Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Based on the 2000 shooting death of Clement, Mills was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, one count of attempted robbery, and two weapons offenses. The district court for the Virgin Islands and the Third Circuit affirmed his convictions. While the prosecutors engaged in serious misconduct by repeated suggestions that the jurors could not be safe in their homes if Mills was free, repeated references to the possibility that the gun Mills discarded would endanger schoolchildren and the community, and the display throughout closing argument of a gruesome crime-scene photo of the victim’s corpse. this misconduct did not render his trial fundamentally unfair. The courts also rejected arguments that the self-defense jury instructions were improper. Mills’s ineffective assistance claim was rejected because the record was not sufficiently developed. View "Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Mills" on Justia Law

An informant told a Pennsylvania State Trooper that Steiner, a convicted felon, was staying on the informant’s property, was “on the run,” and had a sawed-off shotgun, which Steiner called a “cop killer,” in a camper on the property. The officer obtained a search warrant for the camper, paid the informant $100, and told the informant to drive Steiner to a gas station, where officers would arrest Steiner on a warrant that had issued for Steiner’s failure to appear at a hearing on an unrelated sexual assault charge. Executing the warrant, police seized a sawed-off shotgun, .32 and .38 caliber ammunition, and shotgun ammunition. The informant stated that he had seen missing pieces of the shotgun at a home that Steiner supposedly owned; police obtained another warrant for that home, where they found those parts and various types of ammunition. Steiner was indicted as a felon-in-possession of a firearm and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). He was convicted of felony possession of ammunition and sentenced to an 87-month prison term. The Third Circuit affirmed, upholding admission of the evidence related to the sexual assault warrant and the court’s failure to instruct the jury that it was required to reach a unanimous verdict. View "United States v. Steiner" on Justia Law

Moreno was involved in a mortgage-fraud scheme as an appraiser who supplied inflated appraisals to other members of the scheme in exchange for money. He was also involved as broker, buyer, or seller, in other fraudulent transactions. Moreno was found guilty of five counts of wire fraud and two counts of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and sentenced to 96 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed the conviction, but vacated the sentence. The court rejected claims of violation of the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule, based on the testimony of a cooperating witness, who read statements of a non-testifying U.S. Secret Service Special Agent into the record. The court also upheld a finding that there were more than 50 victims and a resulting application of a four-level enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. The court erred in permitting the prosecutor, during Moreno’s sentencing allocution and without leave of court, to engage in a vigorous cross-examination of Moreno. View "United States v. Moreno" on Justia Law

Officer Grenier was notified by radio of multiple calls reporting shots fired near the intersection of East 23rd and Crosby Streets, a well-known drug trafficking location. The dispatcher reported that there was a white vehicle heading east on East 23rd Street toward Madison Street. The dispatcher did not further describe the vehicle, its passengers, the identity of the callers, or when the shooting reportedly occurred, but Grenier interpreted the dispatcher’s use of priority tone to indicate that the shooting was in progress. Driving on Madison Street in his marked police car, Grenier observed a white vehicle, driven by West, coming from the location of the reported shooting. Grenier stopped the car. West unsuccessfully moved to suppress a firearm found during a subsequent search. The Third Circuit affirmed his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, finding the stop constitutional. View "United States v. West" on Justia Law

A former inmate claimed that correctional officers violated her constitutional rights when, without proper authorization, they took her from one place of confinement to another where they denied her potable water, clothing, and sanitary napkins and related medications and subjected her to an unlawful body cavity search. The district court granted three defendants summary judgment and dismissed remaining claims against the other defendants, finding that she did not demonstrate that there were issues of material fact and that the complaint did not allege facts constituting a cause of action. The Third Circuit affirmed as to the former New Jersey Attorney General, New Jersey Commissioner of Corrections, and a Correctional Sergeant, but reversed dismissal of cruel and unusual punishment claims against unnamed defendants with respect to: the alleged denial of potable water and sanitary napkins and related medications; the inmate being required to go to the shower or otherwise be exposed while naked in the presence of male prison personnel and inmates; body cavity search claims. View "Chavarriaga v. NJ Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Singh, a citizen of India, was granted asylum in 1993, and adjusted to lawful permanent resident status in 1994. In 2000, Singh was convicted of conspiracy to counterfeit passports, counterfeiting and using visas, and mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 371; unlawful possession of forged, counterfeited, altered, and falsely-made non-immigrant U.S. visas, 18 U.S.C. 1546. Singh departed the U.S. and re-entered in 2003. In 2009, he applied for admission as a lawful permanent resident. He was instead detained and served with a notice of removal charging him as inadmissible because he had committed a crime involving moral turpitude: his 2000 counterfeiting conviction. Singh appeared before the Immigration Court, acknowledged proper service, admitted all of the factual allegations, and conceded the sole charge of removability. Singh sought cancellation of removal, and indicated that he would not be seeking any alternative forms of relief. The IJ denied Singh’s application because Singh had not accrued the requisite seven years of continuous residence required by 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a). The BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. Singh’s continuous residency clock stopped in 2000 when he committed his crime involving moral turpitude and could never re-start. View "Singh v. Attorney Gen., United States" on Justia Law

In 2003, Foy was charged in Pennsylvania with threatening a federal official, 18 U.S.C. 115(a)(1)(B). The government also sought revocation of probation imposed by a Texas district court. The Pennsylvania court found that Foy was incapable of assisting in his defense and committed him for 120 days (18 U.S.C. 4241(d)). In 2005, the court found that Foy continued to be incompetent and that there was no substantial probability that he would attain competency in the foreseeable future. The government successfully moved to dismiss the criminal complaint. Three years later the Pennsylvania court terminated Foy’s Texas probation. The warden at the Missouri Federal Medical Center certified that Foy was suffering from a mental disease or defect so that his release would pose a substantial risk and that suitable arrangements for state custody were not available. A Missouri district court ordered Foy committed under section 4246(d). The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Annual reports have recommended Foy’s conditional release. Rather than accept a conditional release, Foy sought unconditional release by instituting proceedings in both district courts.The Pennsylvania court denied his FRCP 60(d)(3) motion and declined to vacate the order of civil commitment. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that the Pennsylvania court lacked jurisdiction because Foy’s commitment is currently pursuant to a Missouri order. View "United States v. Foy" on Justia Law

Nagle and Fink were co-owners and executives of concrete manufacturing and construction businesses. The businesses entered into a relationship with a company owned by a person of Filipino descent. His company would bid for subcontracts on Pennsylvania transportation projects as a disadvantaged business enterprise. Federal regulations require states that receive federal transportation funds to set annual goals for participation in transportation construction projects by disadvantaged business enterprises, 49 C.F.R. 26.21. If his company won the bid for the subcontract, Nagle and Fink’s businesses would perform all of the work. Fink pled guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States. A jury found Nagle guilty of multiple charges relating to the scheme. The Third Circuit affirmed Nagle’s conviction, upholding the admission of electronic evidence discovered during searches of the businesses’ offices, but vacated both sentences, based on loss calculation errors. View "United States v. Nagle" on Justia Law

In 2000, Bronowicz was charged with crimes ranging from terroristic threats to driving under the influence. He entered a negotiated plea, served his term of imprisonment, and was released. A complicated sequence of probation revocation and sentencing proceedings allegedly had the cumulative effect of unlawfully imposing additional penalties for criminal judgments that had already been satisfied. Bronowicz successfully appealed his additional prison sentence in state court and then filed a federal suit, seeking damages for wrongful incarceration under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed his claims as barred by the 1994 Supreme Court decision, Heck v. Humphrey. The Third Circuit reversed in part, holding that an order from the Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacating a sentence imposed by a court of common pleas constitutes a favorable termination of the proceedings against a plaintiff within the meaning of Heck v. Humphrey, notwithstanding the fact that the order failed expressly to address the inmate’s specific legal challenges to the sentence, so that any section 1983 claims stemming from the invalidated sentence are not barred by Heck. View "Bronowicz v. County of Allegheny" on Justia Law

Lewis, Shavers, and White committed a 2005 armed robbery of a North Philadelphia “speakeasy,” pointing firearms, ordering people to the floor, and threatening to shoot. They were charged with Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a); conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery; using and carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and attempted witness tampering. The court instructed the jury that Lewis was charged with “using and carrying a firearm during the crime of violence.” The jury found the three guilty. Lewis was sentenced to 57 months on the Hobbs Act counts and 84 months’ incarceration, the mandatory minimum, on the section 924 count, for “brandishing” a firearm. The Supreme Court remanded in light of its decision in Alleyne v. U.S., concerning imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence based upon facts that were never charged or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The Third Circuit initially affirmed, finding harmless error, but subsequently vacated and remanded. Lewis was sentenced for brandishing, but was convicted of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, which has a shorter mandatory minimum sentence. Lewis was never indicted for brandishing. The error contributed to the sentence and was not harmless. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law