Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2017, a man was found dead next to 22 small wax bags containing fentanyl-laced heroin, stamped “WI FIGHT?” He had overdosed on fentanyl and heroin. Officers determined that M.M. was the victim’s drug dealer. Charged with intent to distribute a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and distribution of a controlled substance resulting in death, section 841(b)(1)(C), M.M. entered into a plea agreement. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3553(e), the government recommended a departure below the applicable mandatory minimum sentence of 240 months if M.M. provided “substantial assistance.”M.M. invoked section 3553(a)'s factors, including his addiction and psychological issues related to his upbringing. The court granted the downward departure motion after evaluating M.M.’s cooperation and addressing those factors but without specifying the basis of the departure. The government challenged the 120-month sentence under Rule 35(a), arguing that section 3553(e) does not allow a court to reduce a sentence below a statutory mandatory minimum based on considerations unrelated to substantial assistance. The District Court agreed that clear error had occurred and clarified that M.M.’s substantial assistance entitled him to a departure to 180 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit vacated. The authority to amend a sentence under Rule 35(a) is very narrow and there was no clear error in the original sentence. View "United States v. Minichella" on Justia Law

Desu co-owned Heights Pharmacy with Desai. Desai collected Heights' cash earnings and deposited a small portion of that cash into the pharmacy’s bank account, leaving the rest undeposited. After paying for certain items from the undeposited cash, such as part of Desai’s salary, Desai split the undeposited cash between herself and Desu. Desai kept the cash earnings off the general ledger. The underreporting on Heights Pharmacy’s tax returns led to underreported net income on Desu’s individual tax returns. Following a government investigation, Desai pleaded guilty and testified against Desu. Desu also co-owned Arthur Avenue Pharmacy, with Pujara. Desu and Pujara also kept the cash earnings off Arthur’s general ledger. Pujara testified against Desu, who was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 371 for conspiracy to impede the lawful government functions of the IRS and willfully assisting in the preparation and presentation of materially false tax returns.The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the jury received a faulty government exhibit for use in its deliberations; two counts in the indictment fail to state an offense; the district court erred in excluding testimony regarding the Desais’ cash transactions on relevancy grounds; the district court erred in denying a “Franks” evidentiary hearing; the government constructively amended the indictment; and the district court erred at sentencing by failing to account for certain deductions and exclusions in Desu’s income when calculating the tax loss. View "United States v. Desu" on Justia Law

The Unions represented employees at Care One facilities. Care One sued the Unions for damages arising from actions that allegedly amounted to a pattern of racketeering under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961, based upon its characterization of these actions as “extortionate.”The district court dismissed the complaint, reasoning that no reasonable juror could conclude that the vandalism underlying Care One’s claims could be attributed to union members and that other actions the Unions undertook to exert pressure on Care One—including advertisements, picketing, and attempts to invoke regulatory and legislative processes—were not “extortionate.” The court further concluded that Defendants lacked the specific intent to deceive and were entitled to summary judgment on mail and wire fraud claims. The Third Circuit affirmed. Labor tactics, such as the Unions engaged in here, are not extortionate. As long as unions pursue legitimate labor objectives, their coercive tactics are not subject to liability. The court noted that an investigation by the Connecticut State’s Attorney closed without identifying any suspects, let alone any union-member suspects; union membership alone would not tie the actions of any such members to the Unions. There is no admissible evidence that the Unions authorized the acts of sabotage and vandalism. View "Care One Management LLC v. United Healthcare Workers East" on Justia Law

Taylor, on probation, was found to be in possession of drugs, a firearm, and cash, and moved to suppress the evidence. Before the scheduled hearing, his court-appointed lawyer (Carey) moved to withdraw because Taylor would not permit him to withdraw pro se motions in which Taylor refused to “accept that the laws of the United States govern him.” Taylor contended that “the United States is not a country. It is a corporation.” The court denied Carey’s motion Taylor filed more documents. Carey again moved to withdraw, explaining that Taylor “desires to proceed pro se.” Carey acknowledged substantial concerns about Taylor’s legal competency.” Taylor acknowledged that he “d[id not] understand law” and requested that the court “deal with [him] commonly.” The court stated that his pro se filings were rambling and not founded on any legal principles. Taylor repeatedly attempted to challenge the jurisdiction of the court.The court denied his request to represent himself, denied his motion to suppress, and, later (twice) appointed new counsel. Taylor was convicted and sentenced to 264 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit vacated. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to self-representation if he “knowingly and intelligently” waives his right to counsel. When Taylor invoked that right, the district court bore “the weighty responsibility of conducting a sufficiently penetrating inquiry to satisfy itself that” Taylor could make such a waiver. The court did not complete the requisite inquiry. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Kane woke up to find his girlfriend, Ally, dead. Ally had a tourniquet wrapped around her arm; nearby, officers spotted a purse containing wax bags bearing the word “Butter,” containing a mix later determined to be heroin and fentanyl. Another bag contained syringes and nine empty packets that were stamped with a Viking helmet. Another purse held nine full packets of drugs bearing a "bulldog" stamp. There were 56 empty Butter bags in the room. Kane agreed to conduct a controlled purchase of drugs from Collins, who had been Ally’s dealer for two years. Collins handed Kane five bundles of Butter-stamped heroin. Collins (not knowing Ally had died) confirmed it was the same stuff Ally had purchased the night of her overdose. Collins explained that he had obtained the Butter-stamped heroin from Jacobs. Jacobs was arrested for distributing the drugs that killed Ally. The prosecution used its peremptory strikes to strike all but one minority juror. Jacobs, an African-American, raised an unsuccessful Batson challenge.The Third Circuit upheld Jacobs’ convictions. Though the prosecution did not prove Jacobs’ crimes with 100% certainty, it was not required to do so. A rational juror could have decided Jacobs was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt after drawing inferences from the evidence and testimony. The court did not err in its jury instructions or in denying the Batson challenge. The court incorrectly imposed a “general sentence” for Jacobs’ three convictions; on remand the district court must clarify a specific sentence for each offense. View "United States v. Jacobs" on Justia Law

Officer Staffer saw Jefferson traveling at high speed with his car alarm blaring. Staffer, suspecting the vehicle was stolen, attempted a traffic stop. Jefferson was driving with an open container of alcohol. Fearing a probation violation, Jefferson did not stop. Officer Lias joined the pursuit after hearing radio dispatches, only aware that Jefferson was driving a possibly stolen vehicle. Although other officers observed Jefferson traveling at high speeds, running red lights, ignoring police signals to pull over, and driving close to other vehicles, Lias did not personally witness Jefferson doing so. Jefferson hit a fire hydrant. Officers surrounded Jefferson’s vehicle. Jefferson reversed, striking a police vehicle before backing into an intersection. Lias arrived as Jefferson was driving away. Lias claims that he discharged his firearm because he feared for his own safety and others around him. Jefferson was struck in his forearm, fracturing his bones, but drove away. Jefferson later pled guilty to second-degree eluding.The district court rejected Jefferson’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, finding Lias entitled to qualified immunity. The Third Circuit reversed. A jury should make factual determinations regarding Lias’s decision to employ deadly force against Jefferson. Video footage makes clear that neither Lias nor anyone else was in danger of being struck by Jefferson. It is clearly established that an otherwise non-threatening individual engaged in vehicular flight is entitled to be free from being subjected to deadly force if it is unreasonable for an officer to believe his or others’ lives are in immediate jeopardy. Jefferson’s second-degree eluding conviction does not preclude his excessive force claim. View "Jefferson v. Lias" on Justia Law

Maple’s girlfriend, Vinsek, told him that Teck had tried to rape her. Later, they found her apartment ransacked and blamed Teck and his friend, Altman. Maple tracked them down at a bar, where he brawled with them. Vinsek called the police to report the burglary. Maple stated, “maybe I’ll just handle it my way.” Hours later, Maple found Teck and Altman and shot at them, killing Teck. Detectives went to talk to Maple and Vinsek, identified themselves as police, and stated that Maple was not under arrest but asked to talk with him about the murder. Maple agreed. Officers failed to read his Miranda rights. After about an hour, Maple confessed. He was then arrested and read Miranda warnings. He waived those rights and confessed again, on tape. At trial, Maple confessed again, claiming he was drunk at the time. The prosecution produced a “mountain of evidence” that proved his intent. Altman and three witnesses testified to the shooting. Maple was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder.The Third Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of habeas relief. E Even if the trial court should have suppressed his confession before Miranda warnings, any error was harmless; other evidence overwhelmingly incriminated him. Maple doubtless would have been convicted of first-degree murder of Teck and trying to murder Altman. View "Maple v. Superintendent Albion SCI" on Justia Law

Vastardis, a citizen of Greece and Chief Engineer onboard the Liberian-registered petroleum tanker, Evridiki, was convicted of offenses related to maritime pollution: failing to maintain an accurate Oil Record Book for several weeks, 33 U.S.C. 1908(a); falsifying high-seas Oil Record Book entries, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. 1519; obstructing justice in the Coast Guard’s investigation of the Evridiki, 18 U.S.C. 1505; and making false statements, 18 U.S.C. 1001. The district court imposed a $7,500 fine, a $400 special assessment, and three years’ probation. Vastardis was barred from entering or applying for visas to enter the U.S.The Third Circuit affirmed the convictions but vacated the portion of the sentence that precludes Vastardis from entering the U.S. while under court supervision. The deception at issue involved falsely documenting bilge water discharges that occurred when the Evridiki was on the high seas and were only discovered when the Evridiki was docked in the Delaware Bay port. Vastardis cannot be convicted in a U.S. court for crimes occurring in international waters, but the convictions here were based on the presence of inaccurate records in U.S. waters, so the district court had subject matter jurisdiction even though the actual entries may have been made beyond U.S. jurisdiction while on the high seas. View "United States v. Vastardis" on Justia Law

Johnson developed an obsession with the allegations of sexual assault against entertainer Bill Cosby. Hoping to discredit the accusers, Johnson posed as an attorney and filed a fabricated document on the civil docket of a lawsuit against Cosby. His trick was quickly discovered. Johnson was convicted of making a false statement and identity theft. On appeal, he argued that the prosecution failed to prove that his statements were material as necessary to establish liability under 18 U.S.C. 1001.The Third Circuit reversed Johnson’s convictions. Johnson’s behavior wasted public time and resources and distracted court officials from their work but only Congress can define a federal crime. While there was significant evidence that Johnson’s statements were false, there was no evidence that any decision entrusted to the judge in the underlying Cosby trial could have been influenced by the praecipe filed by Johnson, which contained an unsigned exhibit that accused a party of failing to report income. This false statement, even if considered by the judge, was not relevant, much less material. Far from proving that using a false identity enabled the false praecipe to be filed, the record reveals that Johnson’s identity was immaterial and that Johnson could have filed the same documents under his, or any other, name. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Garrett, a New Jersey prisoner, has commenced at least 10 civil actions against prison officials, state officials, and the United States, avoiding paying filing fees for these lawsuits by proceeding in forma pauperis. All his lawsuits have been unsuccessful. Garrett appealed the dismissal of his latest lawsuit, which concerns his risk of contracting COVID-19 and speedy trial issues.The Third Circuit affirmed, citing the three-strikes rule, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). Noting the division among circuit courts, the court stated that a suit dismissed under “Heck” is dismissed for failure to state a claim and counts as a strike. In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner lacks a “cause of action” under section 1983 if the prisoner is challenging an “allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment” before having the conviction or sentence overturned (the favorable-termination requirement). Garrett has three prior suits dismissed for failure to meet Heck’s “favorable-termination” requirement. Garrett has not shown that he is “under imminent danger of serious physical injury,” 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). View "Garrett v. Murphy" on Justia Law