Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Haistens sold discounted animal pesticides and drugs online from their South Carolina home. They operated in violation of multiple FDA and EPA regulations. They sold counterfeit DVDs of movies and television shows that they obtained from China. The Haistens ignored cease-and-desist letters from state regulators and animal pesticides companies. Department of Homeland Security agents began making undercover purchases from the Haistens. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) seized shipments of counterfeit DVDs. Agents then searched the Haistens’ home, which revealed unapproved animal pesticides and drugs, counterfeit DVDs, and business records. In the ensuing prosecution, Count 14 charged the Haistens with trafficking counterfeit DVDs that were seized by CBP officers in Cincinnati. Count 15 charged them with trafficking counterfeit DVDs, that were seized at their home. Defense counsel did not request a jury instruction on improper venue or move for acquittal on Counts 14 or 15 for lack of proper venue in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The Haistens appealed, challenging an evidentiary ruling and a statement the government made during its summation. The Third Circuit affirmed.The Haistens then sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that their trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge venue on Counts 14 and 15. The Third Circuit remanded the denial of that motion for the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on whether their counsel had a strategic reason for not raising a defense based on improper venue. View "United States v. Haisten" on Justia Law

Guaranteed was a “reverse distributor,” paid by healthcare providers to return unused or expired pharmaceutical drugs to the drug manufacturers, for refunds for the healthcare-provider clients. Refunds were wired directly to Guaranteed’s general operating account; the company then issued refund checks to the relevant clients, less a service fee. In 2001, the Department of Defense contracted with Guaranteed. The government began investigating Guaranteed after the District of Columbia noticed that it did not receive the full refund on a return of some of its pharmaceuticals. The investigation uncovered a series of schemes that Guaranteed used to defraud its clients.Guaranteed, its CEO, and its CFO, were convicted of multiple counts of wire fraud, mail fraud, conspiracy to launder money, and theft of government property. In addition to prison sentences, the court imposed more than $100 million in restitution and forfeitures. The Third Circuit reversed the money laundering convictions and remanded for resentencing. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, there is not sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged complex financial transactions—after the initial receipt of “commingled” fraudulent and lawfully obtained funds—were designed for "concealment money laundering." The court otherwise affirmed, rejecting challenges to a search warrant, the sufficiency of the evidence, the jury instructions, and the court’s refusal to permit proposed expert testimony. View "United States v. Fallon" on Justia Law

De Castro, a citizen of the Dominican Republic came to the U.S. around 2002-2003. In 2012, he married a U.S. citizen. In 2014, his spouse’s Petition for Alien Relative was approved. The State Department notified De Castro that his immigrant visa petition was eligible for further processing. Months later, he was arrested as an alien in possession of a weapon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5)(A). De Castro eventually pleaded guilty and was allowed to depart voluntarily in 2017. Thirteen months after the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Rehaif” decision, De Castro sought a writ of error coram nobis challenging his conviction. In Rehaif, the Supreme Court held that section 922(g)'s “knowingly” provision applies to both the possession and immigration status elements. De Castro argued that the government never proved he knew he was illegally or unlawfully in the United States; the court never informed him at his plea colloquy that the government was required to prove that element.The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of the petition, finding that De Castro did not have a sound reason for his delay in seeking relief; his knowledge-of-immigration-status argument was not futile in 2017 when he entered his plea agreement; and De Castro cannot establish actual innocence under the Rehaif standard because he cannot demonstrate it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would conclude that he knew of his status as an illegal alien at the time he possessed a firearm. View "United States v. De Castro" on Justia Law

In New Jersey for a family party, Saint-Jean was driving home to Massachusetts with his uncle. Palisades Interstate Park Police stopped the vehicle for driving too slowly and for having tinted windows. In response to questions, Saint-Jean stated that he was originally from Haiti but was a U.S. citizen. Officers ordered the men out of the car, frisked them, and requested to search the vehicle. Saint-Jean signed a consent-to-search form. In a compartment between the front seats, they found small plastic bags containing heart-shaped objects that looked like Valentine’s Day candies. The officers suspected that the items were actually MDMA or ecstasy. Saint-Jean stated that they were Valentine’s Day candies from his coworker and offered her contact information. The officers declined, arrested Saint-Jean, and took him to a police station. The objects were not tested. The officers issued a traffic summons and a criminal summons for possessing a controlled substance, later downgraded to a disorderly persons offense. Many weeks later, the objects were determined to be candy. The prosecution continued for four more months.In Saint-Jean’s subsequent civil rights suit, the district court rejected the officers’ request for qualified immunity for Fourth Amendment claims but dismissed one constitutional claim against the officers and all of the claims against the prosecutor and the governmental entities. Before the officers appealed, Saint-Jean amended his complaint. The Third Circuit dismissed the appeal. Due to the prior amendment, the district court’s order was not final and there was no basis for appellate jurisdiction. View "Saint-Jean v. Palisades Interstate Park Commission" on Justia Law

In 2005, Bentley robbed a liquor store at gunpoint and was caught after a car chase. He confessed and was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), Hobbs Act robbery, and using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, section 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm charge carried a sentence of not more than 10 years but under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) a person convicted of that crime who has three or more prior convictions “for a violent felony or a serious drug offense,” is subject to a mandatory sentence of “not less than fifteen years,” section 924(e)(1). Bentley pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence and admitted he was subject to ACCA’s sentencing enhancement. The agreement listed prior convictions: first-degree reckless endangering (Delaware, 1991) and robbery and use of a firearm (Virginia 1988 and 1989). Bentley was sentenced to 22 years’ imprisonment.After the Supreme Court’s 2015 “Johnson” holding that ACCA’s “residual clause,” was unconstitutionally vague, Bently sought resentencing, arguing that the prior convictions mentioned in his plea no longer counted as strikes under ACCA. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The undisputed PSR documented six North Carolina convictions for breaking and entering as ACCA predicates. Any Johnson error would be harmless. View "United States v. Bentley" on Justia Law

Under the 1982 Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA), a court sentencing a defendant convicted of certain crimes could order restitution 18 U.S.C. 3663(a)(1); a restitution order was “a lien in favor of the United States,” that expired 20 years after the entry of the judgment.” The 1996 Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) made restitution mandatory and provides that a restitution lien never becomes unenforceable, and a defendant’s liability to pay expires 20 years after the defendant’s release from imprisonment. Days before MVRA took effect, Norwood committed a New Jersey bank robbery and was convicted of federal crimes. His $19,562.87 restitution order was governed by the VWPA. Norwood filed successful habeas petitions. His restitution order was not disturbed, although his sentence was reduced.In 2016, U.S. Attorney’s office sought money from Norwood’s prison account ($6,031.40) to satisfy Norwood’s outstanding restitution. The ensuing dispute continued until the 20-year anniversary of Norwood’s original judgment and restitution order. Under the VWPA, his liability to pay would have expired. The district court held that the government could enforce its lien under the VWPA because it filed its motion to do so before May 30, 2017. The court analogized to the tax code and concluded there was no ex post facto issue. The Third Circuit reversed. Retroactively applying the MVRA to extend the duration of Norwood’s restitutionary liability violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. View "United States v. Norwood" on Justia Law

Barney’s wife got a restraining order against him and temporary custody of their son. She was subsequently found dead near their son’s daycare, her throat cut open. Barney was charged with murder. Barney had a rocky relationship with his defense lawyer, Riley, and claims that he told Riley of his plan to represent himself on July 14, 2005, then wrote the judge a letter. Though Barney had dated the letter July 21, the judge did not get it until August 10, the day before the trial began. In court, the judge held up the letter, explained that he had not read it, and handed it to Riley. Riley promised Barney that he would “deal with” Barney’s request. He never did.After a two-week trial, Barney was convicted of first-degree murder. His conviction was affirmed. In habeas proceedings, the New Jersey Superior Court found that Barney did not “clearly and unequivocally” tell the court or Riley that he wanted to represent himself. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. The state court ruling was not “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established” Supreme Court precedent, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). Barney did not establish prejudice in his ineffective assistance claim; the trial court did not get Barney’s request until the eve of jury selection. View "Barney v. Administrator New Jersey State Prisons" on Justia Law

In 2008, Shields was convicted of crack cocaine offenses. His PSR classified him as a career offender based on his 1995 Maryland conviction for robbery with a deadly weapon and his 2002 Maryland conviction for conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine. His Guidelines range was 360 months to life. Shields objected to an enhancement for the use of a firearm in connection with the offense and to the drug quantity attributed to him, which exceeded that found by the jury. The court declined to rule on the objections because neither would change his Guidelines range given his career-offender status. The court sentenced Shields to 360 months in prison. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 subsequently reduced the disparities between the sentencing schemes for crack and powder cocaine. Shields became eligible for resentencing in 2018, based on the First Step Act.Shields requested a full sentencing hearing or to file a sentencing memorandum with supplemental documentation “to present evidence of his post-sentence rehabilitation” and to dispute his career-offender status. He believed one of his prior convictions was no longer a predicate offense, and renewed his objections to the enhancements for firearm use and drug weight. The court denied his request for a full hearing and reduced his sentence to 262 months, stating “[t]he First Step Act does not permit the court to consider other statutory or sentencing guideline amendments enacted since" the offense. The Third Circuit vacated. The district court had the discretion to consider Shields’s arguments concerning intervening changes in law and abused its discretion in denying him the opportunity to make other arguments in favor of a downward variance. View "United States v. Shields" on Justia Law

Norton, a 38-year-old Connecticut woman, communicated for several months with a 14-year-old Pennsylvania boy. Their communications became overtly sexual. Norton drove from Connecticut to Pennsylvania and met the minor in a park near his home. Soon after, the minor’s parents discovered Norton’s communications with the minor and notified law enforcement. Norton was convicted of attempted enticement of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b), and travel to engage in illicit sexual conduct with a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2423(b). She was sentenced to 168 months in prison, 20 years of supervised release, and special assessments of $200 (18 U.S.C. 3013) and $5,000 under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act, 18 U.S.C. 3014 (JVTA).The Third Circuit affirmed. The court rejected Norton’s argument that her due process rights were violated because the court sentenced her based on false contentions by the government that she lied when she testified that she had no intention of meeting the minor after lunch and that the evidence showed, contrary to her testimony, that Norton returned to the same park to meet the minor after lunch. The district court did not mention either of the two allegedly materially incorrect facts when responding to Norton’s objection to the two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice or in analyzing the 3553(a) factors. The court upheld a determination that Norton was not indigent for purposes of imposing the JVTA assessment. View "United States v. Norton" on Justia Law

In 2016, York County, Pennsylvania police officers conducted controlled cocaine buys from Brown, then obtained a search warrant for Brown’s apartment. Inside the apartment, they discovered Brown himself, cocaine, scales, money, and a loaded revolver tucked under the couch cushion where Brown had been sitting. Brown was indicted on multiple counts, including being a felon in possession of a firearm. 18 U.S.C. 922(g). Brown pleaded guilty to cocaine possession and distribution and the section 922(g) offense. At the time of sentencing, Brown had five prior Pennsylvania convictions for the distribution, or possession with intent to distribute, of controlled substances. One, from 2008, involved cocaine, and the remaining four, spanning from 2009-2014, involved marijuana.The district court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)'s 15-year mandatory minimum. The court declined to decide whether Brown was a “career offender” under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 after making the ACCA determination. The Third Circuit affirmed Brown’s 15-year sentence, despite the intervening federal decriminalization of hemp. Absent contrary statutory language, the law in effect at the time of the commission of the federal offense applies when employing the categorical approach in the ACCA context. The state schedule matched the federal schedule in effect when Brown committed the federal offense triggering the ACCA enhancement. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law