Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Glass pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The district court applied a career-offender enhancement, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, based on two prior state convictions under 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. 780-113(a)(30) (from 2001 and 2004) then applied a downward variance, primarily on the observation that the pre-sentence investigation report overstated the seriousness of Glass’s criminal past. The court also noted Glass’s significant family responsibilities, his drug addiction, and his relatively young age and imposed a prison term of 132 months. The Third Circuit affirmed the imposition of the career-offender enhancement. Noting that Glass failed to challenge the inclusion of his convictions as predicate offenses for career-offender purposes prior to appeal and Glass’s first appellate counsel acknowledged that trial counsel had conceded the issue, the Third Circuit applied plain error review. The Pennsylvania law does not sweep more broadly than section 4B1.2; it is a “controlled substance offense” and may serve as a predicate offense to a career-offender enhancement under section 4B1.1. View "United States v. Glass" on Justia Law

Rinaldi, a Lewisburg inmate, alleged that he had been assaulted by Cellmate 1. His informal and subsequent formal "Assault Requests" were denied. The following day, Rinaldi was transferred. According to Rinaldi, Counselor Baysore had warned Rinaldi that unless he stopped filing requests, she would have him placed with a cellmate who was known for assaulting his cellmates. Officer Gee allegedly told Rinaldi he was being moved was because he “didn’t listen.” Cellmate 2, Rinaldi alleges, threatened to kill Rinaldi. Rinaldi claims he “suffered cuts and bruises and emotional distress” from altercations with Cellmate 2. Rinaldi allegedly was concerned about further retaliation and did not file an informal resolution with Lewisburg. He filed his “Retaliation Request” with the Regional Director, where it was rejected with directions to file it at Lewisburg. Separately, Rinaldi sought relief for the assault by Cellmate 2. The Regional Director responded: [T]here is no record of you being assaulted by your previous or current cellmate. . . your appeal is denied." Rinaldi’s further appeal to the General Counsel was denied on the merits. The Third Circuit vacated, in part, the dismissal of RInaldi’s claims. Rinaldi’s Assault Request was denied at the highest level on the merits and was properly exhausted under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). Rinaldi’s Retaliation Request satisfies the objective test for unavailability. Accepting his allegations as true, “a reasonable inmate of ordinary firmness and fortitude” would be “deter[red] . . . from lodging a grievance.” A Federal Tort Claims Act claim was properly dismissed as concerning discretionary functions. View "Rinaldi v. United States" on Justia Law

Workman, one of two people to shoot Hunt in 2006, was convicted of first-degree murder in Pennsylvania on a theory of transferred intent. His trial counsel, pursuing “a unique theory of criminal liability,” did not meaningfully test the Commonwealth’s case, having told Workman that he could not be convicted of murder because Hunt was already dead when he was struck by Workman’s bullet. Based on this representation, Workman declined a plea bargain for a 20-year term of imprisonment. Workman’s post-conviction counsel failed to make a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on failure to present a cogent defense. The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of his habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254. Although his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was procedurally defaulted in state post-conviction relief proceedings, that default should be excused because his state post-conviction counsel rendered ineffective assistance. On the face of the record, trial counsel’s assistance was manifestly ineffective, having included calling no witnesses, presenting no evidence, and arguing inconsistently with the testimony in evidence. View "Workman v. Superintendent Albion SCI" on Justia Law

Homeland Security Agent Kuc posed as a Pennsylvania drug trafficker, communicating by phone with men called Cejas and Juan, who used telephone numbers with Mexican country codes. They sent two kilograms of methamphetamine to a Springfield, Pennsylvania mailbox. Kuc received the methamphetamine on May 29, 2015, and deposited $2,000 in an agreed-upon bank account the following day in Philadelphia. On June 3, Kuc traveled to Los Angeles and spoke to Cejas, who stated that he would direct his local contact to contact Kuc. Kuc received a phone call from Renteria. The two planned to exchange methamphetamine and heroin for $146,500, which included $28,000 owed for the Pennsylvania methamphetamine shipment. The next day, the men met at a Huntington Beach restaurant. Kuc saw the drugs and gave other agents a prearranged signal, Renteria was convicted of conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine and one kilogram or more of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 846, and was sentenced to 153 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was not a proper venue because it was not reasonably foreseeable that conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy would have occurred there; that the court gave incorrect jury instructions concerning venue; and that the court erred in its sentencing calculation. The court declined to adopt the “reasonable foreseeability” test; Renteria’s activities constituted overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, sufficient to establish venue under section 3237(a). View "United States v. Renteria" on Justia Law

David was married to Belford, 2001-2006; they had four children. After an award of joint custody, David and his mother (Lenore) kidnapped the children and absconded to Central America. David was eventually returned to the U.S., convicted, and incarcerated. At his direction, his family engaged in a years-long conspiracy to harass Belford, including the publication of videos and other social media postings that accused Belford of criminal conduct; surveillance; and letter-writing campaigns. David’s parental rights and the familial rights of Lenore, his father (Thomas), and his sister (Amy) were terminated. The harassment continued. David filed a petition to reduce his back payments of child support in Delaware Family Court. Although he resided in Texas and could participate by phone, David, Lenore, and Thomas drove to Delaware, with an assault rifle, handguns, military-style knives, thousands of rounds of ammunition, restraints, body armor, binoculars, an electric shock device, gas cans, a shovel, photographs of Belford’s children and residence, and notes about Belford’s neighbors. Thomas and David entered the New Castle County Courthouse lobby, where Thomas shot and killed Belden and her friend, injured two police officers, and then shot himself in the head. David, Lenore, and Amy were convicted of combinations of: conspiracy to commit interstate stalking and cyberstalking, 18 U.S.C. 2261A(1) and 18 U.S.C. 371; interstate stalking; and interstate and cyberstalking resulting in death, with Thomas as an unindicted co-conspirator. The district court sentenced each to life imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, the lack of a specific unanimity instruction, the constitutionality of the statutes under which they were convicted, and their sentences. View "United States v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

A shooting death occurred during a 2000 fight between the victim, Preston, and Preston’s brother Leonard. Leonard took the stand at his own trial and was convicted of third-degree murder. Preston was later convicted and is serving a 20-40-year sentence for third-degree murder. Preston sought habeas relief based on an alleged violation of his Confrontation Clause rights. Faced with Leonard's invocation of the Fifth Amendment (his appeal was pending) the trial court had allowed the Commonwealth to use Leonard’s police statement and his prior testimony. The prosecutor read aloud portions of those statements, occasionally stopping to ask Leonard if he remembered making them. Leonard largely replied “no comment.” The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Preston’s petition. While the use of the prior statements against Preston violated the Confrontation Clause, Preston’s Confrontation Clause claim was procedurally defaulted. Rejecting Preston’s argument that counsel’s failure to raise an objection at trial provided cause to excuse the procedural default, the court stated that Preston failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was constitutionally ineffective under the two-pronged "Strickland" test. Preston cannot show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure, which was objectively unreasonable, given the cumulative evidence against him. Even absent Leonard’s testimony, the jury would have concluded that Leonard was the shooter. View "Preston v. Superintendent Graterford SCI" on Justia Law

Edison, New Jersey, Police Officer Bradley and his partner saw a minivan on the road at night without headlights, while its driver was using a mobile phone and had an obstructed view. They pulled over the van, driven by Roberts; Clark was a passenger. The traffic stop lasted about 23 minutes from the time Officer Bradley arrived at the driver-side window until he discovered a handgun and a marijuana cigarette on Clark. The district court concluded that the traffic stop was impermissibly extended so that evidence seized after the stop should have ended may be suppressed, citing the Supreme Court’s 2015 “Rodriguez” holding. The Third Circuit affirmed the suppression of the evidence. Given the information confronting Bradley when he confirmed through the computerized check that Roberts was authorized to drive the vehicle, and when there was no fact calling that authority into doubt, Bradley no longer could have reasonably questioned it. Bradley’s inquiry into Roberts’ criminal history was not tied to the traffic stop’s mission, and, at that point, “tasks tied to the traffic infraction . . . reasonably should have been . . . completed.” The questions therefore impermissibly extended the stop. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law

After a 2001 joint trial with co-defendants, Eley and Eiland, a jury convicted Mitchell of second-degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery for the shooting death of a Harrisburg taxi driver. He is serving a sentence of life imprisonment. Mitchell and Eley had unsuccessfully moved to have their cases severed. After unsuccessful state court proceedings, Mitchell sought federal habeas relief (28 U.S.C. 2254), arguing that the admission of testimony by jailhouse informants concerning Eiland’s out-of-court statements violated his Confrontation Clause rights. The district court concluded that Eiland’s statements to the informants were nontestimonial under Supreme Court precedent (Crawford (2004)) so their admission did not violate his rights even though he could not cross-examine Eiland. Mitchell argued that the Supreme Court decided Crawford after the last state court proceeding dealing with the Sixth Amendment issue so that Crawford principles were not “clearly established” at the time. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Mitchell, by focusing narrowly on the “clearly established Federal law” language of 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) and by relying on the law in effect at the time of his proceedings, misstates the standard applicable to habeas corpus review of a state court conviction. Relief is available “only on the ground that [a prisoner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Mitchell is not in custody pursuant to what is now recognized as a Sixth Amendment violation. View "Mitchell v. Superintendent Dallas SCI" on Justia Law

Mayo is currently serving a 23-year term of imprisonment for a 2001 conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (ACCA) recidivist enhancement provision, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), having committed three prior offenses in Pennsylvania that the court treated as violent felonies under ACCA: aggravated assault, in 1993, and two robberies, in 1993 and 1994. Mayo argued that, in light of the Supreme Court’s 2015 “Johnson” holding, invalidating ACCA’s residual clause, his sentence is now unconstitutional because none of his prior convictions were for crimes that qualify as a “violent felony” as defined in ACCA. The district court rejected Mayo’s claim for post-conviction relief. The Third Circuit vacated. The aggravated assault conviction was under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 2702(a)(1), which prohibits “attempt[ing] to cause serious bodily injury to another, or caus[ing] such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life[.]” As Pennsylvania interprets section 2702(a)(1), it does not necessarily involve the element of physical force required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the ACCA. At least one of the convictions that the court relied on to enhance Mayo’s sentence does not qualify as a violent felony. View "United States v. Mayo" on Justia Law

Before trial on a 77-count indictment that charged Appellants with operating a ticket-fixing scheme in the Philadelphia Traffic Court, the district court denied a motion to dismiss charges of conspiracy (18 U.S.C. 1349), mail fraud (18 U.S.C. 1341), and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343). A private citizen and the Traffic Court administrator subsequently pleaded guilty to all counts, then appealed whether the indictment properly alleged mail fraud and wire fraud. Three Traffic Court Judges proceeded to a joint trial and were acquitted of fraud and conspiracy but convicted of perjury for statements they made before the Grand Jury. They disputed the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that the prosecutor’s questions were vague and that their answers were literally true; claimed that the jury was prejudiced by evidence on the fraud and conspiracy counts; and argued that the court erred by ruling that certain evidence was inadmissible. The Third Circuit affirmed the convictions. The Indictment sufficiently alleged that the defendants engaged in a scheme to defraud the Commonwealth and the city of money in costs and fees; it explicitly states that the scheme deprived the city and the Commonwealth of money, and describes the object of the scheme as obviating judgments of guilt that imposed the fines and costs. View "United States v. Hird" on Justia Law