Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Tyson contacted a 17-year-old female on Facebook to engage her in prostitution. He traveled from Pennsylvania to New York City, picked up the victim and her friend, took them to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, then rented several rooms at a Motel 6. Phone records reveal that Harrisburg-area individuals contacted the victim to engage in commercial sexual activity. Law enforcement recovered the victim during a sting operation, interviewed her and reviewed her phone. They found a video of the victim performing oral sex on an adult male in a Motel 6 room. The man was identified as Tyson. Tyson was indicted for knowingly transporting a minor to engage in prostitution, 18 U.S.C. 2423(a) and producing child pornography, section 2251(a). Before trial, the court prohibited Tyson “from eliciting evidence to establish ‘mistake of age’” and from asserting “mistake of age” as an affirmative defense. The court found that such evidence’s “probative value is substantially outweighed by a risk that the evidence will result in unfair prejudice, confuse the issues, or mislead the jury.” Tyson entered a plea agreement, with a recommendation that his sentences be served concurrently for a total of 180 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed. The statutes’ text, context, and history make it clear that knowledge of age is not an element and mistake of age is not a defense. View "United States v. Tyson" on Justia Law

Bell and Robinson entered a Philadelphia store, wearing stockings over their faces. Bell grabbed an employee’s neck, pointed a weapon and threw the employee to the ground, then took cash from the register. The employee grabbed Bell. Bell hit the employee with the weapon, causing the weapon to break. The employee then realized the firearm was actually a plastic gun; he stood and attempted to stop the robbery. Bell and Robinson fled the store with $1,000.00 in cash. Bell dropped his hat, which was seized by the police for DNA testing. Approximately one year later, the police obtained a warrant for Bell’s DNA. Officers went to Bell’s residence to execute the warrant and found Bell hiding on the roof outside his bedroom window with a bag containing ammunition.Bell pled guilty as a felon in possession of ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and to Hobbs Act robbery, section 1951(a). The court imposed a two-level enhancement for physical restraint, U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) and a four-level enhancement for use of a dangerous weapon, section 2B3.1(b)(2)(D). The court calculated a sentencing range of 77-96 months and imposed a sentence of 86 months. The Third Circuit remanded for resentencing, affirming the application of the dangerous weapon enhancement but reversing the enhancement for physical restraint. While grabbing the victim and forcing him down satisfied the physical force requirement, the victim was not left with no alternative and the restraint was quite limited in time without sustained focus on the victim. Objects that appear to be dangerous weapons are considered dangerous weapons for purposes of section 2B3.1. View "United States v. Bell" on Justia Law

Eight-year-old Quinteros and his mother came to the U.S. from El Salvador in 2001. When he was 13, Quinteros joined the gang MS-13. In 2011, Quinteros was indicted for conspiracy to commit assault with a dangerous weapon, 18 U.S.C. 1959(a)(6). The planned gang attack never occurred. Quinteros later pled guilty and was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment. In prison, Quinteros left MS-13 to follow Christianity. Other MS-13 members in prison told him that when he was deported “things are going to change. There’s no getting out over there.” Quinteros was charged as removable for having committed an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), (U), and (J). Quinteros checked the form box to contest his deportability but failed to follow up with additional documentation. Quinteros then sought withholding of removal. An asylum officer determined that Quinteros demonstrated a reasonable fear that he would be tortured in El Salvador. Before an IJ, Quinteros testified and presented studies and reports, that discussed the perception and treatment of individuals with tattoos in El Salvador. The Third Circuit vacated the BIA’s rejection of Quinteros’s claims. Quinteros’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. 1959(a)(6) is not an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), (U), or (J); conviction under section 1959(a)(6) does not require an overt act and is not a categorical match for conspiracy under the Immigration Act. View "Quinteros v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

A Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Office confidential informant made controlled purchases of PCP from Mitchell. Agents observed Mitchell traveling between the meeting and properties on Carlisle and Goodman Streets (owned by Mitchell’s wife’s LLC). Executing a warrant at Carlisle, agents arrested Mitchell and found keys to both properties and $2,947 in cash on Mitchell’s person. Inside the Carlisle property, agents recovered a loaded handgun, crack cocaine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. Inside the Goodman property, they found a loaded handgun, a photograph of and mail addressed to Mitchell, drug paraphernalia, and PCP. Later, agents searched a third property, also owned by Mitchell’s wife’s company, and found another gun, more drugs, and pictures of Mitchell. A witness testified that he purchased powder cocaine from Mitchell, weekly, in 2009-2011, including at Carlisle.The Third Circuit affirmed Mitchell’s convictions for 17 drug distribution and firearms offenses but vacated his 1,020-month sentence. The court rejected arguments that the district court failed to investigate possible juror bias; admitted statements in violation of the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause; and failed to instruct the jury that aiding and abetting the possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime requires that the accomplice have advance knowledge that the principal would possess a gun. Mitchell also argued that there was insufficient evidence that he aided and abetted possession of the Carlisle Street loaded firearm or constructively possessed the firearm. The court erred by relying on Mitchell’s bare arrest record to determine his sentence, without distinguishing between adjudications, adult convictions, and arrests. View "United States v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Ludwikowski went to the police station to report extortionate threats. He was there for about seven hours and was questioned extensively about why he was vulnerable to extortion. He was given water and offered pizza. He went to the restroom, unaccompanied, at least three times. He was interviewed for about four hours, in three phases, punctuated by breaks. He had his phone and used it to make a call. It came to light that Ludwikowski, a pharmacist, had been filling fraudulent oxycodone prescriptions. He was later tried for distribution of a controlled substance. He moved to suppress the statements he made at the police station, arguing that they were inadmissible because no one read him his Miranda rights. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Ludwikowski was not in custody, so no Miranda warnings were needed. Much of the interview was devoted to trying to identify the extorter and the motivation; the interview would have been shorter if Ludwikowski had been more responsive. His statements at the police station were not involuntary. A reasonable person would have understood he could leave; Ludwikowski’s calm demeanor and calculated answers belie his argument that he subjectively felt his freedom was constrained. There was no plain error in the admission of expert testimony on the practice of pharmacy. . View "United States v. Ludwikowski" on Justia Law

Sepling, represented by SC, pled guilty to importing GBL, a controlled substance analogue, 21 U.S.C. 952; Sepling’s sentence would be calculated without consideration of the Guidelines career offender section. Sepling was released on bond pending sentencing and became involved in a conspiracy to import methylone, another Schedule I controlled substance. He was charged under 21 U.S.C. 963. A search uncovered three kilograms of methylone. Subsequent investigation revealed that the conspiracy involved approximately 10 kilograms. A Public Defender (APD) represented Sepling on the new charges. The prosecution agreed to withdraw the new charge; in exchange, Sepling’s involvement in the conspiracy would be factored into his GBL sentence as relevant conduct. The APD ceased representing Sepling. Sepling’s unmodified Guideline range for the GBL was 27-33 months. The methylone relevant conduct dramatically increased his base offense level. The PSR analogized methylone to MDMA, commonly called “ecstasy,” and held him responsible for 10 kilograms, resulting in responsibility equivalent to that for conspiring to distribute five and a half tons of marijuana, for a sentencing range of 188-235 months. SC did not object to that calculation, nor did he file a sentencing memorandum. Rather than researching the pharmacological effect of methylone, SC relied upon Sepling to explain the effects of methylone. SC, the government, and the court all confessed that they did not possess any substantive knowledge of methylone The Third Circuit vacated the 102-month sentence. Sepling was prejudiced by his counsel’s ineffectiveness. View "United States v. Sepling" on Justia Law

In the visiting room, a friend handed Pennsylvania inmate Thomas a bag of M&Ms. He ate one and then quickly drank soda. A guard, believing that Thomas had ingested contraband, removed him to a dry cell for observation until natural processes allowed the ingested contraband to be retrieved. The sink and toilet were capped. Dry cells lack all linens and moveable items other than a mattress. Inmates’ clothes are exchanged for a smock; their movements are carefully controlled to prevent them from concealing or disposing of contraband. To expedite his release from the dry cell, Thomas was offered and accepted laxatives. Over the next four days, Thomas had 12 bowel movements and was x-rayed. No evidence of contraband was found. He was confined to the dry cell for five more days. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Thomas filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Third Circuit reversed in part. Whether there was a penological justification to continue Thomas’s confinement in the dry cell after four days constitutes a disputed issue of material fact. When confinement in a dry cell is not foul or inhuman and serves a legitimate penological interest, it will not violate the Eighth Amendment. View "Thomas v. Tice" on Justia Law

During York City, Pennsylvania's New Year’s Eve fireworks festivities, Officer Thorne heard gunshots. He observed Gray carrying a firearm, walking down a pathway between rowhomes at 721 and 723 Wallace Street. Thorne gave chase with his firearm drawn, identified himself as police, and ordered Gray to drop the firearm. Gray saw that Thorne was pointing a firearm and ran toward Wallace Street. Thorne saw Gray toss his gun and run onto the porch of 725 Wallace, next to Gray’s home. Thorne followed and restrained Gray. Officer Davis arrived. Gray was taken into custody. Thorne found the firearm in front of 731 Wallace, with one round chambered and six in the magazine. The National Criminal Information Center listed the firearm as stolen in Manchester, New Hampshire, in 1995. A month later Manchester Police notified Thorne: OUR DETECTIVES HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO LOCATE THE ORIGINAL VICTIM … THE FIREARM IS NOT CONSIDERED STOLEN AT THIS POINT. The Third Circuit affirmed Gray’s conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), his 84-month sentence (a downward variance of 36 months), and the application of sentencing enhancements for possession of a stolen firearm, recklessly creating a risk of serious bodily injury in the course of fleeing from law enforcement, and obstruction of justice for committing perjury at trial,. The change in designation by the Manchester Police did not change the fact that the gun had been reported stolen and appeared on the NCIC list until recovered in Gray’s possession. View "United States v. Gray" on Justia Law

Janine, a secretary in the judicial chambers of her sister Joan, was charged with conspiring with another sister, a State Senator, to divert the services of legislative staff for the benefit of Joan’s campaign for a seat on the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The 2010 charges ended in a mistrial. In 2011, before Janine was retried, prosecutors filed new charges relating to activities in Joan’s judicial chambers. Janine was found guilty on all charges. She sought habeas corpus relief, arguing that her retrial on the 2010 charges should have been barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A Magistrate Judge wrote a Report & Recommendation that Janine was not “in custody” for purposes of habeas jurisdiction because she challenged only her convictions on the 2010 charges but had received no penalty for them. The R&R advised the parties that they had 14 days to file objections. No objections were filed. The district court adopted the R&R. About two weeks later, Janine filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(1) claiming that her lawyer had given the R&R to his assistant, assuming that the assistant would send the R&R to Janine and that Janine would inform him if she wanted to file objections. The assistant did not forward the R&R; the lawyer never followed up. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Janine’s failure to timely respond to the R&R is the kind of claim foreclosed by 28 U.S.C. 2254: “ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during ... collateral post-conviction proceedings.” The court also agreed that Janine was not in custody. View "Orie v. District Attorney Allegheny County" on Justia Law

Federal prisoner Brown filed his “Kemmerer” complaint, alleging that prison officials had injured him; he successfully moved to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which waives fees if the prisoner demonstrates that he cannot afford the fees. Under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), the “three strikes rule,” a prisoner cannot proceed IFP if he has three times brought an action that was dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim. Brown later filed his “Sage” complaint, alleging that prison employees were deliberately indifferent to his serious health issues. Brown again sought to proceed IFP, attempting to invoke the rule’s “imminent danger” exception. The court denied Brown’s motion in Sage and vacated its Kemmerer IFP decision based on Brown’s “strikes” in California prison litigation. Brown filed a third action, claiming that a prison physician assistant denied him treatment. The court again held he did not meet the exception and dismissed the case.In consolidated appeals, the Third Circuit reversed, concluding that Brown's third "strike" did not qualify. Following rehearing en banc, the court denied Brown’s IFP application, clarifying the framework for assessing IFP applications. Courts need not employ a rigid “two-step” analysis of the plaintiff’s economic status and the merits of the complaint. Courts are free to assess the merits of the lawsuit “at any time.” Brown “brought an action” in his third California case when he tendered his complaint and asked to proceed IFP. View "Brown v. Sage" on Justia Law