Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hillocks, a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago and a lawful U.S. permanent resident, was convicted of using a communication facility to facilitate a felony. The Board of Immigration Appeals applied the modified categorical approach, looked to Hillocks’s plea colloquy, and found that Hillocks used a phone to facilitate the sale of heroin. The Board found that his conviction was therefore both an aggravated felony and related to a controlled substance, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2) and ordered Hillocks removed. The Third Circuit vacated the removal order. The categorical approach does not call for the consideration of the facts of a particular case; the court presumes that the state conviction rested upon the least of the acts criminalized by the statute, and then determines whether that conduct would fall within the federal definition of the crime. The modified approach only applies when the statute of conviction has alternative elements, and “at least one” of the alternative divisible categories would, by its elements, be a match with a generic federal crime. Pennsylvania’s statute does not have enumerated categories that suggest alternate elements, it does not provide different punishments depending on the underlying crime; the underlying felonies serving as a basis for a conviction under the statute are means, not separate elements. View "Hillocks v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

In 1987, Romansky was convicted of car theft-related crimes. His case worked its way through the Pennsylvania courts and eventually generated a federal habeas corpus petition. The district court denied “Romansky’s lengthy, multifaceted petition” and declined to grant a certificate of appealability. The Third Circuit granted a certificate of appealability on two issues. The court then affirmed, concluding that the petition is not timely under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d) as to claims concerning the events surrounding Romansky’s first trial in 1987. Romansky’s post-conviction claim as to that trial was not resolved until 1997; the limitations period would have expired one year later, in 1998. This petition, alleging that he was deprived of due process by the discrepancy between the conspiracy charge as described in the charging documents and the charge as presented to the jury, was not filed until 2009. The sentence imposed in 2000 after a retrial was not a new judgment on the undisturbed counts of conviction. Romansky was not denied the effective assistance of counsel when his lawyer during the 2000 retrial and resentencing refused to raise the issue of the 1987 conspiracy-charge discrepancy despite repeated requests that he do so. View "Romansky v. Superintendent Greene SCI" on Justia Law

Furgess has myasthenia gravis, a neuromuscular disease that inhibits his ability to see, walk, speak, and lift. He arrived at the Albion, Pennsylvania prison in 2014 and was provided with an accessible shower stall and a cell closer to the medical and dining halls, and was fitted for leg braces. In December 2015, Furgess was moved to the Restrictive Housing Unit, which was not equipped with handicapped-accessible shower facilities. Furgess was not provided with an accessible shower nor was he escorted to the infirmary shower facilities. On March 7, Furgess filed an unsuccessful grievance. He was moved to a handicapped-accessible cell but was not provided access to a shower. On March 16, Furgess was escorted to a shower that was not handicapped-accessible. The hot water exacerbated his symptoms, so Furgess tried to leave the shower room. Without rails or safety bars, he slipped and was knocked unconscious. He is now confined to a wheelchair and suffers from headaches and back pain. Furgess filed another unsuccessful grievance, then filed suit under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The Third Circuit vacated the dismissal of his claims. The provision of showers is a program, service, or activity under the ADA and the RA; Furgess has adequately alleged that he was denied a shower “by reason of” his disability and that the Department was deliberately indifferent in failing to provide him with a handicapped-accessible shower. View "Furgess v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Damon pleaded guilty to knowingly and intentionally distributing and possessing with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. 2. The written plea agreement includes a provision stating that both parties “waive certain rights to file an appeal, collateral attack, writ or motion after sentencing, including, but not limited to an appeal under 18 U.S.C. 3742 or a motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255.” After questioning Damon, the district court determined that the plea was knowing and voluntary and included waivers of appeal and post-conviction relief. After his release from prison, Damon sought an early end to his term of supervised release. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court in denying his motion. His plea agreement precludes challenges to his sentence, and any shortening of his supervision would amount to a change in his sentence, View "United States v. Damon" on Justia Law

In 2003, Cordaro and his co-defendant were elected as two of three Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania county commissioners. About 30 percent of Ackers’ business was municipal engineering, mostly for Lackawanna County. McLaine, Acker’s principal, expressed concerns to Cordaro's friend, Hughes. Hughes arranged a meeting, telling McLaine to bring a list of Acker's existing work for the county. McLaine’s list included the Lackawanna Watershed 2000 Program, a multi-year project based on a $30 million congressional grant; work on the Main Street and Gilmartin Street Bridges; work for several municipal authorities; and surveying, paving, and mapping. Cordaro stated, “I think I can let you keep that, . . . if we’re having fundraisers you’re going to have to participate and support us.” McLaine agreed. After becoming aware that Acker might lose two large contracts, McLaine called Hughes, who called Cordaro. Hughes asked, “how much money ... to give for the work.” Cordaro said, “maybe $15,000.” Hughes told McLaine that if he gave him $10,000 a month for Cordaro, Hughes could guarantee that Acker would keep its contracts and that he would lose his work if he did not pay. Payments began. In 2011, Cordaro was convicted of bribery, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B); Hobbs Act extortion, section 1951(a); and racketeering, sections 1962(c) and (d). The court instructed the jury that those crimes required an “official act.” In 2016, the Supreme Court (McDonnell) clarified what constitutes an “official act.” The Third Circuit affirmed the rejection of Cordaro’s habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. 2241) because Cordaro cannot show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror properly charged under McDonnell would have convicted him. View "Cordaro v. United States" on Justia Law

The law is well established that a defendant cannot relitigate the denial of a motion to suppress evidence after he enters a valid, unconditional guilty plea. The Third Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. The court held that defendant could not challenge on appeal the denial of his motion to suppress because his Fourth Amendment claims are irrelevant to his judgment of conviction, which was entered following a valid and unconditional guilty plea. View "United States v. Porter" on Justia Law

Married criminal defendants, Hall and Blunt, were convicted of engaging in a scheme to collect unemployment compensation benefits from federal and state agencies by using the identities of military service people. They had been appointed separate defense counsel at the onset of their case, each of whom engaged in extensive motion practice at every stage of the trial proceedings. They sought to be re-tried separately so that they may each have an opportunity to present their cases without any unwarranted constraints. The Third Circuit reversed the denial of their motions for severance. The court noted that Blunt’s testimony resulted in “clear” prejudice against Hall, “both from an emotional and evidentiary standpoint.” Blunt clearly was compelled to waive her privilege and testify in her own defense at trial. She stated in her initial motion for severance that she was being made to choose between preserving her spousal privilege and providing exculpatory testimony on her own behalf. View "United States v. Blunt" on Justia Law

Police officers kicked down doors of a Camden, New Jersey residence. Hours earlier, Forrest had finished work for a contractor across the street. He went to the residence to speak with acquaintances and was inside, waiting for a cab. According to Forrest, the officers beat threatened him, then took Forrest to the hospital. In the police report, Officer Parry wrote that he had observed Forrest engaging in a hand-to-hand drug transaction, that Forrest initiated the physical altercation with officers, and that Forrest was in possession of 49 bags of a controlled substance.Forrest filed an Internal Affairs complaint in July 2008 but had no response. Forrest pleaded guilty to possession with intent and served 18 months. He was released when Parry admitted that he had falsified the police report. Three officers pleaded guilty to conspiracy to deprive individuals of their civil rights, disrupting over 200 criminal cases. Forrest’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985 was among 89 lawsuits against Camden. Forrest opted out of a global settlement. The district court unilaterally divided Forrest’s municipal liability claim into three theories: failure to supervise through Internal Affairs, failure to supervise, and failure to train. The court associated certain evidence to only the first theory, granted Camden summary judgment on the failure to supervise and train theories, excluded evidence that was material to the remaining theory, and “effectively awarded summary judgment on the state law negligent supervision claim.” The jury instructions confused the relevant law. The Third Circuit vacated. The artificial line, drawn by the district court, between what were ostensibly theories with largely overlapping evidence resulted in erroneous rulings as to what was relevant, and instructions as to what law the jury was to apply. View "Forrest v. Parry" on Justia Law

Payano, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, came to the U.S. legally at age 12. In 1998, at age 18, he pleaded guilty to first-degree possession of a controlled substance. In 2001, after completing his sentence, he was removed. Payano illegally reentered the U.S. in 2012. During a 2017 Pennsylvania traffic stop, the trooper found a kilogram of cocaine hidden in Payano's vehicle. Payano was charged with illegal reentry and possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine. The district court agreed that the drugs were the fruit of an unconstitutional search. The government dismissed the drug charge. Payano pleaded guilty to illegal reentry.Because Payano’s 1998 conviction was for drug possession, not drug distribution, it was a felony under federal law, not an aggravated felony. Payano’s plea was under 8 U.S.C. 1326(b)(1), which carries a maximum sentence of 10 years. The PSR calculated the Guidelines range as 24-30 months’ imprisonment and correctly listed the statutory maximum, but cited 1326(b)(2) (illegal reentry following an aggravated felony with a 20-year maximum). The government sought an upward variance because Payano had been “convicted of an aggravated felony" and had the court “correct” the PSR to reflect that Payano had pleaded guilty to “aggravated reentry.” Payano’s counsel agreed. The court imposed a four-year sentence. The Third Circuit vacated, agreeing that there was error but declining to extend the “Molina-Martinez“ presumption of prejudice because a mistaken understanding about the applicable statutory range, without more, has far less bearing on the actual sentence than a Guidelines-calculation error. The error did affect Payano’s substantial rights and without correction would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. View "United States v. Payano" on Justia Law

In 1993, three men broke into the Connor home. Connor and Ezekiel returned during the break-in; Ezekiel was shot and killed. The intruders fled. Roach was arrested and charged with first-degree murder under Virgin Islands law and unlawful flight to avoid prosecution under federal law. He testified that he did not commit the crime and did not know a possible co-conspirator, Simon. Roach was convicted. Simon was later arrested. The Virgin Islands charged him with burglary, conspiracy, and first-degree premeditated murder. One week before trial, it moved to amend to charge felony-murder, robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery. Simon’s attorney unsuccessfully objected. Two days before trial, the court again permitted an amendment. At trial, the government presented Roach as its key witness. Roach indicated that Simon orchestrated the burglary and shot Ezekiel. The U.S. Attorney’s Office filed a stipulation to vacate and reduce Roach’s conviction to second-degree murder. The Third Circuit remanded the denial of Simon’s habeas petition. The Superior Court abused its discretion in declining to conduct an evidentiary hearing to address Simon’s claim that the government violated its Brady obligations by failing to disclose a prior agreement with Roach. The Appellate Division erred in dismissing Simon’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective without remanding for an evidentiary hearing. Simon presented facts that, if true, tend to show his counsel had a conflict of interest by representing a co-conspirator at the time of his trial. View "Simon v. Government of the Virgin Islands" on Justia Law