Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Johnson developed an obsession with the allegations of sexual assault against entertainer Bill Cosby. Hoping to discredit the accusers, Johnson posed as an attorney and filed a fabricated document on the civil docket of a lawsuit against Cosby. His trick was quickly discovered. Johnson was convicted of making a false statement and identity theft. On appeal, he argued that the prosecution failed to prove that his statements were material as necessary to establish liability under 18 U.S.C. 1001.The Third Circuit reversed Johnson’s convictions. Johnson’s behavior wasted public time and resources and distracted court officials from their work but only Congress can define a federal crime. While there was significant evidence that Johnson’s statements were false, there was no evidence that any decision entrusted to the judge in the underlying Cosby trial could have been influenced by the praecipe filed by Johnson, which contained an unsigned exhibit that accused a party of failing to report income. This false statement, even if considered by the judge, was not relevant, much less material. Far from proving that using a false identity enabled the false praecipe to be filed, the record reveals that Johnson’s identity was immaterial and that Johnson could have filed the same documents under his, or any other, name. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Garrett, a New Jersey prisoner, has commenced at least 10 civil actions against prison officials, state officials, and the United States, avoiding paying filing fees for these lawsuits by proceeding in forma pauperis. All his lawsuits have been unsuccessful. Garrett appealed the dismissal of his latest lawsuit, which concerns his risk of contracting COVID-19 and speedy trial issues.The Third Circuit affirmed, citing the three-strikes rule, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). Noting the division among circuit courts, the court stated that a suit dismissed under “Heck” is dismissed for failure to state a claim and counts as a strike. In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner lacks a “cause of action” under section 1983 if the prisoner is challenging an “allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment” before having the conviction or sentence overturned (the favorable-termination requirement). Garrett has three prior suits dismissed for failure to meet Heck’s “favorable-termination” requirement. Garrett has not shown that he is “under imminent danger of serious physical injury,” 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). View "Garrett v. Murphy" on Justia Law

In August 2019, Sheppard began serving a three-year term of supervised release in connection with a 2016 guilty plea for mail fraud. During the first year of his supervision, Sheppard learned that his girlfriend and his assigned probation officer were engaged in an alleged “personal relationship” that included texting and telephone conversations concerning the probation officer’s romantic relationship. Sheppard moved for early termination of his term of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(1). The Third Circuit affirmed the summary denial of the motion. The district court was not required to cite the specific 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors; it sufficiently indicated that it considered the relevant factors. The court did not fail to consider the effect of the probation officer’s alleged misconduct but focused the majority of its decision on addressing Sheppard’s rehabilitation argument. It found that Sheppard “offer[ed] no persuasive explanation for why the purported misconduct of his former probation officer makes him less amenable to, or needful of, such assistance.” View "United States v. Sheppard" on Justia Law

Since his 2012 federal conviction, Garrett has brought at least 10 federal civil suits. In this suit, Garrett sued New Jersey's Governor and another official under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging due process and “speedy trial” violations. The district court granted Garrett in forma pauperis status. The court screened Garrett’s complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii), concluded that Garrett’s due process claim “is a string of nonsequiturs" with no facts to support any claim, and dismissed Garrett’s speedy trial claim as properly raised only in a habeas action. The Third Circuit advised Garrett to seek a final judgment to perfect his right to appeal. The district court obliged, dismissing Garrett’s complaint “with prejudice.” Garrett never filed a new or amended notice of appeal in the district court, and a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days “after the entry” of judgment, 28 U.S.C. 2107(a).The Third Circuit then denied Garrett’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis; he must pay filing fees under the three-strikes rule. 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). A suit dismissed under “Heck” is dismissed for failure to state a claim and counts as a strike. In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner lacks a section 1983 “cause of action” if the prisoner is challenging an “allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment” before having the conviction or sentence overturned. Garrett has not shown imminent danger or serious physical injury. View "Garrett v. Murphy" on Justia Law

In 2014, Claude, convicted of bank fraud, access device fraud, aggravated identity theft, and currency offenses, was sentenced to 232 months’ imprisonment. In 2020, Claude sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), citing “extraordinary and compelling circumstances” arising from his purported “substantial assistance to the D.E.A. of New Jersey.” Claude alleged that, four years earlier, he provided crucial assistance, which allowed the government to “bust[] someone with multiple kilos of cocaine” and “locat[e] a cell phone that was part of a child pornography indictment.” The government filed a Rule 35(b) motion on behalf of another prisoner who, Claude insists, “reap[ed] the benefits” of his efforts, resulting in a “gross disparity” between his sentence and that of the undeserving cooperator. The government asserted that his purported assistance was neither substantial nor welcomed.The district court denied Claude’s motion, stating that a reduction of sentence for post-sentencing cooperation requires a Rule 35 motion from the government’ and cannot be raised by a defendant through a section 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for compassionate release. While the First Step Act made substantial changes to the procedures applicable to compassionate release motiongs based on extraordinary and compelling reasons, Congress made no changes to Rule 35, which governs sentence reductions based on substantial assistance. The Third Circuit affirmed. Substantial assistance is not itself an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting compassionate release under section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). View "United States v. Claude" on Justia Law

Quinnones pleaded guilty to two counts of armed bank robbery and stipulated that her commission of an armed robbery of a store should be treated at sentencing as if it were a third conviction. The PSR recommended that she be sentenced as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, classifying her conviction for armed bank robbery and her four prior convictions for assault by a prisoner under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 2703 as “crimes of violence.” Quinnones objected, arguing that three of her 2703 convictions did not qualify as crimes of violence. The district court applied the career offender designation, departed downward from the Guidelines range of 188-235 months, and sentenced Quinnones to 132 months’ imprisonment.The Third Circuit vacated. Assault by a prisoner under the portion of section 2703 that criminalizes “caus[ing] another to come into contact with [bodily] fluid” when the prisoner knew or should have known the fluid came from someone with a communicable disease is not a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. The least culpable conduct for which a defendant can be convicted under the statute is spitting or expelling fluid when the person should have known the fluid was infected; such conduct does not include “physical force” for purposes of the Guidelines. A defendant can be convicted of 2703’s bodily fluids felony with only a negligent state of mind as to whether the fluid originated from an infected person. View "United States v. Quinnones" on Justia Law

Talley, a Pennsylvania state prison inmate, signed a settlement agreement resolving two prior lawsuits. He alleges that the Settlement Agreement was fraudulent because attorneys had not entered a “‘proper’ appearance” on behalf of a defendant and that another attorney breached the Agreement when he filed it as an exhibit to a motion in one of the suits. Talley asserted violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961, violations of the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and numerous state law claims.The district court dismissed, finding that the attorney had entered a permissible appearance by signing and filing an answer on behalf of the defendants, and Talley’s RICO and constitutional claims were meritless because the Agreement was never actually filed on the docket. The court denied Talley leave to amend his federal claims as futile. Talley moved to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal. The Third Circuit granted the IFP motion and affirmed the dismissal. The IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. 1915 providing that prisoners may proceed in federal court without prepayment of filing fees, contains a “three-strikes rule.” Courts may call a strike when a prisoner’s “action or appeal . . . was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted[.]” Talley’s prior “mixed dismissals” are not strikes. View "Talley v. Wetzel" on Justia Law

At initial hearings, New Jersey's Parole Board may consult any information it deems relevant, including an inmate’s criminal history. At successive parole hearings, the Board could not consider old information, including the inmate's criminal history. The 1997 Amendments to the Parole Act eliminated that prohibition and instructed the Board to prepare an “objective risk assessment” before every parole hearing, incorporating old information, including an inmate’s “educational and employment history” and “family and marital history,” and other factors. When Holmes was on parole in the 1970s, he killed two acquaintances, murdered a 69-year-old, and wounded a police officer. Sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole, Holmes remains behind bars 48 years later. At his initial parole hearing in 2001, the Board refused to release Holmes. After a 2012, hearing, the Board issued a detailed written statement that probed Holmes’s past parole violations, highlighted the homicides, and scrutinized the shootout that preceded his arrest. The statement noted his unblemished disciplinary record since his initial parole hearing. Without specifying the weight placed on each factor, the Board rejected Holmes’s request for release.Holmes challenged the decision on ex post facto grounds. The Third Circuit vacated the dismissal of his petition. For many prisoners, the rules present little risk to their parole prospects. For Holmes, the change plausibly produced a significant risk of prolonging his time behind bars. View "Holmes v. Christie" on Justia Law

Scott was sentenced for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. His PSR included a career offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(2), which applies if a defendant “committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to sustaining at least two felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” Scott had a 2019 conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and a 2019 conviction for Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(b)(1) and for using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), resulting in an advisory guideline range of 84–105 months’ imprisonment. Neither Scott nor the government challenged the enhancement or any of the PSR’s calculations The court sentenced Scott to 90 months’ imprisonment consecutive to an existing sentence.The Third Circuit vacated the sentence. Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence” under the career offender provision, U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a). The court applied the “oft-bedeviling categorical approach” and compared the statutory offense with the definition of “crime of violence” found in the Guidelines to conclude that Hobbs Act robbery sweeps more broadly than the career offender guideline. The court noted the consensus of the Courts of Appeals. View "United States v. Scott" on Justia Law

Stinson and Jarmon each ran drug trafficking conspiracies out of a North Philadelphia public housing complex/ at various times, 2010-2015. The complex included about 500 apartment units and two playgrounds. During a joint investigation among local police, the FBI, and the DEA, government agents put up pole cameras, established wiretaps, used confidential informants to make controlled drug purchases, pulled trash, analyzed pen registers, and—after Stinson’s arrest and incarceration in 2012— listened to recordings of Stinson’s phone conversations while he was in prison. After the investigation ended in 2017, Stinson and 12 others were charged with conspiracy to distribute 280 grams or more of crack cocaine and related crimes. Separately, Jarmon and 12 others were charged with similar crimes. Most of their co-defendants pleaded guilty and some cooperated.Stinson and Jarmon proceeded to separate trials and were convicted of the conspiracy charges and most of the related charges. Each was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings, the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to drug quantities, and the sentences. Stinson and Jarmon had no reasonable expectation of privacy in their phone calls. View "United States v. Jarmon" on Justia Law