Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Porter was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in 1986. Since then, he has been incarcerated in solitary confinement on death row. In 2003, the district court granted, in part, Porter’s 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition, determining that his penalty phase verdict form was unconstitutional. The order vacated Porter’s death sentence. Appeals from the order were held in abeyance pending the Pennsylvania courts' ruling on another petition and remain in abeyance.Porter then claimed violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments rights by continuing to confine him on death row even though his death sentence had been vacated. Porter alleged that his solitary confinement has caused “irreversible damage” to his mental health. The district court held that Porter does not have a procedural due process interest in avoiding solitary confinement because Porter’s death sentence remains active; Porter has not offered evidence of actual injury or deliberate indifference so he cannot succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim; and Porter cannot make a substantive due process claim based on the same allegations at issue in his Eighth Amendment claim.The Third Circuit reversed in part. The existence of the stay does not extinguish procedural due process rights. While 33 years of solitary confinement may violate the Eighth Amendment, the claimed Eighth Amendment right has not been clearly established so representatives of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections are entitled to qualified immunity. View "Porter v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Harvard gave Mazzetti (a stranger) a ride home because Mazzetti was afraid of her boyfriend (Sutton). Upon their arrival, Sutton made threats, tried to get Mazzetti out of the vehicle, and used racial slurs against Harvard, a Black male. Harvard called 911 and proceeded to leave with Mazzetti. Sutton jumped onto the hood of Harvard’s moving vehicle, making death threats. Harvard believed Sutton had a firearm and a knife. Harvard informed the 911 operator of the situation and drove onto the highway. The operator instructed Harvard to take a specific exit.At the police roadblock, Trooper Cesnalis did not respond to Harvard’s explanation, made no effort to locate the knife or the firearm, and asked Harvard to take a Breathalyzer test. Harvard agreed. After six tries, Harvard completed the test, which indicated that his blood alcohol content was below the legal limit. Cesnalis nonetheless inferred that Harvard was under the influence because he was sweaty, speaking rapidly, and not directly answering questions. Harvard was handcuffed and taken to the police station. Cesnalis was aware that Sutton had a criminal record but accepted Sutton’s explanation that Harvard had hit him with his vehicle. Sutton was not charged. Mazzetti corroborated Harvard’s statements. Despite negative results from additional testing, Cesnalis charged Harvard with DUI, recklessly endangering another person, reckless driving, simple assault, aggravated assault, and disorderly conduct, referring to Sutton as “the victim.” He omitted several exculpatory facts from the affidavit and referred to Harvard’s criminal history, although there was no evidence that Harvard had a criminal history.Harvard, exonerated, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment for Cesnalis as to false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and Equal Protection but affirmed as to the remaining claims and as to another officer. View "Harvard v. Cesnalis" on Justia Law

In February 2019, Harris filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241, which was recharacterized as a motion for compassionate release. The district court concluded that Harris had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. A prisoner may file a motion for compassionate release with the sentencing court “after [he or she] has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier,” 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). The court concluded that because the Warden denied Harris’s request within 30 days, he was required to completely exhaust the administrative remedy process.The Third Circuit vacated, noting that the government concedes that its argument regarding exhaustion was in error. The statute states that the defendant may file the motion 30 days after the warden receives his request. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

In 2001, Rosen stabbed his wife to death in their home, then called the police and claimed that home invaders had stabbed his wife. Within hours, he confessed to the stabbing but claimed it was an unintentional response to his wife swinging a knife at him. The prosecution requested a psychiatric exam of Rosen in preparation for his first murder trial, where he raised a diminished capacity defense. After his first conviction was overturned, he abandoned his diminished capacity defense. In his federal habeas corpus petition, Rosen argued that the second trial court violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent when it ruled that his statements from the court-ordered psychiatric exam were admissible to impeach Rosen if he chose to testify at his second trial. Electing not to testify, Rosen was again convicted of murder.The Third Circuit affirmed the district court in denying relief. Rosen cannot demonstrate that using his statements to the psychiatric expert at the second trial for the limited purpose of impeachment would violate clearly established Fifth Amendment law. Rosen both initiated an evaluation and introduced psychiatric evidence at his first criminal trial. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court could reasonably find that the Fifth Amendment waiver triggered by Rosen’s mental health defense at his first trial extended to his second trial, at least with respect to the issues raised by his own expert. View "Rosen v. Superintendent Mahanoy SCI" on Justia Law

In 2001, Connellsville police found Haith, lying dead on the sidewalk. District Attorney Vernon helped direct the investigation. Officers interviewed Weimer, who had what looked like blood on her clothes. Weimer told officers that she had given Haith a ride to a party. Others confirmed her story. None of the crime scene DNA matched Weimer. Months later, Beal, whom Weimer had previously dated, told police that Weimer and Gibson killed Haith. Reviewing autopsy photos, an investigator saw an apparent bite mark on Haith’s hand. A bite-mark expert reviewed Beal’s statement, photos of Haith’s hand, and teeth impressions from Gibson and Weimer. He concluded the bite mark matched Weimer and had occurred minutes before Haith’s death. Beal then changed his story. Months later, Blair contacted police, stating that a fellow inmate, Stenger, was involved. Despite three conflicting statements, officers charged Weimer with murder; Vernon approved. Beal recanted his previous statements, testifying that an officer “coaxed me.” The judge dismissed the charges. Investigators continued to investigate Weimer. Stenger told police he would implicate Weimer in exchange for a lighter sentence for unrelated convictions. Officers again charged Weimer. In 2006, a jury convicted her. In 2015, a judge vacated Weimer’s convictions. Significant exculpatory evidence was uncovered. Stenger conceded he knew nothing about Haith’s murder and that police had walked him through his testimony. The bite-mark expert disavowed his testimony. The charges against Weimer were “dropped with prejudice.”Weimer filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit, on interlocutory appeal, held that former D.A. Vernon is not protected by absolute immunity. Aside from Vernon’s approval of the criminal complaint, Weimer alleges Vernon engaged in investigatory conduct. Vernon is entitled to qualified immunity as to Weimer’s failure to intervene claim and as to Vernon’s alleged conduct in directing officers to investigate bite-mark evidence. View "Weimer v. County of Fayette" on Justia Law

In 2014, a sniper attacked Pennsylvania State Troopers at the Barracks, killing one and severely injuring the other. The next day, Troopers received a report that a man (DeLade) with a rifle was walking down a highway 15 miles from the Barracks. Trooper Cargan ran DeLade’s name through a criminal-history database and learned that the Escambia County, Florida sheriff’s department had issued a warrant for DeLade’s arrest, with a “no extradition” status. Cargan called and requested that the department change the status of the warrant to “full extradition.” The department complied. Troopers arrested DeLade, alleging that he had been charged with a crime in Florida. DeLade remained in pretrial detention for five days awaiting his extradition hearing—his first court appearance. Escambia County indicated that it would not extradite DeLade, so the Commonwealth dropped the arrest-prior-to-requisition charge. Another complaint was filed, charging him with being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm; the court released him on bail. DeLade later pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct. A court sentenced him to 12 months’ probation.DeLade filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that Cargan violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause by fabricating evidence to support the arrest-prior-to-requisition charge. The district court granted Cargan summary judgment on DeLade’s Fourth Amendment claims, finding that probable cause existed to justify charging DeLade as a prohibited person in possession of a firearm but declined to grant summary judgment or qualified immunity to Cargan on DeLade’s Fourteenth Amendment claim. The Third Circuit reversed in part. A claim alleging unlawful arrest and pretrial detention before a detainee’s first court appearance sounds in the Fourth Amendment, not the Due Process Clause. View "Delade v. Cargan" on Justia Law

In 2004, Abreu was convicted in Pennsylvania of 22 drug-related counts and was sentenced to 27-54 years’ imprisonment, to run consecutively to a federal sentence Abreu was already serving. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed. Abreu later unsuccessfully sought relief under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). In 2015, Abreu filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, claiming that his PCRA counsel’s assistance was ineffective in failing to assert that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. The district court rejected his claims.The Third Circuit granted a certificate of appealability as to claims that trial counsel performed ineffectively by failing to challenge the admission of grand jury testimony and by failing to seek to strike a police officer’s testimony recounting statements made by others. While Abreu’s appeal was pending, he was released on early parole, subject to a federal removal order, and then removed to the Dominican Republic. His federal conviction (not at issue) permanently bars his reentry. The Third Circuit directed the district court to dismiss Abreu’s petition as moot. Without a collateral consequence of Abreu’s state conviction that can be redressed by a favorable decision on his petition, there is no case or controversy under Article III. View "Abreu v. Superintendent Smithfield SCI" on Justia Law

Seibert pleaded guilty to production and possession of child pornography following a raid in which agents recovered approximately 1,500 images. The Probation Office recommended enhancements under U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(5), which applies “[i]f the defendant engaged in a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor,” and 4B1.5(b)(1), which applies if “the defendant engaged in a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct,” resulting in a Guidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment. After applying the two enhancements and weighing the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors, the court sentenced Seibert to 360 months’ imprisonment.The Third Circuit affirmed. The Guidelines allow for the simultaneous application of both enhancements to the same conduct; there was no procedural error. The court rejected an argument that application of the section 3553(a) factors led to an unduly harsh sentence because it did not place enough weight on Seibert's personal circumstances, including the mental health, medical, and learning challenges. Seibert submitted a psychological evaluation concluding that he “has the libido of an adult but the mind of a small child and does not have the capacity to use rationality to control his impulses.” The district court acknowledged that evidence but concluded that Seibert’s “family struggles” are not “unusually severe.” View "United States v. Seibert" on Justia Law

Argentine citizen Cabeda, a lawful U.S. permanent resident, was convicted in Pennsylvania state court of having involuntary deviate sexual intercourse at age 34 with a 15-year-old boy. Immigration authorities found her removable for having committed a state-law offense qualifying as an “aggravated felony,” 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), specifically the “sexual abuse of a minor.”The Third Circuit granted her petition for review. Notwithstanding her actual, admitted sexual abuse of a minor, she cannot be removed because the Pennsylvania statute under which she was convicted could conceivably be violated by conduct that falls short of satisfying all the elements of the federally defined crime of sexual abuse of a minor. The categorical approach mandates ignoring what she actually did and focusing instead on what someone else, in a hypothetical world, could have done. The court called this “a surpassingly strange result but required by controlling law.” View "Cabeda v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

A four-year-old stated that Heinrich had pulled her pants down and taken pictures. Pennsylvania state police conducted a consensual search of Heinrich’s electronic devices and found sexually explicit images of two children. Heinrich was charged with 15 counts of using or inducing a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of that conduct, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), and one count of possessing material depicting the sexual exploitation of a minor, section 2252(a)(4)(B). Heinrich admitted to taking the pictures and that they depicted sexually explicit conduct but planned to defend himself against the production charges, claiming he lacked the requisite specific intent.Heinrich proffered an expert witness, a psychologist. The government moved to exclude that evidence as inadmissible because the charged offenses were general intent crimes and under Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 403, 702, or 704(b). After a hearing on the applicability of Rule 704(b), the judge’s law clerk conducted a telephonic status conference, stating that the court intended to grant the government’s motions based on Rules 403 and 704(b). No opinion or order was docketed. The judge did not participate in the conference, which was unrecorded and not transcribed. Heinrich entered a conditional guilty plea and appealed.The Third Circuit vacated without addressing the merits of the ruling, noting the “impossible position” of attempting “to review an adjunct-presented non-ruling that caused the Defendant to plead guilty.” District courts must articulate their Rule 403 reasoning on the record. View "United States v. Heinrich" on Justia Law