" on Justia Law

Before 2003 Doe pled guilty to two simple assaults in Pennsylvania. In 2003, he pled guilty in federal court to distribution and possession with intent to distribute at least five grams of crack cocaine. His sentence as a career offender occurred under precedent categorically designating his prior convictions as crimes of violence. He did not appeal his 262-month sentence. In 2004 the government moved to reduce Doe’s sentence for “substantial assistance” in a different criminal investigation. While that Rule 35 motion was pending, Doe filed a section 2255 motion arguing that his assault convictions were not crimes of violence. The 2008 Supreme Court decision, Begay, held that a DUI conviction is not a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because it does not involve “purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.” The career-offender Sentencing Guideline was similar to the ACCA. In 2009, the district court granted Doe Rule 35 relief; counsel withdrew the 2255 motion. The Third Circuit then held that courts must inquire into the part of the statute to which the defendant actually pled guilty to determine whether the career-offender enhancement applies. In 2012 Doe filed a section 2255 motion, again raising his Begay argument. The statute of limitations on Doe’s Begay argument expired in 2009, when he withdrew his 2008 motion. The court concluded that there was no basis to toll the limitations period because Doe’s 2008 counsel was not deficient. The Third Circuit remanded. The court noted that while Doe has been released from prison, his case is not moot; proceeded under an assumption that the 2255 motion was not a second or successive motion over which the district court lacked jurisdiction; held that Doe had not procedurally defaulted his claim; and held that claims of Begay error are cognizable on collateral review. View "United States v. Doe" on Justia Law

In 2007 fraudulent checks in the amount of $181,577 were cashed against the accounts of seven Citizens Bank customers in New York, Pennsylvania, and Delaware. Fraud investigator Swoyer discovered that Tolliver’s employee number was the only one used to access all of the accounts; only Tolliver and one assistant manager worked on all of the days on which the accounts were accessed.. Swoyer, Postal Inspector Busch, and a Secret Service agent interviewed Tolliver. At trial, Swoyer testified that he reviewed Tolliver’s entire logbook with her and that Tolliver told him that she had not given her password to anyone and that she always logged off her computer when she walked away from a terminal. Seven of Tolliver’s former co-workers testified they never knew Tolliver’s password or saw it written down. A jury convicted Tolliver of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344, aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a), and unauthorized use of a computer, 18 U.S.C. 1030. The court imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 30 months’ imprisonment and restitution. The Third Circuit affirmed. Tolliver, represented by newly appointed counsel, filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, claiming that her trial counsel was ineffective by failure to investigate. The district court granted her motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Third Circuit vacated. View "United States v. Tolliver" on Justia Law

Taylor, working at Dollar Express in 2000, observed that manager Ritterson routinely arrived at 5:00 a.m. and would smoke a cigarette on the loading dock with the door open before starting work and that the store contained a safe, but no other security measures. Washington, Johnson, Waddy and Taylor planned a robbery. Johnson carried the gun; Washington drove. Washington and Taylor remained in the car while Waddy and Johnson entered and confronted Ritterson and another employee. Johnson shot them. Washington then ran into the store and helped remove $750 from the safe. Waddy filled a bag with merchandise. When the others returned to the car, Taylor did not take any money. Taylor surrendered and agreed to testify. Waddy also gave a statement. Johnson, Waddy, and Washington were tried together. Washington was convicted of second-degree murder, robbery, and criminal conspiracy. After exhausting state remedies, Washington obtained conditional federal habeas corpus relief, based on his argument that introduction of a jointly-tried non-testifying coconspirator’s confession violated his Confrontation Clause rights. The redacted confession replaced Washington’s name with “someone I know” or “the driver.” The Third Circuit affirmed; no reasonable reading of Supreme Court Confrontation Clause jurisprudence would permit introduction of the redacted confession. Following remand for consideration under the Supreme Court’s decision in White v. Woodall (2014), the Third Circuit again affirmed. View "Washington v. Sec'y PA Dept. of Corrs." on Justia Law

Lee’s daughter, Ji, suffered severe mental illness, with suicidal and homicidal ideation. One morning in 1989 police found Lee in the street, retrieving items that Li had thrown out the window. Officers entered the house and found Ji in a manic state, but observed no evidence of violence. At the suggestion of his pastor, Lee took Ji the same day to a religious retreat. Upon arrival, she took a walk and jumped into a body of water; she became agitated and had to be physically restrained. During the night, a fire began in their cabin. Lee escaped, but his daughter died. Lee was charged with arson and murder, based on fire-science and gas-chromatography evidence. The defense argued suicide. Lee was convicted. On appeal, state courts received evidence about developments in fire science that “provided ample reason to question the reliability of the arson investigation,” but denied Lee’s claims. In 1995 Lee filed a pro se post-conviction petition. The Commonwealth did not respond; the petition remained pending. An attorney submitted an amended petition in 2005, claiming newly discovered, exculpatory scientific evidence, and that appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to raise that claim. State courts rejected the argument. Lee filed a federal habeas petition. The Third Circuit reversed a 2010 denial and ordered the district court to grant discovery. On remand the court found that “admission of the fire expert testimony undermined the fundamental fairness of the entire trial” and that the Commonwealth failed to show other “‘ample evidence’ of guilt.” The Third Circuit affirmed the grant of relief. View "Lee v. Superintendent Houtzdale SCI" on Justia Law

Fazio, a permanent resident alien, was charged with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. Fazio pleaded guilty to the lesser-included offense of conspiring to distribute more than 200 grams but fewer than 300 grams of cocaine, waiving the right to take a direct appeal from his conviction or sentence, except if the government appealed from the sentence or the sentence exceeded the applicable statutory limits or unreasonably exceeded the Sentencing Guidelines range. Fazio waived the right to move to vacate sentence (28 U.S.C. 2255) and the right to file any other collateral proceeding attacking his conviction or sentence. The plea agreement stated: Fazio recognizes that pleading guilty may have consequences with respect to his immigration status … no one, including his own attorney or the district court, can predict to a certainty the effect of his conviction on his immigration status. The court reviewed the waiver in detail at the hearing. The Third Circuit affirmed denial of Fazio’s subsequent 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his sentence, in which he argued that counsel was ineffective in failing to warn Fazio properly of the immigration consequences of his plea, as required by the Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky, 2010. View "United States v. Fazio" on Justia Law

DEA agents executed a search warrant in Reading, Pennsylvania and arrested Bui at 1307 Lorraine Road. Bui admitted that “the only reason they purchased that house was to . . . convert it into a marijuana grow factory.” Bui was indicted on: conspiracy to manufacture more than 1,000 marijuana plants, 21 U.S.C. 846; manufacturing, and aiding and abetting the manufacturing, of more than 100 marijuana plants, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. 2; using the house to manufacture and to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 856(a)(1); and manufacturing and distributing marijuana within 1,000 feet of Hampden Park, a school district athletic field, 21 U.S.C. 860(a) and 18 U.S.C. 2. Bui pled guilty to counts one and four and stipulated that the house was within 1000 feet of Hampden Park, so that his base offense level should be increased two levels. According to Bui, he pled guilty because counsel told him he would receive a reduced sentence by doing so and told family members that Bui was eligible for a reduced sentence under the “safety valve,” 18 U.S.C. 3553. At sentencing, counsel withdrew that motion, explaining that section 3553(f) did not apply to 21 U.S.C. 860 convictions. Bui was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 120 months’ imprisonment. The district court rejected his pro se habeas petition. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that Bui’s counsel provided ineffective assistance. View "United States v. Bui" on Justia Law

Norris was arrested in 1999 for aggravated assault. Norris complained; the court appointed new counsel for post-verdict motions, but rejected claims of ineffective assistance and imposed sentence under Pennsylvania’s “three strikes” law. In 2003, Norris filed a pro se petition for collateral relief, asserting that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek dismissal on speedy trial grounds because more than three years elapsed between issuance of the criminal complaint and the trial. The state court dismissed, ruling that the issue lacked merit. On appeal, his attorney (Wolfe) abandoned that argument despite Norris’s insistence that it be included. In pro se filings, Norris presented the argument and claimed ineffective assistance. The court affirmed dismissal, holding that Wolfe had not provided ineffective assistance by declining to make the argument. Norris filed a federal habeas petition, arguing that trial and direct appeal counsel were ineffective in failing to raise the speedy trial issue. The court denied the petition because of procedural default. In 2012, Norris moved for relief from judgment invoking a 2012 Supreme Court holding that attorney error in collateral proceedings may sometimes excuse procedural default of a habeas petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim. The district court denied his motion. The Third Circuit affirmed. Norris’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was presented on initial collateral review and only waived on collateral appeal, so Martinez does not justify relief. View "Norris v. Brooks" on Justia Law

On June 16, Lokhande was found bleeding on a sidewalk in Independence Park. Lokhande could not recall being assaulted. Robles testified that on that night, he, Baldwin, and Santos drove into Philadelphia, using Baldwin’s sedan with a black hood that did not match the car. Santos and Baldwin exited the car. Robles remained inside, too drunk to walk. Three men joined them, talking and drinking. A man approached and asked for help finding his car. Robles then saw the man “being attacked,” with Baldwin and Santos were “around” the victim; he admitted that “any” or “all” of the men could have attacked the victim. Video surveillance tape showed a tan Ford with a black hood leaving the scene. On June 20, Santos and Baldwin returned to Independence Park and encountered Crumbock and his wife, D, in the same location. Crumbock testified that the men “surrounded” him, two jumped on his back and “punched him,” and his phone and wallet were stolen. A ranger heard D’s screams and ran after the man. Crumbock and D identified Santos. Two days later, police stopped the car with Baldwin, Santos, and Robles inside. The Third Circuit rejected challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, but vacated Baldwin’s conviction because the prosecution’s summation advocated a basis for conviction that was not charged. The court vacated one assault conviction as violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. View "United States v. Centeno" on Justia Law