Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Rivera-Cruz pleaded guilty to distributing and possessing with intent to manufacture and distribute cocaine hydrochloride, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The drug quantities yielded a base offense level of 32. The Probation Office recommended a two-level firearm enhancement and a two-level obstruction of justice enhancement. Based on a total offense level of 36 and a criminal history category of VI, Rivera-Cruz’s Guidelines range was 324–405 months’ imprisonment but the offense carried a statutory maximum of 240 months’ imprisonment. The government moved for a "substantial assistance" downward departure and recommended a 215-month sentence. The court calculated the departure in terms of “offense levels as opposed to specific quantities of time,” settled on a five-level departure to an offense level of 31, and sentenced Rivera-Cruz to 188 months’ imprisonment. The Sentencing Commission later adopted Guidelines Amendment 782, retroactively reducing Rivera-Cruz’s base offense level by two, so that Rivera-Cruz’s Guidelines range would have been 262–327 months’ imprisonment, with the 240-month statutory maximum. Rivera-Cruz requested a sentence reduction, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), citing Amendment 782. The Third Circuit affirmed denial of his motion. In 2018, the Supreme Court held that such relief is unavailable to a defendant whose Guidelines range is “scrapped” because of a statutory mandatory minimum sentence; the Third Circuit held that the same is true where a statutory maximum displaces the defendant’s Guidelines range. View "United States v. Rivera-Cruz" on Justia Law

In December 2017, Reese was charged with using a facility and means of interstate or foreign commerce to attempt to induce, entice, or coerce a minor into engaging in sexual activity. The government sought pretrial detention arguing that there was probable cause to believe that Reese had committed the charged offense, which created a rebuttable presumption in favor of detention, 18 U.S.C. 3142(e)(3)(E). The motion was granted. In February 2018, Reese filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition. In March 2018, Reese, through counsel, moved for pretrial release in the separate criminal case, but before the same judge. That judge denied the motion, concluding that the evidence against Reese was “overwhelming,” that Reese had numerous prior criminal convictions, that Reese had previously violated conditions of bail, and that Reese lacked ties to the community. An appeal of that denial is pending. The court then dismissed the section 2241 petition. The Third Circuit held that a federal detainee cannot challenge his pretrial detention via a section 2241 habeas petition; such a request for release pending trial can only be considered under the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3141–3150, which provides a comprehensive scheme governing pretrial-release decisions. View "Reese v. Warden Philadelphia FDC" on Justia Law

Thomas was arrested on charges that she “knowingly attempted to provide material support . . . to a designated foreign terrorist organization,” 18 U.S.C. 2339B. Thomas unsuccessfully moved for a bill of particulars and to compel notice and discovery of surveillance. Thomas pled guilty. Access to several documents on the docket was restricted. Philly Declaration moved to intervene and obtain access to all records on the docket, transcripts of Thomas’s plea hearing and her ex parte presentation to the court regarding the motions, and search warrant materials. The prosecution agreed that certain records should be largely unsealed but maintained that the “Plea Document” that was docketed with the publicly-filed guilty plea memorandum should remain under seal for reasons detailed in a sealed addendum and objected to unsealing a “Grand Jury exhibit” attached to Thomas’s reply brief in support of her motion for a bill of particulars and to unredacting quotes and citations that appeared in the Reply Brief itself. The district court ruled in favor of the government. The Third Circuit affirmed as to the Plea Document, vacated with respect to the Reply Brief and Exhibit, and remanded. While a presumptive First Amendment right of access attaches to plea hearings and related documents, the district court properly concluded that the compelling government interests of national security would be substantially impaired by permitting full access to this plea document. The proposed redactions are properly first considered by the district court. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Glass pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The district court applied a career-offender enhancement, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, based on two prior state convictions under 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. 780-113(a)(30) (from 2001 and 2004) then applied a downward variance, primarily on the observation that the pre-sentence investigation report overstated the seriousness of Glass’s criminal past. The court also noted Glass’s significant family responsibilities, his drug addiction, and his relatively young age and imposed a prison term of 132 months. The Third Circuit affirmed the imposition of the career-offender enhancement. Noting that Glass failed to challenge the inclusion of his convictions as predicate offenses for career-offender purposes prior to appeal and Glass’s first appellate counsel acknowledged that trial counsel had conceded the issue, the Third Circuit applied plain error review. The Pennsylvania law does not sweep more broadly than section 4B1.2; it is a “controlled substance offense” and may serve as a predicate offense to a career-offender enhancement under section 4B1.1. View "United States v. Glass" on Justia Law

Rinaldi, a Lewisburg inmate, alleged that he had been assaulted by Cellmate 1. His informal and subsequent formal "Assault Requests" were denied. The following day, Rinaldi was transferred. According to Rinaldi, Counselor Baysore had warned Rinaldi that unless he stopped filing requests, she would have him placed with a cellmate who was known for assaulting his cellmates. Officer Gee allegedly told Rinaldi he was being moved was because he “didn’t listen.” Cellmate 2, Rinaldi alleges, threatened to kill Rinaldi. Rinaldi claims he “suffered cuts and bruises and emotional distress” from altercations with Cellmate 2. Rinaldi allegedly was concerned about further retaliation and did not file an informal resolution with Lewisburg. He filed his “Retaliation Request” with the Regional Director, where it was rejected with directions to file it at Lewisburg. Separately, Rinaldi sought relief for the assault by Cellmate 2. The Regional Director responded: [T]here is no record of you being assaulted by your previous or current cellmate. . . your appeal is denied." Rinaldi’s further appeal to the General Counsel was denied on the merits. The Third Circuit vacated, in part, the dismissal of RInaldi’s claims. Rinaldi’s Assault Request was denied at the highest level on the merits and was properly exhausted under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). Rinaldi’s Retaliation Request satisfies the objective test for unavailability. Accepting his allegations as true, “a reasonable inmate of ordinary firmness and fortitude” would be “deter[red] . . . from lodging a grievance.” A Federal Tort Claims Act claim was properly dismissed as concerning discretionary functions. View "Rinaldi v. United States" on Justia Law

Workman, one of two people to shoot Hunt in 2006, was convicted of first-degree murder in Pennsylvania on a theory of transferred intent. His trial counsel, pursuing “a unique theory of criminal liability,” did not meaningfully test the Commonwealth’s case, having told Workman that he could not be convicted of murder because Hunt was already dead when he was struck by Workman’s bullet. Based on this representation, Workman declined a plea bargain for a 20-year term of imprisonment. Workman’s post-conviction counsel failed to make a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on failure to present a cogent defense. The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of his habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254. Although his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was procedurally defaulted in state post-conviction relief proceedings, that default should be excused because his state post-conviction counsel rendered ineffective assistance. On the face of the record, trial counsel’s assistance was manifestly ineffective, having included calling no witnesses, presenting no evidence, and arguing inconsistently with the testimony in evidence. View "Workman v. Superintendent Albion SCI" on Justia Law

Homeland Security Agent Kuc posed as a Pennsylvania drug trafficker, communicating by phone with men called Cejas and Juan, who used telephone numbers with Mexican country codes. They sent two kilograms of methamphetamine to a Springfield, Pennsylvania mailbox. Kuc received the methamphetamine on May 29, 2015, and deposited $2,000 in an agreed-upon bank account the following day in Philadelphia. On June 3, Kuc traveled to Los Angeles and spoke to Cejas, who stated that he would direct his local contact to contact Kuc. Kuc received a phone call from Renteria. The two planned to exchange methamphetamine and heroin for $146,500, which included $28,000 owed for the Pennsylvania methamphetamine shipment. The next day, the men met at a Huntington Beach restaurant. Kuc saw the drugs and gave other agents a prearranged signal, Renteria was convicted of conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine and one kilogram or more of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 846, and was sentenced to 153 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was not a proper venue because it was not reasonably foreseeable that conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy would have occurred there; that the court gave incorrect jury instructions concerning venue; and that the court erred in its sentencing calculation. The court declined to adopt the “reasonable foreseeability” test; Renteria’s activities constituted overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, sufficient to establish venue under section 3237(a). View "United States v. Renteria" on Justia Law

David was married to Belford, 2001-2006; they had four children. After an award of joint custody, David and his mother (Lenore) kidnapped the children and absconded to Central America. David was eventually returned to the U.S., convicted, and incarcerated. At his direction, his family engaged in a years-long conspiracy to harass Belford, including the publication of videos and other social media postings that accused Belford of criminal conduct; surveillance; and letter-writing campaigns. David’s parental rights and the familial rights of Lenore, his father (Thomas), and his sister (Amy) were terminated. The harassment continued. David filed a petition to reduce his back payments of child support in Delaware Family Court. Although he resided in Texas and could participate by phone, David, Lenore, and Thomas drove to Delaware, with an assault rifle, handguns, military-style knives, thousands of rounds of ammunition, restraints, body armor, binoculars, an electric shock device, gas cans, a shovel, photographs of Belford’s children and residence, and notes about Belford’s neighbors. Thomas and David entered the New Castle County Courthouse lobby, where Thomas shot and killed Belden and her friend, injured two police officers, and then shot himself in the head. David, Lenore, and Amy were convicted of combinations of: conspiracy to commit interstate stalking and cyberstalking, 18 U.S.C. 2261A(1) and 18 U.S.C. 371; interstate stalking; and interstate and cyberstalking resulting in death, with Thomas as an unindicted co-conspirator. The district court sentenced each to life imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, the lack of a specific unanimity instruction, the constitutionality of the statutes under which they were convicted, and their sentences. View "United States v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

A shooting death occurred during a 2000 fight between the victim, Preston, and Preston’s brother Leonard. Leonard took the stand at his own trial and was convicted of third-degree murder. Preston was later convicted and is serving a 20-40-year sentence for third-degree murder. Preston sought habeas relief based on an alleged violation of his Confrontation Clause rights. Faced with Leonard's invocation of the Fifth Amendment (his appeal was pending) the trial court had allowed the Commonwealth to use Leonard’s police statement and his prior testimony. The prosecutor read aloud portions of those statements, occasionally stopping to ask Leonard if he remembered making them. Leonard largely replied “no comment.” The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Preston’s petition. While the use of the prior statements against Preston violated the Confrontation Clause, Preston’s Confrontation Clause claim was procedurally defaulted. Rejecting Preston’s argument that counsel’s failure to raise an objection at trial provided cause to excuse the procedural default, the court stated that Preston failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was constitutionally ineffective under the two-pronged "Strickland" test. Preston cannot show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure, which was objectively unreasonable, given the cumulative evidence against him. Even absent Leonard’s testimony, the jury would have concluded that Leonard was the shooter. View "Preston v. Superintendent Graterford SCI" on Justia Law

Edison, New Jersey, Police Officer Bradley and his partner saw a minivan on the road at night without headlights, while its driver was using a mobile phone and had an obstructed view. They pulled over the van, driven by Roberts; Clark was a passenger. The traffic stop lasted about 23 minutes from the time Officer Bradley arrived at the driver-side window until he discovered a handgun and a marijuana cigarette on Clark. The district court concluded that the traffic stop was impermissibly extended so that evidence seized after the stop should have ended may be suppressed, citing the Supreme Court’s 2015 “Rodriguez” holding. The Third Circuit affirmed the suppression of the evidence. Given the information confronting Bradley when he confirmed through the computerized check that Roberts was authorized to drive the vehicle, and when there was no fact calling that authority into doubt, Bradley no longer could have reasonably questioned it. Bradley’s inquiry into Roberts’ criminal history was not tied to the traffic stop’s mission, and, at that point, “tasks tied to the traffic infraction . . . reasonably should have been . . . completed.” The questions therefore impermissibly extended the stop. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law