Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In September 2017, Luis Davis, Joel Rivera, and Chriss Cepeda broke into the home of Stephen O’Dea and Kathryn Duncan on the island of Saint Croix. The intruders physically assaulted the couple, threatened them with a gun, and stole their money and vehicle. Davis was later indicted on twelve counts, including brandishing a firearm during a violent crime, carjacking, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Davis pleaded guilty to these three counts in exchange for the Government dismissing the remaining counts and recommending a sentence at the low end of the Sentencing Guidelines range (87 to 108 months).The District Court determined the applicable Guidelines sentence for brandishing a firearm was the statutory minimum of 84 months’ imprisonment and the Guidelines range for the carjacking and felon-in-possession counts was 87 to 108 months’ imprisonment. At sentencing, Davis’s counsel presented mitigating evidence regarding his client’s abusive childhood, intellectual disabilities, drug addiction, and the negative influence of his adopted brother. The Government, however, emphasized the heinous nature of Davis’s crimes and the harm suffered by the victims. Davis’s counsel objected, claiming that the Government’s position sounded like a breach of the plea agreement. The District Court sentenced Davis to 102 months’ imprisonment on the carjacking and felon-in-possession counts, in addition to the statutory minimum of 84 months’ imprisonment for brandishing a firearm. Davis appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed with Davis that the Government breached the plea agreement. The court found that the Government's emphasis on the heinous nature of Davis's crimes and the harm suffered by the victims effectively advocated for a sentence higher than the one it promised to recommend. The court vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. View "USA v. Davis" on Justia Law

Between 2012 and 2015, Anthony D’Ambrosio and Armando Delgado were involved in a sex trafficking ring that operated across several states. They were responsible for transporting victims, collecting money, providing security, and supplying drugs to the victims. In 2015, a federal grand jury indicted them, and in 2017, a jury convicted them of several crimes, including sex trafficking of children and transportation of an individual to engage in prostitution. As part of their sentences, the District Court required them to comply with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) as a condition of their supervised release.Delgado objected to the SORNA registration requirement at his sentencing, arguing that his offenses did not require SORNA registration. The District Court acknowledged that it was unclear whether the SORNA requirement applied to Delgado’s offenses and delegated the determination to the Probation office. Delgado appealed this decision, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision, stating that the District Court did not impose any SORNA requirement. However, following his direct appeal, Probation required Delgado to register under SORNA. Delgado challenged this condition, but the District Court denied his motion, stating that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his legal challenge.D’Ambrosio, on the other hand, did not object to the SORNA registration requirement at his sentencing. The District Court required D’Ambrosio to comply with SORNA as a condition of his supervised release. D’Ambrosio first challenged the SORNA requirement in a motion to modify, which the District Court also denied on the grounds of lacking jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the District Court's decisions. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred in delegating its responsibility to determine the applicability of SORNA to the Probation office and in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the defendants' motions to modify the conditions of their supervised release. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. D’Ambrosio" on Justia Law

Sahbree Hurtt was convicted of possession of heroin, fentanyl, and cocaine with intent to distribute. The District Court determined that his prior convictions for aggravated assault and drug trafficking qualified him as a "career offender" under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (USSG), leading to sentencing enhancements. Hurtt objected to his status as a career offender, arguing that neither conviction constituted a career-offender predicate.The District Court reviewed judicial records from Hurtt's prior convictions and determined that he had prior convictions under specific sections of Pennsylvania's aggravated-assault and drug-trafficking statutes. The court concluded that these convictions qualified as a "crime of violence" and "controlled substance offense," respectively, under the USSG. Consequently, the court imposed corresponding enhancements and sentenced Hurtt to 120 months' imprisonment. Hurtt appealed this decision, challenging his status as a career offender.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The court found that Hurtt's conviction for aggravated assault under a specific subsection of Pennsylvania's aggravated-assault statute constituted a "crime of violence" under the USSG. The court also determined that Hurtt's conviction for drug trafficking under a specific section of Pennsylvania's drug-trafficking statute constituted a "controlled substance offense" under the USSG. Therefore, the court concluded that Hurtt qualifies as a career offender under the USSG, affirming the District Court's judgment. View "USA v. Sahbree Hurtt" on Justia Law

The case involves Tahjair Dorsey, who was convicted for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Dorsey had previously pleaded guilty to carrying a firearm without a license, a felony under Pennsylvania law. He was paroled in June 2021. In August 2021, during an investigation into suspected gang activity, Dorsey was observed leaving a residence under surveillance and was apprehended after fleeing a vehicle stop. A stolen handgun was recovered nearby, and Dorsey's DNA was found on it. He was subsequently indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm.Dorsey pleaded guilty but later appealed his conviction, arguing that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to him under the Second Amendment. However, he had not raised this objection at any stage of the District Court proceedings. The District Court sentenced Dorsey to time served and three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case for plain error. The court referred to its en banc decision in Range v. Attorney General, which held that disarming an individual with a single, almost-thirty-year-old criminal conviction for food stamp fraud was not consistent with the Second Amendment. The court found that Dorsey could not show that he was similarly situated to the appellant in Range for Second Amendment purposes. The court noted that Dorsey's prior conviction was for a state firearm law violation, was more recent, and he was on state parole at the time of the offense. The court concluded that any Second Amendment error inherent in Dorsey’s conviction was not plain and affirmed the lower court's decision. View "USA v. Dorsey" on Justia Law

James Chandler was convicted for twice robbing on-duty United States Postal Service employees using a fake gun, and in one instance, kidnapping his victim. The District Court enhanced Chandler's sentence for using the replica gun in the robberies and the kidnapping, and for the kidnapping being motivated, at least in part, by the mail carrier being a government employee.Chandler appealed the application of these two enhancements, arguing that the judge erred in holding that a replica of a gun constitutes a dangerous weapon, and further erred in holding that his kidnapping of the second mail carrier was motivated by her status as a government employee. He also appealed his conviction for armed robbery, rather than unarmed robbery, again arguing that a replica firearm is not a dangerous weapon.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The Court of Appeals found that the term "dangerous weapon" is genuinely ambiguous and can include a replica firearm. The Court also found that the District Court did not err in accepting Chandler's guilty plea to armed robbery. Finally, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that Chandler was motivated to kidnap the mail carrier because she was a government employee. View "USA v. Chandler" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Jonathan Goerig, who was found parked in a high-school parking lot. A police officer, acting on a tip, approached Goerig and began questioning him. The officer noticed Goerig's shorts were pulled down and his suspicious responses led the officer to order him out of his truck. Evidence found in the truck revealed that Goerig planned to meet a minor for sex.Prior to the current review, the District Court had denied Goerig's motion to suppress the evidence found in his truck, his statements to the arresting officers, and all evidence recovered from his phone and iCloud account. The court held that the officer had not seized Goerig until he told him to get out of the truck and by then, he had reasonable suspicion. It also ruled that police had validly seized all the evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment. The court held that the police officer did not seize Goerig until he ordered him to step out of the truck. Until then, the officer was just asking him questions. The court also held that by the time the officer ordered Goerig out of the truck, he had reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop. The court further held that the arrest was proper and that the police validly searched and seized all the evidence. The court concluded that the Terry stop, arrest, and searches and seizures were proper, and thus affirmed the District Court's judgment. View "USA v. Goerig" on Justia Law

The case involves defendants Abdur Rahim Islam and Shahied Dawan, who were charged with multiple counts of fraud and bribery related to their roles in Universal Community Homes and Universal Education Companies. During their nearly six-week-long trial, five original jurors were discharged and replaced by alternates. When one of the remaining jurors contracted COVID-19, the defendants refused to proceed with eleven jurors, leading the District Court to declare a mistrial based on manifest necessity. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause barred their reprosecution. The District Court denied the motion.The case was previously tried in March 2022, but the jury was unable to reach a verdict, leading to a retrial in September 2022. During the retrial, three jurors were discharged during the first phase of the trial due to various personal reasons. After the jury acquitted all four defendants of the honest services wire fraud charges, the trial continued with the remaining charges against Islam and Dawan. However, two more jurors were discharged due to personal reasons, and another juror contracted COVID-19, leading to the declaration of a mistrial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the District Court’s declaration of a mistrial was manifestly necessary, affirming the decision as to Islam. However, the court dismissed Dawan’s appeal as moot because he was acquitted on all other counts, and any remaining double jeopardy issues with respect to him were no longer live. The court found that the District Court had considered and exhausted all reasonably available alternatives before declaring a mistrial, and therefore did not abuse its discretion when it discharged the jury. View "USA v. Islam" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Victor Cora-Alicea, who was involved in a drug trafficking operation led by Ramone Velazquez. Cora-Alicea, who had no supervisory responsibilities and was merely tasked with bagging drugs, was arrested and pleaded guilty to violations of drug trafficking laws. His sentencing was calculated based on a base offense level of 31, with reductions for his safety-valve eligibility, minor role, and acceptance of responsibility, resulting in a total offense level of 24. His criminal history category I was based on a nonexistent criminal record. The District Court set his Guidelines range at 51–63 months. Cora-Alicea requested a mitigation-based variance from the range, arguing that his life history, personal characteristics, and an anticipated change to the Guidelines for people with zero criminal history points justified a variance to approximately 24 months’ imprisonment.The District Court sentenced Cora-Alicea to 45 months on each count, to be served concurrently, followed by a total of three years on supervised release. The court took into consideration his zero-point status but ignored Cora-Alicea’s other bases for a variance. Cora-Alicea appealed the District Court’s judgment, arguing that the court procedurally erred at sentencing by dismissing the majority of his personal mitigation evidence offered in support of a variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) on the ground that it was “already taken into account” by the downward adjustments under the Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that the District Court had erred in its interpretation of the Guidelines. The court noted that the safety-valve provision, minor-role, and acceptance-of-responsibility adjustments considered in Cora-Alicea’s sentencing had nothing to do with the myriad of mitigating circumstances he raised under § 3553(a). The court concluded that the District Court's erroneous legal conclusion preempted any weighing of the mitigation evidence against the Guidelines range or the other sentencing factors. As a result, the court vacated Cora-Alicea’s sentence and remanded his case to the District Court for resentencing. View "USA v. Cora-Alicea" on Justia Law

The case involves Alice Chu, who was indicted in September 2019 and convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit health care fraud and five counts of health care fraud. Chu's trial was initially set for February 22, 2021, but due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Chief Judge of the District of New Jersey issued multiple standing orders that delayed trials and excluded these delays from Speedy Trial Act (STA) calculations. Chu's trial eventually commenced on March 1, 2022.Chu moved to dismiss multiple times on STA grounds, arguing that the delays denied her right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment and that the government abused the grand jury process causing inexcusable delay. The District Court denied these motions. After her conviction, Chu filed two motions for a new trial, claiming she was unfairly prejudiced by trial testimony about prior bad acts and that newly discovered evidence could change the probability of a conviction at trial. The District Court denied both motions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's decisions. The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the exclusions resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic did not violate defendants’ rights under the STA. The Court also found no clear error in the District Court’s adoption of the factual findings contained within the COVID Standing Orders. The Court of Appeals further agreed with the District Court that Chu failed to show that the government’s “sole or dominant purpose” was to impermissibly delay her trial. The Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Chu's motions for a new trial and that the evidence at trial was sufficient to prove Chu’s knowledge and intent to commit health care fraud. View "United States v. Chu" on Justia Law

The case involves Terril Edwards, who was convicted in 2008 on three counts: possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine, carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, and possession of a firearm by a felon. Based on Edwards’s criminal history, the District Court determined that the statutory minimum for the Drug Trafficking Charge was life imprisonment. In 2011, Edwards filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence, which the District Court denied. In 2019, following the passage of the First Step Act of 2018, Edwards filed a motion for resentencing. The District Court granted the motion and resentenced Edwards to a total of 240 months.Edwards's conviction and sentence were affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. In 2020, Edwards filed a second motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif v. United States. The District Court transferred the petition to the Third Circuit to determine whether it could consider the successive petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that Edwards's second motion was a second or successive motion because a First Step Act resentencing is unrelated to the validity of the judgment it amends and thus does not result in a new, intervening judgment under Magwood. The court also held that Edwards had not satisfied the requirements of § 2255(h) because Rehaif did not announce a “new rule of constitutional law” made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. Finally, the court held that Edwards could not challenge his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, as the Supreme Court had foreclosed this possibility in Jones v. Hendrix. As a result, the court denied Edwards's requests. View "In re Edwards" on Justia Law