Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Quinnones pleaded guilty to two counts of armed bank robbery and stipulated that her commission of an armed robbery of a store should be treated at sentencing as if it were a third conviction. The PSR recommended that she be sentenced as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, classifying her conviction for armed bank robbery and her four prior convictions for assault by a prisoner under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 2703 as “crimes of violence.” Quinnones objected, arguing that three of her 2703 convictions did not qualify as crimes of violence. The district court applied the career offender designation, departed downward from the Guidelines range of 188-235 months, and sentenced Quinnones to 132 months’ imprisonment.The Third Circuit vacated. Assault by a prisoner under the portion of section 2703 that criminalizes “caus[ing] another to come into contact with [bodily] fluid” when the prisoner knew or should have known the fluid came from someone with a communicable disease is not a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. The least culpable conduct for which a defendant can be convicted under the statute is spitting or expelling fluid when the person should have known the fluid was infected; such conduct does not include “physical force” for purposes of the Guidelines. A defendant can be convicted of 2703’s bodily fluids felony with only a negligent state of mind as to whether the fluid originated from an infected person. View "United States v. Quinnones" on Justia Law

Talley, a Pennsylvania state prison inmate, signed a settlement agreement resolving two prior lawsuits. He alleges that the Settlement Agreement was fraudulent because attorneys had not entered a “‘proper’ appearance” on behalf of a defendant and that another attorney breached the Agreement when he filed it as an exhibit to a motion in one of the suits. Talley asserted violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961, violations of the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and numerous state law claims.The district court dismissed, finding that the attorney had entered a permissible appearance by signing and filing an answer on behalf of the defendants, and Talley’s RICO and constitutional claims were meritless because the Agreement was never actually filed on the docket. The court denied Talley leave to amend his federal claims as futile. Talley moved to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal. The Third Circuit granted the IFP motion and affirmed the dismissal. The IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. 1915 providing that prisoners may proceed in federal court without prepayment of filing fees, contains a “three-strikes rule.” Courts may call a strike when a prisoner’s “action or appeal . . . was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted[.]” Talley’s prior “mixed dismissals” are not strikes. View "Talley v. Wetzel" on Justia Law

At initial hearings, New Jersey's Parole Board may consult any information it deems relevant, including an inmate’s criminal history. At successive parole hearings, the Board could not consider old information, including the inmate's criminal history. The 1997 Amendments to the Parole Act eliminated that prohibition and instructed the Board to prepare an “objective risk assessment” before every parole hearing, incorporating old information, including an inmate’s “educational and employment history” and “family and marital history,” and other factors. When Holmes was on parole in the 1970s, he killed two acquaintances, murdered a 69-year-old, and wounded a police officer. Sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole, Holmes remains behind bars 48 years later. At his initial parole hearing in 2001, the Board refused to release Holmes. After a 2012, hearing, the Board issued a detailed written statement that probed Holmes’s past parole violations, highlighted the homicides, and scrutinized the shootout that preceded his arrest. The statement noted his unblemished disciplinary record since his initial parole hearing. Without specifying the weight placed on each factor, the Board rejected Holmes’s request for release.Holmes challenged the decision on ex post facto grounds. The Third Circuit vacated the dismissal of his petition. For many prisoners, the rules present little risk to their parole prospects. For Holmes, the change plausibly produced a significant risk of prolonging his time behind bars. View "Holmes v. Christie" on Justia Law

Scott was sentenced for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. His PSR included a career offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(2), which applies if a defendant “committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to sustaining at least two felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” Scott had a 2019 conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and a 2019 conviction for Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(b)(1) and for using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), resulting in an advisory guideline range of 84–105 months’ imprisonment. Neither Scott nor the government challenged the enhancement or any of the PSR’s calculations The court sentenced Scott to 90 months’ imprisonment consecutive to an existing sentence.The Third Circuit vacated the sentence. Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence” under the career offender provision, U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a). The court applied the “oft-bedeviling categorical approach” and compared the statutory offense with the definition of “crime of violence” found in the Guidelines to conclude that Hobbs Act robbery sweeps more broadly than the career offender guideline. The court noted the consensus of the Courts of Appeals. View "United States v. Scott" on Justia Law

Stinson and Jarmon each ran drug trafficking conspiracies out of a North Philadelphia public housing complex/ at various times, 2010-2015. The complex included about 500 apartment units and two playgrounds. During a joint investigation among local police, the FBI, and the DEA, government agents put up pole cameras, established wiretaps, used confidential informants to make controlled drug purchases, pulled trash, analyzed pen registers, and—after Stinson’s arrest and incarceration in 2012— listened to recordings of Stinson’s phone conversations while he was in prison. After the investigation ended in 2017, Stinson and 12 others were charged with conspiracy to distribute 280 grams or more of crack cocaine and related crimes. Separately, Jarmon and 12 others were charged with similar crimes. Most of their co-defendants pleaded guilty and some cooperated.Stinson and Jarmon proceeded to separate trials and were convicted of the conspiracy charges and most of the related charges. Each was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings, the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to drug quantities, and the sentences. Stinson and Jarmon had no reasonable expectation of privacy in their phone calls. View "United States v. Jarmon" on Justia Law

Icker, a part-time uniformed police officer, twice pulled over a woman who was driving alone at night and detained her, claiming that she appeared intoxicated or that he could smell marijuana. Icker handcuffed each woman and searched her car, claiming to find incriminating evidence. The women had criminal histories. He advised each that charges could put them in violation of their supervision or bond. Icker indicated that he wanted oral sex and transported each victim in his police cruiser to a location where the woman performed oral sex on him. Icker also groped or harassed three other women, using his authority as a police officer. Icker pleaded guilty to two counts of depriving the victims of their civil right to bodily integrity, 18 U.S.C. 242. The plea agreement recommended 144 months' imprisonment and included several conditions of supervised release but did not refer to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 34 U.S.C. 20901. Icker waived his right to appeal.The Third Circuit vacated the imposition of a condition of supervised release that required Icker to register as a sex offender under SORNA “as directed by the probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex offender registration agency.” Convictions under section 242 are not SORNA “sex offenses.” Icker was not given notice of any potential SORNA requirements in signing his appellate waiver. Any attempted delegation of Icker’s status as a “sex offender” to a third party was an improper delegation of Article III powers. View "United States v. Icker" on Justia Law

The Third Circuit denied a petition for review challenging the BIA's ruling that petitioner's conviction for aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1) is a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT), thus making him removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). The court applied the modified categorical approach and concluded that petitioner pleaded guilty to violating section 1028A with the predicate felony of bank fraud, an undeniable CIMT. The court explained that that, by itself, is sufficient to support the BIA's ruling that petitioner's 1028A(a)(1) conviction constituted a CIMT because it requires fraudulent intent. Because this conviction is petitioner's second CIMT, the court concluded that the BIA did not err in concluding that he is removable under section 1227 (a)(2)(A)(ii). View "Sasay v. Attorney General of the United States" on Justia Law

The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's application of a sentencing enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon under USSG 2D1.1(b)(1). The court concluded, in United States v. Drozdowski, 313 F.3d 819, 823 (3d Cir. 2002), that spatial proximity of guns to drugs is not necessary to establish a connection between firearms to a drug offense under USSG 2D1.1(b)(1). Although the connection is so tenuous as to place it on the outer edge of the sentencing enhancement, the court concluded that defendant has not carried his burden of proving that the connection was clearly improbable, which is the test applied.In this case, defendant had a small arsenal of weapons and ammunition in the same house where law enforcement observed him agreeing to provide several pounds of meth. Furthermore, he has neither credibly rebutted any of the Government's evidence nor offered any plausible alternative explanation for why he possessed the weapons. Therefore, the court cannot say that the connection between the guns and the drugs was clearly improbable. View "United States v. Denmark" on Justia Law

Arrington claims he stopped engaging in drug activity after he was released from prison on parole in 2007. The government contends Arrington became a Pennsylvania drug supplier. In 2009, the police arrested Arrington’s co-conspirators. Arrington helped them attempt to escape apprehension. He abandoned his parole appointments and fled the state. Arrington was subsequently charged with possession with the intent to distribute controlled substances, conspiracy to do the same, and traveling in interstate commerce with the intent to facilitate unlawful activity. His co-conspirators testified against him. Arrington claims he told his attorney, Kress, that he wanted to testify to explain that he absconded from parole not because of his involvement in drug trafficking; Kress did not honor this request because doing so would open Arrington to cross-examination, which might enable the government to introduce evidence of his prior convictions. Kress allegedly never sought Arrington's consent to waive his right to testify or explained that the decision was his to make. However, during his closing argument, Kress covered some of the material to which Arrington claims he would have testified.Arrington moved to vacate his convictions under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that Kress was ineffective for unilaterally waiving his right to testify. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The bar for obtaining an evidentiary hearing on a section 2255 motion is low but Arrington does not meet it, because his claim conclusively fails Strickland’s prejudice prong. View "United States v. Arrington" on Justia Law

Under 8 U.S.C. 1226(c), the government must detain noncitizens who are removable because they committed certain specified offenses or have connections with terrorism, and it must hold them without bond pending their removal proceedings. In 2012, the plaintiffs filed a habeas petition on behalf of a putative class of noncitizens who are detained under section 1226(c) in New Jersey, contending that it violates due process to mandatorily detain noncitizens who have substantial defenses to removal and that the procedure for conducting “Joseph” hearings is constitutionally inadequate.The Third Circuit held that section 1226(c) is constitutional even as applied to noncitizens who have substantial defenses to removal. For those detainees who contend that they are not properly included within section 1226(c) and are therefore entitled to a Josepth hearing, the government has the burden to establish the applicability of section 1226(c) by a preponderance of the evidence and the government must make available a contemporaneous record of the hearing, consisting of an audio recording, a transcript, or their functional equivalent. Section 1252(f)(1) does not authorize classwide injunctions, so the court reversed the district court’s order in part. View "Gayle v. Warden Monmouth County Correctional Institution" on Justia Law