Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Based on a scheme to file false unemployment claims with the Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Service Members Program, Hall and his wife, Blunt, were charged with mail fraud, money laundering, aggravated identity theft, conspiracy to commit mail fraud, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. The government introduced recordings of telephone calls made from Blunt’s cell phone to unemployment compensation offices. Blunt testified that Hall made most of those calls. The Third Circuit vacated Hall’s conviction, citing spousal privilege. Before his new trial, Hall unsuccessfully objected to the admission of certain evidence.The Third Circuit affirmed Hall’s convictions. The court upheld the admission of testimony by Hall’s former probation officer, Leon, testimony that it was Hall’s voice on the recordings. The court rejected arguments that Leon’s testimony was unreliable because it was based on insufficient contacts with Hall, was a product of impermissible pressure, and violated Hall’s Fifth Amendment rights. The court also rejected a claim that the recording of Hall’s post-arrest interview was inadmissible for its proffered purpose: allowing the jury to compare Hall’s voice on the interview with the recorded voice, as it would impermissibly task the jury with identifying the voice, Federal Rule of Evidence 901, and require them to act as voice identification experts, Rules 606 and 701. The Fourth Amendment did not require the government to obtain search warrants for Hall’s bank records. View "United States v. Hall" on Justia Law

The Albanian-born brothers lived in New Jersey illegally. They came to the FBI’s attention because of a 2006 video that depicted them at a firing range in the Pocono mountains shooting weapons and shouting “jihad in the States.” The FBI deployed cooperating witnesses to monitor their activities and arranged a controlled sale of semi-automatic weapons. Based on a plot to attack the Fort Dix Army base and other military facilities, they were convicted of conspiracy to murder members of the U.S. military, 18 U.S.C. 1114, 1117; possession or attempted possession of firearms in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) and 924(c)(1)(B)(ii); possession of machineguns, 18 U.S.C. 922(o); and possession of firearms by an illegal alien, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5).The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of their habeas petitions, in which they argued that their 18 U.S.C. 924(c) convictions must be vacated under the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Davis” holding. Because each defendant was subject to an unchallenged life sentence, any potential vacatur of their Section 924(c) convictions would result in no practical change to their confinement. The “concurrent sentence doctrine” provides a court “discretion to avoid resolution of legal issues affecting less than all of the counts in an indictment where at least one count will survive and the sentences on all counts are concurrent.” View "Duka v. United States" on Justia Law

Allinson was convicted of federal programs bribery, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(2), and conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371, in connection with a pay-to-play scheme involving Pawlowski, the former Mayor of Allentown, Pennsylvania.The Third Circuit affirmed. Sufficient evidence showed the parties’ plan to steer a Parking Authority contract to Allinson’s law firm in exchange for campaign contributions to support Allinson’s bribery conviction; it is an “official act” for a public official to use his power to influence the awarding of government contracts, even if the official lacks final decision-making power. The court rejected Allinson’s argument that the indictment, which alleged a single conspiracy among Allinson and others, impermissibly varied from the evidence at trial that, he claimed, proved only multiple, unrelated conspiracies. The charged conspiracy included over 10 alleged co-conspirators and seven distinct sub-schemes, only one of which involved Allinson but the government’s efforts at trial were reasonably calculated to prevent guilt transference. No constructive amendment of the indictment occurred. The prosecution’s statement in closing arguments that “Bribery happens with a wink and a nod and sometimes a few words, an understanding between two people,” was not improper. Allinson failed to show “clear and substantial prejudice” resulting from the joint trial. View "United States v. Allinson" on Justia Law

Pawlowski, the former mayor of Allentown, Pennsylvania, was convicted of federal programs bribery, 18 U.S.C. 666; Travel Act bribery, 18 U.S.C. 1952; attempted Hobbs Act extortion, 18 U.S.C. 1001; wire and mail fraud, honest services fraud, making false statements to the FBI, and conspiracy. The charges stemmed from a scheme in which Pawlowski steered city contracts and provided other favors in exchange for campaign contributions. The district court imposed a 180-month sentence.The Third Circuit affirmed. There was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find “quid pro quo” to support the bribery convictions. Any error caused by Pawlowski's inability to recross-examine a government witness was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Pawlowski’s sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. The case against Pawlowski was strong. The evidence showed a man eager to influence and be influenced if it would help him fund his political campaigns. View "United States v. Pawlowski" on Justia Law

Dongarra, incarcerated for bank robbery, was transferred to a new prison and went through the onboarding process, supervised by Officer Smith. Smith gave him an ID card that indicated “Registered Offender,” and a T-shirt “know[n]” to be a “sex offender T-shirt.” The shirt falsely suggested that he had been imprisoned at Terre Haute, “a sex offender prison.” Dongarra stated that he “could be killed” if prisoners mistook him for a sex offender. Smith said he did not care and that he “hope[d] [Dongarra] kn[e]w how to fight.” Dongarra appealed to other staff, who asked Smith for another T-shirt. Smith refused. Frightened, Dongarra skipped meals and lost weight and stopped going out for recreation. Dongarra filed a grievance. Though he never got a response, a few weeks later the prison replaced his ID card and T-shirt.Dongarra sued Smith and two unnamed officers, seeking damages and an injunction, citing “Bivens.” The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 case. Injunctive relief is not available because Dongarra had not sued anyone who could fire or discipline Smith and by the time Dongarra sued, the prison had corrected the error. No court has extended Bivens to cover similar facts; “special factors” bar extending Bivens here. Although the officer violated Dongarra’s rights, the feared risk never materialized. Damages cannot be awarded to compensate him for an assault that never happened. View "Dongarra v. Smith" on Justia Law

Agarwal, a contract network engineer, had security credentials that granted him access to the corporate offices and internal networks of telecommunications companies. Agarwal installed key-logging software to obtain employee usernames and passwords and installed unauthorized hardware and computer code that enabled him to surreptitiously transfer information. Agarwal also used a vacant office without authorization. The companies learned of the unauthorized activities and devoted significant resources to investigate and remediate the breaches; compromised accounts and computers were temporarily taken offline. Agarwal monitored the investigations.Agarwal eventually pleaded guilty to aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1), and two counts under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) for intentionally accessing a protected computer without authorization and obtaining information valued at more than $5,000, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2); 1030(c)(2)(B)(iii). The statutory maximum sentence was 12 years, five years for each CFAA violation, plus a mandatory consecutive two-year term for identity theft. Agarwal disputed the PSR's loss calculation of over $3,000,000, most of which was for salary expenses for investigating and remediating the breaches. His Guidelines range was 70-87 months’ imprisonment for the CFAA violations. The court sentenced Agarwal to 70 months’ imprisonment for the CFAA violations, plus the mandatory two-year sentence. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument the plea was unknowing because Agarwal could not have reasonably foreseen the losses that would be attributed to his CFAA violations. Agarwal signed the plea agreement aware that the loss amount was disputed and waived the right to appeal his sentence. View "United States v. Agarwal" on Justia Law

Martin’s state conviction became “final” in April 2002, triggering the one-year limitations period on state prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus relief, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). The clock ran for 193 days, until October 21, 2002, when Martin filed a petition for state post-conviction relief (PCR). The clock was paused until June 14, 2004, the last day on which Martin could have appealed (but did not) the trial court’s denial of his petition—and expired 172 days later, on December 3, 2004. In June 2015, Martin filed a petition seeking federal habeas relief. The state appellate court had accepted Martin’s April 2012 motion for leave to appeal “as within time” the denial of his 2002 PCR petition; he argued that the ruling retroactively tolled the limitations period. Martin essentially argued that a “properly filed” PCR petition is “pending” under section 2244(d)(2) for the period between the expiration of time under state law in which a prisoner could have timely appealed the denial of a PCR petition, and the prisoner’s submission of a motion for leave to file a PCR appeal “as within time.”.The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his petition as untimely. Section 4 2244(d)(2)’s tolling mechanism looks forward, not backward, and a state court’s acceptance of an appeal “as within time” does not rewind the one-year clock. View "Martin v. Administrator New Jersey State Prison" on Justia Law

In 2017, a man was found dead next to 22 small wax bags containing fentanyl-laced heroin, stamped “WI FIGHT?” He had overdosed on fentanyl and heroin. Officers determined that M.M. was the victim’s drug dealer. Charged with intent to distribute a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and distribution of a controlled substance resulting in death, section 841(b)(1)(C), M.M. entered into a plea agreement. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3553(e), the government recommended a departure below the applicable mandatory minimum sentence of 240 months if M.M. provided “substantial assistance.”M.M. invoked section 3553(a)'s factors, including his addiction and psychological issues related to his upbringing. The court granted the downward departure motion after evaluating M.M.’s cooperation and addressing those factors but without specifying the basis of the departure. The government challenged the 120-month sentence under Rule 35(a), arguing that section 3553(e) does not allow a court to reduce a sentence below a statutory mandatory minimum based on considerations unrelated to substantial assistance. The District Court agreed that clear error had occurred and clarified that M.M.’s substantial assistance entitled him to a departure to 180 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit vacated. The authority to amend a sentence under Rule 35(a) is very narrow and there was no clear error in the original sentence. View "United States v. Minichella" on Justia Law

Desu co-owned Heights Pharmacy with Desai. Desai collected Heights' cash earnings and deposited a small portion of that cash into the pharmacy’s bank account, leaving the rest undeposited. After paying for certain items from the undeposited cash, such as part of Desai’s salary, Desai split the undeposited cash between herself and Desu. Desai kept the cash earnings off the general ledger. The underreporting on Heights Pharmacy’s tax returns led to underreported net income on Desu’s individual tax returns. Following a government investigation, Desai pleaded guilty and testified against Desu. Desu also co-owned Arthur Avenue Pharmacy, with Pujara. Desu and Pujara also kept the cash earnings off Arthur’s general ledger. Pujara testified against Desu, who was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 371 for conspiracy to impede the lawful government functions of the IRS and willfully assisting in the preparation and presentation of materially false tax returns.The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the jury received a faulty government exhibit for use in its deliberations; two counts in the indictment fail to state an offense; the district court erred in excluding testimony regarding the Desais’ cash transactions on relevancy grounds; the district court erred in denying a “Franks” evidentiary hearing; the government constructively amended the indictment; and the district court erred at sentencing by failing to account for certain deductions and exclusions in Desu’s income when calculating the tax loss. View "United States v. Desu" on Justia Law

The Unions represented employees at Care One facilities. Care One sued the Unions for damages arising from actions that allegedly amounted to a pattern of racketeering under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961, based upon its characterization of these actions as “extortionate.”The district court dismissed the complaint, reasoning that no reasonable juror could conclude that the vandalism underlying Care One’s claims could be attributed to union members and that other actions the Unions undertook to exert pressure on Care One—including advertisements, picketing, and attempts to invoke regulatory and legislative processes—were not “extortionate.” The court further concluded that Defendants lacked the specific intent to deceive and were entitled to summary judgment on mail and wire fraud claims. The Third Circuit affirmed. Labor tactics, such as the Unions engaged in here, are not extortionate. As long as unions pursue legitimate labor objectives, their coercive tactics are not subject to liability. The court noted that an investigation by the Connecticut State’s Attorney closed without identifying any suspects, let alone any union-member suspects; union membership alone would not tie the actions of any such members to the Unions. There is no admissible evidence that the Unions authorized the acts of sabotage and vandalism. View "Care One Management LLC v. United Healthcare Workers East" on Justia Law