Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After completing a minimum sentence, Pennsylvania inmates are eligible to serve the rest of their sentence on parole. The decision to grant parole is discretionary. Most parolees first rely on halfway houses. Public houses have only 700 spaces, and private contract facilities have 2,100 spaces statewide but each year, about 9,000 Pennsylvania inmates are released on parole. The State Police must notify each resident, school district, day-care center, and college about nearby registered violent sex offenders, making it difficult to place sex offenders into community halfway houses because of community backlash. Sex offenders also tend to linger in halfway houses longer than other parolees because of the difficulties in finding alternate housing. The Department of Corrections considers 13 factors before placing a parolee in a halfway house, including community sensitivity to a criminal offense or specific criminal incident.In a class action challenge, the district court held that paroled sex offenders are similarly situated to other paroled offenders and that there could be no rational basis to delay their placement into halfway houses because of “community sensitivity.” The Third Circuit reversed. A discretionary grant of parole cannot erase the differences between sex crimes and other crimes. DOC’s halfway house policy considering “community sensitivity,” among many other factors, is rationally related to legitimate government interests. View "Stradford v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Langley was arrested in connection with a Newark drug trafficking operation. Langley agreed to plead guilty to conspiring to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute 28 grams or more of crack-cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, which carries a mandatory five-year minimum sentence, agreeing that he would not argue for a sentence below five years’ imprisonment and that he would enter into an appellate waiver, applicable to any challenges to a sentence of five years or below. During his plea hearing, the district court engaged in a thorough colloquy and ensured that Langley had discussed his plea agreement with his counsel and that he understood the appellate waiver. The court considered his arguments concerning the pandemic, the effect of the crack/powder cocaine disparity on the Guidelines calculation, and the age of his criminal convictions. The court determined that the applicable guideline range was 110-137 months and sentenced Langley to 60 months’ imprisonment.In lieu of filing an appellate brief, Langley’s counsel moved to withdraw, asserting in his Anders brief that he identified “no issue of even arguable merit.” Langley submitted a pro se brief, arguing for a further sentencing reduction. The Third Circuit dismissed. Langley’s court-appointed counsel filed an Anders brief that, on its face, met the standard for a “conscientious investigation" of possible grounds for appeal. Counsel is not required to anticipate or address all possible arguments. There are no non-frivolous issues for Langley to raise on appeal. View "United States v. Langley" on Justia Law

Gussie was charged with fraud. Virgin Islands prosecutors later learned one of the grand jurors might have been a victim of Gussie’s scheme. The government obtained a superseding indictment from a new grand jury about a year later. A jury convicted Gussie, who was sentenced to 45 months in prison.The Third Circuit affirmed. The superseding indictment cured any potential defect, making any error harmless. Gussie suffered no prejudice facing charges under the validly returned superseding indictment. The court rejected Gussie’s arguments that allowing an alleged victim to sit on the grand jury considering an indictment against her was “so prejudicial” that it caused the grand jury “no longer to be a grand jury,” requiring dismissal with prejudice and that the superseding indictment exceeded the statute of limitations because the original indictment was not validly pending when the superseding indictment returned. While Gussie claimed the government knew the juror was a possible victim and permitted the juror’s participation, the district court found no supporting facts for that assertion. View "United States v. Gussie" on Justia Law

In August 2009, Kennedy and his father were arrested by Philadelphia police during an armed home invasion. In October 2013, after numerous delays, they went on trial. Both were convicted. Kennedy was sentenced to 10-15 years of imprisonment. After failing to obtain redress under the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief Act, Kennedy’s appeal was rejected by the Pennsylvania Superior Court. In July 2019, Kennedy filed a pro se federal habeas petition, arguing that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. The district court denied Kennedy’s petition on grounds of procedural default and adopted the state-court finding that only 16 days of the 50-month delay in bringing Kennedy to trial were attributable to the Commonwealth. The court additionally held his petition to be “without merit."The Third Circuit reversed, concluding that Kennedy’s procedural default was excused and that his Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Right was violated. The Commonwealth had, in the interim, conceded that Kennedy’s Sixth Amendment claim was exhausted. The court noted that a 50-month delay is exceptional and that the Commonwealth did not overcome the presumptive prejudice of a four-year delay, despite the strength of its case at trial. Kennedy has also identified prejudice stemming from loss of employment, anxiety, and incarceration. View "Kennedy v. Superintendent Dallas SCI" on Justia Law

Baghdad, a Moroccan citizen, has lived in the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident for two decades. In 2018, he and two accomplices ran out of a Pennsylvania store with three drills (worth about $1000) and sold them at a pawn shop. He pleaded guilty to retail theft and faced nearly two years’ incarceration. The government argued that his conviction was for an aggravated felony, making him removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The term “aggravated felony” includes theft convictions that result in prison sentences of at least one year. An immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals agreed that the retail theft conviction constituted an aggravated felonyThe Third Circuit denied Baghdad’s petition for review, applying the categorical approach. Baghdad was convicted of a crime that shares all three elements with generic theft and his sentence was for more than one year. While Pennsylvania juries may infer that a defendant who concealed merchandise intended to steal it, that inference is permissive, not mandatory. It depends on facts from which the jury could infer intent to steal beyond a reasonable doubt and it does not shift the burden of proof. Baghdad’s conviction makes him removable. View "Baghdad v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The Haistens sold discounted animal pesticides and drugs online from their South Carolina home. They operated in violation of multiple FDA and EPA regulations. They sold counterfeit DVDs of movies and television shows that they obtained from China. The Haistens ignored cease-and-desist letters from state regulators and animal pesticides companies. Department of Homeland Security agents began making undercover purchases from the Haistens. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) seized shipments of counterfeit DVDs. Agents then searched the Haistens’ home, which revealed unapproved animal pesticides and drugs, counterfeit DVDs, and business records. In the ensuing prosecution, Count 14 charged the Haistens with trafficking counterfeit DVDs that were seized by CBP officers in Cincinnati. Count 15 charged them with trafficking counterfeit DVDs, that were seized at their home. Defense counsel did not request a jury instruction on improper venue or move for acquittal on Counts 14 or 15 for lack of proper venue in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The Haistens appealed, challenging an evidentiary ruling and a statement the government made during its summation. The Third Circuit affirmed.The Haistens then sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that their trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge venue on Counts 14 and 15. The Third Circuit remanded the denial of that motion for the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on whether their counsel had a strategic reason for not raising a defense based on improper venue. View "United States v. Haisten" on Justia Law

Guaranteed was a “reverse distributor,” paid by healthcare providers to return unused or expired pharmaceutical drugs to the drug manufacturers, for refunds for the healthcare-provider clients. Refunds were wired directly to Guaranteed’s general operating account; the company then issued refund checks to the relevant clients, less a service fee. In 2001, the Department of Defense contracted with Guaranteed. The government began investigating Guaranteed after the District of Columbia noticed that it did not receive the full refund on a return of some of its pharmaceuticals. The investigation uncovered a series of schemes that Guaranteed used to defraud its clients.Guaranteed, its CEO, and its CFO, were convicted of multiple counts of wire fraud, mail fraud, conspiracy to launder money, and theft of government property. In addition to prison sentences, the court imposed more than $100 million in restitution and forfeitures. The Third Circuit reversed the money laundering convictions and remanded for resentencing. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, there is not sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged complex financial transactions—after the initial receipt of “commingled” fraudulent and lawfully obtained funds—were designed for "concealment money laundering." The court otherwise affirmed, rejecting challenges to a search warrant, the sufficiency of the evidence, the jury instructions, and the court’s refusal to permit proposed expert testimony. View "United States v. Fallon" on Justia Law

De Castro, a citizen of the Dominican Republic came to the U.S. around 2002-2003. In 2012, he married a U.S. citizen. In 2014, his spouse’s Petition for Alien Relative was approved. The State Department notified De Castro that his immigrant visa petition was eligible for further processing. Months later, he was arrested as an alien in possession of a weapon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5)(A). De Castro eventually pleaded guilty and was allowed to depart voluntarily in 2017. Thirteen months after the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Rehaif” decision, De Castro sought a writ of error coram nobis challenging his conviction. In Rehaif, the Supreme Court held that section 922(g)'s “knowingly” provision applies to both the possession and immigration status elements. De Castro argued that the government never proved he knew he was illegally or unlawfully in the United States; the court never informed him at his plea colloquy that the government was required to prove that element.The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of the petition, finding that De Castro did not have a sound reason for his delay in seeking relief; his knowledge-of-immigration-status argument was not futile in 2017 when he entered his plea agreement; and De Castro cannot establish actual innocence under the Rehaif standard because he cannot demonstrate it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would conclude that he knew of his status as an illegal alien at the time he possessed a firearm. View "United States v. De Castro" on Justia Law

In New Jersey for a family party, Saint-Jean was driving home to Massachusetts with his uncle. Palisades Interstate Park Police stopped the vehicle for driving too slowly and for having tinted windows. In response to questions, Saint-Jean stated that he was originally from Haiti but was a U.S. citizen. Officers ordered the men out of the car, frisked them, and requested to search the vehicle. Saint-Jean signed a consent-to-search form. In a compartment between the front seats, they found small plastic bags containing heart-shaped objects that looked like Valentine’s Day candies. The officers suspected that the items were actually MDMA or ecstasy. Saint-Jean stated that they were Valentine’s Day candies from his coworker and offered her contact information. The officers declined, arrested Saint-Jean, and took him to a police station. The objects were not tested. The officers issued a traffic summons and a criminal summons for possessing a controlled substance, later downgraded to a disorderly persons offense. Many weeks later, the objects were determined to be candy. The prosecution continued for four more months.In Saint-Jean’s subsequent civil rights suit, the district court rejected the officers’ request for qualified immunity for Fourth Amendment claims but dismissed one constitutional claim against the officers and all of the claims against the prosecutor and the governmental entities. Before the officers appealed, Saint-Jean amended his complaint. The Third Circuit dismissed the appeal. Due to the prior amendment, the district court’s order was not final and there was no basis for appellate jurisdiction. View "Saint-Jean v. Palisades Interstate Park Commission" on Justia Law

In 2005, Bentley robbed a liquor store at gunpoint and was caught after a car chase. He confessed and was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), Hobbs Act robbery, and using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, section 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm charge carried a sentence of not more than 10 years but under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) a person convicted of that crime who has three or more prior convictions “for a violent felony or a serious drug offense,” is subject to a mandatory sentence of “not less than fifteen years,” section 924(e)(1). Bentley pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence and admitted he was subject to ACCA’s sentencing enhancement. The agreement listed prior convictions: first-degree reckless endangering (Delaware, 1991) and robbery and use of a firearm (Virginia 1988 and 1989). Bentley was sentenced to 22 years’ imprisonment.After the Supreme Court’s 2015 “Johnson” holding that ACCA’s “residual clause,” was unconstitutionally vague, Bently sought resentencing, arguing that the prior convictions mentioned in his plea no longer counted as strikes under ACCA. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The undisputed PSR documented six North Carolina convictions for breaking and entering as ACCA predicates. Any Johnson error would be harmless. View "United States v. Bentley" on Justia Law