Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Seibert pleaded guilty to production and possession of child pornography following a raid in which agents recovered approximately 1,500 images. The Probation Office recommended enhancements under U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(5), which applies “[i]f the defendant engaged in a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor,” and 4B1.5(b)(1), which applies if “the defendant engaged in a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct,” resulting in a Guidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment. After applying the two enhancements and weighing the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors, the court sentenced Seibert to 360 months’ imprisonment.The Third Circuit affirmed. The Guidelines allow for the simultaneous application of both enhancements to the same conduct; there was no procedural error. The court rejected an argument that application of the section 3553(a) factors led to an unduly harsh sentence because it did not place enough weight on Seibert's personal circumstances, including the mental health, medical, and learning challenges. Seibert submitted a psychological evaluation concluding that he “has the libido of an adult but the mind of a small child and does not have the capacity to use rationality to control his impulses.” The district court acknowledged that evidence but concluded that Seibert’s “family struggles” are not “unusually severe.” View "United States v. Seibert" on Justia Law

Argentine citizen Cabeda, a lawful U.S. permanent resident, was convicted in Pennsylvania state court of having involuntary deviate sexual intercourse at age 34 with a 15-year-old boy. Immigration authorities found her removable for having committed a state-law offense qualifying as an “aggravated felony,” 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), specifically the “sexual abuse of a minor.”The Third Circuit granted her petition for review. Notwithstanding her actual, admitted sexual abuse of a minor, she cannot be removed because the Pennsylvania statute under which she was convicted could conceivably be violated by conduct that falls short of satisfying all the elements of the federally defined crime of sexual abuse of a minor. The categorical approach mandates ignoring what she actually did and focusing instead on what someone else, in a hypothetical world, could have done. The court called this “a surpassingly strange result but required by controlling law.” View "Cabeda v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

A four-year-old stated that Heinrich had pulled her pants down and taken pictures. Pennsylvania state police conducted a consensual search of Heinrich’s electronic devices and found sexually explicit images of two children. Heinrich was charged with 15 counts of using or inducing a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of that conduct, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), and one count of possessing material depicting the sexual exploitation of a minor, section 2252(a)(4)(B). Heinrich admitted to taking the pictures and that they depicted sexually explicit conduct but planned to defend himself against the production charges, claiming he lacked the requisite specific intent.Heinrich proffered an expert witness, a psychologist. The government moved to exclude that evidence as inadmissible because the charged offenses were general intent crimes and under Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 403, 702, or 704(b). After a hearing on the applicability of Rule 704(b), the judge’s law clerk conducted a telephonic status conference, stating that the court intended to grant the government’s motions based on Rules 403 and 704(b). No opinion or order was docketed. The judge did not participate in the conference, which was unrecorded and not transcribed. Heinrich entered a conditional guilty plea and appealed.The Third Circuit vacated without addressing the merits of the ruling, noting the “impossible position” of attempting “to review an adjunct-presented non-ruling that caused the Defendant to plead guilty.” District courts must articulate their Rule 403 reasoning on the record. View "United States v. Heinrich" on Justia Law

Savage's North Philadelphia regional drug trafficking operation, KSO, distributed large quantities of controlled substances and fiercely protected its network and territory, using guns and violence. Early in KSO’s operation, Savage took care of threats against KSO himself. As his power grew, his enforcers did his bidding. While detained on criminal charges, Savage continued to manage KSO’s affairs. He retaliated against those who cooperated with government agents and arranged for the murder of the prosecution’s main witness in a murder case and, in a later case, orchestrated the firebombing of the home of another cooperating witness, ensuring no one would survive. Savage was convicted of conspiracy to participate in a racketeering (RICO) enterprise, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d); 12 counts of violent crime in aid of racketeering (VICAR) murder, section 1959(a)(1); VICAR conspiracy to commit murder, section 1959(a)(5); retaliating against a witness, section 1513; and using fire to commit a felony, section 844(h)(1).The Third Circuit affirmed the convictions and the imposition of the death penalty, rejecting several challenges to the selection of the jury. If any gaps exist in the record, they do not entitle Savage to relief. Savage was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when the court waited until days before voir dire began to substitute new lead counsel. The district court did not plainly err in instructing the jury on the doctrine of transferred intent. The court rejected six challenges relating to the penalty phase proceedings. View "United States v. Savage" on Justia Law

Following a 2016 altercation with a correctional officer at the U.S. Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Bullock pleaded guilty to knowingly and intentionally forcibly assaulting, resisting, opposing, impeding, intimidating, and interfering with a correctional officer, 18 U.S.C. 111(a) and (b). Bullock had two prior convictions for robbery in North Carolina. that corresponded to generic robbery under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(2). The district court found that Bullock qualified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, with a Guidelines range of 151-188 months’ imprisonment, but gave Bullock a substantial downward variance, imposing a sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment.Bullock argued his conviction under 18 U.S.C. 111 was not categorically a crime of violence for purposes of the sentencing enhancement. The Third Circuit affirmed. Applying the modified categorical approach, the court looked to the record of conviction and determined that a defendant who violates section 111(b) has used physical force against the person of another, either through employing a deadly or dangerous weapon or by inflicting bodily injury. View "United States v. Bullock" on Justia Law

C.S., age 17, made threatening statements to a confidential informant in an online chatroom dedicated to discussing terroristic attacks. Law enforcement searched C.S.’s home and cell phone. In his home, agents discovered assault rifles, ammunition, a crossbow, a headscarf, smoke bombs, grenade casings, military-style ammunition vest and gear, and a long-bladed knife. His cell phone revealed Internet searches, literature about making explosives, Islamic Jihadi propaganda videos depicting beheadings, and photos of C.S. posing with his assault rifle while wearing military gear and headscarf. C.S. was adjudicated delinquent, 18 U.S.C. 875(c). During several conversations, C.S. made threats against a local church. Although juvenile proceedings are usually sealed, the court permitted the government to notify the church that it was the subject of a threat and that the party who communicated the threat had been prosecuted. The order did not identify C.S.The Third Circuit affirmed. C.S.’s statements qualified as threats under section 875(c). A rational factfinder could find that a reasonable person could consider C.S.’s statements to be “a serious expression of an intent to inflict bodily injury.” The court did not violate the confidentiality provisions of the Juvenile and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. 5031-5038), in allowing the government to notify the church of the threats and acted well within its discretion in issuing the notification order. View "United States v. C.S." on Justia Law

Mack, a practicing Muslim, was an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution in Loretto, Pennsylvania, and worked for pay at the prison’s commissary. Mack alleges that he was harassed, based on his religion, by correctional officers Roberts and Venslosky, who supervised the inmates working in the commissary. Mack alleges that he raised these issues with their supervisor, Stephens; that upon overhearing Mack’s oral complaint to Stephens, Roberts told Mack, “[y]ou are not going to be here long”; and that Venslosky fired Mack less than two weeks later. The district court denied the government’s motion for summary judgment on Mack’s First Amendment retaliation claim.The Third Circuit reversed. The court noted that no statute provides a damages remedy for constitutional claims brought against federal officials. Although the Supreme Court recognized an implied damages action for such claims under the Fourth Amendment in 1971 (Bivens), the Court has since recognized an implied damages remedy in only two other instances. In 2017, the Supreme Court cautioned against creating additional implied damages remedies and explicitly declared expansion of Bivens a “disfavored judicial activity.” The Third Circuit declined to expand Bivens to create a damages remedy for Mack’s First Amendment retaliation claim. View "Mack v. Yost" on Justia Law

Downey has long struggled with glaucoma, which can lead to blindness if left uncontrolled. His condition worsened while he was imprisoned at the State Correctional Institution at Waymart, Pennsylvania. Doctors recommended that Downey have surgery expeditiously to save his eyesight. Nothing happened for almost a year, although he repeatedly reached out to prison staff. Surgery came too late; Downey is now blind. Downey sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1999. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment, concluding that he failed to exhaust available administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a)..The Third Circuit reversed in part. Downey’s claims for monetary relief are not procedurally defaulted. Under the prison’s procedures, a prisoner dealing with an emergency or an urgent situation is not bound by the ordinary procedures specified in the grievance policy; he only needs to alert the closest staff person. The court rejected the prison’s “efforts to downplay the urgency” of Downey’s situation and found that Downey complied with the policy. The court affirmed the dismissal of claims against the Department of Corrections and its officials on state sovereign immunity grounds, although that defense was not raised before the district court. View "Downey v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Pawlowski was convicted of federal program bribery, Travel Act bribery, attempted Hobbs Act extortion, wire and mail fraud, honest services fraud, making false statements to the FBI, and conspiracy. As the mayor of Allentown, Pennsylvania, he had steered city contracts and provided other favors in exchange for campaign contributions. In May 2020, 19 months into his 15-year sentence, Pawlowski sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1). He suffers from hypertensive heart disease, COPD, shortness of breath, sleep apnea, and has only one lung; those conditions place him at a higher risk of serious illness and death from COVID-19. As of June 19, 2020, at the Danbury, Connecticut facility where he is incarcerated, 98 inmates had tested positive for the virus, one had died and 91 had recovered; 61 staff members had tested positive. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. While Pawlowski’s conditions placed him at increased risk should he contract COVID-19, the district court reasonably concluded that the sentencing factors set out at 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) did not weigh in favor of release. The court noted the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, and afford adequate deterrence. View "United States v. Pawlowski" on Justia Law

In 1998, Pennsylvania and 45 other states entered into a settlement agreement with certain cigarette manufacturers, who agreed to disburse funding to the states to cover tobacco-related healthcare costs. Pennsylvania’s 2001 Tobacco Settlement Act established the "EE Program" to reimburse participating hospitals for “extraordinary expenses” incurred for treating uninsured patients according to a formula. The Department of Human Services (DHS) determines the eligibility of each hospital for EE Program payments. The Pennsylvania Auditor General reported that for Fiscal Years 2008-2012, some participating hospitals received disbursements for unqualified claims, and recommended that DHS claw back funds from overpaid hospitals and redistribute the money to hospitals that had been underpaid. DHS followed that recommendation for fiscal years prior to 2010 but discovered methodological discrepancies and discontinued the process for Fiscal Years 2010-2012.Plaintiffs, on behalf of all “underpaid” hospitals, sued an allegedly overpaid hospital, alleging conspiracy to defraud the EE Program in violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. 1961–1964. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants submitted fraudulent claims for reimbursement, in violation of the wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. 1343 (a RICO predicate offense). The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of the claims, finding that the theory of liability adequately alleges proximate causation. No independent factors that accounted for the plaintiffs’ injury and no more immediate victim was better situated to sue. View "St. Lukes Health Network, Inc. v. Lancaster General Hospital" on Justia Law