Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Pawlowski, the former mayor of Allentown, Pennsylvania, was convicted of federal programs bribery, 18 U.S.C. 666; Travel Act bribery, 18 U.S.C. 1952; attempted Hobbs Act extortion, 18 U.S.C. 1001; wire and mail fraud, honest services fraud, making false statements to the FBI, and conspiracy. The charges stemmed from a scheme in which Pawlowski steered city contracts and provided other favors in exchange for campaign contributions. The district court imposed a 180-month sentence.The Third Circuit affirmed. There was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find “quid pro quo” to support the bribery convictions. Any error caused by Pawlowski's inability to recross-examine a government witness was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Pawlowski’s sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. The case against Pawlowski was strong. The evidence showed a man eager to influence and be influenced if it would help him fund his political campaigns. View "United States v. Pawlowski" on Justia Law

Dongarra, incarcerated for bank robbery, was transferred to a new prison and went through the onboarding process, supervised by Officer Smith. Smith gave him an ID card that indicated “Registered Offender,” and a T-shirt “know[n]” to be a “sex offender T-shirt.” The shirt falsely suggested that he had been imprisoned at Terre Haute, “a sex offender prison.” Dongarra stated that he “could be killed” if prisoners mistook him for a sex offender. Smith said he did not care and that he “hope[d] [Dongarra] kn[e]w how to fight.” Dongarra appealed to other staff, who asked Smith for another T-shirt. Smith refused. Frightened, Dongarra skipped meals and lost weight and stopped going out for recreation. Dongarra filed a grievance. Though he never got a response, a few weeks later the prison replaced his ID card and T-shirt.Dongarra sued Smith and two unnamed officers, seeking damages and an injunction, citing “Bivens.” The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 case. Injunctive relief is not available because Dongarra had not sued anyone who could fire or discipline Smith and by the time Dongarra sued, the prison had corrected the error. No court has extended Bivens to cover similar facts; “special factors” bar extending Bivens here. Although the officer violated Dongarra’s rights, the feared risk never materialized. Damages cannot be awarded to compensate him for an assault that never happened. View "Dongarra v. Smith" on Justia Law

Agarwal, a contract network engineer, had security credentials that granted him access to the corporate offices and internal networks of telecommunications companies. Agarwal installed key-logging software to obtain employee usernames and passwords and installed unauthorized hardware and computer code that enabled him to surreptitiously transfer information. Agarwal also used a vacant office without authorization. The companies learned of the unauthorized activities and devoted significant resources to investigate and remediate the breaches; compromised accounts and computers were temporarily taken offline. Agarwal monitored the investigations.Agarwal eventually pleaded guilty to aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1), and two counts under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) for intentionally accessing a protected computer without authorization and obtaining information valued at more than $5,000, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2); 1030(c)(2)(B)(iii). The statutory maximum sentence was 12 years, five years for each CFAA violation, plus a mandatory consecutive two-year term for identity theft. Agarwal disputed the PSR's loss calculation of over $3,000,000, most of which was for salary expenses for investigating and remediating the breaches. His Guidelines range was 70-87 months’ imprisonment for the CFAA violations. The court sentenced Agarwal to 70 months’ imprisonment for the CFAA violations, plus the mandatory two-year sentence. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument the plea was unknowing because Agarwal could not have reasonably foreseen the losses that would be attributed to his CFAA violations. Agarwal signed the plea agreement aware that the loss amount was disputed and waived the right to appeal his sentence. View "United States v. Agarwal" on Justia Law

Martin’s state conviction became “final” in April 2002, triggering the one-year limitations period on state prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus relief, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). The clock ran for 193 days, until October 21, 2002, when Martin filed a petition for state post-conviction relief (PCR). The clock was paused until June 14, 2004, the last day on which Martin could have appealed (but did not) the trial court’s denial of his petition—and expired 172 days later, on December 3, 2004. In June 2015, Martin filed a petition seeking federal habeas relief. The state appellate court had accepted Martin’s April 2012 motion for leave to appeal “as within time” the denial of his 2002 PCR petition; he argued that the ruling retroactively tolled the limitations period. Martin essentially argued that a “properly filed” PCR petition is “pending” under section 2244(d)(2) for the period between the expiration of time under state law in which a prisoner could have timely appealed the denial of a PCR petition, and the prisoner’s submission of a motion for leave to file a PCR appeal “as within time.”.The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his petition as untimely. Section 4 2244(d)(2)’s tolling mechanism looks forward, not backward, and a state court’s acceptance of an appeal “as within time” does not rewind the one-year clock. View "Martin v. Administrator New Jersey State Prison" on Justia Law

In 2017, a man was found dead next to 22 small wax bags containing fentanyl-laced heroin, stamped “WI FIGHT?” He had overdosed on fentanyl and heroin. Officers determined that M.M. was the victim’s drug dealer. Charged with intent to distribute a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and distribution of a controlled substance resulting in death, section 841(b)(1)(C), M.M. entered into a plea agreement. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3553(e), the government recommended a departure below the applicable mandatory minimum sentence of 240 months if M.M. provided “substantial assistance.”M.M. invoked section 3553(a)'s factors, including his addiction and psychological issues related to his upbringing. The court granted the downward departure motion after evaluating M.M.’s cooperation and addressing those factors but without specifying the basis of the departure. The government challenged the 120-month sentence under Rule 35(a), arguing that section 3553(e) does not allow a court to reduce a sentence below a statutory mandatory minimum based on considerations unrelated to substantial assistance. The District Court agreed that clear error had occurred and clarified that M.M.’s substantial assistance entitled him to a departure to 180 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit vacated. The authority to amend a sentence under Rule 35(a) is very narrow and there was no clear error in the original sentence. View "United States v. Minichella" on Justia Law

Desu co-owned Heights Pharmacy with Desai. Desai collected Heights' cash earnings and deposited a small portion of that cash into the pharmacy’s bank account, leaving the rest undeposited. After paying for certain items from the undeposited cash, such as part of Desai’s salary, Desai split the undeposited cash between herself and Desu. Desai kept the cash earnings off the general ledger. The underreporting on Heights Pharmacy’s tax returns led to underreported net income on Desu’s individual tax returns. Following a government investigation, Desai pleaded guilty and testified against Desu. Desu also co-owned Arthur Avenue Pharmacy, with Pujara. Desu and Pujara also kept the cash earnings off Arthur’s general ledger. Pujara testified against Desu, who was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 371 for conspiracy to impede the lawful government functions of the IRS and willfully assisting in the preparation and presentation of materially false tax returns.The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the jury received a faulty government exhibit for use in its deliberations; two counts in the indictment fail to state an offense; the district court erred in excluding testimony regarding the Desais’ cash transactions on relevancy grounds; the district court erred in denying a “Franks” evidentiary hearing; the government constructively amended the indictment; and the district court erred at sentencing by failing to account for certain deductions and exclusions in Desu’s income when calculating the tax loss. View "United States v. Desu" on Justia Law

The Unions represented employees at Care One facilities. Care One sued the Unions for damages arising from actions that allegedly amounted to a pattern of racketeering under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961, based upon its characterization of these actions as “extortionate.”The district court dismissed the complaint, reasoning that no reasonable juror could conclude that the vandalism underlying Care One’s claims could be attributed to union members and that other actions the Unions undertook to exert pressure on Care One—including advertisements, picketing, and attempts to invoke regulatory and legislative processes—were not “extortionate.” The court further concluded that Defendants lacked the specific intent to deceive and were entitled to summary judgment on mail and wire fraud claims. The Third Circuit affirmed. Labor tactics, such as the Unions engaged in here, are not extortionate. As long as unions pursue legitimate labor objectives, their coercive tactics are not subject to liability. The court noted that an investigation by the Connecticut State’s Attorney closed without identifying any suspects, let alone any union-member suspects; union membership alone would not tie the actions of any such members to the Unions. There is no admissible evidence that the Unions authorized the acts of sabotage and vandalism. View "Care One Management LLC v. United Healthcare Workers East" on Justia Law

Taylor, on probation, was found to be in possession of drugs, a firearm, and cash, and moved to suppress the evidence. Before the scheduled hearing, his court-appointed lawyer (Carey) moved to withdraw because Taylor would not permit him to withdraw pro se motions in which Taylor refused to “accept that the laws of the United States govern him.” Taylor contended that “the United States is not a country. It is a corporation.” The court denied Carey’s motion Taylor filed more documents. Carey again moved to withdraw, explaining that Taylor “desires to proceed pro se.” Carey acknowledged substantial concerns about Taylor’s legal competency.” Taylor acknowledged that he “d[id not] understand law” and requested that the court “deal with [him] commonly.” The court stated that his pro se filings were rambling and not founded on any legal principles. Taylor repeatedly attempted to challenge the jurisdiction of the court.The court denied his request to represent himself, denied his motion to suppress, and, later (twice) appointed new counsel. Taylor was convicted and sentenced to 264 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit vacated. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to self-representation if he “knowingly and intelligently” waives his right to counsel. When Taylor invoked that right, the district court bore “the weighty responsibility of conducting a sufficiently penetrating inquiry to satisfy itself that” Taylor could make such a waiver. The court did not complete the requisite inquiry. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Kane woke up to find his girlfriend, Ally, dead. Ally had a tourniquet wrapped around her arm; nearby, officers spotted a purse containing wax bags bearing the word “Butter,” containing a mix later determined to be heroin and fentanyl. Another bag contained syringes and nine empty packets that were stamped with a Viking helmet. Another purse held nine full packets of drugs bearing a "bulldog" stamp. There were 56 empty Butter bags in the room. Kane agreed to conduct a controlled purchase of drugs from Collins, who had been Ally’s dealer for two years. Collins handed Kane five bundles of Butter-stamped heroin. Collins (not knowing Ally had died) confirmed it was the same stuff Ally had purchased the night of her overdose. Collins explained that he had obtained the Butter-stamped heroin from Jacobs. Jacobs was arrested for distributing the drugs that killed Ally. The prosecution used its peremptory strikes to strike all but one minority juror. Jacobs, an African-American, raised an unsuccessful Batson challenge.The Third Circuit upheld Jacobs’ convictions. Though the prosecution did not prove Jacobs’ crimes with 100% certainty, it was not required to do so. A rational juror could have decided Jacobs was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt after drawing inferences from the evidence and testimony. The court did not err in its jury instructions or in denying the Batson challenge. The court incorrectly imposed a “general sentence” for Jacobs’ three convictions; on remand the district court must clarify a specific sentence for each offense. View "United States v. Jacobs" on Justia Law

Officer Staffer saw Jefferson traveling at high speed with his car alarm blaring. Staffer, suspecting the vehicle was stolen, attempted a traffic stop. Jefferson was driving with an open container of alcohol. Fearing a probation violation, Jefferson did not stop. Officer Lias joined the pursuit after hearing radio dispatches, only aware that Jefferson was driving a possibly stolen vehicle. Although other officers observed Jefferson traveling at high speeds, running red lights, ignoring police signals to pull over, and driving close to other vehicles, Lias did not personally witness Jefferson doing so. Jefferson hit a fire hydrant. Officers surrounded Jefferson’s vehicle. Jefferson reversed, striking a police vehicle before backing into an intersection. Lias arrived as Jefferson was driving away. Lias claims that he discharged his firearm because he feared for his own safety and others around him. Jefferson was struck in his forearm, fracturing his bones, but drove away. Jefferson later pled guilty to second-degree eluding.The district court rejected Jefferson’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, finding Lias entitled to qualified immunity. The Third Circuit reversed. A jury should make factual determinations regarding Lias’s decision to employ deadly force against Jefferson. Video footage makes clear that neither Lias nor anyone else was in danger of being struck by Jefferson. It is clearly established that an otherwise non-threatening individual engaged in vehicular flight is entitled to be free from being subjected to deadly force if it is unreasonable for an officer to believe his or others’ lives are in immediate jeopardy. Jefferson’s second-degree eluding conviction does not preclude his excessive force claim. View "Jefferson v. Lias" on Justia Law