Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Georgetown Law invited Yung to interview an alumnus. Yung thought his interviewer was rude. Georgetown rejected Yung's application. Yung launched a cyber-campaign, creating fake obituaries for the interviewer’s wife and son, social-media profiles and blogs in the interviewer's name, containing KKK content and bragging about child rape. A Google search of the interviewer’s name revealed thousands of similar posts. In reports to the Better Business Bureau, Yung accused the interviewer of sexually assaulting a female associate and berating prospective employees. Impersonating the interviewer’s wife, he published an online ad seeking a sex slave. The interviewer’s family got hundreds of phone calls from men seeking sex. Strange men went to the interviewer’s home. The interviewer hired cyber-investigators, who, working with the FBI, traced the harassment to Yung.Yung, charged with cyberstalking, 18 U.S.C. 2261A(2)(B) & 2261(b) unsuccessfully challenged the law as overbroad under the First Amendment. Yung was sentenced to prison, probation, and to pay restitution for the interviewer’s investigative costs ($70,000) and Georgetown’s security measures ($130,000). The Third Circuit affirmed the conviction. A narrow reading of the statute’s intent element is possible so it is not overbroad--limiting intent to harass to “criminal harassment, which is unprotected because it constitutes true threats or speech that is integral to proscribable criminal conduct.” The court vacated in part. Yung could not waive his claim that the restitution order exceeds the statute and Georgetown suffered no damage to any property right. View "United States v. Yung" on Justia Law

Federal prosecutors indicted Cannon and moved for his detention, 18 U.S.C. 3142. Because of the drug and firearms charges against Cannon, section 3142(e)’s presumption of detention pending trial applied. Because Cannon had complied with the conditions of his state court bond during his release, a magistrate granted Cannon’s request for pretrial release with conditions. Condition 1, required under the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3142(b), was that Cannon “must not violate federal, state, or local law while on release.”Cannon is a paraplegic and suffers from serious and painful medical conditions. Cannon's doctor had issued him a certification under Pennsylvania’s Medical Marijuana Act to obtain medical marijuana from an approved dispensary. The magistrate rejected Cannon's request for medical marijuana use, stating: "It’s still federally illegal, card or not.” Cannon replied that he “[did]n’t need it” before agreeing to abide by the conditions. A month later, Cannon unsuccessfully asked the court to modify the conditions and again requested an exemption. The Probation Office informed the court that on several occasions, Cannon had either tested positive for marijuana or admitted using marijuana.The court entered an order revoking Cannon’s bond. The Third Circuit affirmed; the use and possession of marijuana—even where sanctioned by a state— remains a violation of federal law. View "United States v. Cannon" on Justia Law

The Bank Secrecy Act requires U.S. citizens to report interests in foreign accounts with a value exceeding $10,000, 31 U.S.C. 5314. Collins, a dual citizen of the U.S. and Canada, has lived in the U.S. since 1994 and has bank accounts in the U.S., Canada, France, and Switzerland. In 2007, the balance of his Swiss account exceeded $800,000. Collins did not report any of those accounts until he voluntarily amended his tax returns in 2010. The IRS accepted Collins into its Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (OVDP). His amended returns for 2002-2009 yielded modest refunds stemming from large capital losses in 2002. Collins then withdrew from the OVDP, prompting an audit. Because Collins invested in foreign mutual funds, his Swiss holdings were subject to an additional tax on passive foreign investment companies, 26 U.S.C. 1291, which he failed to compute in his amended returns. The IRS audit determined that Collins owed an additional $71,324 plus penalties. In 2015 the IRS determined that since he withdrew from the OVDP, Collins was liable for civil penalties for “willful failure” to report foreign accounts. The IRS assessed a civil penalty of $308,064.The district court and Third Circuit affirmed, citing a “decades‐long course of conduct, omission, and scienter” by Collins in failing to disclose his foreign accounts. The disparity between Collins’s putative income tax liability and his penalty is stark but is consistent with the statute. View "United States v. Collins" on Justia Law

Adams was not tried until 2017, nearly two years after his arraignment on firearms charges. Rejecting his motions to dismiss on Speedy Trial Act grounds, the district court described “numerous continuances [and] unnecessary motions,” caused by Adams’s “obstreperous behavior.” At one point, because of Adams’s demands, the judge canceled a scheduled trial date and did not set a particular date for that future hearing or for trial, without citing 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(7)(A), which allows district courts to pause the speedy trial clock by entering a continuance, or state that this continuance would serve the “ends of justice.” Adams also argued that motions in limine filed by the government did not qualify for the Act’s exclusion of “delay resulting from any pretrial motion” under 3161(h)(1)(D), and that his motion for discovery did not toll the clock from its filing through its official disposition.The Third Circuit affirmed his convictions, concluding those periods of delay were excluded, The district court did not plainly err in failing to instruct the jury on the “knowledge-of-status” element under “Rehaif.” The record makes clear that Adams devised his straw-purchaser scheme precisely because he knew he was a felon who could not lawfully possess firearms. View "United States v. Adams" on Justia Law

In 1979-1980, Lesko went on a multi-day “Kill for Thrill” spree with his friend, Travaglia, ending the lives of four individuals in Western Pennsylvania. For the killing of a 21-year-old police officer, Lesko was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Lesko proceeded through many levels of the Pennsylvania state courts and two rounds of federal habeas proceedings. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of his latest petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition, which challenged both his 1981 guilt-phase trial and his 1995 resentencing. The court rejected claims that the prosecution violated Lesko’s Brady rights by suppressing an agreement between a prosecution witness who was found in possession of Lesko’s gun (Montgomery) and the prosecution; a January 1980 police report; and information from the juvenile file of another prosecution witness, Rutherford. Lesko’s counsel did not perform ineffectively by violating his right to testify; Lesko was not prejudiced by any ineffectiveness in failing to properly investigate and present mitigating evidence at resentencing. View "Lesko v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Ford, a Haitian national, became involved in Haitian national politics by joining PPD in 2012; he believed the ruling political party, PHTK, was corrupt and involved in human rights abuses. Ford received anonymous threatening telephone calls; in 2014, armed men encircled Ford’s home, shot into it, and burned it down. Ford reported the attack to Haitian authorities and fled Haiti. The United States began removal proceedings.Ford hired an attorney, who submitted a Form I-589 application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. Ford and the attorney subsequently had little contact. Ford stated the attorney “never prepared me for my final hearing.” The attorney provided scant documentary evidence to support Ford’s application and did not submit any documents about the PPD. The IJ denied relief, finding that Ford was credible but had “submitted no objective evidence” to help meet his burden in proving that he was harassed or persecuted on account of his political opinion or that Ford’s fear of persecution upon his return to Haiti was reasonable. Ford retained new counsel. The BIA affirmed and denied a motion to reopen Ford’s case based on ineffective assistance.The Third Circuit vacated. Ford presents a meritorious ineffective-assistance claim; his lawyer failed to present important and easily available evidence going to the heart of Ford’s claims. View "Saint Ford v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Gaines served as the “muscle” in a drug house. Thompson came to the house to buy drugs. Williams, a visitor, told Thompson that the house was “closed,” denied him entry, and told him to leave. Thompson kept knocking and asking to come in. Eventually, Gaines walked outside and an argument ensued. Williams joined them. Gaines ultimately stabbed Thompson multiple times. Williams pulled Gaines off of Thompson. Stab wounds resulted in hemorrhaging that caused Thompson’s death. Gaines was convicted in Pennsylvania state court of first-degree murder in Pennsylvania,Gaines sought habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court granted his petition, holding that Gaines’s trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the omission of a jury instruction that no adverse inference could be drawn from Gaines’s election not to testify in his own defense. The Third Circuit reversed. Gaines’s trial counsel made a reasonable tactical choice when he did not object. Counsel testified he was aware that the court failed to give the requested no-adverse-inference instruction, but that he decided not to object because he “was concerned that throwing [the instruction] in at the end" may have drawn undue attention to the fact that Gaines did not testify. He testified that he was satisfied with the charge as it stood because it placed the burden of proof squarely on the Commonwealth and exhaustively detailed the law of self-defense. View "zGaines v. Superintendent Benner Township" on Justia Law

In 2020, Abreu pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). His PSR calculated his Guidelines range applying the enhancement for a defendant who “committed any part of the instant offense” after a felony conviction for either a “crime of violence” or a “controlled substance offense” U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(4). The enhancement was predicated on his prior conviction for conspiracy to commit second-degree aggravated assault under New Jersey law, The district court applied the enhancement and sentenced Abreu to 56 months’ imprisonment.Following a 2019 Supreme Court case, Kisor v. Wilkie, the Third Circuit reexamined 4B1.2 and concluded that the text of the “controlled substance offense” prong unambiguously excluded inchoate crimes and overruled its “Hightower” precedent. The Third Circuit then vacated Abreu’s sentence, citing the Guidelines’ text and recent Supreme Court precedent and declining to defer to the commentary to 2K2.1, which purports to define the term “crime of violence” to encompass conspiracy crimes. View "United States v. Abreu" on Justia Law

Dawson was caught driving a car containing bags of fentanyl, stamped with the label “Peace of Mind”. Earlier that day, Police had responded to the overdose death of “L.B.”, who was found with bags of fentanyl bearing the same “Peace of Mind” label. L.B.’s cell phone revealed that Dawson had been supplying L.B. with fentanyl. Police used that phone to set up a drug deal with Dawson, apprehending him upon his arrival. Dawson pled guilty to possessing fentanyl with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). Dawson was caught with only four grams of fentanyl, but he had been convicted four times of heroin trafficking under Pennsylvania law. The PSR classified him as a career offender and calculated a guidelines range of 188-235 months’ imprisonment. Dawson also objected to the PSR’s mention of L.B.’s death.The court sentenced Dawson to 142 months’ imprisonment; it neither held that Dawson caused L.B.'s death nor deemed the issue irrelevant to crafting a sentence under the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. The Third Circuit affirmed. Dawson’s state drug trafficking convictions are career offender predicates, as the state offense, 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. §780-113(a)(30), does not criminalize a broader range of conduct than the Guidelines. Dawson did not show that his substantial rights were affected by the district court's failure to rule on whether Dawson caused L.B. to die from a drug overdose. View "United States v. Dawson" on Justia Law

Price was found dead in her bedroom from an overdose of fentanyl. A jury convicted Zayas of distributing and conspiring to distribute the fentanyl that killed Price; of distributing fentanyl to someone who was pregnant; and distributing it within 1,000 feet of a playground. The district court sentenced Zayas to life imprisonment.The Third Circuit affirmed in part, rejecting Zayas’s argument that he was prejudiced by the government’s failure to timely disclose potentially exculpatory evidence–his statements that he believed the drugs that he delivered to Price were in white bags. The evidence is clearly sufficient to establish Zayas’s guilt for distributing and conspiring to distribute the fentanyl that killed Price beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury could reasonably conclude that Price did not have any drugs before she purchased the drugs from Zayas just before her death; that those drugs contained fentanyl because both Price and Zayas had discussed the drugs’ unusual potency. Although the court gave erroneous jury instructions, a rational juror viewing the evidence could only have concluded that he knew she was pregnant. The court vacated in part, finding the evidence insufficient to support his conviction for distributing fentanyl within 1,000 feet of a playground as defined by the statute. View "United States v. Zayas" on Justia Law