Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Malik Moss was convicted of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and heroin. The District Court held an evidentiary hearing to determine the quantity and purity of the methamphetamine attributable to Moss for sentencing purposes. The government presented evidence of two purchases by Moss and his co-conspirator, Jacob Santiago, on October 27-28, 2021, and November 11, 2021. The evidence included phone calls, cellphone data, text messages, and recorded statements indicating that Moss and Santiago bought a total of fifteen pounds of methamphetamine. The District Court also considered the purity levels of controlled purchases made directly from Moss, which ranged from 62% to 95%, and applied the lowest purity level of 62% to calculate Moss's sentence.The District Court initially scheduled the evidentiary hearing for December 12, 2022, but rescheduled it for December 21 due to Santiago's absence. During the December 12 proceeding, the government informed the court that a cooperating co-conspirator wished to breach his cooperation agreement and not testify. At the December 21 hearing, U.S. Marshals observed Moss's girlfriend's friend attempting to record the proceeding. The government later submitted evidence from Moss's prison communications showing that he had arranged for the recording to expose the co-conspirator and had sent threatening notes to the co-conspirator's family. Based on this evidence, the District Court applied an obstruction-of-justice enhancement and added two points to Moss's base offense level.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and found no clear error in the District Court's factual findings related to the drug quantity, drug purity, and the application of the obstruction-of-justice enhancement. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment, upholding Moss's 384-month sentence. View "United States v. Moss" on Justia Law

George Pitsilides, a successful restaurateur and professional poker player, was convicted in 1998 in Pennsylvania for criminal conspiracy to commit pool selling and bookmaking, and two counts of pool selling and bookmaking. These offenses are classified as first-degree misdemeanors in Pennsylvania, punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment. Consequently, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Pitsilides is barred from possessing a firearm. Despite these convictions, Pitsilides continued to engage in illegal gambling activities, leading to further convictions in Virginia in 2011 for operating an illegal gambling enterprise.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment in favor of the Government, applying the two-step framework from Binderup v. Attorney General. The court concluded that Pitsilides failed to show his convictions were not serious and rejected his argument that his offenses fell within the carveout for business-related offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(A).The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that the legal landscape had changed significantly since the District Court's decision, particularly with the Supreme Court's rulings in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi, and the Third Circuit's en banc decision in Range v. Attorney General. These cases emphasized the need for individualized assessments of whether a felon poses a danger to public safety when challenging firearm prohibitions under the Second Amendment.The Third Circuit concluded that the record was insufficient to determine whether § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to Pitsilides. The court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case to the District Court for further factual development to assess whether Pitsilides poses a special danger of misusing firearms. View "Pitsilides v. Barr" on Justia Law

Michael Milchin pleaded guilty to healthcare fraud, conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, conspiracy to distribute oxycodone, and possession of oxycodone with intent to distribute. He was sentenced to 168 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Milchin filed multiple motions for compassionate release and sentence reductions based on various grounds, including his health and the threat of COVID-19, but these were denied. This appeal concerns his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on the new U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1, which allows an offense-level reduction for certain offenders with zero criminal history points at the time of sentencing.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania first concluded that Milchin was not eligible for the reduction on November 13, 2023, and dismissed his motion without prejudice due to a stay on motions seeking retroactive application of § 4C1.1. Milchin's subsequent request for appointment of counsel was denied on March 1, 2024, as the court determined he did not qualify for a sentence reduction. On March 4, 2024, Milchin filed an "Emergency Motion for Sentence Reduction," which was also denied by the District Court, citing its earlier orders. Milchin then appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Milchin was not eligible for the offense-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1 because he had received an aggravating role adjustment. The court interpreted § 4C1.1(a)(10) to disqualify any defendant who either received an aggravating role adjustment or was engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise. The court affirmed the District Court's judgment, concluding that Milchin did not meet the criteria for a sentence reduction under the new guideline. View "USA v. Michael Milchin" on Justia Law

Corrigan Clay, an American citizen, pleaded guilty to sexually abusing his minor adopted daughter while living in Haiti, violating 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c). Clay argued that Congress lacked the power to enact § 2423(c), which criminalizes illicit sexual conduct by U.S. citizens abroad. He contended that his non-commercial conduct did not fall under Congress's authority to regulate foreign commerce or its treaty power.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denied Clay's motion to dismiss the indictment, ruling that § 2423(c) was a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to regulate the channels of foreign commerce. The court did not address the treaty power arguments. Clay then pleaded guilty without a plea agreement and was sentenced to 235 months' imprisonment, the bottom of the Sentencing Guidelines range. He appealed, challenging the constitutionality of § 2423(c) and the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the District Court's decision. The Third Circuit held that § 2423(c) is a permissible exercise of congressional power under both the Foreign Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. The court reasoned that Congress has broader authority to regulate foreign commerce than interstate commerce, and § 2423(c) fits within this power as it regulates the channels of foreign commerce and activities that substantially affect foreign commerce. Additionally, the court found that § 2423(c) is rationally related to implementing the Optional Protocol to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography, thus falling under the Necessary and Proper Clause.The Third Circuit also found no procedural or substantive errors in Clay's sentencing, affirming the District Court's judgment. The court concluded that the sentence was reasonable and appropriately reflected the seriousness of the offense, the need for just punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation. View "USA v. Clay" on Justia Law

Aqudre Quailes and Ayinda Harper were separately charged with being felons in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Harper was on Pennsylvania state probation and parole when his probation officer discovered photographs of him holding firearms on social media. During a home visit, officers found a semiautomatic pistol in his residence. Harper had thirteen prior felony convictions. Quailes, on parole for one of his six prior felony convictions, was arrested for absconding from parole. Authorities found firearms and ammunition in his girlfriend’s apartment, where he had been staying.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissed both indictments, ruling that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. The court reasoned that the defendants' status as parolees or probationers did not negate their Second Amendment rights. The Government appealed, arguing that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to state parolees and probationers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to Quailes and Harper because neither had completed their criminal sentences. The court referenced its en banc decision in Range v. Attorney General, which held that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional for a felon who had completed his sentence, and United States v. Moore, which upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) for felons still serving their sentences. The court concluded that historical practices support disarming convicts who are still serving their sentences, including those on state parole or probation. Consequently, the Third Circuit reversed the District Court’s orders and remanded the cases for further proceedings. View "USA v. Quailes" on Justia Law

Dwayne Sherman was indicted for several offenses related to drug trafficking in Central Pennsylvania, including six counts of money laundering, one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, and one count of conspiracy to launder money. The charges stemmed from activities between 2012 and 2018. Evidence presented at trial included testimony from a drug dealer, Paul Alston, who bought cocaine from Sherman, and FBI informant Ruben Martin, who received large sums of cash from Sherman intended for Mexico. Sherman admitted to selling cocaine and making money drops but claimed ignorance of the money's criminal origins.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denied Sherman’s motion for a new trial but vacated three of his money-laundering convictions, finding they were separate means of committing a single offense. At sentencing, the court applied a dangerous-weapon enhancement based on Sherman’s testimony about having access to handguns while storing drug proceeds at home, resulting in a 262-month imprisonment sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. Sherman argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, the government’s proof of the drug conspiracy varied from the indictment, and the district court erred in applying the dangerous-weapon enhancement. The Third Circuit found that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict, including Sherman’s knowledge and intent regarding the money laundering and drug conspiracy charges. The court also found no impermissible variance between the indictment and the trial evidence and upheld the district court’s application of the dangerous-weapon enhancement. Consequently, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Sherman" on Justia Law

Jorge Rivera-Guadalupe was living in a rooming house in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, when he was mugged and robbed. His friend, Christopher Valkosak, came to stay with him for protection. The next evening, Valkosak was shot by a stranger in the hallway outside Rivera-Guadalupe’s room. Detective Jacob Pierce investigated the incident, interviewed a neighbor who described the shooter as a tall Black male, and obtained a search warrant for Rivera-Guadalupe’s room. The search yielded marijuana, a knife, and IDs but no gun. Rivera-Guadalupe was arrested and charged with multiple offenses, including attempted homicide and possession of marijuana. He was acquitted of all charges after being incarcerated for over eighteen months.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissed claims against other defendants but allowed the malicious prosecution claim against Det. Pierce to proceed. Det. Pierce sought dismissal based on qualified immunity, arguing that probable cause for some charges precluded a malicious prosecution claim. The District Court, referencing Johnson v. Knorr, held that probable cause for one charge does not insulate officers from liability for malicious prosecution on other charges lacking probable cause. Det. Pierce’s motion for judgment on the pleadings was denied, and he appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the right to be prosecuted only on charges supported by probable cause was not clearly established at the time of Rivera-Guadalupe’s prosecution due to conflicting precedents within the circuit and among other circuits. The court reversed the District Court’s denial of qualified immunity for Det. Pierce and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss on that basis. The court clarified that the any-crime rule applies to false arrest claims but not to malicious prosecution claims. View "Rivera-Guadalupe v. Pierce" on Justia Law

A Kenyan national, lawfully admitted to the United States, was convicted in 2014 and 2019 of felony vehicular fleeing or attempting to elude a pursuing police officer under Pennsylvania law. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged him with removability based on these convictions, arguing they constituted crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs). The Immigration Court and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the removal orders.In 2017, DHS charged the petitioner with removability based on his 2014 fleeing-or-eluding conviction and 2016 simple assault convictions. The Immigration Judge found that simple assault did not constitute a CIMT and terminated the proceedings. However, the judge noted that the fleeing-or-eluding conviction could be a CIMT if combined with another CIMT. In 2019, after the petitioner’s second fleeing-or-eluding conviction, DHS again charged him with removability. The Immigration Judge rejected the petitioner’s res judicata defense and concluded that both fleeing-or-eluding convictions were CIMTs, sustaining the charge of removability. The BIA affirmed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA misapplied the categorical approach by relying on a realistic-probability analysis to determine that the fleeing-or-eluding convictions were CIMTs. The court held that the Pennsylvania statute under which the petitioner was convicted is divisible and that one of the felony subsections does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. Consequently, the court granted the petition for review, concluding that the petitioner’s convictions did not qualify as CIMTs under the categorical approach, and thus, he was not removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). View "Ndungu v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Nahsiem McIntosh was involved in a burglary at a sporting goods store in Newark, Delaware, where he and a co-defendant stole various firearms, including an AR-15-style weapon. The next day, McIntosh was apprehended by law enforcement, who found a loaded semiautomatic pistol in a trashcan that McIntosh had discarded. McIntosh was subsequently arrested and indicted on three counts, pleading guilty to two: theft of firearms from a federal firearm licensee and being a felon in possession of a firearm.The District Court for the District of Delaware applied two sentencing enhancements based on the Sentencing Guidelines: one for possession of a semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a large capacity magazine and another for possession of a firearm in connection with another felony offense. McIntosh objected to these enhancements, arguing that the commentary interpreting these guidelines was not entitled to deference. The District Court overruled his objections and sentenced him to 100 months for each count, to run concurrently.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Sentencing Commission's commentary on the guidelines was entitled to deference. The court found that the term "large capacity magazine" was genuinely ambiguous and that the Commission's interpretation, defining it as a magazine capable of accepting more than 15 rounds, was reasonable and within the Commission's expertise. Similarly, the court upheld the enhancement for possession of a firearm in connection with another felony offense, finding that the commentary reasonably interpreted the guideline to include possession of a firearm during the course of a burglary. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's application of both sentencing enhancements. View "USA v. McIntosh" on Justia Law

Henry Washington, a state prisoner, alleged that prison guard T.S. Oswald sexually assaulted him twice, once in 2013 and again in 2015. During the first incident, Washington claimed that Oswald and another guard handcuffed him, fondled him, and attempted to insert a nightstick into his rectum, causing him to bleed. In the second incident, Oswald allegedly fondled Washington and attempted to insert his finger into Washington's rectum while escorting him back to his cell.Washington sued Oswald under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for cruel and unusual punishment. The jury found in favor of Washington, awarding him $20,000 in compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive damages for the 2013 assault, and $20,000 in compensatory damages and $200,000 in punitive damages for the 2015 assault. Oswald moved for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, arguing insufficient evidence and excessive punitive damages. The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denied these motions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find Oswald liable for both assaults. The court also upheld the punitive damages, finding them not excessive under the Due Process Clause. The court noted that Oswald's actions were highly reprehensible, the punitive damages were proportionate to the harm caused, and the awards were consistent with those in comparable cases. The court affirmed the District Court's decision, maintaining the jury's awards. View "Washington v. Gilmore" on Justia Law