Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Criminal Law
United States v. Welshans
The Third Circuit affirmed Welsans’s conviction for distribution and possession of child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2252). The court rejected an argument that his due process right to a fair trial was violated because the prosecution informed the jury, through evidence and argument, that his pornography files included deeply abhorrent videos and images of bestiality, bondage, and acts of violence against very young children. While the challenged evidence was inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and the prosecutor’s closing argument improperly appealed to the passions of the jury, the misconduct did not so infect Welshans’s trial with unfairness as to violate due process. The evidence against Welshans was overwhelming; there was no dispute that his computers contained child pornography; Welshans was the sole user of the computers; he installed and used a file-sharing network, which was used to distribute child pornography; Welshans used the Internet account from which the child pornography was distributed. Welshans nonetheless claimed, based solely on his credibility, that he did not know that there was child pornography on his computers. The court remanded for resentencing. Welshans’s attempt to put files in the computer’s recycling bin when he knew the police were coming did not merit the application of the obstruction of justice enhancement. View "United States v. Welshans" on Justia Law
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Criminal Law
United States v. Welshans
The Third Circuit affirmed Welsans’s conviction for distribution and possession of child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2252). The court rejected an argument that his due process right to a fair trial was violated because the prosecution informed the jury, through evidence and argument, that his pornography files included deeply abhorrent videos and images of bestiality, bondage, and acts of violence against very young children. While the challenged evidence was inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and the prosecutor’s closing argument improperly appealed to the passions of the jury, the misconduct did not so infect Welshans’s trial with unfairness as to violate due process. The evidence against Welshans was overwhelming; there was no dispute that his computers contained child pornography; Welshans was the sole user of the computers; he installed and used a file-sharing network, which was used to distribute child pornography; Welshans used the Internet account from which the child pornography was distributed. Welshans nonetheless claimed, based solely on his credibility, that he did not know that there was child pornography on his computers. The court remanded for resentencing. Welshans’s attempt to put files in the computer’s recycling bin when he knew the police were coming did not merit the application of the obstruction of justice enhancement. View "United States v. Welshans" on Justia Law
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Criminal Law
Ricks v. Shover
Ricks, a former inmate at a Pennsylvania State Corrections facility, alleged that during a routine morning pat-down, Corrections Officer Keil rubbed his erect penis against Ricks’ buttocks through both men’s clothing. When Ricks stepped away and verbally protested to Keil’s supervisor, Lieutenant Shover, Ricks alleges that Shover “slammed” Ricks against the wall, causing injuries to his face, head, neck, and back. The district court dismissed his 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint, stating that “a small number of incidents in which a prisoner is verbally harassed, touched, and pressed against without his consent do not amount” to an Eighth Amendment violation. The Third Circuit reversed. A single incident of sexual abuse can constitute “cruel and unusual punishment” under the Eighth Amendment if the incident was objectively sufficiently intolerable and cruel, capable of causing harm, and the official had a culpable state of mind rather than a legitimate penological purpose. Although his sexual abuse claim as to Shover under a participation or failure-to-intervene theory was properly dismissed, Ricks’ excessive force claim stands on a different footing and should have been permitted to survive the motion to dismiss. View "Ricks v. Shover" on Justia Law
United States v. Kalb
An unidentified 911 caller reported that a man had been electrocuted near Valley Forge Park and “may have been scrapping.” Officers found a deceased man next to an electrical box. At the restaurant from which the call originated, an officer spoke with a security guard who said a white male driving a small Ford pickup truck had recently used the phone. The identifying information was broadcast. Approximately four minutes later and four blocks away, an officer spotted a vehicle matching the description—driven by Kalb—and stopped it. Kalb admitted placing the call. He was taken to the Upper Merion Township police station and admitted to driving his friend to the scrapping location. Kalb was indicted for destruction of property on U.S. land, 18 U.S.C. 1363 and aiding and abetting, 18 U.S.C. 2. The court granted Kalb’s motion to suppress on October 21, then held a conference call and scheduled a status conference for November 29. During that call, the government “sought leave to review the transcript of the suppression hearing before proceeding.” On November 29, the government filed a motion to reconsider the suppression order. The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the motion as untimely. A motion for reconsideration, filed after the statutory appeal period elapsed but considered on the merits, does not keep the appeal period from expiring; 18 U.S.C. 3731 imposes a 30-day jurisdictional filing requirement, which can be stopped only by a timely-filed motion for reconsideration. View "United States v. Kalb" on Justia Law
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Criminal Law
United States v. Shaw
Essex County Correctional Facility Officer Shaw was covering the women’s unit alone overnight. Some women, including E.S., “flashed” him with their buttocks. Shaw responded with sexual comments and spoke over an intercom connected to E.S.'s shared cell, stating that he was “going to come in there.” Around 3:00 a.m. Shaw entered the cell and raped E.S. Her cellmate remained asleep. E.S. told a male inmate (via hand signals), her mother and her attorney. The male inmate reported the incident. E.S. then formally reported the assault. She was examined and was found to have semen on her cervix. The government’s expert testified that the DNA mixture was “approximately 28.9 million times more likely in the African American population” that E.S. and Shaw were the sources than if E.S. and a “randomly selected unrelated individual” were the sources. Shaw is African American. Electronic records of the cell doors established that E.S.’s cell door was opened at 2:43:41 a.m. and closed at 2:50:39 a.m. Only Shaw was logged onto the computer that opened the door. Shaw denied the accusations, stated that he left the unit on his break during the time at issue, and testified that inmates were known to be engaging in sex in the gym. Convicted of deprivation of civil rights through aggravated sexual abuse, 18 U.S.C. 242, and obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. 1512(b)(3), Shaw was sentenced to 25 years’ incarceration. The Third Circuit affirmed, upholding jury instructions and rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. View "United States v. Shaw" on Justia Law
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Criminal Law
United States v. Foster
A Wilmington barbershop employee watched an Accord in the parking lot for approximately 20 minutes and later testified that the passenger had a full beard and that the driver was wearing a red or pink scarf over his face, while repeatedly looking around the strip of stores and “pumping himself up to do something.” He could not identify the occupants; he could only tell that they were black males. When Delaware State Troopers arrived, the Accord left. The barbershop’s owner took a picture of the car’s license plate. Troopers discovered that the car had been reported stolen in an armed robbery and sent an email alert. Trooper Yeldell received the e-mail and patrolled the area the following morning. The car passed; Yeldell saw that the passenger (Foster) was wearing a red or pink scarf; the driver (Payton) was a black male with facial hair. Moments later, in the parking lot, Foster was outside of the Accord, holding an object. The second man was not present. Yeldell pulled out his gun and ordered Foster to the ground. Foster ran. Shot with a Taser, Foster fell, and a gun "went flying.” Officers recovered a loaded semi-automatic pistol. Payton was picked up while walking down the street, based on a generic description of a “black man.” The Accord was transported; a search revealed a loaded rifle, a scope, duct tape, and gloves, which were not in the car when it was stolen. No DNA or fingerprints connected either defendant to those items. The Third Circuit affirmed their convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), finding there was reasonable suspicion to stop Payton and upholding the admission of the barbershop employees’ testimony and sentencing enhancements for use of a firearm in connection with another offense. View "United States v. Foster" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
United States v. James
In 2015, former Virgin Islands Senator James was charged with wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and federal programs embezzlement, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(A), stemming from his use of legislative funds to ostensibly obtain historical documents from Denmark related to the Fireburn, an 1878 St. Croix uprising. The indictment specified: obtaining cash advances from the Legislature but retaining a portion of those funds for his personal use; double-billing for expenses for which he had already received a cash advance; submitting invoices and receiving funds for translation work that was never done; and submitting invoices and receiving funds for translation work that was completed before his election to the Legislature. James, who argued that he was engaged in legislative fact-finding, moved to dismiss the indictment on legislative immunity grounds. The district court denied the motion, stating that James’ actions were not legislative acts worthy of statutory protection under the Organic Act of the Virgin Islands. The Third Circuit affirmed. Under 48 U.S.C. 1572(d) legislators are protected from being “held to answer before any tribunal other than the legislature for any speech or debate in the legislature." The conduct underlying the government’s allegations concerning James is clearly not legislative conduct protected by section 1572(d). View "United States v. James" on Justia Law
United States v. James
In 2015, former Virgin Islands Senator James was charged with wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and federal programs embezzlement, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(A), stemming from his use of legislative funds to ostensibly obtain historical documents from Denmark related to the Fireburn, an 1878 St. Croix uprising. The indictment specified: obtaining cash advances from the Legislature but retaining a portion of those funds for his personal use; double-billing for expenses for which he had already received a cash advance; submitting invoices and receiving funds for translation work that was never done; and submitting invoices and receiving funds for translation work that was completed before his election to the Legislature. James, who argued that he was engaged in legislative fact-finding, moved to dismiss the indictment on legislative immunity grounds. The district court denied the motion, stating that James’ actions were not legislative acts worthy of statutory protection under the Organic Act of the Virgin Islands. The Third Circuit affirmed. Under 48 U.S.C. 1572(d) legislators are protected from being “held to answer before any tribunal other than the legislature for any speech or debate in the legislature." The conduct underlying the government’s allegations concerning James is clearly not legislative conduct protected by section 1572(d). View "United States v. James" on Justia Law
United States v. Grant
Grant was 16 years old when he committed crimes that led to his incarceration. He was convicted in 1992 under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and for drug trafficking. The court determined that Grant would never be fit to reenter society and sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for the RICO convictions with a concurrent 40-year term for the drug convictions and a mandatory consecutive five-year term for a gun conviction. In 2012, the Supreme Court decided, in Miller v. Alabama, that only incorrigible juvenile homicide offenders who have no capacity to reform may be sentenced to LWOP and that all non-incorrigible juvenile offenders are entitled to a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” The court resentenced Grant to a term of 65 years without parole. Grant argued that the sentence constitutes de facto LWOP. The Third Circuit vacated Grant’s sentence. A sentence that either meets or exceeds a non-incorrigible juvenile offender’s life expectancy violates the Eighth Amendment; courts must hold evidentiary hearings to determine the non-incorrigible juvenile offender’s life expectancy and must consider as sentencing factors his life expectancy and the national age of retirement, with the section 3553(a) factors, to properly structure a meaningful opportunity for release. View "United States v. Grant" on Justia Law
Moreno v. Attorney General United States
Moreno, a 49-year-old citizen of Argentina, was admitted to the U.S. under a grant of humanitarian parole in 1980. In 2015, Moreno pleaded guilty to one count of possession of child pornography under Pennsylvania’s “Sexual abuse of children” statute and was sentenced to five years of probation and required to register as a sex offender. DHS initiated removal proceedings in 2016, charging Moreno as removable for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). The Immigration Judge ordered him removed; the Board of Immigration Appeals rejected Moreno’s appeal. The Third Circuit denied his petition for review, rejecting Moreno’s argument that, under the categorical approach, the least culpable conduct hypothetically necessary to sustain a conviction under the statute of his conviction is not morally turpitudinous. Pennsylvania’s Pennsylvania’s community consensus, as gauged by case law and legislative enactments, condemns the least culpable conduct punishable under the statute as morally turpitudinous. View "Moreno v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law
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Criminal Law, Immigration Law