Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Powell was carrying $33,550 in cash deposits from a K-Mart to an armored vehicle and met his supervisor, Bougouneau. In the parking lot, a man, whose face was partially covered, shot Powell three times and Bourgouneau once and took the bag. Schneider, an off-duty Virgin Islands police officer, happened to be present and recognized Hodge as the shooter. Hodge was apprehended. Both Powell and Bougouneau survived. Hodge was charged with: Interference with Commerce by Robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951; multiple counts of Use and Discharge of a Firearm During the Commission of a Crime of Violence (robbery and attempted murder), 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A); two counts of Attempted First Degree Murder, 14 V.I.C. 921, 922(a)(2); multiple counts of Using an Unlicensed Firearm During Commission of a Crime of Violence (attempted murder, robbery, first-degree assault), 14 V.I.C. 2253(a); two counts of First Degree Assault with Intent to Commit Murder, 14 V.I.C. 295(1); two counts of First Degree Robbery, 14 V.I.C. 1861 and 1862(1); and First Degree Reckless Endangerment, 14 V.I.C. 625(a). Before trial, Hodge indicated he wanted substitute counsel, but none was arranged. The Third Circuit vacated in part. Hodge’s multiple convictions under the Virgin Islands firearms statute violated his right against double jeopardy. The court rejected claims based on the denials of his motions to substitute counsel and to strike three jurors for cause, admission of prejudicial evidence at trial, alleged insufficiency of the evidence, and error in the jury instructions. View "United States v. Hodge" on Justia Law

Parker, an indigent prisoner and prolific pro se litigant, initiated about 40 civil matters over a short period of time. In 2014, Parker filed suit, claiming that officials subjected him to false arrest, malicious prosecution, and the use of excessive force during his 2011 arrest, and sought to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The court granted the IFP motion and considered the case under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), which directs a court to dismiss a case “at any time” if it determines that the “action or appeal is frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” The court concluded that Parker’s claims were time-barred and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. This was Parker’s first strike under the PLRA “three strikes” rule. which limits a prisoner’s ability to proceed IFP if the prisoner abuses the judicial system by filing frivolous actions. Parker’s next strikes arose from the dismissals, as “frivolous,” of two 2015 civil rights complaints. The Third Circuit affirmed, stating that an indigent prisoner appealing a district court’s imposition of his “third strike” may not proceed IFP for that appeal without demonstrating that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. View "Parker v. Montgomery County Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

At voir dire for Penn’s retrial on felon-in-possession charges, Prospective Juror #207 indicated that jury service would be a hardship because he attended school on a full-time basis, the trial, which would last two-three days and would conflict with his scheduled tonsillectomy, and rescheduling surgery would conflict with basketball preseason practice, which started the following week. The appointment was the earliest that he could secure after getting sick with bronchitis four times; #207 was a varsity basketball player on a basketball scholarship and would be unable to perform activities for two weeks after the surgery. The judge said he had no objection to keeping him, adding, “I don’t believe him . . . if he truly was having surgery on Wednesday, he would have notified the jury office ... and his doctor would send a note.” The student was seated as the ninth juror. The morning after opening statements, the court received a doctor’s note and learned that the surgery could be rescheduled. The judge advised counsel, overruled defense counsel’s objection, excused the student, and seated an alternate juror. Defense counsel argued that the student was African-American and that there was only one other African-American on the jury, a middle-aged woman. The jury convicted Penn. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that making the substitution without findings deprived Penn of his constitutional rights to due process, fundamental fairness, equal protection, and an impartial jury. View "United States v. Penn" on Justia Law

In 2006, Mathias was convicted of first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder based on a shooting that killed one person and severely injured another. The judge properly instructed the jurors they must find the accomplice himself had the specific intent to kill but, over defense counsel’s objection and contrary to Pennsylvania law, also indicated that the jurors could convict an accomplice based on the specific intent of the principal. While appellate counsel raised the jury instructions on criminal conspiracy, he did not raise the murder instructions. The state court observed that appellate counsel had not adequately briefed any of Mathias’s claims and deemed them waived but rejected the conspiracy instruction claim on the merits. Mathias filed a pro se petition under Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act, untimely raising a claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The Superior Court rejected it on the merits. Mathias filed a pro se petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Third Circuit reversed a grant of habeas relief on Mathias’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel and due process claims based on the murder instruction despite waiving the Rule 4(a)(3) timeliness requirement. Regardless of whether counsel’s performance was deficient, the state court did not clearly err in determining there was no prejudice and its decision was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent on internally inconsistent jury instructions. View "Mathias v. Superintendent Frackville SCI" on Justia Law

Acting on apparent insider information from a drug courier, Washington and his co-conspirators planned to rob a Philadelphia property where they thought 10 kilograms of cocaine were stored. The “stash house” was a trap; the “courier” was an undercover ATF agent. The cocaine did not exist. Washington was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery and drug charges (18 U.S.C. 1951(a) and 21 U.S.C. 846) but acquitted on a gun charge. The fictitious amount of cocaine triggered a 20-year mandatory minimum. Washington was sentenced to 264 months in prison. Washington claimed that people of color are swept up in such stings in disproportionate numbers, that the use of the statutory mandatory minimum term violated his due process rights, and that his attorney rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. The Third Circuit rejected those arguments but remanded for limited post-judgment discovery. While stash-house reverse stings can raise constitutional concerns, the use of a mandatory minimum sentence did not deprive Washington of due process. With respect to denial of pretrial discovery on ATF’s operations and enforcement statistics, the court agreed that a district court may exercise its discretion to grant limited discovery, or otherwise to conduct in camera analysis of government data before deciding whether limited discovery is warranted even if a defendant seeking discovery on a selective enforcement claim has not otherwise met his full burden under Supreme Court precedent concerning selective prosecution. View "United States v. Washington" on Justia Law

In 1991, Bruce and others went Vine’s mussel shell camp, tied up Vine and his fiance, shot them, set the house ablaze and completed a robbery. Federal authorities became involved, leading to Bruce’s 1996 convictions for witness tampering murder. In 2011, the Supreme Court decided “Fowler,” interpreting the statute under which Bruce was convicted, making it a crime “to kill another person, with intent to . . . prevent the communication by any person to a law enforcement officer . . . of the United States . . . of information relating to the . . . possible commission of a Federal offense,” 18 U.S.C. 1512(a)(1)(C). Fowler addressed situations where the defendant killed with the intent to prevent communication with officers in general but did not have federal officers in mind at the time. Ordinarily, federal prisoners collaterally challenge their convictions or sentences under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Bruce never pursued his statutory interpretation argument on direct appeal or in his initial section 2255 motion. Section 2255(h) does not permit a second petition for previously unavailable rules of statutory interpretation, but a savings clause allows a federal prisoner to seek habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241 when 2255’s remedy “is inadequate or ineffective.” The Third Circuit concluded that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction under section 2241, but that this is not the extraordinary case in which a successful showing of actual innocence has been made View "Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg USP" on Justia Law

Martin pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); (b)(1)(B)(iii). The parties agreed that Martin’s advisory Guidelines range was 70-87 months’ imprisonment and that a sentence of 87 months was appropriate. According to the Probation Office, Martin’s Guidelines range was 188-235 months’ because Martin was a career offender. At sentencing, the district court stated that Martin was a career offender, noting crimes of aggravated assault, resisting arrest, and fleeing a police officer. After considering the 18 U.S.C. 3553 factors, the Court sentenced Martin to 87 months’ imprisonment. Martin did not appeal. In 2014, the Sentencing Commission promulgated Guidelines Amendment 782, retroactively reducing the base offense for many drug quantities, including the drug quantity associated with Martin’s offense. Martin sought a reduction of sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), citing Amendment 782. The district court found him ineligible for relief because his Guidelines range was based on his status as a career offender rather than the drug quantity. The Third Circuit affirmed. Martin’s status as a career offender meant that he was not eligible for a reduced sentence. View "United States v. Martin" on Justia Law

Defendants were tried together and convicted of several racketeering-related offenses in connection with a loan sharking and illegal gambling operation in Philadelphia. The district court entered preliminary orders of forfeiture making both men jointly and severally liable for more than $5 million of the proceeds from the criminal operation. During the pendency of their appeal, the Supreme Court issued its 2017 "Honeycutt" opinion, reviewing one of the forfeiture statutes at issue in the defendants’ case, 21 U.S.C. 853, and holding that joint and several liability is unauthorized. In light of that holding, the Third Circuit remanded for reconsideration of the forfeiture orders, but otherwise affirmed. The court rejected an argument that the district court violated the Sixth Amendment by applying a “dangerous weapons” sentencing enhancement based on the defendants’ use of an axe to make threats. Defendants argued that the use of the axe constitutes acquitted conduct because it was one of the acts that formed the basis of Count 26, of which they were found not guilty. The court also rejected challenges to the sentencing calculations associated with the RICO conspiracy. View "United States v. Gjeli" on Justia Law

Ferriero was chairman of the Bergen County Democratic Organization (BCDO) from 1998 until he resigned in 2009. Ferriero took payments from a vendor (C3) that provided emergency notification systems for local governments in exchange for recommending to officials that their towns hire the firm. Ferriero’s corporation executed a contract, described as an “agreement . . . to provide governmental relations consulting services required in connection with marketing of a product known as C3 and any other related products or services.” The municipalities that bought the product were unaware that Ferriero stood to benefit financially. The Third Circuit affirmed Ferriero’s convictions, a forfeiture order, and sentence based on violations of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. 1952, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962(c), and the federal wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. 1343. The evidence was sufficient to prove New Jersey bribery as a predicate act for his Travel Act and RICO convictions. There was sufficient evidence for a rational juror to conclude Ferriero participated in the conduct of the BCDO’s affairs by means of a pattern of bribery and to conclude that failure to disclose Ferriero’s C3 interest amounted to a materially false or fraudulent misrepresentation. View "United States v. Ferriero" on Justia Law

The district court denied a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) filed by Millhouse, a Lewisburg prisoner. The court identified five strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), and found that Millhouse failed to establish that he was under imminent danger of serious physical injury. The statute limits IFP status: In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger. The Third Circuit vacated. For purposes of this appeal, Millhouse has only one strike. The court must look to the date the notice of appeal is filed, not the date on which the court rules, in assessing whether a particular dismissal counts as a strike and a dismissal without prejudice for failure to state a claim does not rise to the level of a strike. View "Millhouse v. Heath" on Justia Law