Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1990, Brow was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, possession with intent to distribute marijuana, and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana and cocaine. The PSR determined that Brow was responsible for 492 grams of crack cocaine and 67 grams of marijuana and was subject to a maximum term of life imprisonment and a minimum term of 10 years’ imprisonment. Brow had two prior Virgin Islands convictions for third-degree assault and one for third-degree robbery. The PSR found that those convictions constituted crimes of violence. Brow, classified as a career offender, was sentenced to 30 years. In an unrelated 1994 decision, in the Northern District of Georgia, Brow was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and was sentenced to 10 years, “consecutively" to sentences previously imposed.Brow moved for an unspecified reduction of his term of incarceration under the First Step Act. The district court denied the motion, concluding that, for sentencing purposes, Brow remained a career offender with his Guidelines determination unchanged, and that applying the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, no sentence reduction was appropriate. The court specifically rejected Brow’s arguments about his age and likelihood of recidivism and that his crime did not involve violence or firearms.The Third Circuit affirmed, noting Brow’s “intriguing” effort. Although the incarceration portion of his drug conviction sentence is complete, he sought First Step Act relief that would lower the incarceration period of his unrelated, consecutive sentence. View "United States v. Brow" on Justia Law

In 2005, Brasby was convicted in state court of aggravated assault, a second-degree felony, for recklessly causing serious bodily injury to another person by shooting the person four times in the back. The New Jersey statute provided: A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he . . . [a]ttempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely or knowingly or under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly causes such injury.” In 2019, police arrested Brasby after they observed him selling drugs. A search incident to the arrest found suspected controlled substances and a loaded stolen handgun.Brasby, indicted for illegal possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), entered into a plea agreement. The parties did not agree on whether Brasby’s 2005 conviction was for a crime of violence. The Third Circuit had previously held that a conviction for reckless conduct is insufficient to qualify as a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines’ elements clause.The Third Circuit to affirmed his 57-month sentence based on a 57-71 month Guidelines range. Without the "crime of violence" enhancement, the range would have been 30-37 months. Brasby’s aggravated assault conviction qualified as a felony conviction for a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a) because the federal generic definition of aggravated assault—and therefore the Guidelines’ definition—includes the same mens rea of heightened recklessness as the New Jersey statute. View "United States v. Brasby" on Justia Law

Before the 2016 Democratic National Convention, the Secret Service announced that access to certain areas would be restricted. Graber, a paramedic, joined political protests outside the Restricted Area. Protestors breached the gated perimeter. The Philadelphia Police Department apprehended those within the Restricted Area. Graber was one of seven individuals taken into custody; the police did not prepare any arrest paperwork for Graber. Special Agent Boresky was charged with serving as an affiant for a criminal complaint against the arrestees. Another agent e-mailed Boresky a synopsis of the events and photographs. Boresky appeared before a Magistrate and signed an affidavit identifying Graber as having been arrested inside the Restricted Area, based upon his “personal knowledge,” “information developed during the course of this investigation,” and information 'imparted by other officers. Boresky was not present at the arrest, did not view any video evidence, and did not write the affidavit. Graber was detained overnight. Graber’s counsel provided news video clips confirming that Graber never passed through the fence. The charges against Graber were dismissed.Citing “Bivens,” in which the Supreme Court held that a cause of action existed against federal agents who violated the Fourth Amendment, Graber sued Boresky for false arrest, unlawful detention, and false charges. Denying a motion to dismiss, the district court held that a Bivens claim could be brought against Boresky. The court later dismissed Boresky’s qualified immunity summary judgment motion. The Third Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction; the Bivens ruling is not a final decision and is not appealable under the collateral order doctrine. View "Graber v. Boresky" on Justia Law

In 2012, Lewis was convicted of possession with intent to distribute marijuana under N.J. Stat. 2C:35-5. In 2020, Lewis pleaded guilty in federal court to unlawful possession of a firearm 18 U.S.C. 922(g). Section 922(g) carries an increased base offense level for a defendant convicted of a prior “controlled substance offense,” U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), under federal or state law. Lewis argued that only a conviction related to a substance listed in the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. 801, qualified as a “controlled substance offense.” The CSA at the time of Lewis’s federal sentencing defined marijuana more narrowly than did New Jersey law at the time of his state conviction. In 2018, Congress amended the CSA’s definition of “marihuana” to exclude hemp. In 2019, New Jersey followed suit. The government argued that substances regulated by state law are controlled substances under the Guidelines, even if they are not regulated by federal law. The district court agreed with Lewis.The Third Circuit vacated. The meaning of “controlled substance” in U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(b)’s definition of “controlled substance offense” includes drugs regulated by state law at the time of the predicate state conviction, even if they are not federally regulated or are no longer regulated by the state at the time of the federal sentencing. Marijuana, including hemp, was regulated by New Jersey at the time of Lewis’s predicate state conviction; the district court erred in declining to apply the 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) enhancement. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Philadelphia officers Kling and Nestel stopped Gallman for running a stop sign and recovered a firearm from Gallman’s passenger. Officer Rosinski moved Gallman to the patrol car. Kling discovered a firearm near Gallman's driver’s seat. Gallman, previously convicted of first-degree robbery, was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon, and unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence. During the hearing, the government informed the court that there was an open Internal Affairs Division (IAD) investigation about Rosinski’s failure to call a supervisor to a traffic stop. The government also supplied an IAD memorandum regarding a racial profiling complaint against Rosinski and Stout, who was also present at the Gallman stop. That matter was closed before Gallman’s arrest; the allegation was unfounded.Following COVID-19 protocol, Gallman's trial was conducted in one courtroom and video-streamed to another where the public and Gallman’s family were seated. Outside the presence of the jury, the court asked Gallman whether he wanted to stipulate his prior conviction and discussed the pending Rosinski IAD investigation.The Third Circuit affirmed Gallman’s conviction. Closing the video stream during the sessions away from the jury did not constitute reversible error; it was not “clear under current law” that the Sixth Amendment public-trial right applied to those proceedings. The closures here were brief and resulted from pandemic protocol challenges rather than any substantive decision. Some of the topics discussed were also discussed in open court. Nor did the court abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Gallman’s prior conviction. View "United States v. Gallman" on Justia Law

Heinrich undressed two preschool girls, manipulated them into positions, and took pictures of their genitals. When the girls reported the incident, police found the photos and video of the girls as well as the other child pornography on Heinrich’s electronic devices, although Heinrich had tried to delete the images of the girls. He admitted that he had taken the pictures. Charged with 15 counts of producing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), and one count of possessing child pornography, section 2252(a)(4)(B). Heinrich argued that he lacked the mental state required by 2251(a) because he was trying to show beauty and innocence, not “sexually explicit conduct.” Heinrich tried to present an expert psychological report that concluded, his “painful history as a ‘damaged’ child led him to capture on film what he inappropriately saw as images of beauty, purity, and innocence.”The Third Circuit affirmed his convictions. The report is inadmissible because, under the statute, his reason for taking the pictures is irrelevant; punishes those who orchestrate objectively sexually explicit conduct involving a minor in order to take pictures of that conduct. Heinrich did that. Defining the crime that way is constitutional: trying to expose children’s genitals is in itself usually blameworthy. View "United States v. Heinrich" on Justia Law

Kwasnik was an estate-planning attorney who convinced clients to open irrevocable family trusts in order to avoid federal and state taxes and to ensure that they earned interest on the funds. Kwasnik named himself as a trustee, with authority to move assets into and out of the trust accounts. He received the account statements. In reality, Kwasnik moved the funds from his clients’ trust accounts to accounts of entities that he controlled. Within days, the funds were depleted. Clients were defrauded of approximately $13 million.Kwasnik pleaded guilty to money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), then moved to withdraw his plea. The district court denied the motion and sentenced him. Kwasnik then filed a notice of appeal. He later filed three more post-appeal motions in the district court concerning his guilty plea. The court denied them. The Third Circuit affirmed with respect to the denial of the first motion. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Kwasnik did not have “newly discovered” evidence. The court declined to consider the others. A party must file a new or amended notice of appeal when he seeks appellate review of orders entered by a district court after he filed his original appeal, Fed.R.App.P. 4(b). View "United States v. Kwasnik" on Justia Law

Convicted of wire fraud, for his scheme to defraud Gains Capital, Banks was sentenced to 104 months’ imprisonment. Banks made fraudulent deposits of $324,000 and unsuccessfully executed 70 withdrawals/transfers totaling $264,000. Gain Capital, however, did not transfer any to Banks and suffered no loss.The Third Circuit remanded for resentencing. The district court erred in applying the loss enhancement to the U.S.S.G. fraud guideline. The loss enhancement in the Guideline’s application notes impermissibly expands the word “loss” to include both intended loss and actual loss. The court affirmed the conviction, rejecting an argument that the court erred in denying Cross his constitutionally protected right to self-representation. The court predicated its finding that Banks could not understand the risks of self-representation on Banks’s voluminous filings and the court’s own observations of Banks over several years, including his “unrelenting and persistent focus on CIA-managed ‘voice-to-skull’ technology, a construct as to which he admits he has no factual basis to conclude was ever applied to him.” The court properly concluded Banks could not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. The court upheld special device-purchase and financial-transactions conditions of supervised release and a requirement that Banks participate in DNA collection. View "United States v. Banks" on Justia Law

Investigating drug trafficking based on the report of a confidential informant, the police entered the homes of both Alexander and his girlfriend, without search warrants. Officers entered Alexander’s home and secured the premises, then waited to conduct a search until a warrant was issued. At Alexander’s girlfriend’s home, they secured the premises and were applying for a warrant, which was all but certain to issue, when they received what they understood as consent to a search. Alexander was charged with possession with intent to distribute 28 grams or more of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B); possession with intent to distribute cocaine; possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i); and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2).The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of Alexander’s motion to suppress, citing the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. There was probable cause to believe Alexander had cocaine and drug-dealing paraphernalia in both houses. Officers had reason to believe that Alexander had been tipped off so that evidence of drug dealing would be imminently destroyed. Exigent circumstances justified the officers entering without a warrant; the search of Alexander’s residence was valid because a warrant was properly issued. View "United States v. Alexander" on Justia Law

In 2012, the DEA, the FBI, and the Chester Police Department initiated a joint investigation of a drug trafficking conspiracy (DTG) that employed confidential informants, controlled purchases of narcotics, surveillance, pole cameras, pen registers, and court-authorized wiretaps. To facilitate their drug trafficking, members of the DTG illegally carried guns and stashed both drugs and guns in alleyways and in a playground.Some members pled guilty; the four Appellants, among others, were convicted on drug conspiracy and related charges. The Third Circuit affirmed their convictions and sentences. Any improper expert testimony in violation of Rule of Evidence 704(b) was harmless error in light of the evidence that supports the Appellants’ membership in the conspiracy. The court rejected claims that the district court erred in its instructions and interrogatories to the jury concerning the quantity of drugs for which they were held responsible and erred in admitting evidence of firearms and acts of violence in the vicinity of the DTG’s territory during the period of the conspiracy. The court properly calculated the sentences, considering career offender status, acceptance of responsibility, firearms enhancements, and drug quantities attributable to the Appellants. View "United States v. Womack" on Justia Law