Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2008, State Trooper DiLillo stopped a car for speeding. Allen was the passenger. His uncle, Andrew, was driving. Allen had rented the vehicle. Each man was subject to an outstanding warrant. They were placed under arrest. Allen admitted that he had marijuana on his person. DiLillo discovered baggies of marijuana in Allen’s shoes. Trooper Nugnes arrived; DiLillo left with the men. When a tow truck arrived, the driver attempted to unlock the car and accidentally opened the trunk. Nugnes told the truck driver not to do anything and pulled out something wrapped in black plastic, which Nugnes correctly believed to be a bundle of heroin.The court denied Allen’s motion to suppress the heroin, finding that the evidence was in plain view. Allen pled guilty, admitting in court that: there was heroin in the car and that he intended to distribute it. On remand, the trial court heard testimony from the tow truck driver and Nugnes and was “not persuaded, by even the preponderance of the evidence, that the mannitol or the heroin was visible prior to the trooper’s incursion into the trunk.” The Supreme Court of New Jersey vacated Allen’s conviction because of Nugnes’s warrantless search.Allen filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Allen did not establish a malicious prosecution claim because he failed to show that his case was terminated in a way indicative of his innocence. With respect to claims against the state police, New Jersey has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. View "Allen v. New Jersey State Police" on Justia Law

Jabateh was a rebel commander during the Liberian civil war. He later fled to the United States seeking asylum. His conduct in Liberia, characterized by brazen violence and wanton atrocities, made honest immigration application impossible. He concealed his crimes and portrayed himself as a persecuted victim. Jabateh’s fraud succeeded for almost 20 years.In 2016, Jabateh was charged with the fraud in his immigration documents, 18 U.S.C. 1546(a) and perjury, 18 U.S.C. 1621. The five-year limitations period for misconduct related to Jabateh's 2001 application for permanent residency had passed, leaving only Jabateh’s oral responses in a 2011 Interview affirming his answer of “no” to questions related to genocide and misrepresentations during his immigration applications. The district court noted “the force of the prosecution’s trial evidence,” establishing that Jabateh personally committed or ordered his troops to commit murder, enslavement, rape, and torture “because of race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion.”The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to Jabateh’s 360-month sentence. The court acknowledged that section 1546(a) criminalizes fraud in immigration documents and that Jabateh was not charged with fraud in his immigration documents, only with orally lying about those documents. Jabateh, however, failed to raise this argument at trial. “Given the novelty of the interpretative question, and the lack of persuasive" guidance, the court declined to hold that this reading of section 1546(a) meets the stringent standards for “plain error” reversal. View "United States v. Jabateh" on Justia Law

The statutes, 18 U.S.C. 2257 and 2257A, require producers of pornography to verify the age and identity of each person portrayed, to keep records of the age verification, and to label each depiction with the location where law enforcement may obtain those records. In 2009, the plaintiffs filed suit. Their First Amendment challenges have resulted in three prior Third Circuit opinions. In 2016, the court remanded for the evaluation of those claims under strict scrutiny.The Third Circuit affirmed the resulting order in part. The two association plaintiffs lack standing to bring as-applied First Amendment claims on behalf of their members. The age verification, recordkeeping, and labeling requirements violate the First Amendment as applied to plaintiffs who are at least 30 years old. The government conceded that the requirements need not apply when sexually explicit depictions show performers who are at least 30 years old because, at that age, an adult performer could not reasonably appear to be a child. For these plaintiffs, the requirements are not the least restrictive way to protect children. The requirements are not facially invalid under the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine; the plaintiffs failed to prove that those provisions improperly restrict a substantial amount of protected speech relative to their plainly legitimate sweep. A nationwide injunction was broader than necessary to provide full relief to those plaintiffs who prevailed on their as-applied claims. View "Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Porter was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in 1986. Since then, he has been incarcerated in solitary confinement on death row. In 2003, the district court granted, in part, Porter’s 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition, determining that his penalty phase verdict form was unconstitutional. The order vacated Porter’s death sentence. Appeals from the order were held in abeyance pending the Pennsylvania courts' ruling on another petition and remain in abeyance.Porter then claimed violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments rights by continuing to confine him on death row even though his death sentence had been vacated. Porter alleged that his solitary confinement has caused “irreversible damage” to his mental health. The district court held that Porter does not have a procedural due process interest in avoiding solitary confinement because Porter’s death sentence remains active; Porter has not offered evidence of actual injury or deliberate indifference so he cannot succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim; and Porter cannot make a substantive due process claim based on the same allegations at issue in his Eighth Amendment claim.The Third Circuit reversed in part. The existence of the stay does not extinguish procedural due process rights. While 33 years of solitary confinement may violate the Eighth Amendment, the claimed Eighth Amendment right has not been clearly established so representatives of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections are entitled to qualified immunity. View "Porter v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Harvard gave Mazzetti (a stranger) a ride home because Mazzetti was afraid of her boyfriend (Sutton). Upon their arrival, Sutton made threats, tried to get Mazzetti out of the vehicle, and used racial slurs against Harvard, a Black male. Harvard called 911 and proceeded to leave with Mazzetti. Sutton jumped onto the hood of Harvard’s moving vehicle, making death threats. Harvard believed Sutton had a firearm and a knife. Harvard informed the 911 operator of the situation and drove onto the highway. The operator instructed Harvard to take a specific exit.At the police roadblock, Trooper Cesnalis did not respond to Harvard’s explanation, made no effort to locate the knife or the firearm, and asked Harvard to take a Breathalyzer test. Harvard agreed. After six tries, Harvard completed the test, which indicated that his blood alcohol content was below the legal limit. Cesnalis nonetheless inferred that Harvard was under the influence because he was sweaty, speaking rapidly, and not directly answering questions. Harvard was handcuffed and taken to the police station. Cesnalis was aware that Sutton had a criminal record but accepted Sutton’s explanation that Harvard had hit him with his vehicle. Sutton was not charged. Mazzetti corroborated Harvard’s statements. Despite negative results from additional testing, Cesnalis charged Harvard with DUI, recklessly endangering another person, reckless driving, simple assault, aggravated assault, and disorderly conduct, referring to Sutton as “the victim.” He omitted several exculpatory facts from the affidavit and referred to Harvard’s criminal history, although there was no evidence that Harvard had a criminal history.Harvard, exonerated, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment for Cesnalis as to false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and Equal Protection but affirmed as to the remaining claims and as to another officer. View "Harvard v. Cesnalis" on Justia Law

In February 2019, Harris filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241, which was recharacterized as a motion for compassionate release. The district court concluded that Harris had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. A prisoner may file a motion for compassionate release with the sentencing court “after [he or she] has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier,” 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). The court concluded that because the Warden denied Harris’s request within 30 days, he was required to completely exhaust the administrative remedy process.The Third Circuit vacated, noting that the government concedes that its argument regarding exhaustion was in error. The statute states that the defendant may file the motion 30 days after the warden receives his request. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

In 2001, Rosen stabbed his wife to death in their home, then called the police and claimed that home invaders had stabbed his wife. Within hours, he confessed to the stabbing but claimed it was an unintentional response to his wife swinging a knife at him. The prosecution requested a psychiatric exam of Rosen in preparation for his first murder trial, where he raised a diminished capacity defense. After his first conviction was overturned, he abandoned his diminished capacity defense. In his federal habeas corpus petition, Rosen argued that the second trial court violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent when it ruled that his statements from the court-ordered psychiatric exam were admissible to impeach Rosen if he chose to testify at his second trial. Electing not to testify, Rosen was again convicted of murder.The Third Circuit affirmed the district court in denying relief. Rosen cannot demonstrate that using his statements to the psychiatric expert at the second trial for the limited purpose of impeachment would violate clearly established Fifth Amendment law. Rosen both initiated an evaluation and introduced psychiatric evidence at his first criminal trial. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court could reasonably find that the Fifth Amendment waiver triggered by Rosen’s mental health defense at his first trial extended to his second trial, at least with respect to the issues raised by his own expert. View "Rosen v. Superintendent Mahanoy SCI" on Justia Law

In 2001, Connellsville police found Haith, lying dead on the sidewalk. District Attorney Vernon helped direct the investigation. Officers interviewed Weimer, who had what looked like blood on her clothes. Weimer told officers that she had given Haith a ride to a party. Others confirmed her story. None of the crime scene DNA matched Weimer. Months later, Beal, whom Weimer had previously dated, told police that Weimer and Gibson killed Haith. Reviewing autopsy photos, an investigator saw an apparent bite mark on Haith’s hand. A bite-mark expert reviewed Beal’s statement, photos of Haith’s hand, and teeth impressions from Gibson and Weimer. He concluded the bite mark matched Weimer and had occurred minutes before Haith’s death. Beal then changed his story. Months later, Blair contacted police, stating that a fellow inmate, Stenger, was involved. Despite three conflicting statements, officers charged Weimer with murder; Vernon approved. Beal recanted his previous statements, testifying that an officer “coaxed me.” The judge dismissed the charges. Investigators continued to investigate Weimer. Stenger told police he would implicate Weimer in exchange for a lighter sentence for unrelated convictions. Officers again charged Weimer. In 2006, a jury convicted her. In 2015, a judge vacated Weimer’s convictions. Significant exculpatory evidence was uncovered. Stenger conceded he knew nothing about Haith’s murder and that police had walked him through his testimony. The bite-mark expert disavowed his testimony. The charges against Weimer were “dropped with prejudice.”Weimer filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit, on interlocutory appeal, held that former D.A. Vernon is not protected by absolute immunity. Aside from Vernon’s approval of the criminal complaint, Weimer alleges Vernon engaged in investigatory conduct. Vernon is entitled to qualified immunity as to Weimer’s failure to intervene claim and as to Vernon’s alleged conduct in directing officers to investigate bite-mark evidence. View "Weimer v. County of Fayette" on Justia Law

In 2014, a sniper attacked Pennsylvania State Troopers at the Barracks, killing one and severely injuring the other. The next day, Troopers received a report that a man (DeLade) with a rifle was walking down a highway 15 miles from the Barracks. Trooper Cargan ran DeLade’s name through a criminal-history database and learned that the Escambia County, Florida sheriff’s department had issued a warrant for DeLade’s arrest, with a “no extradition” status. Cargan called and requested that the department change the status of the warrant to “full extradition.” The department complied. Troopers arrested DeLade, alleging that he had been charged with a crime in Florida. DeLade remained in pretrial detention for five days awaiting his extradition hearing—his first court appearance. Escambia County indicated that it would not extradite DeLade, so the Commonwealth dropped the arrest-prior-to-requisition charge. Another complaint was filed, charging him with being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm; the court released him on bail. DeLade later pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct. A court sentenced him to 12 months’ probation.DeLade filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that Cargan violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause by fabricating evidence to support the arrest-prior-to-requisition charge. The district court granted Cargan summary judgment on DeLade’s Fourth Amendment claims, finding that probable cause existed to justify charging DeLade as a prohibited person in possession of a firearm but declined to grant summary judgment or qualified immunity to Cargan on DeLade’s Fourteenth Amendment claim. The Third Circuit reversed in part. A claim alleging unlawful arrest and pretrial detention before a detainee’s first court appearance sounds in the Fourth Amendment, not the Due Process Clause. View "Delade v. Cargan" on Justia Law

In 2004, Abreu was convicted in Pennsylvania of 22 drug-related counts and was sentenced to 27-54 years’ imprisonment, to run consecutively to a federal sentence Abreu was already serving. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed. Abreu later unsuccessfully sought relief under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). In 2015, Abreu filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, claiming that his PCRA counsel’s assistance was ineffective in failing to assert that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. The district court rejected his claims.The Third Circuit granted a certificate of appealability as to claims that trial counsel performed ineffectively by failing to challenge the admission of grand jury testimony and by failing to seek to strike a police officer’s testimony recounting statements made by others. While Abreu’s appeal was pending, he was released on early parole, subject to a federal removal order, and then removed to the Dominican Republic. His federal conviction (not at issue) permanently bars his reentry. The Third Circuit directed the district court to dismiss Abreu’s petition as moot. Without a collateral consequence of Abreu’s state conviction that can be redressed by a favorable decision on his petition, there is no case or controversy under Article III. View "Abreu v. Superintendent Smithfield SCI" on Justia Law