Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Under the 1982 Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA), a court sentencing a defendant convicted of certain crimes could order restitution 18 U.S.C. 3663(a)(1); a restitution order was “a lien in favor of the United States,” that expired 20 years after the entry of the judgment.” The 1996 Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) made restitution mandatory and provides that a restitution lien never becomes unenforceable, and a defendant’s liability to pay expires 20 years after the defendant’s release from imprisonment. Days before MVRA took effect, Norwood committed a New Jersey bank robbery and was convicted of federal crimes. His $19,562.87 restitution order was governed by the VWPA. Norwood filed successful habeas petitions. His restitution order was not disturbed, although his sentence was reduced.In 2016, U.S. Attorney’s office sought money from Norwood’s prison account ($6,031.40) to satisfy Norwood’s outstanding restitution. The ensuing dispute continued until the 20-year anniversary of Norwood’s original judgment and restitution order. Under the VWPA, his liability to pay would have expired. The district court held that the government could enforce its lien under the VWPA because it filed its motion to do so before May 30, 2017. The court analogized to the tax code and concluded there was no ex post facto issue. The Third Circuit reversed. Retroactively applying the MVRA to extend the duration of Norwood’s restitutionary liability violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. View "United States v. Norwood" on Justia Law

Barney’s wife got a restraining order against him and temporary custody of their son. She was subsequently found dead near their son’s daycare, her throat cut open. Barney was charged with murder. Barney had a rocky relationship with his defense lawyer, Riley, and claims that he told Riley of his plan to represent himself on July 14, 2005, then wrote the judge a letter. Though Barney had dated the letter July 21, the judge did not get it until August 10, the day before the trial began. In court, the judge held up the letter, explained that he had not read it, and handed it to Riley. Riley promised Barney that he would “deal with” Barney’s request. He never did.After a two-week trial, Barney was convicted of first-degree murder. His conviction was affirmed. In habeas proceedings, the New Jersey Superior Court found that Barney did not “clearly and unequivocally” tell the court or Riley that he wanted to represent himself. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. The state court ruling was not “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established” Supreme Court precedent, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). Barney did not establish prejudice in his ineffective assistance claim; the trial court did not get Barney’s request until the eve of jury selection. View "Barney v. Administrator New Jersey State Prisons" on Justia Law

In 2008, Shields was convicted of crack cocaine offenses. His PSR classified him as a career offender based on his 1995 Maryland conviction for robbery with a deadly weapon and his 2002 Maryland conviction for conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine. His Guidelines range was 360 months to life. Shields objected to an enhancement for the use of a firearm in connection with the offense and to the drug quantity attributed to him, which exceeded that found by the jury. The court declined to rule on the objections because neither would change his Guidelines range given his career-offender status. The court sentenced Shields to 360 months in prison. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 subsequently reduced the disparities between the sentencing schemes for crack and powder cocaine. Shields became eligible for resentencing in 2018, based on the First Step Act.Shields requested a full sentencing hearing or to file a sentencing memorandum with supplemental documentation “to present evidence of his post-sentence rehabilitation” and to dispute his career-offender status. He believed one of his prior convictions was no longer a predicate offense, and renewed his objections to the enhancements for firearm use and drug weight. The court denied his request for a full hearing and reduced his sentence to 262 months, stating “[t]he First Step Act does not permit the court to consider other statutory or sentencing guideline amendments enacted since" the offense. The Third Circuit vacated. The district court had the discretion to consider Shields’s arguments concerning intervening changes in law and abused its discretion in denying him the opportunity to make other arguments in favor of a downward variance. View "United States v. Shields" on Justia Law

Norton, a 38-year-old Connecticut woman, communicated for several months with a 14-year-old Pennsylvania boy. Their communications became overtly sexual. Norton drove from Connecticut to Pennsylvania and met the minor in a park near his home. Soon after, the minor’s parents discovered Norton’s communications with the minor and notified law enforcement. Norton was convicted of attempted enticement of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b), and travel to engage in illicit sexual conduct with a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2423(b). She was sentenced to 168 months in prison, 20 years of supervised release, and special assessments of $200 (18 U.S.C. 3013) and $5,000 under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act, 18 U.S.C. 3014 (JVTA).The Third Circuit affirmed. The court rejected Norton’s argument that her due process rights were violated because the court sentenced her based on false contentions by the government that she lied when she testified that she had no intention of meeting the minor after lunch and that the evidence showed, contrary to her testimony, that Norton returned to the same park to meet the minor after lunch. The district court did not mention either of the two allegedly materially incorrect facts when responding to Norton’s objection to the two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice or in analyzing the 3553(a) factors. The court upheld a determination that Norton was not indigent for purposes of imposing the JVTA assessment. View "United States v. Norton" on Justia Law

In 2016, York County, Pennsylvania police officers conducted controlled cocaine buys from Brown, then obtained a search warrant for Brown’s apartment. Inside the apartment, they discovered Brown himself, cocaine, scales, money, and a loaded revolver tucked under the couch cushion where Brown had been sitting. Brown was indicted on multiple counts, including being a felon in possession of a firearm. 18 U.S.C. 922(g). Brown pleaded guilty to cocaine possession and distribution and the section 922(g) offense. At the time of sentencing, Brown had five prior Pennsylvania convictions for the distribution, or possession with intent to distribute, of controlled substances. One, from 2008, involved cocaine, and the remaining four, spanning from 2009-2014, involved marijuana.The district court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)'s 15-year mandatory minimum. The court declined to decide whether Brown was a “career offender” under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 after making the ACCA determination. The Third Circuit affirmed Brown’s 15-year sentence, despite the intervening federal decriminalization of hemp. Absent contrary statutory language, the law in effect at the time of the commission of the federal offense applies when employing the categorical approach in the ACCA context. The state schedule matched the federal schedule in effect when Brown committed the federal offense triggering the ACCA enhancement. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Vurimindi, a native of India, came to the U.S. on a work visa in 2000, and after marrying an American citizen, became a lawful permanent resident in 2008. Vurimindi’s erratic behavior toward his neighbors eventually led to his arrest and conviction on two counts of misdemeanor stalking under Pennsylvania law, which makes it a crime to: engage[] in a course of conduct or repeatedly commit[] acts toward another person . . . under circumstances which demonstrate either an intent to place such other person in reasonable fear of bodily injury or to cause substantial emotional distress to such other person.” Vurimindi was sentenced to two consecutive terms of 15-30 months’ imprisonment.In removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), which makes any noncitizen convicted of a “crime of stalking” removable, the IJ applied the categorical approach, comparing the elements of the relevant state offense with the elements of the federal generic offense. The IJ concluded that Vurimindi was removable. The Third Circuit granted Vurimindi’s petitions for review. The BIA mistakenly found that Vurimindi failed to raise the issue before the IJ; the Pennsylvania stalking offense sweeps more broadly than the federal generic under the categorical approach and is not a removable offense. View "Vurimindi v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Granthon was shot dead on a Harrisburg, Pennsylvania street corner. A day earlier, Granton had purchased an ounce of crack cocaine from Burton. Granthon “was short a couple grams” and sought a refund. The evidence linking Burton to Granthon’s death was “overwhelming.” Burton was convicted of first-degree murder. Williams was also charged with first-degree murder, conspiracy, and reckless endangerment of another but the evidence was weaker. No witness recognized Williams and no cell phone records placed him near the scene that night. Williams claimed he spent the night at a casino, but offered conflicting alibi stories and never used his casino rewards card that night. Williams’s trial lawyer’s “defense theory” was that Williams was “not placed at the scene.” He did not call Rochon, a witness at Burton’s trial whose testimony allegedly indicated that Granthon also shot a gun, nor did he make the case for self-defense or voluntary manslaughter.Williams was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of his petition for habeas relief, rejecting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. His trial attorney’s alleged negligence is not self-evident, as the attorney may have reasonably thought that self-defense arguments would detract from an alibi defense. To show his attorney was negligent, Williams would need to develop the record in district court but the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act forbids federal courts from supplementing the state court record under these circumstances. View "Williams v. Superintendent Mahanoy SCI" on Justia Law

Messina filed suit, accusing Coello—who was dating Messina’s former boyfriend— of harassment. Coello pled not guilty and the charge was dismissed. Subsequently, private attorney Estabrooks requested an appointment to prosecute Messina’s complaint. New Jersey Court Rules permit courts to appoint a “private prosecutor to represent the State in cases involving cross-complaints.” This 2007 prosecution did not involve a cross-complaint and Estabrooks did not disclose that she was also representing Messina in custody and other civil actions against Coello’s boyfriend. Without recording any findings as to the need for a private prosecutor or the suitability of Estabrooks, Municipal Judge DiLeo approved her application. Irregularities continued at trial and post-conviction. Without addressing Coello’s lack of representation or her evidence, DiLeo reinstated her jail term based on a letter from Estabrooks.In 2016, a New Jersey state court vacated Coello's harassment conviction. The prosecution, by then familiar with allegations of judicial misconduct against DiLeo, did not oppose the motion. In 2020, Coello filed this federal civil rights action against Estabrooks, DiLeo, and municipal defendants. The district court dismissed most of her claims as untimely, reasoning that at the time of her trial and sentencing, Coello had reason to know of her alleged injuries. The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal, citing the special timeliness rules governing her precise claims. Under Heck v. Humphrey, her claims all imply the invalidity of her criminal prosecution; she could not file suit until her conviction was vacated View "Coello v. DiLeo" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for various child pornography offenses in February 2018. Defendant expressed his intention to represent himself and the district court permitted him to do so, but appointed the Federal Public Defender's Office as standby counsel. However, subsequently, Defendant announced to the court he was invoking his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and largely refused to participate in the proceedings. After holding a hearing, the district court held that Defendant waived and forfeited his right to represent himself and appointed the Federal Public Defender's Office as his attorney. Ultimately, Defendant was convicted and sentenced to 180 months of imprisonment.On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court's determination that he waived and forfeited his right to represent himself. The court affirmed Defendant's conviction. The court explained "the right to represent oneself is not absolute, however; judges 'may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.'" Here, Defendant stopped communicating with the court, failed to open his legal mail and repeatedly violated court orders. Thus, the Third Circuit held that the district court did not err in concluding that "it would be impossible to conduct a fair trial with a pro se defendant who refused to cooperate or engage at all with the court." View "USA v. Thomas Noble" on Justia Law

Defendant, a former scientist employed by GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), pled guilty to a single count of conspiracy to steal trade secrets, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1832(a)(5) based on allegations he stole company documents. At sentencing, the government sought a sentencing enhancement based on the “loss” attributable to Defendant's conduct. However, the district court denied the government's request for an enhancement.On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed. The court noted that finding that under the commentary to U.S.S.G. 2B1.1, the definition of “loss” includes losses that the defendants intended. However, here, it was uncontested that GSK did not suffer any actual loss. Further, the court determined that the government failed to prove that Defendant purposely sought to inflict pecuniary harm on GSK. View "USA v. Yu Xue" on Justia Law