Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A former inmate claimed that correctional officers violated her constitutional rights when, without proper authorization, they took her from one place of confinement to another where they denied her potable water, clothing, and sanitary napkins and related medications and subjected her to an unlawful body cavity search. The district court granted three defendants summary judgment and dismissed remaining claims against the other defendants, finding that she did not demonstrate that there were issues of material fact and that the complaint did not allege facts constituting a cause of action. The Third Circuit affirmed as to the former New Jersey Attorney General, New Jersey Commissioner of Corrections, and a Correctional Sergeant, but reversed dismissal of cruel and unusual punishment claims against unnamed defendants with respect to: the alleged denial of potable water and sanitary napkins and related medications; the inmate being required to go to the shower or otherwise be exposed while naked in the presence of male prison personnel and inmates; body cavity search claims. View "Chavarriaga v. NJ Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Singh, a citizen of India, was granted asylum in 1993, and adjusted to lawful permanent resident status in 1994. In 2000, Singh was convicted of conspiracy to counterfeit passports, counterfeiting and using visas, and mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 371; unlawful possession of forged, counterfeited, altered, and falsely-made non-immigrant U.S. visas, 18 U.S.C. 1546. Singh departed the U.S. and re-entered in 2003. In 2009, he applied for admission as a lawful permanent resident. He was instead detained and served with a notice of removal charging him as inadmissible because he had committed a crime involving moral turpitude: his 2000 counterfeiting conviction. Singh appeared before the Immigration Court, acknowledged proper service, admitted all of the factual allegations, and conceded the sole charge of removability. Singh sought cancellation of removal, and indicated that he would not be seeking any alternative forms of relief. The IJ denied Singh’s application because Singh had not accrued the requisite seven years of continuous residence required by 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a). The BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. Singh’s continuous residency clock stopped in 2000 when he committed his crime involving moral turpitude and could never re-start. View "Singh v. Attorney Gen., United States" on Justia Law

In 2003, Foy was charged in Pennsylvania with threatening a federal official, 18 U.S.C. 115(a)(1)(B). The government also sought revocation of probation imposed by a Texas district court. The Pennsylvania court found that Foy was incapable of assisting in his defense and committed him for 120 days (18 U.S.C. 4241(d)). In 2005, the court found that Foy continued to be incompetent and that there was no substantial probability that he would attain competency in the foreseeable future. The government successfully moved to dismiss the criminal complaint. Three years later the Pennsylvania court terminated Foy’s Texas probation. The warden at the Missouri Federal Medical Center certified that Foy was suffering from a mental disease or defect so that his release would pose a substantial risk and that suitable arrangements for state custody were not available. A Missouri district court ordered Foy committed under section 4246(d). The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Annual reports have recommended Foy’s conditional release. Rather than accept a conditional release, Foy sought unconditional release by instituting proceedings in both district courts.The Pennsylvania court denied his FRCP 60(d)(3) motion and declined to vacate the order of civil commitment. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that the Pennsylvania court lacked jurisdiction because Foy’s commitment is currently pursuant to a Missouri order. View "United States v. Foy" on Justia Law

Nagle and Fink were co-owners and executives of concrete manufacturing and construction businesses. The businesses entered into a relationship with a company owned by a person of Filipino descent. His company would bid for subcontracts on Pennsylvania transportation projects as a disadvantaged business enterprise. Federal regulations require states that receive federal transportation funds to set annual goals for participation in transportation construction projects by disadvantaged business enterprises, 49 C.F.R. 26.21. If his company won the bid for the subcontract, Nagle and Fink’s businesses would perform all of the work. Fink pled guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States. A jury found Nagle guilty of multiple charges relating to the scheme. The Third Circuit affirmed Nagle’s conviction, upholding the admission of electronic evidence discovered during searches of the businesses’ offices, but vacated both sentences, based on loss calculation errors. View "United States v. Nagle" on Justia Law

In 2000, Bronowicz was charged with crimes ranging from terroristic threats to driving under the influence. He entered a negotiated plea, served his term of imprisonment, and was released. A complicated sequence of probation revocation and sentencing proceedings allegedly had the cumulative effect of unlawfully imposing additional penalties for criminal judgments that had already been satisfied. Bronowicz successfully appealed his additional prison sentence in state court and then filed a federal suit, seeking damages for wrongful incarceration under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed his claims as barred by the 1994 Supreme Court decision, Heck v. Humphrey. The Third Circuit reversed in part, holding that an order from the Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacating a sentence imposed by a court of common pleas constitutes a favorable termination of the proceedings against a plaintiff within the meaning of Heck v. Humphrey, notwithstanding the fact that the order failed expressly to address the inmate’s specific legal challenges to the sentence, so that any section 1983 claims stemming from the invalidated sentence are not barred by Heck. View "Bronowicz v. County of Allegheny" on Justia Law

Lewis, Shavers, and White committed a 2005 armed robbery of a North Philadelphia “speakeasy,” pointing firearms, ordering people to the floor, and threatening to shoot. They were charged with Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a); conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery; using and carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and attempted witness tampering. The court instructed the jury that Lewis was charged with “using and carrying a firearm during the crime of violence.” The jury found the three guilty. Lewis was sentenced to 57 months on the Hobbs Act counts and 84 months’ incarceration, the mandatory minimum, on the section 924 count, for “brandishing” a firearm. The Supreme Court remanded in light of its decision in Alleyne v. U.S., concerning imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence based upon facts that were never charged or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The Third Circuit initially affirmed, finding harmless error, but subsequently vacated and remanded. Lewis was sentenced for brandishing, but was convicted of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, which has a shorter mandatory minimum sentence. Lewis was never indicted for brandishing. The error contributed to the sentence and was not harmless. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

In 2004, an undercover detective made four purchases of cocaine from Ross. Surveillance officers watched Ross leave a Chester residence and drive to the agreed-upon location. The detective arranged another purchase and obtained a warrant to search that residence. Officers arrested Ross as he left the house and found cocaine and a loaded handgun in his car. Searching the residence, they discovered a semi-automatic handgun, and a loaded 9mm pistol with a modified firing pin enabling it to fire continuously. An ATF expert testified that the pistol, as modified, met the definition of a machinegun, 26 U.S.C. 5845(b). Ross was convicted of cocaine distribution, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); carrying a firearm in drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1); possession of a machinegun in furtherance of drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(B)(ii); possession of a machinegun, 18 U.S.C. 922(o); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court did not instruct the jury – and defense counsel failed to object– that the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had specific knowledge of the firearm’s characteristics that made it a “machinegun.” The Third Circuit affirmed his conviction. He unsuccessfully moved to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to challenge the jury instruction and the sufficiency of the evidence. Because Ross had not satisfied a threshold requirement of section 2255, the Third Circuit remanded with directions to dismiss. View "United States v. Ross" on Justia Law

Saranchak entered open plea of guilty to murdering his grandmother and uncle and was convicted on two counts of first-degree murder following a non-jury degree-of-guilt hearing. A jury found that Saranchak should be sentenced to death for his crimes. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed Saranchak’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Saranchak then sought state post-conviction relief, asserting that his attorney, Watkins, had been constitutionally ineffective. The same judge who had presided over both phases of his trial denied relief under the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 9541–9546, The PCRA court—the same judge who presided over both phases of Saranchak’s trial. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. The district court denied Saranchak’s federal habeas petition. The Third Circuit affirmed in part, rejecting an argument that the degree-of-guilt phase of his trial was suffused with prejudice from the cumulative errors arising out of his counsel’s performance at trial. The Third Circuit reversed with respect to the death sentence, finding that the court did not adequately evaluate mitigation evidence concerning Saranchak's childhood and mental health. View "Saranchak v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

The victim, born in Russia in 1986, was sent to study ballet at the Bolshoi Academy at age 10. When his family became unable to pay his fees, teachers introduced them to Schneider, an American lawyer living in Moscow. Schneider agreed to financially assist the family. His parents agreed to the victim living at Schneider’s apartment. Schneider began engaging in sexual activity with the victim. In 2000, Schneider told the victim that if the school nurse asked about the condition of the victim’s anus, he should say that he had used a solid stick of hemorrhoid medication. Schneider explained that if anyone discovered their sexual activity, Schneider would go to jail and the victim would not achieve his goals. In 2001, the victim and Schneider traveled to Philadelphia, where the victim resided at Schneider’s parents’ home while attending a summer ballet program. Upon their return to Moscow, the sexual activity resumed. When the victim was 16, the two moved to Massachusetts, where the victim attended school and danced professionally. In 2008, the victim filed a civil complaint, which was was stayed when Schneider was charged with traveling in foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct with another person, 18 U.S.C. 2423(b), and transporting an individual in foreign commerce with intent that such individual engage in a sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, 18 U.S.C. 2421. The Third Circuit affirmed his conviction, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings and sentencing. View "United States v. Schneider" on Justia Law

The government obtained a warrant to search the email account of Fattah, a U.S. Congressman, who is the subject of an investigation involving federal criminal laws relating to fraud, extortion, and bribery. Fattah alleged that he used the “gmail” account for both personal matters and official business relating to his congressional duties and challenged the unexecuted search warrant on Speech or Debate Clause grounds. The court declined to invalidate the unexecuted search warrant. The Third Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Because an unexecuted search warrant is not separate from the merits of the case and is reviewable on appeal, if a defendant is convicted, it does not qualify for review under the collateral order doctrine. View "In the Matter of the Search of Elec Commc'ns" on Justia Law