Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jumper, a securities broker-dealer, arranged financing on behalf of private investors for the purchase of a Pennsylvania fire-brick manufacturer. Jumper fraudulently obtained authority to transfer the company’s pension plan assets by forging the majority stakeholder’s signature on several documents. Between 2007-2016, Jumper transferred $5.7 million from the pension plan to accounts he controlled.The SEC filed a civil complaint against Jumper for securities fraud in the Western District of Tennessee. The Department of Justice filed criminal charges against Jumper in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The Tennessee court entered a default judgment for the SEC and ordered Jumper to disgorge $5.7 million and to pay prejudgment interest of $726,758.79. In Pennsylvania, Jumper pleaded guilty to wire fraud and agreed to make full restitution; the parties stipulated a loss of $1.5-$3.5 million.The district court considered Jumper’s request for a downward departure based on medical issues, discussed the relevant 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, and denied Jumper’s requests, explaining, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is equipped to provide consistent, adequate medical care. The court sentenced Jumper to 78 months’ incarceration, at the bottom of the Guidelines range of 78–97 months, and ordered him to pay $2,426,550 in restitution. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the sentence violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and principles of collateral estoppel and that the court improperly concluded that the BOP could treat his medical issues. View "United States v. Jumper" on Justia Law

In 2006, Mervilus, age 22, supported his mother, a cancer patient, and two younger siblings. Abreu accused Mervilus of robbing and stabbing him. Mervilus agreed to take a polygraph examination. Earlier that year, officers dismissed drug charges after a polygraph exam indicated he truthfully denied responsibility. New Jersey permitted polygraph results to be admitted at trial. The Union County Police Department’s only certified polygraph examiner, Kaminskas, conducted the exam. Kaminskas used the “Arther Method,” an “outlier in the polygraph world,” not accredited by the American Polygraph Association. The Method relies on subjective observations and assumptions, such as that certain ethnic groups do not experience any guilt when they lie. Kaminskas concluded Mervilus was deceptive. The only relevant question where Mervilus’s physiological responses signaled deception was a question for which Kaminskas insisted Mervilus change his answer. At trial Abreu failed to identify Mervilus, pointing to a different Black man. The court admitted the polygraph exam. Mervilus was convicted. In 2011, the conviction was overturned on the ground that Kaminskas’s testimony was improper and prejudicial.Mervilus sued Kaminskas, Chief Vaniska, and Union County, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit reversed the summary judgment rejection of those claims. Mervilus introduced sufficient evidence to try his fabrication-of-evidence claim against Kaminskas. His Monell claim against Union County is viable even if Kaminskas did not fabricate evidence; a jury might not render an inconsistent verdict if it found the County liable but Kaminskas not culpable. View "Mervilus v. Union County" on Justia Law

U.S. Marshals in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania staked out Carey’s residence to arrest him for violating his conditions of supervised release. Carey placed a bag in the trunk of his car and began to pull away, hitting a parked car. Officers searched his car and found Carey’s open bag, containing a shoe box with a large opening. It contained $79,320. From Carey’s residence, his girlfriend, Slone, heard the commotion and flushed cocaine and PCP down the toilet. The government’s expert estimated that the bags together contained around 112 grams of cocaine. Slone indicated there was marijuana and a loaded firearm in the house. Police obtained a search warrant and recovered approximately five pounds of marijuana and 310 grams of cocaine, five cellular phones, a money counter, a loaded handgun [registered to Slone], ammunition, a holster, digital scales, and other drug-related items.After unsuccessful motions to suppress, Carey was charged with possessing with intent to distribute marijuana and 500 grams or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a); possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and conspiring to possess with intent to distribute marijuana and 500 grams or more of cocaine hydrochloride, 21 U.S.C. 846. Slone testified against Carey. After rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings and the calculation of Carey’s Guidelines range, the Third Circuit held that insufficient evidence supports Carey’s conviction for possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Carey" on Justia Law

Appellant and co-defendants were tried in connection with the armed robbery of a Philadelphia convenience store. The district court instructed the jury that each defendant could be convicted of Hobbs Act robbery under three alternative theories of liability: direct, aiding and abetting, or for participation in a Pinkerton conspiracy. The district court further instructed that defendants could be convicted under Section 924(c) based on either a direct or an aiding and abetting theory. The jury found all parties guilty on all counts in a general verdict, and the district court denied their motions for judgment of acquittal. Appellant argued that his conviction for Hobbs Act robbery must be vacated because the district court failed to charge the jury on those elements, and the Government failed to prove them.   The Third Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court correctly charged the jury on the elements of Hobbs Act Robbery. The court explained the district court did not err in giving this jury instruction, and Appellant concedes that a reasonable jury, following this instruction, could have concluded that he aided and abetted co-defendant’s completed Hobbs Act robbery by intending to “facilitate the taking of the gun from the clerk.” Further, the court held that Appellant committed a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c). The court wrote that Appellant indisputably brandished his firearm during co-defendant’s completed Hobbs Act robbery, and while the jury’s general verdict obscures whether Appellant’s Hobbs Act robbery conviction was based on an aiding and abetting or a Pinkerton theory of guilt, under either theory he is liable for committing a crime of violence. View "USA v. Abid Stevens" on Justia Law

In 1995, Range pleaded guilty to making false statements about his income to obtain $2,458 of food stamp assistance. His conviction was classified as a misdemeanor punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment. Range was sentenced to three years’ probation. Three years later, Range attempted to purchase a firearm but was rejected by the instant background check system. Range’s wife subsequently bought him a deer-hunting rifle. Years later Range learned that he was barred from purchasing and possessing firearms because of his welfare fraud conviction. He sold his rifle to a firearms dealer and sought a declaratory judgment that 18 U.S.C. 922(g) violated the Second Amendment as applied to him. The section prohibits firearm ownership by any person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year—the federal definition of a felony.In 2022, the Third Circuit affirmed the rejection of the suit, reasoning that “the people” constitutionally entitled to bear arms are “law-abiding, responsible citizens,” and that even if Range fell within “the people,” the government demonstrated that its prohibition is consistent with historical tradition.On rehearing, en banc, the Third Circuit reversed. Despite his false statement conviction, Range remains among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment. The government did not carry its burden of showing that the Nation’s history and tradition of firearm regulation support disarming Range. View "Range v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Garcia-Vasquez, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, came to the U.S. illegally. In 1999, he was convicted of conspiring to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. After serving his prison sentence, he was removed. Garcia-Vasquez returned to the U.S. illegally. He was subsequently convicted in state court for distributing heroin and other drug offenses. New Jersey released him to immigration authorities. Garcia-Vasquez pleaded guilty to reentering the country illegally after having been convicted of an aggravated felony and removed, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a), (b)(2). Based on his 1999 cocaine-conspiracy conviction the government advocated a 16-level enhancement under Sentencing Guideline 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i). The Guideline’s Application Note 5 extends that enhancement to inchoate crimes like conspiracy. Garcia-Vasquez argued that application notes may not extend the reach of the Guideline’s text and that, under the categorical approach, his federal conspiracy conviction did not count as a generic conspiracy because its elements did not require an overt act.The district court applied the enhancement, sentencing him to 46 months’ imprisonment, the bottom of the enhanced range. The Third Circuit affirmed. Garcia-Vasquez argued that his 1999 conviction was only for conspiring to traffic drugs, not actually trafficking them; only Application Note 5 names inchoate crimes expressly. The court rejected the argument. The plain meaning of “drug trafficking offense” includes drug-trafficking conspiracies so it is not necessary to resort to the application notes. View "United States v. Garcia-Vasquez" on Justia Law

Somerset County officers were patrolling in response to recent gang-related crimes and shootings. Detective Gambino recognized a vehicle he had seen earlier parked in front of a known meeting place for the Bounty Hunter Bloods. Gambino followed the car, saw it turn without signaling, and radioed his supervisor, Sergeant Brown, to pull the car over for a traffic violation. Brown, driving with two other officers, initiated the traffic stop. Gambino arrived and shined his flashlight by the car's left rear door. Dowdell, whom Gambino knew from prior arrests to be a member of the Bloods, was sitting in the back seat. Gambino opened the left rear car door to “have a conversation.” Gambino saw a bulge in Dowdell’s jacket, ordered Dowdell out of the car, patted him down, and discovered a fully loaded semi-automatic firearm.Dowdell, charged as a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), argued that Gambino violated his Fourth Amendment rights by “physically intruding on” the car door. The Third Circuit affirmed an order granting Dowdell’s motion to suppress evidence, rejecting the government’s arguments that the district court abused its discretion in finding that it had waived any argument that existing precedent should be extended to justify opening the car door and, alternatively, in not excusing the waiver. The government’s sole legal theory was that reasonable suspicion justified opening the door. View "United States v. Dowdell" on Justia Law

Simmons pleaded guilty to Transportation with Intent to Engage in Criminal Sexual Activity and was sentenced to 210 months of imprisonment and a lifetime of supervised release. After beginning his supervised release, Simmons choked, punched, and threatened to throw hot grease at his mother. Simmons held both his mother and his girlfriend against their will as he trashed his mother's apartment and threw hot grease. The next day, Simmons’ mother was at the home of a friend. Simmons arrived wearing a mask and fired a gunshot through the front door into an occupied room. A home security camera captured video and audio, including Simmons stating, “Next time I’m going to kill everybody.” Simmons’ mother told his probation officer that Simmons did not live with her, despite him having listed her address as his own with Pennsylvania’s sex offender registry.The U.S. Probation Office alleged four violations of his supervised release: the two violent incidents, failure to update his address with the sex offender registry, and possession of a firearm. The district court found Simmons violated the terms of his release and sentenced him to 21 months’ imprisonment followed by a reimposed life term of supervised release. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting Simmons’s arguments that the court violated 18 U.S.C. 3583(h) by not subtracting the 21 months from his life term of supervised release and that the imposition of a life term of supervised release was substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Simmons" on Justia Law

In 2008, Jenkins pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(e). He was sentenced to the 15-year mandatory minimum under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because he had three prior convictions “for a violent felony or a serious drug offense.” including two prior drug convictions and a conviction for aggravated assault under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 2702(a)(3). Section 2702(a)(3) applies to one who “attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury” to certain persons “in the performance of duty.”In 2015, the Supreme Court, in “Johnson," held that ACCA’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. As a result, Jenkins’s Section 2702(a)(3) conviction for a non-enumerated offense would qualify as a predicate violent felony only if it satisfied the elements clause. Jenkins moved to correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that because Section 2702(a)(3) can be violated without the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force, it is not a “violent felony” under ACCA’s elements clause. The Third Circuit agreed and granted relief. A violation of Section 2702(a)(3) can be committed by a failure to act. The court acknowledged the “bizarre result” required by the categorical approach in analyzing Pennsylvania’s aggravated assault laws. View "United States v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

In 2010, Harris pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(e), which typically carries a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment. Harris’ PSR concluded that Harris qualified for a sentence enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because his criminal record included three predicate offenses: one serious drug conviction and at least two violent felony convictions. Based on this determination, the district court imposed a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years.In 2016, Harris moved to correct his sentence (28 U.S.C. 2255) following the Supreme Court’s Johnson decision, claiming the statutes underlying his prior convictions criminalize reckless conduct. In 2021, the Supreme Court (Borden) held crimes that could be committed with a mens rea of recklessness do not qualify as violent felonies under ACCA’s element of force clause. Borden eliminated some of Harris’ prior convictions as predicate offenses.Before the Borden decision, the Third Circuit (Mayo) held a Pennsylvania conviction for first-degree aggravated assault does not require physical force as understood within the context of ACCA. Based on Mayo, the Third Circuit vacated Harris’ sentence; his aggravated assault conviction is stricken as a predicate, and he no longer has the three violent felony convictions necessary to justify the enhancement. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law