Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Investigating Playpen, a global dark-web child pornography forum with more than 150,000 users, the FBI relied on a single search warrant, issued in the Eastern District of Virginia, to search the computers of thousands of Playpen users all over the world, using malware called a “Network Investigative Technique” (NIT). Werdene, a Pennsylvania citizen, was a Playpen user whose computer was compromised by the NIT. He was charged in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania with possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B). The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress. The NIT warrant violated the prior version of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(b) with respect to jurisdictional limits and the magistrate judge exceeded her authority under the Federal Magistrates Act. The warrant was therefore void ab initio, and the Rule 41(b) infraction was a Fourth Amendment violation. However, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule may apply to warrants that are void ab initio. The warrant was issued by a neutral, detached, duly-appointed magistrate judge, who determined that it was supported by probable cause and particularly described the places to be searched and things to be seized. The FBI, therefore, acted in good-faith; there is no evidence that it exceeded the scope of the warrant. View "United States v. Werdene" on Justia Law

During Greene’s 1996 trial for murder, robbery, and conspiracy, the prosecution introduced the redacted confessions of Greene’s non-testifying codefendants. Pennsylvania’s High Court summarily dismissed an appeal in which Greene argued that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1998 "Gray" holding, decided after the Superior Court rejected Greene’s Confrontation Clause claim, entitled him to relief. Pennsylvania courts also rejected his post-conviction petitions. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the denial of Greene's 2004 habeas petition, noting that Gray had not sought certiorari relief after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed his appeal and did not assert his “Gray” claim in his state post-conviction petition. Three years later, Greene filed a pro se Rule 60(b)(6) motion to vacate, arguing that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to advise Greene to petition the U.S. Supreme Court, citing the Court’s 2012 decision (Martinez v. Ryan) that “[w]here, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.” The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, citing the Supreme Court’s 2017 holding (Davila v. Davis) that “a federal court [may not] hear a substantial, but procedurally defaulted, claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel when a prisoner’s state post-conviction counsel provides ineffective assistance by failing to raise that claim.” View "Greene v. Superintendent Smithfield SCI" on Justia Law

Williams, a citizen of Guyana and a lawful U.S. permanent resident, immigrated to this country in 1970, when he was 13 months old. He has no family in Guyana; his relatives are all U.S. citizens. In 2006, he pleaded guilty to five counts of first-degree forgery under Georgia Code 16-9-1(a). Williams was charged as removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The IJ denied relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, rejecting an argument that the Georgia forgery statute is broader than generic forgery because it criminalizes the use of a fictitious name when signing a document and because the statute does not require a showing of prejudice. The BIA later denied a motion for reconsideration under the Supreme Court’s 2016 "Mathis" decision, arguing that Georgia’s forgery statute is indivisible under Mathis and is overbroad in criminalizing some conduct that does not relate to forgery--false agency endorsements. The Third Circuit denied relief. Employing a “looser categorical approach,” the court considered the “logical connection” between the federal offense the state law and concluded that concerns about the inauthenticity or unauthorized nature of a written instrument establish a logical relationship between common law forgery and false agency endorsement. The intent elements are “directly analogous” and target the “same core criminal conduct.” View "Williams v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Wilson pled guilty to three counts of unarmed bank robbery or attempted bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). The district court imposed enhancements for being a career offender, U.S.S.G. 4B1.2, and for making a death threat, U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)(2)(F). In one of two completed robberies, Wilson had passed the bank teller a note, stating “this is a hold up, empty your drawers now, or else.” The presentence report suggested that section 2113(a) be treated as a “crime of violence” under the guidelines, and, because Wilson had two prior convictions under that same statute, that he be classified as a “career offender.” The threat-of-death enhancement did not increase the total offense level beyond that mandated by the career-offender enhancement. Wilson did not object to the threat-of-death enhancement, but did object to being treated as a “career offender.” The district court overruled that objection and sentenced him to 151 months in prison, at the bottom of the guidelines range calculated in the PSR. The Third Circuit affirmed, joining other Circuits in holding that bank robbery by intimidation counts as a crime of violence. View "United States v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Harrisburg Officer Simmons, conducting undercover surveillance, heard a dispatch about gunshots east of his location, describing two potential suspects in dark-colored hooded sweatshirts, walking west. Minutes later, Simmons observed two men in dark-colored hooded sweatshirts walking west. Graves had a “pronounced, labored” gait and tense arms, suggesting that “he may have concealed something heavy.” Simmons yelled “Police,” handcuffed Graves, and conducted a pat-down search, during which he felt “multiple small hard objects” in Graves’ front pockets. The objects felt like crack cocaine but were packets of Depakote and one bullet. Graves admitted that he had a loaded pistol in his boot. Graves was charged with possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number, 18 U.S.C. 922(k); 924(a)(1)(B) and unlawful possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2); 924(e). After denial of his motion to suppress, Graves pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm. The court treated Graves as a career offender, finding that his two convictions for North Carolina common law robbery were the categorical equivalent of the enumerated crime of robbery, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1. The Third Circuit affirmed. Simmons had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was underway and did not exceed the bounds of a valid protective frisk. Under the Guidelines, generic federal robbery is defined as in the majority of state robbery statutes, without the requirement of more than de minimis force; North Carolina common law robbery and generic federal robbery contain the same elements. View "United States v. Graves" on Justia Law

Ferguson pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and was sentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. During that term of supervision, the U.S. Probation Office informed the court that Ferguson had been convicted in the Delaware County Court on seven counts of aggravated indecent assault on a person less than 13 years old, one count of criminal solicitation of a person less than 13 years old, and eight counts of indecent assault on a person less than 13 years old. Ferguson was sentenced to 10-20 years’ confinement in state custody, to be followed by seven years’ probation. Ferguson did not contest that he had violated the conditions of his supervised release. Although Ferguson’s violation carried a range of 30-37 months’ imprisonment under the USSG, the statutory maximum sentence was 24 months’ imprisonment followed by three years of supervision. In imposing sentence, the court described Ferguson’s arrest record and, based on his “long and serious criminal history,” imposed a sentence of 24 months imprisonment, consecutive to his state sentence, with no supervised release to follow. Neither party objected. The Third Circuit affirmed. Although the court described Ferguson’s arrest record, its characterization of his criminal history was accurate; the court did not really on the history of arrests alone. View "United States v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

Ley pleaded guilty as a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). According to the presentence report (PSR), Ley sustained a 2006 conviction for felony aggravated assault in Pennsylvania, which it classified as a “crime of violence” under the career-offender Guideline, USSG 4B1.2(a)(1). The criminal history Guidelines require the cumulative counting of sentences for offenses that are separated by an intervening arrest. Without an intervening arrest, prior sentences are counted as a single sentence if imposed on the same day. Two of Ley’s criminal history points were based on prior convictions for possession of drug paraphernalia, stemming from traffic offenses. After each, the police released Ley and advised him that the case would proceed via summons. Ley pleaded guilty and was sentenced for both offenses on the same day. His total offense level and criminal history category produced a sentencing range of 46-57 months. Ley argued that the drug paraphernalia sentences should be treated as a single sentence because they were imposed on the same day and were separated not by an arrest, but by a traffic stop so that he should have had a range of 36-47 months. Ley was sentenced to 46 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit vacated, citing the “plain meaning” of the Guidelines. If the issuance of a summons should be treated as an arrest, "the Commission knows how to do so." View "United States v. Ley" on Justia Law

Mullin, age 29, had been in and out of prison and struggled with substance abuse. Serving a sentence at a halfway house, Mullin was found in possession of contraband and was transferred to New Jersey’s Central Reception & Assignment Facility, where he was assessed and assigned to an area that did not feature extensive or individualized supervision. In his Assignment Facility cell, he fashioned a noose from a bedsheet and took his own life. Mullin’s mother, Joan, was given information that was incomplete and inaccurate; she was told that her son had died at a different facility, an error repeated on his death certificate. More than two years into Joan’s civil-rights suit, her attorney received a previously-undisclosed investigative report that contained statements by fellow inmates about a guard who allegedly refused Mullin’s requests for psychiatric assistance and urged Mullin to kill himself. Due to a clerical error, the disc containing those disclosures was misfiled, and not accessed until 10 months later. By that time, Joan’s complaint, premised on a knew-or-should-have-known theory of vulnerability to suicide, had been partially dismissed. The district court denied a request for leave to amend and granted the remaining defendant summary judgment. The Third Circuit vacated. Denying leave to amend was an impermissible exercise of discretion. Some factors relied upon to deny leave are not supported by the record or are at odds with precedent. Counsel’s mistake does not, alone, support the denial. View "Mullin v. Balicki" on Justia Law

Despite repeatedly asserting his innocence, Satterfield was convicted of first-degree murder in 1985 and sentenced to life in prison. After years of direct and collateral litigation, the district court, acting on his habeas petition, found that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim meritorious. The Third Circuit reversed, finding his petition barred by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA’s) one-year statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). Years later, the Supreme Court decided, in McQuiggin v. Perkin, that a petitioner who can make a credible showing of actual innocence can overcome that limitations period. Satterfield sought relief from the judgment denying his habeas petition, characterizing McQuiggin’s change in law as an extraordinary circumstance to justify relief under FRCP 60(b)(6). The district court denied Satterfield’s motion. The Third Circuit vacated, holding that changes in decisional law may, under certain circumstances, justify Rule 60(b)(6) relief. “A district court addressing a Rule 60(b)(6) motion premised on a change in decisional law must examine the full panoply of equitable circumstances in the particular case.” In this case, the court did not articulate the requisite equitable analysis. If Satterfield can make the required credible showing of actual innocence, an equitable analysis would weigh heavily in favor of deeming McQuiggin’s change in law, as applied to Satterfield’s case, an exceptional circumstance justifying Rule 60(b)(6) relief. View "Satterfield v. District Attorney Philadelphia" on Justia Law

From 2006 through 2011, Poulson tricked homeowners facing foreclosure into selling him their homes and engaged in a multi-million-dollar Ponzi scheme that defrauded investors in those distressed properties. Poulson pleaded guilty to one count of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341. The district court calculated his total fraud to be $2,721,240.94; concluded that this fraud resulted in “substantial financial hardship” for more than 25 victims; and sentenced Poulson to 70 months’ imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release, with a condition prohibiting Poulson from working in the real estate industry for five years. The Third Circuit affirmed in part, upholding the court’s determination of the number of victims who suffered a “substantial financial hardship” under U.S.S.G 2B1.1. The court reasoned that the Guidelines give the court considerable discretion. The court vacated the imposition of a five-year occupational restriction on his three-year term of supervised release, the statutory maximum, and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Poulson" on Justia Law