Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

While serving a state prison sentence in 2006, Chapman wrote a letter, intercepted by prison staff, threatening to kill President Bush. In an interview with Secret Service agents, Chapman admitted that he wanted to kill the President and made additional threats. He pled guilty to threatening the President, 18 U.S.C. 871(a). and was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment. In 2007, Chapman mailed a letter to a federal judge, including threats against the judge and other court staff. Chapman was sentenced to an additional 48 months imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. 876(c). Chapman was released from custody in 2014. He violated the terms of his supervised release and received a sentence of 11 months’ imprisonment. While serving that sentence, Chapman mailed a letter with threats against the federal prosecutor who handled Chapman’s revocation proceedings and the probation officer involved with Chapman’s case. He pled guilty under 18 U.S.C. 876(c) and was sentenced to 70 months, at the low end of the U.S.S.G. range. The Third Circuit affirmed application of the career offender enhancement to his sentence calculation, rejecting an argument that his convictions pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 876(c) did not qualify as crimes of violence. That section proscribes mailing a communication containing a threat to injure a person. View "United States v. Chapman" on Justia Law

Ildefonso-Candelario, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. unlawfully, allegedly in 1996. In 2015, he pled guilty in Pennsylvania state court to a misdemeanor count of obstructing the administration of law or other governmental function. Immigration and Customs Enforcement took Ildefonso-Candelario into custody, charging him with being removable as an alien present without admission or parole, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). At his first hearing, Ildefonso-Candelario stated his intention to seek cancellation of removal. Counsel for ICE suggested that Ildefonso-Candelario’s prior conviction might qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude, which would render him statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C). The Immigration Judge issued an initial holding that the offense was “categorically” a crime involving moral turpitude. ICE added a charge of removability for committing a crime involving moral turpitude. The Immigration Judge then ordered Ildefonso-Candelario removed to Mexico. A single member of the BIA upheld the ruling “[f]or the reasons given by the Immigration Judge.” The Third Circuit remanded to the BIA, holding hold that 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 5101 is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. The offense encompasses non-fraudulent as well as fraudulent conduct, such as obstruction by “physical interference or obstacle.” View "Ildefonso-Candelario v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

A gunman murdered Cooley in an Erie, Pennsylvania bar in 1994. Four years later, the Commonwealth tried Haskell for Cooley’s murder. The primary issue was whether Haskell was the gunman. In addition to circumstantial evidence, the Commonwealth presented four eyewitnesses: One recanted his pre-trial testimony implicating Haskell and two had previously denied that they could identify the shooter. The fourth eyewitness, Blue, did provide consistent testimony claiming she could identify the shooter. She claimed to expect nothing in exchange for her testimony but Blue and the prosecutor knew that she expected to receive help in her own pending criminal matters in exchange for her testimony. The prosecutor failed to correct Blue’s statement and went on to rely on it and vouch for Blue in his closing argument. The Third Circuit granted Haskell’s habeas petition. Haskell was not required to show Blue’s perjured testimony caused him “actual prejudice” under the Supreme Court’s standard in Brecht v. Abrahamson (1993). Brecht does not apply when the state has knowingly presented or failed to correct perjured testimony. In those circumstances, a petitioner carries his burden when he has shown a reasonable likelihood the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury, under the Supreme Court’s 1972 "Giglio" holding. View "Haskell v. Superintendent Greene SCI" on Justia Law

Wrensford and Muller had an altercation with a man at a car wash. Hours later, the man returned with Hendricks. A truck passed the car wash, turned around, and chased Hendricks. The passenger (Wrensford) fired several shots. Hendricks died from gunshot wounds. Officer Mendez drove in the direction that witnesses said the truck was going, and 45 minutes later, encountered two men walking on the road. Before he could approach, both men ran. Mendez broadcast a general description. Officer Cruz heard the transmission that two “black, rasta males” were on the run. Cruz thereafter saw a “rasta guy,” drew his gun, ordered Wrensford to get on the ground. Wrensford was transported to the police station. Officers later recovered a pistol close to where Wrensford had been standing. Witnesses, taken to the police station, saw Wrensford and “blurted out” that they saw the shooter (Wrensford) outside the station. They identified Muller from a photo array. The Third Circuit vacated Wrensford’s conviction for determination of whether an exception to the Fourth Amendment applies and renders the identification evidence admissible; Wrensford was de facto arrested when, without probable cause, he was transported to the police station. The court affirmed as to Muller; he waived his challenge to the suppression rulings. The court did not abuse its discretion by polling the jury and instructing it to redeliberate, or refusing to give a voluntary manslaughter jury instruction. View "United States v. Wrensford" on Justia Law

Azcona-Polanco, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1972. In 1994, he was ordered removed based upon a conviction for heroin distribution but never left the country. In 1997, Azcona-Polanco was convicted of conspiracy to violate federal narcotics laws and sentenced to 168 months’ incarceration. He was deported in 2009, after his incarceration, but re-entered illegally and assumed an alias, having purchased a citizen’s birth certificate and Social Security card. Azcona-Polanco was arrested and pled guilty to illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a); (b)(2). His sentencing range was 41-51 months. The Guideline range for a term of supervised release was one to three years, with a maximum of three years, 18 U.S.C. 3583(b)(2). Azcona-Polanco was presumptively exempt from supervised release as a deportable immigrant, U.S.S.G. 5D1.1(c). The Presentence Investigation Report and sentencing memorandum noted that presumption. The court sentenced Azcona-Polanco to 41 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release, stating, “in case he does illegally reenter the United States he must report in person to Probation.” Azcona-Polanco did not object to the imposition of supervised release. The Third Circuit affirmed. A district court is permitted to impose a term of supervised release on a deportable immigrant “if the court determines it would provide an added measure of deterrence and protection based on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.” View "United States v. Azcona-Polanco" on Justia Law

In the Orthodox Jewish tradition, a woman cannot obtain a religious divorce until her husband gives her a “get” contract. A woman who leaves her husband without obtaining a get becomes an “agunah,” subject to severe social ostracism. She may seek relief in a “beth din” rabbinical court, which may authorize the use of force to secure a get. To assist an agunah to obtain a get is a religious commandment of the Orthodox Jewish faith. Stimler, Epstein, and Goldstein participated in the beth din process, working with “muscle men” to kidnap and torture husbands. An FBI agent posed as an agunah and approached Epstein, who stated that “what we’re doing is basically gonna be kidnapping a guy for a couple of hours and beatin’ him up and torturing him.” On the day of the kidnapping, the rabbis and “tough guys” assembled. Goldstein and Stimler arrived in disguise. The three defendants were charged with substantive kidnapping, attempted kidnapping, and conspiracy to commit kidnapping. The government obtained a court order, under the Stored Communications Act, compelling AT&T to turn over historic cell site location information to obtain 57 days of Goldstein’s location history. The Third Circuit affirmed the convictions of the three men, rejecting a due process claim, challenges to evidentiary rulings, and challenges to jury instructions. Respect for religious beliefs cannot trump legitimate government objectives, such as public safety. View "United States v. Stimler" on Justia Law

After their three-year-old adopted son died, U.S. Army Major John Jackson and his wife, Carolyn, were convicted of conspiracy to endanger the welfare of a child and endangering the welfare of a child. The New Jersey law offenses were “assimilated” into federal law under the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 13(a), which “borrows” state laws to fill gaps in federal law for crimes committed on federal enclaves. The Jacksons’ crimes occurred within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. (Picatinny Arsenal Installation). Using the offense guidelines for assault, U.S.S.G. 2A2.3, and aggravated assault, U.S.S.G. 2A2.2, the Probation Office calculated both defendants’ Guidelines range as 210-262 months. The government calculated a range of 292-365 months. The court declined to calculate the applicable sentencing ranges under the U.S.S.G., reasoning that there was no “sufficiently analogous” offense guideline, sentenced Carolyn to 24 months of imprisonment plus supervised release, and sentenced John to three years of probation plus community service and a fine. The Third Circuit vacated the sentences, adopting an “elements-based” approach, but concluding that the assault guideline is “sufficiently analogous” to the Jacksons’ offenses. The district court failed to make the requisite findings with respect to the Guidelines calculation and the statutory sentencing factors. While the court could consider what would happen if the Jacksons had been prosecuted in state court, it focused on state sentencing practices to the exclusion of federal sentencing principles. The sentences were substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Johnson was convicted in Florida, for lying on a passport application, then convicted in the Virgin Islands, for wire fraud. In both instances, Johnson received a custodial sentence followed by supervised release, the conditions of which would be violated if he committed another crime. Johnson was already imprisoned on the first charge when he was indicted, convicted, and sentenced on the second; he effectively served one aggregate prison term for both convictions. After Johnson was released in 2014, the Florida Probation Office took charge of his supervision. Aside from a June 2014 phone call that he initiated, Johnson had no contact with the Virgin Islands Probation Office. In January 2015, Johnson was again indicted in Florida for lying on a passport application; he pled guilty. In April 2016, a Florida district court entered a judgment of revocation, sentencing him to time served. The Virgin Islands Probation Office took no action until March 2016, when it learned of Johnson’s new indictment. The Virgin Islands District Court began the process of revoking Johnson’s Virgin Islands supervised release. Johnson argued that the Florida judgment of revocation eliminated the Virgin Islands term of supervised release, leaving nothing to supervise or revoke and that the Virgin Islands Probation Office’s abdication of its supervisory responsibility deprived that court of jurisdiction. The Third Circuit affirmed the rejection of those arguments and imposition of an 18-month sentence. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Lambert was charged as a co-conspirator with and accomplice to Tillman’s 1997 acts of murder (Tilman’s former girlfriend’s mother), aggravated assault (Tilman’s former girlfriend), and burglary. Their trial was joint. Before trial, Tillman admitted to the act and claimed mental illness. He made statements to his expert psychiatrist that Lambert had given Tillman a gun. The prosecution presented no direct evidence of any criminal plan between Lambert and Tillman before Tillman’s third return to the house. It relied only on their prior friendship, Lambert’s presence, and that Lambert drove Tillman away after witnessing the shooting. Recognizing that Tillman (who did not testify) would not be subject to cross-examination when the psychiatrist recounted his statements, the trial judge required counsel to redact facially incriminating references to Lambert from that testimony. At trial, the psychiatrist’s testimony, in context, implicated Lambert, who was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the Commonwealth used Tillman’s testimonial statements for their hearsay purpose and, if so, whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a limiting jury instruction. The court found ”some merit to his argument that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated.” View "Lambert v. Warden Greene SCI" on Justia Law

Vickers punched his victim once but the victim suffered a fractured skull, brain hemorrhaging, and was in a coma for four days. Pennsylvania law provides that for a criminal case to be tried without a jury, “[t]he judge shall ascertain from the defendant whether this is a knowing and intelligent waiver, and such colloquy shall appear on the record. The waiver shall be in writing, made a part of the record, and signed by the defendant, the attorney for the Commonwealth, the judge, and the defendant’s attorney.” Those procedures were not followed in Vickers’s case. The judge found Vickers guilty. Vickers sought state post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. Because Vickers’s private attorney had been replaced by a public defender, the attorney was unaware that the process had not been followed, but recommended that Vickers pursue a bench trial for strategic reasons and thought that Vickers wanted a bench trial. The court concluded that Vickers “freely, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his jury trial rights.” Vickers sought habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Third Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of relief. The proper prejudice inquiry is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for his counsel’s deficient performance, Vickers would have exercised his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. He failed to make that showing. View "Vickers v. Superintendent Graterford SCI" on Justia Law