Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's application of a sentencing enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon under USSG 2D1.1(b)(1). The court concluded, in United States v. Drozdowski, 313 F.3d 819, 823 (3d Cir. 2002), that spatial proximity of guns to drugs is not necessary to establish a connection between firearms to a drug offense under USSG 2D1.1(b)(1). Although the connection is so tenuous as to place it on the outer edge of the sentencing enhancement, the court concluded that defendant has not carried his burden of proving that the connection was clearly improbable, which is the test applied.In this case, defendant had a small arsenal of weapons and ammunition in the same house where law enforcement observed him agreeing to provide several pounds of meth. Furthermore, he has neither credibly rebutted any of the Government's evidence nor offered any plausible alternative explanation for why he possessed the weapons. Therefore, the court cannot say that the connection between the guns and the drugs was clearly improbable. View "United States v. Denmark" on Justia Law

Arrington claims he stopped engaging in drug activity after he was released from prison on parole in 2007. The government contends Arrington became a Pennsylvania drug supplier. In 2009, the police arrested Arrington’s co-conspirators. Arrington helped them attempt to escape apprehension. He abandoned his parole appointments and fled the state. Arrington was subsequently charged with possession with the intent to distribute controlled substances, conspiracy to do the same, and traveling in interstate commerce with the intent to facilitate unlawful activity. His co-conspirators testified against him. Arrington claims he told his attorney, Kress, that he wanted to testify to explain that he absconded from parole not because of his involvement in drug trafficking; Kress did not honor this request because doing so would open Arrington to cross-examination, which might enable the government to introduce evidence of his prior convictions. Kress allegedly never sought Arrington's consent to waive his right to testify or explained that the decision was his to make. However, during his closing argument, Kress covered some of the material to which Arrington claims he would have testified.Arrington moved to vacate his convictions under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that Kress was ineffective for unilaterally waiving his right to testify. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The bar for obtaining an evidentiary hearing on a section 2255 motion is low but Arrington does not meet it, because his claim conclusively fails Strickland’s prejudice prong. View "United States v. Arrington" on Justia Law

Under 8 U.S.C. 1226(c), the government must detain noncitizens who are removable because they committed certain specified offenses or have connections with terrorism, and it must hold them without bond pending their removal proceedings. In 2012, the plaintiffs filed a habeas petition on behalf of a putative class of noncitizens who are detained under section 1226(c) in New Jersey, contending that it violates due process to mandatorily detain noncitizens who have substantial defenses to removal and that the procedure for conducting “Joseph” hearings is constitutionally inadequate.The Third Circuit held that section 1226(c) is constitutional even as applied to noncitizens who have substantial defenses to removal. For those detainees who contend that they are not properly included within section 1226(c) and are therefore entitled to a Josepth hearing, the government has the burden to establish the applicability of section 1226(c) by a preponderance of the evidence and the government must make available a contemporaneous record of the hearing, consisting of an audio recording, a transcript, or their functional equivalent. Section 1252(f)(1) does not authorize classwide injunctions, so the court reversed the district court’s order in part. View "Gayle v. Warden Monmouth County Correctional Institution" on Justia Law

Shorter, a transgender woman, has undergone hormone replacement therapy; her body is “openly female.” In 2015, she entered a Federal Correctional Institution to begin a 96-month sentence for creating a fraudulent “tax service.” Despite knowing that Shorter was transgender, prison officials first housed her in a room without a lock with 11 men. Prison officials screened her risk for sexual assault under the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 regulations and concluded she was at “significantly” higher risk than other inmates because she presented as transgender, was small in stature, and had previously been sexually assaulted at another prison. Later, in an unlocked two-person cell, she was assigned a sex offender as her cellmate. Although the prison’s psychology department agreed Shorter should be transferred, she remained in the cell furthest from the officers. Shorter alleges that despite her repeated requests and grievances, she was ultimately stabbed and raped by a fellow inmate. She brought a pro se suit under “Bivens,” claiming officials violated her Eighth Amendment rights by deliberate indifference to the substantial risk that another inmate would assault her.Citing 28 U.S.C. 1915 and 1915A, the district court dismissed her complaint sua sponte before allowing her to serve the defendants. The Third Circuit reversed. Shorter’s case falls comfortably within one of the few contexts in which the Supreme Court has recognized a Bivens remedy. Shorter adequately pleaded a violation of the Eighth Amendment. View "Shorter v. United States" on Justia Law

Singh, a native of India,arrived in the U.S. in 1991, without travel documents or proof of identity. He falsely claimed that his name was Davinder Singh. Singh failed to appear at his immigration hearing and was ordered deported in absentia. Singh filed an asylum application under the name Baljinder Singh and married a U.S. citizen. Singh successfully petitioned to adjust his status to lawful permanent resident without disclosing his immigration history. When Singh later sought naturalization, he again failed to disclose his immigration history. In 2006, he became a U.S. citizen. In 2011, he pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin, MDMA, and marijuana. Singh’s citizenship was revoked, 8 U.S.C. 1451(a), because he illegally procured naturalization.An IJ held Singh removable both for having been convicted of an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(U), conspiracy to commit a controlled substances offense, and for having been convicted of a controlled substances offense. The BIA dismissed his appeal. The Ninth Circuit remanded. The pertinent statutory provisions permit removal only of individuals who were “aliens” at the time of their criminal convictions. The court rejected an argument that Singh should be treated as if he had never been naturalized and was actually an “alien” at the time he was convicted. View "Singh v. Attorney General of the United States" on Justia Law

Andrews was convicted of 13 robberies in 2005, conspiring to commit the robberies, and brandishing a firearm during the crimes and was sentenced to 312 years’ imprisonment: 57 months for the robberies and conspiracy (18 U.S.C. 1951), and 3,684 months for brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); each additional 924(c) count then carried a 25-year mandatory minimum. The 2018 First Step Act revised 924(c) so that the 25-year mandatory minimum for subsequent offenses would not apply unless the defendant already had a final conviction for a 924(c) charge at the time of the offense. Had Andrews been sentenced today, his consecutive 924(c) convictions would each generate a statutory minimum of seven years. The change was not retroactive.Andrews sought a modified sentence, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), a prisoner-initiated motion for compassionate release authorized by First Step Act. The court concluded that it was free to interpret “extraordinary and compelling” reasons required by the Act for and consider reasons beyond the four categories listed in the Sentencing Commission policy statement. The court concluded that the duration of Andrews’s sentence and the non-retroactive changes to mandatory minimums could not be extraordinary and compelling. The court also concluded that the policy statement provides helpful guidance and determined that Andrews’s remaining reasons collectively fell short of being extraordinary. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting the considerable discretion courts have in compassionate release cases and that the court was not bound by the policy statement. View "United States v. Andrews" on Justia Law

Rought sold fentanyl to Carichner, who provided some to Giberson. Both overdosed. Giberson was revived with Narcan; Carichner died. Rought was indicted for possession of fentanyl with intent to distribute resulting in death and serious bodily injury. Days later, he was interrogated by the FBI. After being advised of his rights verbally and in writing, he answered questions about his drug use and his supplier but said he did not want to talk about Carichner’s death without a lawyer. The interrogating agents respected his wishes and turned the questioning to other subjects. In discussing those other subjects, however, Rought quickly brought the conversation back around to Carichner and made incriminating statements.The district court denied Rought’s motion to suppress the statements. A jury convicted him. The Third Circuit affirmed. Invocations of the right to counsel during custodial interrogations can be “limited.” After a limited invocation, interrogation can continue on topics not covered by the invocation. If the suspect, without prompting from law enforcement, then voluntarily reinitiates discussion of a covered topic and waives her previously invoked rights, it “is quite consistent with the Fifth Amendment” for the suspect’s statements about a covered topic to be admissible at trial. View "United States v. Rought" on Justia Law

Lozano, a former Marine, was discharged for medical reasons and suffers from severe asthma, impaired airway, limited motion in his knees and ankle, and total blindness in one eye. Lozano has a handicapped parking permit and a permit for tinted windows on his car. Lozano’s car was parked partly within a handicapped parking space when Sergeant Dorilus arrived. Dorilus could not see the handicapped placard on the dashboard and required Lozano to provide his license and registration, and his permits for handicapped parking and tinted windows. Dorilus claims that Lozano “reeked of alcohol.” Lozano denied having consumed any alcohol and refused to submit to the field sobriety test, claiming he was physically unable to do so. Dorilus arrested Lozano. Officer Hernandez was “present” throughout these events. At the station, Hernandez helped process Lozano. Other officers gave Lozano two breathalyzer tests, but could not provide a sufficient breath sample. During a third breathalyzer test, Lozano had an asthma attack and had to be taken to the hospital. Dorilus charged Lozano with DUI and refusal to take a breath test, After Lozano provided medical records, the charges were dismissed.Lozano subsequently sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act The district court denied the officers’ qualified immunity summary judgment motions. The Third Circuit reversed as to Officer Hernandez, who was not involved in arresting or charging Lozano and therefore is entitled to qualified immunity. View "Lozano v. New Jersey" on Justia Law

In 1992, Grant was convicted of homicide and other crimes that he had committed while he was a juvenile. He was sentenced to life imprisonment under the then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines. Parole is unavailable to those convicted of federal crimes, so the sentence effectively condemned Grant to die in prison. In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court held (Miller v. Alabama) that the Eighth Amendment permits a life-without-parole (LWOP) sentence for a juvenile homicide offender only if the sentencer could have imposed a lesser punishment based on the offender’s youth at the time of the offense.At Miller’s resentencing, the judge recognized that youth can impair judgment and thereby mitigate culpability, stated that a life sentence for Grant would be too harsh, given his juvenile offender status and individual circumstances, and sentenced Grant to a term of 60 years on his homicide-related convictions with an undisturbed five-year consecutive sentence, Grant argued that his 65-year sentence violates Miller because it incarcerates him to his life expectancy, thereby amounting to a de facto LWOP sentence. Grant contends that Miller forbids such a sentence for a juvenile homicide offender unless he or she is incorrigible, which Grant is not. The Third Circuit affirmed. Miller only entitled Grant to a sentencing hearing at which the district court had the discretion to impose a sentence less than LWOP in view of Grant’s youth at the time of his offenses; that is what he received. View "United States v. Grant" on Justia Law

Jacobs, in Cumberland County Jail awaiting trial for a weapons charge, got into a fight with Hanby, another inmate. Less than 30 seconds after the fight ended, corrections officers entered the dorm and identified Hanby as one of the fighters. The officers removed Hanby and took him to the medical unit. About 15 minutes later, officers returned for Jacobs. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Jacobs claims that as the officers removed him from his cell, they violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from excessive force amounting to punishment.The officers moved for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. After reviewing the record, including a security video, the district court denied the motion, finding that a reasonable jury could find that the officers used gratuitous force and that any reasonable officer would have known that such force was unlawful. The Third Circuit affirmed, first noting the objective standard used in analyzing claims by pretrial detainees. The Supreme Court has made clear that officers may not expose inmates to gratuitous force divorced from any legitimate penological purpose. Here, reasonable jurors could conclude that the officers were not facing a disturbance or any threat to jail security. When they returned for Jacobs they found the inmates orderly and compliant. Jacobs posed no threat throughout the encounter. View "Jacobs v. Cumberland County" on Justia Law