Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Nucera was charged with committing a hate crime, depriving another of his civil rights, and making false statements to the FBI, arising from actions he took as a police officer arresting Stroye. His jury engaged in heated deliberations with racial tensions playing a major role. Credibility determinations were crucial, and jurors were deeply divided over whom and what to believe.The Third Circuit rejected Nucera’s claims of jury misconduct. Nucera offers only post-verdict affidavits from jurors who say they experienced racial vitriol, intimidation, and other misconduct that occurred during the jury deliberations. When parties challenge a verdict, Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) bars a court from considering a juror’s statement or affidavit unless it satisfies either an exception in the Rule or a constitutional exception created by the Supreme Court (Peña-Rodriguez, 2017), for evidence of racial bias. The latter exception is narrow and specific: it requires a clear statement that a juror voted for a conviction based on racial animus toward, or stereotypes about, the defendant. None of Nucera’s evidence satisfies the Rule 606(b) exceptions nor does it fit the Peña-Rodriguez exception. The court also affirmed a ruling that limited Nucera’s use of the victim’s out-of-court statement and the court’s jury instructions about unanimity. The court vacated Nucera’s sentence; the district court erred in applying the Sentencing Guidelines. View "United States v. Nucera" on Justia Law

Corsica, Pennsylvania, with 357 residents and two businesses, is governed by a seven-person Council that meets once a month. In 2009, the Council hired Laird as secretary/treasurer—the Borough’s only paid staff position— at $12.50 per hour. Laird was the point person for Borough audits; only Laird and the Council President were authorized to sign Borough checks. Though two signatures were required, the President “common[ly]” provided Laird with signed blank checks. Between 2009-2017, Laird wrote unauthorized checks from the Borough’s bank account to herself and her husband. She paid her personal expenses by electronically transferring Borough funds and used the Borough’s credit card to purchase personal items. Laird embezzled $345,600.79. The Borough had to double property taxes to recoup some of its losses.Laird pleaded guilty to 26 counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, without a plea agreement. The PSR recommended a two-level increase under U.S.S.G 3B1.3 for Laird’s abuse of a position of trust and a 12-level increase under section 2B1.1(b)(1)(G) for loss between $250,000-$550,000. After decreasing three levels for Laird’s acceptance of responsibility, the PSR calculated a Guidelines sentencing range of 27-33 months’ imprisonment. The district court concluded that Laird’s legitimate salary did not reduce the total loss below $250,000 and applied the abuse-of-trust enhancement. The Third Circuit affirmed Laird’s 21-month sentence and a $266,050.79 restitution order. View "United States v. Laird" on Justia Law

Diaz was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine and was sentenced to 33 months’ incarceration followed by 36 months’ supervised release. During that period of supervised release, Scranton Police Officers responded to a report of a physical, domestic incident involving Diaz’s then-girlfriend, Fernandez. Other violations of supervised release included possessing and using marijuana. During a probable cause and detention hearing, Magistrate Saporito heard testimony from Fernandez that she was not scared of Diaz. Saporito imposed a no-contact condition. Fernandez's testimony in the detention hearing was proven false. Diaz had called Fernandez and persuaded her to recant her statements to the police. Saporito ordered Diaz to be detained until his final revocation hearing.At the final supervised release violation hearing, Judge Mannion sentenced Diaz to the statutory maximum of 24 months’ incarceration followed by another two years’ supervised release. Mannion reimposed the no-contact order to apply during Diaz’s incarceration and his new term of supervised release. The Third Circuit vacated in part. The district court lacked either statutory or inherent authority to impose the custodial no-contact order. The court upheld the condition of Diaz’s second period of supervised release as narrowly tailored and sufficiently connected to the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. View "United States v. Santos Diaz" on Justia Law

The Department of Transportation (DOT) provides funds for state transportation projects. States that receive federal transportation funds must set participation goals for disadvantaged business enterprises (DBEs)--for-profit small businesses “at least 51 percent owned by one or more individuals who are both socially and economically disadvantaged” and “[w]hose management and daily business operations are controlled by one or more of the socially and economically disadvantaged individuals who own it.” States certify businesses as DBEs.The defendants were convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349, and wire fraud, section 1343, arising out of DOT-financed contracts for work in Philadelphia that included DBE requirements. The Defendants' bids committed to working on the projects with Markias, a company that had prequalified as a DBE. During the performance of their contracts, the Defendants submitted false documentation regarding Markias’ role; PennDOT awarded the Defendants DBE credits and paid them based on their asserted compliance with the DBE requirements. Markias did not do any work on the projects or supply any of the materials. The Defendants arranged for the actual suppliers to send their invoices to Markias, which then issued its own invoices, adding a 2.25% fee.The Third Circuit affirmed the convictions but vacated the forfeiture order and loss calculation. The court acknowledged the complex nature of this fraud in this and commended the attempt to determine the amount of loss for sentencing purposes, and the amount to be forfeited. View "United States v. Kousisis" on Justia Law

Coleman was convicted for supervising a conspiracy to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), and was sentenced to life imprisonment before the Supreme Court’s 2000 “Apprendi” decision. The court did not specify which provision of section 841(b) grounded his conviction and sentence. After unsuccessfully seeking habeas relief and a sentence reduction under Sentencing Guidelines amendments, Coleman sought a reduced sentence under the 2018 First Step Act, claiming he had been sentenced for a “dual-object conspiracy involving both crack and powder cocaine.” The district court denied Coleman’s motion, finding that he was not convicted of an offense involving crack cocaine.The Third Circuit vacated. The conspiracy trafficked in crack; the court discussed Coleman’s responsibility for crack-related activities at sentencing; and the parties sparred on direct appeal over the amount of crack attributable to Coleman. If, on remand, the court reaffirms what may have been its implicit factual determination, it should acknowledge those crack references and explain why Coleman was not convicted of a crack offense. The Guidelines required the court to determine whether the drugs involved in the conspiracy were powder cocaine, crack, or both, and the amount of each, “regardless of whether the judge believed that [Coleman’s] crack-related conduct was part of the ‘offense of conviction,’” which could explain how Coleman could be found responsible for crack cocaine yet not be convicted of a crack offense. View "United States v. Coleman" on Justia Law

Doyduk came to the U.S. from Turkey on a visa that expired in 2010. Still in the country a year later, he participated in a night of heavy drinking with his then-girlfriend Filipova (also in the country without authorization). Filipova was stabbed in the stomach, suffering a serious injury. Doyduk’s boss, Coskun, called 911. Doyduk was charged with aggravated assault, possessing an instrument of crime, possessing a prohibited offensive weapon, simple assault, and recklessly endangering another person. All the charges were withdrawn after Filipova and Coskun refused to testify. The charging documents were discarded under a Pennsylvania law that requires expungement after 18 months pass without action.In 2011 removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) for having overstayed his visa, Doyduk sought an adjustment of status based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen. At a 2017 hearing, the officer who arrested Doyduk testified about the stabbing. The IJ also considered the Philadelphia police report and heard testimony from Doyduk, his citizen-wife, and others attesting to Doyduk’s character. The IJ denied relief, finding that the evidence strongly suggested that Doyduk committed the crime. The BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. The Immigration and Nationality Act allows IJs to consider facts underlying expunged charges. View "Doyduk v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

In 2005-2013, Nocito, president and CEO of AHS, characterized his personal expenses as deductible AHS business expenses and “shuffled” AHS’s untaxed profits between shell companies he owned that “performed no significant business purpose.” In 2013, Sundo, AHS’s secretary and CFO, provided documents to government investigators under a cooperation agreement, including Exhibit J, later determined by the court to be a privileged document in which Sundo conveyed legal advice to Nocito.After his indictment for tax fraud (18 U.S.C. 371), Nocito moved for pre-trial discovery of all the documents provided by Sundo to support a possible motion to suppress based on government misconduct. The court denied the motion, concluding that Exhibit J did not offer a “colorable basis” for his governmental misconduct claim. A subsequent motion to intervene, brought by the shell companies, attached a Federal Rule 41(g) motion for the return of property, in an attempt to prevent the government from using Exhibit J in future proceedings.The court permitted the companies to intervene but denied their Rule 41(g) motion. It found the Intervenors—even assuming they could establish Exhibit J’s privilege was “a property interest” of which they were deprived—were attempting to use Rule 41(g) improperly to suppress Exhibit J from the evidence against Nocito. The Third Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Rule 41(g) motion was part of an ongoing criminal process; its denial did not constitute a final order. View "United States v. Nocito" on Justia Law

Henderson pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute 40 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing fentanyl, 18 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(iv), without a plea agreement. The district court applied the career offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 and the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), based on findings that Henderson’s 2015 Pennsylvania conviction for possession with intent to deliver heroin qualified as a “controlled substance offense,” and Henderson’s 2005 Pennsylvania conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery qualified as a “crime of violence.” The enhancement increased the applicable Guideline range from 70-87 months’ imprisonment to 188-235 months. Henderson did not challenge the PSR Guideline calculations and was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment, with the court noting Henderson’s “mental health issues.” The Third Circuit stayed Henderson's appeal. In the meantime, the Supreme Court (Borden, 2021) found that crimes that can be committed with recklessness do not qualify as “violent felonies” under ACCA.The Third Circuit vacated Henderson's sentence, noting that its precedents had previously dictated different sentencing outcomes for defendants convicted of conspiracy and other inchoate offenses but that Borden resolved the conflict. Under Pennsylvania law, conspiracy to commit robbery does not constitute a “crime of violence” for purposes of the career offender enhancement. View "United States v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Perez-Colon was convicted of two counts of production of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), one count of distribution, section 2252(a)(2), five counts of attempted distribution, 2252(a)(2), and one count of possession, 2252(a)(4)(B). Eight counts involved “M1,” a female toddler. Perez-Colon was living with M1 and her mother at a motel. He posted a Craigslist advertisement seeking to “share real incest stories fetish stories underage pedo stories” with “real experiences and pictures.” An undercover FBI agent responded. Perez-Colon sent the agent pornographic images and videos of M1. A search of Perez-Colon’s smartphone revealed that he produced these and other similar pictures and videos. Perez-Colon also attempted to distribute an image of a toddler boy's genitals; the boy's mother took the photo and sent it to Perez-Colon to show him the boy’s rash.The Third Circuit affirmed his 55-year sentence. The court rejected Perez-Colon’s objections to his PSR’s treatment of Guideline 3D1.2, which required the court to group closely related counts together when determining Perez-Colon’s number of “units” of counts; to a two-level Guideline 2G2.1(b)(5) enhancement that applies “[i]f the defendant was a parent, relative, or legal guardian of the minor involved in the offense, or if the minor was otherwise in the custody, care, or supervisory control of the defendant”; and to a five-level 4B1.5(b) enhancement for “a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct.” View "United States of America v. Perez-Colon" on Justia Law

When Mack was incarcerated, he worked at the prison commissary, where two supervising prison guards singled him out for harassment because of his Muslim faith. When Mack went to the back of the commissary to pray during shift breaks, the guards followed him and interfered with his prayers by making noises, talking loudly, and kicking boxes. Fearing retaliation if he continued to pray at work, Mack stopped doing so. The guards nevertheless engineered his termination from his commissary job. He sued.The district court granted the guards summary judgment on Mack’s lone surviving claim, under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb, citing qualified immunity. The Third Circuit vacated. While, as a matter of law, qualified immunity can be asserted as a defense under RFRA, the officers have not met their burden of establishing that defense. Framed in the light most favorable to Mack, evidence of the RFRA violation here involved significant, deliberate, repeated, and unjustified interference by prison officials with Mack’s ability to pray as required by his faith. If different facts come out at trial, the officers may again raise qualified immunity. View "Mack v. Yost" on Justia Law