Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Seighman pleaded guilty to a counterfeiting conspiracy, a Class D felony carrying a maximum prison term of 60 months. He was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment followed by 36 months of supervised release. After his release, Seighman bought heroin, tested positive for opiates, and failed to comply with drug treatment. The court revoked Seighman’s supervision and sentenced him to another 24 months’ imprisonment plus 12 months of supervised release. After his second release from prison, Seighman transitioned to Renewal, a residential reentry center. The Probation Office petitioned the court to issue a warrant for Seighman because he brought heroin into Renewal. The Probation Office calculated Seighman’s revocation sentencing range as 21–27 months. Seighman objected, arguing that because his counterfeiting conviction permitted a maximum of 60 months' imprisonment, he could be sentenced to no more than six months (having served 54 months). The Third Circuit affirmed his 24-month sentence. In its 2019 decision, “Haymond,” the Supreme Court found subsection (k) of the supervised release statute (18 U.S.C. 3583) unconstitutional in requiring a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of ‘‘not less than 5 years’’ upon a judge’s finding that a defendant ‘‘commit[ted] any’’ listed ‘‘criminal offense,’’ without granting a defendant the rights that accompany a new criminal prosecution. Subsection (g), which Seighman challenged, applies to other offenses and does not limit the judge’s discretion in the same “manner” as subsection (k). View "United States v. Seighman" on Justia Law

In 2001, Birt was arrested following a traffic stop. A state trooper found 186.5 grams of crack cocaine in the trunk. Birt was charged under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Birt pled guilty. His plea agreement stated that “[t]he maximum penalty for [his] offense is imprisonment for a period of 20 years [and] a fine of $1 million dollars,” plus supervised release and collateral consequences, set forth in 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C). The district court imposed the 20-year maximum sentence, which the Third Circuit affirmed. In 2012, the district court reduced Birt’s sentence to 210 months under Amendment 750 to the Sentencing Guidelines. The Third Circuit affirmed.Birt later sought resentencing under the First Step Act. The district court held that Birt was not convicted of a “covered offense” and was not entitled to relief. The Third Circuit affirmed. “Covered offenses,” under the First Step Act, are offenses that have had their penalty provisions modified by the Fair Sentencing Act. The penalties for Birt’s statute of conviction have not been modified, so the First Step Act has no applicability to Birt’s case. Birt’s statute of conviction is "a tight combination of subsections (a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) of section 841, not section 841(a)(1) in isolation or section 841 as a whole." View "United States v. Birt" on Justia Law

In 2006, Harris pleaded guilty to possession with the intent to distribute five grams or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base and stipulated to the quantity he possessed—33.6 grams. In 2019, Harris sought a reduction of his 210-month sentence under section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018, 132 Stat. 5222. The district court assumed that Harris was eligible but denied relief, stating that “neither the statutory penalties nor the advisory guidelines range would be affected if [he] were sentenced today given the stipulated drug quantity.”Jackson was convicted in 2004 of the same crime. His indictment charged him with possession with the intent to distribute approximately 48 grams of crack. The jury convicted Jackson of possessing five grams or more, without any specific finding that he possessed 48 grams. In 2019, Jackson moved under section 404 for a reduction of his 300-month sentence. The district court denied relief, determining that he was ineligible.The Third Circuit vacated as to Harris and reversed as to Jackson. Section 404 eligibility turns on a defendant’s statute of conviction, not on his possession of a certain quantity of drugs. Although Harris and Jackson each possessed more than 28 grams of crack, Harris pleaded guilty to and Jackson was convicted of possession of five grams or more; both can seek discretionary reductions of their sentences. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Golubitsky, as a Virgin Islands Criminal Justice Act (CJA) panelist, was appointed counsel for Bellille, an indigent defendant in a multi-defendant RICO prosecution. Golubitsky unsuccessfully moved to withdraw, arguing that he was no longer a CJA panelist, having moved to an in-house counsel role, and was contractually barred from the representation. Weeks later, Golubitsky purportedly started an of-counsel relationship at the DiRuzzo law firm and filed an emergency motion to withdraw as Bellille’s counsel, arguing that DiRuzzo represented Ayala, who was likely to testify against Bellille, which created a conflict of interest. Golubitsky and DiRuzzo explained that Golubitsky was “on [the firm’s] system,” could bill using the firm’s software, and was added to DiRuzzo’s malpractice insurance. Golubitsky worked full-time as in-house counsel while working part-time for DiRuzzo’s Florida firm, litigating four matters together. They had no involvement in the other’s work related to Bellille’s case nor had they shared any information about the case. The court denied Golubitsky’s motion and ordered DiRuzzo and Golubitsky to wall off the latter’s representation of Bellille from DiRuzzo’s representation of Ayala.The Third Circuit vacated and remanded, noting many “factual gaps,” surrounding the relationship between DiRuzzo and Golubitsky and why the relationship was established. The situation cannot be both ways. Either the of-counsel relationship was not genuine and there was no basis for imposing a screen or there was a true of-counsel relationship and a screen alone could not cure the conflict. View "United States v. Bellille" on Justia Law

While imprisoned at Moshannon Valley Correctional Center ()MVCC), Davis, a Jamaican national, requested permission to marry a non-inmate U.S. citizen. MVCC apparently imposed requirements on those wishing to get married, beyond the requirements specified in the Federal Bureau of Prison regulations. Davis alleges that, despite having complied with all requirements, including MVCC’s additional requirements, Warden Wigen denied the request. MVCC almost exclusively houses foreign nationals who have been ordered to be deported or are facing immigration proceedings. Davis claims that federal defendants and officials of GEO, a company that operates private prisons on behalf of the government, conspired to ensure that no MVCC inmate can get married; marriage could complicate, and perhaps stop, removal and other immigration proceedings.The Third Circuit vacated the dismissal of section 1983 claims, reasoning that the complaint did not allege a purely private conspiracy, so a basic premise of the district court’s decision on the availability of relief was erroneous. The court affirmed the dismissal of the Bivens claim as asking for an unsupportable extension of Bivens liability; the Supreme Court has never recognized or been asked to recognize, a Bivens remedy for infringement of the right to marry. The court affirmed the dismissal of other 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, and 2000d claims. View "Davis v. Samuels" on Justia Law

Scripps was convicted of wire fraud for transferring millions of dollars from the bank accounts of his mother and autistic uncle—heirs to the family’s publishing fortune—into his own account. During sentencing arguments, the court repeatedly indicated that Scripps could address the court without personally asking Scripps if he wished to speak. The court asked defense counsel (Dezsi) whether Scripps wished to address the court. Dezsi stated that Scripps did not. The judge later concluded that “[t]here’s nothing in this record from which I could fairly conclude there’s any remorse” and sentenced Scripps to 108 months’ imprisonment, the maximum period of incarceration within the Guidelines range. On appeal, with Scripps represented by Dezsi, the Third Circuit affirmed. Scripps filed an unsuccessful 28 U.S.C 2255 motion, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, including by failing to argue that the judge erred by not personally inviting Scripps to speak during sentencing. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) requires a sentencing judge to “address the defendant personally in order to permit the defendant to speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence.”The Third Circuit reversed. The district court abused its discretion in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing. It is possible that appellate counsel’s failure to raise Rule 32 error “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” The Supreme Court has held that a Rule 32 query, directed towards counsel, does not satisfy the requirement that the court personally address the defendant. View "United States v. Scripps" on Justia Law

New York City Officer Pickel was patrolling an area known for violent crime, when a man flagged him down, pointing to the only pedestrian on a bridge (later identified as Torres). The man stated that Torres fired a gun into an old factory across the street. Pickel radioed for backup and followed Torres in his car, believing that Torres posed a potential danger to others and that any delay would make it difficult to locate Torres. As other officers arrived, Pickel activated his emergency lights, exited his patrol car, drew his service pistol, and ordered Torres to “get to the ground.” Torres complied. Officer Hatterer knelt and asked Torres if he had a firearm. According to Hatterer, Torres indicated that it was in his right pocket. Hatterer handcuffed Torres; another officer retrieved the firearm.The district court denied a motion to suppress, reasoning that the gun was found during a constitutional “Terry” investigatory stop rather than during an arrest and that Pickel had reasonable suspicion. Convicted under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, Terry received the mandatory-minimum sentence, 180 months’ imprisonment, based on enhanced sentencing under 18 U.S.C. 924(e), the Armed Career Criminal Act. Although Torres' prior state drug possession offenses were part of a federal drug distribution conspiracy conviction, the conspiracy conviction counted as a separate predicate offense. The Third Circuit affirmed. A drug conspiracy conviction counts as an ACCA predicate offense, if it was distinct in time from the underlying substantive offenses. View "United States v. Torres" on Justia Law

Pennsylvania Trooper Ramirez stopped a car for speeding after running the license plate and learning the car was owned by Enterprise. It lacked typical rental stickers. Each vent had an air freshener clipped to it. The driver, Fruit, gave Ramirez his license and rental car agreement, identifying his passenger, Garner. The rental agreement listed Fruit as the authorized driver but limited to New York and appeared to have expired 20 days earlier. Ramirez questioned Garner; 12 minutes into the stop, Ramirez put their information into his computer and learned that neither man had outstanding warrants, although Fruit was on supervised release. Both had extensive criminal records, including drug and weapons crimes. Enterprise confirmed that Fruit had extended the rental beyond the listed expiration date. Ramirez resolved to ask permission to search the vehicle but waited for backup, which arrived 37 minutes into the stop. Fruit declined permission to search. Ramirez stated that he was calling for a K-9 and Fruit was not free to leave. "Zigi" arrived 56 minutes into the stop, alerted at the car, then entered the vehicle and alerted in the back seat and trunk. A search revealed 300 grams of cocaine and 261 grams of heroin.Both men were indicted for conspiracy to possess (and possession) with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine. The district court denied their motion to suppress, ruling that Ramirez had “an escalating degree of reasonable suspicion” that justified extending the stop. In a consolidated appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed. Ramirez had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop based on information he obtained during the first few minutes of the traffic stop before he engaged in an unrelated investigation; no unlawful extension of the stop occurred. View "United States v. Fruit" on Justia Law

Portanova admitted to downloading child pornography onto his cell phone, on which investigators found 63 videos depicting minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Portanova subsequently pleaded guilty to receipt of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2) and (b)(1), which carries a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence if that person “has a prior conviction . . . under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward” or “relating to . . . the production, possession, receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, shipment, or transportation of child pornography.” Portanova had previously been convicted of possessing and distributing child pornography under Pennsylvania law. The court concluded that his state conviction triggered section 2252(b)(1)'s mandatory minimum enhancement. The Third Circuit affirmed, agreeing that his conviction triggered the mandatory minimum provision. Under the Third Circuit’s “looser categorical approach,” section 2252(b)(1)’s “relating to” language does not require an exact match between the state and federal elements of conviction, and that provision is not unconstitutionally vague. View "United States v. Portanova" on Justia Law

In November 2013, three men robbed a Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania bank. A bank employee, Kane, later admitted to assisting them. The next morning, the three were pulled over in North Carolina. Wilson stated they were driving to Georgia and admitted that they had a lot of cash in the car. The officer, suspecting that they were going to buy drugs in Atlanta, searched the car, found the stolen cash, turned it over to federal agents, then released the men. A week later, three men robbed a Phoenixville, Pennsylvania bank. The police got a tip from Howell, whom Wilson had tried to recruit for the heists. Howell provided Wilson's cell phone number. Police pulled his cell-site location data, which put him at the Bala Cynwyd bank right before the first robbery and showed five calls and 17 text messages to Kane that day. Howell identified Wilson and Moore from a video of the robbery.Kane and Foster took plea bargains. Wilson and Moore were tried for bank robbery, conspiracy, and using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. Moore was sentenced to 385 months’ imprisonment. Wilson received 519 months. The Third Circuit affirmed. Counsel’s stipulation that the banks were federally insured did not violate the Sixth Amendment, which does not categorically forbid stipulating to a crime’s jurisdictional element without the defendant’s consent or over the defendant’s objection. View "United States v. Wilson" on Justia Law