Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2016, York County, Pennsylvania police officers conducted controlled cocaine buys from Brown, then obtained a search warrant for Brown’s apartment. Inside the apartment, they discovered Brown himself, cocaine, scales, money, and a loaded revolver tucked under the couch cushion where Brown had been sitting. Brown was indicted on multiple counts, including being a felon in possession of a firearm. 18 U.S.C. 922(g). Brown pleaded guilty to cocaine possession and distribution and the section 922(g) offense. At the time of sentencing, Brown had five prior Pennsylvania convictions for the distribution, or possession with intent to distribute, of controlled substances. One, from 2008, involved cocaine, and the remaining four, spanning from 2009-2014, involved marijuana.The district court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)'s 15-year mandatory minimum. The court declined to decide whether Brown was a “career offender” under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 after making the ACCA determination. The Third Circuit affirmed Brown’s 15-year sentence, despite the intervening federal decriminalization of hemp. Absent contrary statutory language, the law in effect at the time of the commission of the federal offense applies when employing the categorical approach in the ACCA context. The state schedule matched the federal schedule in effect when Brown committed the federal offense triggering the ACCA enhancement. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Vurimindi, a native of India, came to the U.S. on a work visa in 2000, and after marrying an American citizen, became a lawful permanent resident in 2008. Vurimindi’s erratic behavior toward his neighbors eventually led to his arrest and conviction on two counts of misdemeanor stalking under Pennsylvania law, which makes it a crime to: engage[] in a course of conduct or repeatedly commit[] acts toward another person . . . under circumstances which demonstrate either an intent to place such other person in reasonable fear of bodily injury or to cause substantial emotional distress to such other person.” Vurimindi was sentenced to two consecutive terms of 15-30 months’ imprisonment.In removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), which makes any noncitizen convicted of a “crime of stalking” removable, the IJ applied the categorical approach, comparing the elements of the relevant state offense with the elements of the federal generic offense. The IJ concluded that Vurimindi was removable. The Third Circuit granted Vurimindi’s petitions for review. The BIA mistakenly found that Vurimindi failed to raise the issue before the IJ; the Pennsylvania stalking offense sweeps more broadly than the federal generic under the categorical approach and is not a removable offense. View "Vurimindi v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Granthon was shot dead on a Harrisburg, Pennsylvania street corner. A day earlier, Granton had purchased an ounce of crack cocaine from Burton. Granthon “was short a couple grams” and sought a refund. The evidence linking Burton to Granthon’s death was “overwhelming.” Burton was convicted of first-degree murder. Williams was also charged with first-degree murder, conspiracy, and reckless endangerment of another but the evidence was weaker. No witness recognized Williams and no cell phone records placed him near the scene that night. Williams claimed he spent the night at a casino, but offered conflicting alibi stories and never used his casino rewards card that night. Williams’s trial lawyer’s “defense theory” was that Williams was “not placed at the scene.” He did not call Rochon, a witness at Burton’s trial whose testimony allegedly indicated that Granthon also shot a gun, nor did he make the case for self-defense or voluntary manslaughter.Williams was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of his petition for habeas relief, rejecting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. His trial attorney’s alleged negligence is not self-evident, as the attorney may have reasonably thought that self-defense arguments would detract from an alibi defense. To show his attorney was negligent, Williams would need to develop the record in district court but the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act forbids federal courts from supplementing the state court record under these circumstances. View "Williams v. Superintendent Mahanoy SCI" on Justia Law

Messina filed suit, accusing Coello—who was dating Messina’s former boyfriend— of harassment. Coello pled not guilty and the charge was dismissed. Subsequently, private attorney Estabrooks requested an appointment to prosecute Messina’s complaint. New Jersey Court Rules permit courts to appoint a “private prosecutor to represent the State in cases involving cross-complaints.” This 2007 prosecution did not involve a cross-complaint and Estabrooks did not disclose that she was also representing Messina in custody and other civil actions against Coello’s boyfriend. Without recording any findings as to the need for a private prosecutor or the suitability of Estabrooks, Municipal Judge DiLeo approved her application. Irregularities continued at trial and post-conviction. Without addressing Coello’s lack of representation or her evidence, DiLeo reinstated her jail term based on a letter from Estabrooks.In 2016, a New Jersey state court vacated Coello's harassment conviction. The prosecution, by then familiar with allegations of judicial misconduct against DiLeo, did not oppose the motion. In 2020, Coello filed this federal civil rights action against Estabrooks, DiLeo, and municipal defendants. The district court dismissed most of her claims as untimely, reasoning that at the time of her trial and sentencing, Coello had reason to know of her alleged injuries. The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal, citing the special timeliness rules governing her precise claims. Under Heck v. Humphrey, her claims all imply the invalidity of her criminal prosecution; she could not file suit until her conviction was vacated View "Coello v. DiLeo" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for various child pornography offenses in February 2018. Defendant expressed his intention to represent himself and the district court permitted him to do so, but appointed the Federal Public Defender's Office as standby counsel. However, subsequently, Defendant announced to the court he was invoking his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and largely refused to participate in the proceedings. After holding a hearing, the district court held that Defendant waived and forfeited his right to represent himself and appointed the Federal Public Defender's Office as his attorney. Ultimately, Defendant was convicted and sentenced to 180 months of imprisonment.On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court's determination that he waived and forfeited his right to represent himself. The court affirmed Defendant's conviction. The court explained "the right to represent oneself is not absolute, however; judges 'may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.'" Here, Defendant stopped communicating with the court, failed to open his legal mail and repeatedly violated court orders. Thus, the Third Circuit held that the district court did not err in concluding that "it would be impossible to conduct a fair trial with a pro se defendant who refused to cooperate or engage at all with the court." View "USA v. Thomas Noble" on Justia Law

Defendant, a former scientist employed by GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), pled guilty to a single count of conspiracy to steal trade secrets, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1832(a)(5) based on allegations he stole company documents. At sentencing, the government sought a sentencing enhancement based on the “loss” attributable to Defendant's conduct. However, the district court denied the government's request for an enhancement.On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed. The court noted that finding that under the commentary to U.S.S.G. 2B1.1, the definition of “loss” includes losses that the defendants intended. However, here, it was uncontested that GSK did not suffer any actual loss. Further, the court determined that the government failed to prove that Defendant purposely sought to inflict pecuniary harm on GSK. View "USA v. Yu Xue" on Justia Law

Four defendants, who have multiple ties to organized crime, were convicted for their roles in the unlawful takeover and looting of FirstPlus Financial, a publicly traded mortgage loan company. Their scheme began with the defendants’ and their co-conspirators’ extortion of FirstPlus’s board of directors and its chairman, using lies and threats to gain control of the company. Once they forced the old leadership out, the defendants drained the company of its value by causing it to enter into expensive consulting and legal-services agreements with themselves, causing it to acquire (at vastly inflated prices) shell companies they personally owned, and using bogus trusts to funnel FirstPlus’s assets into their own accounts. They ultimately bankrupted FirstPlus, leaving its shareholders with worthless stock.Each defendant was convicted of more than 20 counts of criminal behavior and given a substantial prison sentence. In a consolidated appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the investigation, the charges and evidence against them, the pretrial process, the government’s compliance with its disclosure obligations, the trial, the forfeiture proceedings, and their sentences. The government conceded that the district court’s assessment of one defendant’s forfeiture obligations was improper under a Supreme Court decision handed down during the pendency of this appeal and remanded that assessment. View "United States v. Scarfo" on Justia Law

Rodriguez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more than 100 grams of heroin and possession with intent to distribute an unspecified amount of heroin and more than 50 grams of methamphetamine. He was sentenced to 262 months’ imprisonment, based on a 262–327-month Sentencing Guidelines range that reflects sentence enhancements for being the organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving five or more participants and for maintaining premises for distributing drugs.The Third Circuit affirmed. The district court found that Rodriguez “set the prices,” “issue[d] edicts,” “dictated to whom and for how much the drugs were to be sold,” and provided drugs to his co-conspirators for distribution and did not clearly err by applying the “leader” sentence enhancement. The court also upheld the application of the “premises” enhancement. Rodriguez directed the activities at the premises in question and those premises were one of the “places where essential parts of drug operation[s] were conducted.” The ownership of premises was not dispositive. View "United States v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

For several years, Adair sold prescription opioid pills in Pittsburgh. She pleaded guilty to a 10-count indictment. At sentencing, the court increased her offense level by four points for being an organizer or leader of extensive criminal activity, U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(a). Although Adair timely pleaded guilty, the government did not move for a one-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility, section 3E1.1(b). The district court calculated Adair’s Sentencing Guidelines range as 188-235 months and granted a downward variance so that Adair received a 168-month prison term for the longest of her concurrent sentences.The Third Circuit affirmed, upholding the imposition of a four-point increase for the organizer-leader enhancement and rejecting an argument that the court should have compelled the government to move for a one-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility. View "United States v. Adair" on Justia Law

In 2015, Mitchell was convicted of drug-and gun-related offenses, including two counts of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, and aiding and abetting such possession, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1). After the enactment of the 2018 First Step Act, the Third Circuit vacated Mitchell’s 1,020-month sentence, finding that the sentencing court violated his due process rights.The Third Circuit held that the provisions of the First Step Act do apply to Mitchell’s resentencing. The Act is ambiguous; it applies, prospectively, to all offenses committed after the Act’s enactment but, retroactively, “to any offense that was committed before the date of enactment of this Act, if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of [that] date.” The court chose to interpret it broadly to allow the Act’s provisions to apply to a defendant whose pre-Act-unconstitutional sentence was vacated after the Act’s enactment. Because Mitchell’s sentence was fully vacated, he was an unsentenced defendant after the enactment of the Act and entitled to benefit from it. View "United States v. Mitchell" on Justia Law