Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1985, Clark and Devose assaulted and kidnapped a postal worker at gunpoint, stripped him of his uniform, and restrained him in his truck. Disguised in the uniform, Devose gained entry to a banker’s home, where they held the banker’s 85-year-old mother-in-law and 19-year-old daughter at gunpoint and called the banker to demand ransom. Clark raped the girl. They saw police outside and fled. Devose pleaded guilty and agreed to testify against Clark.In 1990, Clark was convicted of two conspiracy offenses, attempted extortion, assault of a postal worker, kidnapping, theft of a postal vehicle, and using a firearm during a crime of violence--kidnapping (18 U.S.C. 924(c)). Clark was sentenced to life imprisonment plus five years for the firearm count, to be served consecutively, as section 924 required. The Sentencing Guidelines did not then apply. Clark filed an unsuccessful appeal and numerous unsuccessful collateral attacks. In 2019, the Supreme Court held that part of section 924(c)’s definition of “crime of violence” is unconstitutionally vague.In Clark’s successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, the parties agreed that kidnapping does not qualify as a section 924(c) crime of violence. The district court vacated Clark’s 924 conviction but declined to conduct a full resentencing. The Third Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. As a matter of first impression, the court held that a certificate of appealability is required for a prisoner in federal custody to appeal a district court’s choice of remedy in a 28 U.S.C. 2255 proceeding. View "Clark v. United States" on Justia Law

Davis, a non-citizen, and Beckford, a U.S. citizen, met when they were children. In 1993, Davis was sentenced to life in prison for nonviolent drug convictions. When his sentence was reduced to 30 years in 2008, the two decided to marry. viewing marriage as an expression of their Christian faith. In 2012, Davis was moved to Moshannon Valley, a private prison that houses low-security alien inmates. The prison’s written policy for allowing marriage had certain behavioral requirements; the prison psychologist and other officials had to approve the request. Davis unsuccessfully challenged the denial of his marriage request through the prison’s administrative process. The Administrator of the Bureau of Prisons Privatization Management Branch informed Davis that marriage requests remained exclusively within the province of Moshannon officials. Davis learned that Moshannon had not approved a single request to marry during its contractual relationship. Davis’s sentence was later reduced to 27 years. He was deported after his release. Although their marriage would not have allowed Davis to challenge his deportation, Davis alleges that marriage to a U.S. citizen could provide a basis for other inmates to challenge their removals. Davis alleged that federal officials directed Moshannon officials to deny all inmate marriage requests to ensure that marriage to a citizen would not interfere with deportations. The district court dismissed claims under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1, under 42 U.S.C. 1985; and for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Third Circuit vacated in part. Davis stated a RFRA claim. View "Davis v. Wigen" on Justia Law

Shaknitz pleaded guilty to three counts of distribution and attempted distribution of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a), and one count of possession of child pornography. Shaknitz was sentenced to a 170-month term of imprisonment and a five-year term of supervised release. During sentencing, the district court orally imposed a condition on Shaknitz’s incarceration, limiting his contact with his five-year-old son to telephone only. In its written judgment, the court did not include its previously-announced condition but recommended that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) impose the telephone-only condition. The judgment did not state that the recommendation superseded the oral pronouncement.The Third Circuit vacated, noting its prior holding that a sentencing court lacks “inherent authority to impose a no-contact order during [a defendant’s] incarceration term.” It is unclear whether the written judgment was intended to replace the mandate with a recommendation; sentencing courts have the authority to recommend to the BOP that defendants’ contact with others be limited where necessary and appropriate. View "United States v. Shaknitz" on Justia Law

Kramer’s then-wife, Terry, found a document on her husband’s computer that led her to believe that Kramer had engaged in sexual conduct with a minor. Later, Terry found photographs on Kramer’s cellphone depicting the victim engaged in sexual acts. Terry met with police, described the sexually explicit photographs, and showed them the document; she emailed the photographs to the police. The victim reported that Kramer had sexually abused her for years and had used his cellphone to take pictures of her engaged in sexual conduct. Kramer admitted to having a sexual relationship with the victim and to taking the photographs. With a warrant, law enforcement searched Kramer’s cellphone and eventually found videos and photographs depicting sexual acts involving the victim.Kramer was charged with sexual exploitation of children, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). While in custody, he sent Terry a letter: “You crossed [the] line and it IS going to cost you,” repeatedly stating that he would have Terry arrested for her purported crimes. Kramer was then charged with attempted witness tampering, 18 U.S.C. 1512(b)(1). The Third Circuit affirmed Kramer’s convictions and 350-month sentence, upholding the denial of Kramer’s motion to suppress evidence. Terry conducted a private search of his cellphone and voluntarily provided the evidence to the government; the evidence was admissible without implicating the Fourth Amendment. The court properly denied Kramer’s motion to dismiss the attempted witness tampering charge. View "United States v. Kramer" on Justia Law

Following the armed robbery of a Winston-Salem, North Carolina convenience store, officers obtained a warrant for Stanford’s arrest and contacted Wilmington Detective Cannon for help apprehending Stanford, whom they believed had fled to Delaware. Cannon obtained a search warrant authorizing the use of a cell-site simulator to locate Stanford’s cell phone. Cannon alleged that Stanford was originally from Wilmington and had family members and associates who could assist him. Officers learned that Stanford was at a Wilmington Residence. While conducting surveillance, police approached a woman who exited the Residence and asked whether Stanford was there. She said Stanford and Gibson—Stanford’s brother, wanted on other charges—were inside. Officers knocked, announced, and entered the unlocked door. Stanford and Gibson were arrested. Cannon obtained a warrant to search the Residence for evidence of the North Carolina robbery. The Affidavit contained possible inaccuracies about the other suspects and Stanford's stay at the Residence. The subsequent search of the Residence yielded a loaded handgun beneath a cushion on the couch where Stanford was laying when he was arrested.Stanford was charged with illegal firearm possession 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress, based on the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, and his sentence. Delaware first- and second-degree robbery are U.S.S.G crimes of violence. View "United States v. Stanford" on Justia Law

Johnsonburg, Pennsylvania Officer Cuneo learned that the St. Marys Police Department had a search warrant to obtain a DNA sample from Perez. Cuneo knew Perez, a local with a history of illegal drug use. A log entry instructed officers who saw Perez to “hold” him and call St. Marys. Cuneo knew that Perez’s DNA had been found at the scene of a recent drug house burglary. Cuneo inferred—mistakenly—that a “body” warrant also had been issued. Later, sitting in his cruiser, Cuneo spotted Perez. The men stood on the sidewalk, having a “friendly conversation.” When Cuneo mentioned the DNA warrant and told Perez he needed to take him into custody. Perez said he was going home and sprinted away.Cuneo pursued Perez. Perez says he was tased from behind without warning. Cuneo says he warned Perez to stop before tasing him. Perez fell forward, breaking his nose. Cuneo radioed for backup and medical assistance. Perez recovered; a physical altercation ensued. Cuneo repeatedly tased and struck Perez with his baton, then shot Perez in the back.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Cuneo asserted qualified immunity in defense. The court denied Cuneo’s summary judgment motion as to his use of his firearm and the unlawful seizure claim. The Third Circuit reversed in part. Cuneo did not seize Perez during their initial encounter. The court remanded so Perez’s excessive force claim for Cuneo’s use of his firearm can proceed. View "Perez v. Borough of Johnsonburg" on Justia Law

Vepuri is the de facto director of KVK-Tech, a generic drug manufacturer. He employed Panchal as its director of quality assurance. KVK-Tech manufactured and sold Hydroxyzine, a prescription generic drug used to treat anxiety and tension. The government alleges that Vepuri, Panchal, and KVK-Tech sourced active ingredient for the Hydroxyzine from a facility (DRL) that was not included in the approvals that they obtained from the FDA and that they misled the FDA about their practices.An indictment charged all three defendants with conspiracy to defraud and to commit offenses against the United States and charged KVK-Tech with an additional count of mail fraud. The district court dismissed the portion of the conspiracy charge that alleges that the three conspired to violate the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), which prohibits introducing a “new drug” into interstate commerce unless an FDA approval “is effective with respect to such drug,” 21 U.S.C. 355(a).The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that a deviation from the approved drug application means that the approval is no longer effective. The approval ceases being effective only when it has been withdrawn or suspended. The indictment does not include any allegations that the KVK-Tech Hydroxyzine manufactured with active ingredients from DRL had a different composition or labeling than the KVK-Tech Hydroxyzine with the effective approval. View "United States v. Vepuri" on Justia Law

For 15 years, Charles ran 26 payday-lending companies, violating state criminal laws against usury, charging fees roughly equal to 780% interest per year. The companies grossed nearly half a billion dollars. Charles was convicted of 17 counts, including two for RICO conspiracy. He was sentenced to 14 years in prison, fined $2.5 million, and had to forfeit $64 million in illicit gains from the RICO conspiracy. Charles had already given some of the forfeited property to his daughter Linda. After the forfeiture orders, Linda filed ancillary claims to recover her interest in the assets.The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of her claims. For a RICO conviction, the defendant “shall forfeit” any interest in or proceeds from the conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 1963(a). Third parties may neither intervene in that forfeiture proceeding nor bring separate suits to assert their interests. Any person, other than the defendant, asserting a legal interest in the forfeited property may bring an ancillary claim; the court can amend the forfeiture order if that party shows that she either was a bona fide purchaser for value or has an interest in the forfeited property that was vested or superior at the time of the crime. The third party cannot “relitigate” the underlying forfeiture order. View "United States v. Hallinan" on Justia Law

Rivera flew from Miami to Saint Thomas, where Customs officers selected her for extra screening and asked her to fill out a Customs Declaration Form. On the Form, and in statements to officers, Rivera claimed ownership of two suitcases that she had retrieved from the baggage claim. Later, she said she did not own one of them, although it had a baggage tag with her name on it. Rivera said the suitcase belonged to Nieves. The other suitcase had a baggage tag with Nieves’ name on it. Rivera said that Nieves asked Rivera to retrieve the bag for her. Officers searched both suitcases. Each contained six vacuumed-sealed bags of a green, plant-like substance. The bags were concealed by clothes. A DHS agent interviewed Rivera, who changed her story about who told her to pick up the suitcase. She said did not know it was in the suitcases, which were packed by someone else.The Third Circuit affirmed Rivera’s convictions for conspiracy to possess, and possession, with intent to distribute, less than 50 kilograms of marijuana. The court rejected her argument under the 2018 Farm Act, which amended the Controlled Substances Act to exclude hemp from the definition of marijuana. The Act carved out an exception to marijuana offenses: Someone with cannabis possesses marijuana except if the cannabis has a THC concentration of 0.3% or less. The government need not disprove an exception to a criminal offense unless a defendant produces evidence to put the exception at issue. View "United States v. Rivera" on Justia Law

Jumper, a securities broker-dealer, arranged financing on behalf of private investors for the purchase of a Pennsylvania fire-brick manufacturer. Jumper fraudulently obtained authority to transfer the company’s pension plan assets by forging the majority stakeholder’s signature on several documents. Between 2007-2016, Jumper transferred $5.7 million from the pension plan to accounts he controlled.The SEC filed a civil complaint against Jumper for securities fraud in the Western District of Tennessee. The Department of Justice filed criminal charges against Jumper in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The Tennessee court entered a default judgment for the SEC and ordered Jumper to disgorge $5.7 million and to pay prejudgment interest of $726,758.79. In Pennsylvania, Jumper pleaded guilty to wire fraud and agreed to make full restitution; the parties stipulated a loss of $1.5-$3.5 million.The district court considered Jumper’s request for a downward departure based on medical issues, discussed the relevant 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, and denied Jumper’s requests, explaining, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is equipped to provide consistent, adequate medical care. The court sentenced Jumper to 78 months’ incarceration, at the bottom of the Guidelines range of 78–97 months, and ordered him to pay $2,426,550 in restitution. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the sentence violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and principles of collateral estoppel and that the court improperly concluded that the BOP could treat his medical issues. View "United States v. Jumper" on Justia Law