Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Department of Transportation (DOT) provides funds for state transportation projects. States that receive federal transportation funds must set participation goals for disadvantaged business enterprises (DBEs)--for-profit small businesses “at least 51 percent owned by one or more individuals who are both socially and economically disadvantaged” and “[w]hose management and daily business operations are controlled by one or more of the socially and economically disadvantaged individuals who own it.” States certify businesses as DBEs.The defendants were convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349, and wire fraud, section 1343, arising out of DOT-financed contracts for work in Philadelphia that included DBE requirements. The Defendants' bids committed to working on the projects with Markias, a company that had prequalified as a DBE. During the performance of their contracts, the Defendants submitted false documentation regarding Markias’ role; PennDOT awarded the Defendants DBE credits and paid them based on their asserted compliance with the DBE requirements. Markias did not do any work on the projects or supply any of the materials. The Defendants arranged for the actual suppliers to send their invoices to Markias, which then issued its own invoices, adding a 2.25% fee.The Third Circuit affirmed the convictions but vacated the forfeiture order and loss calculation. The court acknowledged the complex nature of this fraud in this and commended the attempt to determine the amount of loss for sentencing purposes, and the amount to be forfeited. View "United States v. Kousisis" on Justia Law

Coleman was convicted for supervising a conspiracy to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), and was sentenced to life imprisonment before the Supreme Court’s 2000 “Apprendi” decision. The court did not specify which provision of section 841(b) grounded his conviction and sentence. After unsuccessfully seeking habeas relief and a sentence reduction under Sentencing Guidelines amendments, Coleman sought a reduced sentence under the 2018 First Step Act, claiming he had been sentenced for a “dual-object conspiracy involving both crack and powder cocaine.” The district court denied Coleman’s motion, finding that he was not convicted of an offense involving crack cocaine.The Third Circuit vacated. The conspiracy trafficked in crack; the court discussed Coleman’s responsibility for crack-related activities at sentencing; and the parties sparred on direct appeal over the amount of crack attributable to Coleman. If, on remand, the court reaffirms what may have been its implicit factual determination, it should acknowledge those crack references and explain why Coleman was not convicted of a crack offense. The Guidelines required the court to determine whether the drugs involved in the conspiracy were powder cocaine, crack, or both, and the amount of each, “regardless of whether the judge believed that [Coleman’s] crack-related conduct was part of the ‘offense of conviction,’” which could explain how Coleman could be found responsible for crack cocaine yet not be convicted of a crack offense. View "United States v. Coleman" on Justia Law

Doyduk came to the U.S. from Turkey on a visa that expired in 2010. Still in the country a year later, he participated in a night of heavy drinking with his then-girlfriend Filipova (also in the country without authorization). Filipova was stabbed in the stomach, suffering a serious injury. Doyduk’s boss, Coskun, called 911. Doyduk was charged with aggravated assault, possessing an instrument of crime, possessing a prohibited offensive weapon, simple assault, and recklessly endangering another person. All the charges were withdrawn after Filipova and Coskun refused to testify. The charging documents were discarded under a Pennsylvania law that requires expungement after 18 months pass without action.In 2011 removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) for having overstayed his visa, Doyduk sought an adjustment of status based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen. At a 2017 hearing, the officer who arrested Doyduk testified about the stabbing. The IJ also considered the Philadelphia police report and heard testimony from Doyduk, his citizen-wife, and others attesting to Doyduk’s character. The IJ denied relief, finding that the evidence strongly suggested that Doyduk committed the crime. The BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. The Immigration and Nationality Act allows IJs to consider facts underlying expunged charges. View "Doyduk v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

In 2005-2013, Nocito, president and CEO of AHS, characterized his personal expenses as deductible AHS business expenses and “shuffled” AHS’s untaxed profits between shell companies he owned that “performed no significant business purpose.” In 2013, Sundo, AHS’s secretary and CFO, provided documents to government investigators under a cooperation agreement, including Exhibit J, later determined by the court to be a privileged document in which Sundo conveyed legal advice to Nocito.After his indictment for tax fraud (18 U.S.C. 371), Nocito moved for pre-trial discovery of all the documents provided by Sundo to support a possible motion to suppress based on government misconduct. The court denied the motion, concluding that Exhibit J did not offer a “colorable basis” for his governmental misconduct claim. A subsequent motion to intervene, brought by the shell companies, attached a Federal Rule 41(g) motion for the return of property, in an attempt to prevent the government from using Exhibit J in future proceedings.The court permitted the companies to intervene but denied their Rule 41(g) motion. It found the Intervenors—even assuming they could establish Exhibit J’s privilege was “a property interest” of which they were deprived—were attempting to use Rule 41(g) improperly to suppress Exhibit J from the evidence against Nocito. The Third Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Rule 41(g) motion was part of an ongoing criminal process; its denial did not constitute a final order. View "United States v. Nocito" on Justia Law

Henderson pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute 40 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing fentanyl, 18 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(iv), without a plea agreement. The district court applied the career offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 and the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), based on findings that Henderson’s 2015 Pennsylvania conviction for possession with intent to deliver heroin qualified as a “controlled substance offense,” and Henderson’s 2005 Pennsylvania conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery qualified as a “crime of violence.” The enhancement increased the applicable Guideline range from 70-87 months’ imprisonment to 188-235 months. Henderson did not challenge the PSR Guideline calculations and was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment, with the court noting Henderson’s “mental health issues.” The Third Circuit stayed Henderson's appeal. In the meantime, the Supreme Court (Borden, 2021) found that crimes that can be committed with recklessness do not qualify as “violent felonies” under ACCA.The Third Circuit vacated Henderson's sentence, noting that its precedents had previously dictated different sentencing outcomes for defendants convicted of conspiracy and other inchoate offenses but that Borden resolved the conflict. Under Pennsylvania law, conspiracy to commit robbery does not constitute a “crime of violence” for purposes of the career offender enhancement. View "United States v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Perez-Colon was convicted of two counts of production of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), one count of distribution, section 2252(a)(2), five counts of attempted distribution, 2252(a)(2), and one count of possession, 2252(a)(4)(B). Eight counts involved “M1,” a female toddler. Perez-Colon was living with M1 and her mother at a motel. He posted a Craigslist advertisement seeking to “share real incest stories fetish stories underage pedo stories” with “real experiences and pictures.” An undercover FBI agent responded. Perez-Colon sent the agent pornographic images and videos of M1. A search of Perez-Colon’s smartphone revealed that he produced these and other similar pictures and videos. Perez-Colon also attempted to distribute an image of a toddler boy's genitals; the boy's mother took the photo and sent it to Perez-Colon to show him the boy’s rash.The Third Circuit affirmed his 55-year sentence. The court rejected Perez-Colon’s objections to his PSR’s treatment of Guideline 3D1.2, which required the court to group closely related counts together when determining Perez-Colon’s number of “units” of counts; to a two-level Guideline 2G2.1(b)(5) enhancement that applies “[i]f the defendant was a parent, relative, or legal guardian of the minor involved in the offense, or if the minor was otherwise in the custody, care, or supervisory control of the defendant”; and to a five-level 4B1.5(b) enhancement for “a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct.” View "United States of America v. Perez-Colon" on Justia Law

When Mack was incarcerated, he worked at the prison commissary, where two supervising prison guards singled him out for harassment because of his Muslim faith. When Mack went to the back of the commissary to pray during shift breaks, the guards followed him and interfered with his prayers by making noises, talking loudly, and kicking boxes. Fearing retaliation if he continued to pray at work, Mack stopped doing so. The guards nevertheless engineered his termination from his commissary job. He sued.The district court granted the guards summary judgment on Mack’s lone surviving claim, under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb, citing qualified immunity. The Third Circuit vacated. While, as a matter of law, qualified immunity can be asserted as a defense under RFRA, the officers have not met their burden of establishing that defense. Framed in the light most favorable to Mack, evidence of the RFRA violation here involved significant, deliberate, repeated, and unjustified interference by prison officials with Mack’s ability to pray as required by his faith. If different facts come out at trial, the officers may again raise qualified immunity. View "Mack v. Yost" on Justia Law

Freeman was convicted, along with Miller and Collier, of second-degree murder. The jury had heard the confession of Miller, a non-testifying codefendant, with redactions that replaced the names of Collier and Freeman, with the substitutes “the first guy” and “the second guy.” The court gave a limiting instruction that the statement was to be considered only as to Miller, not as to the other defendants, in order to protect Freeman’s Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness against him. Freeman’s objection was overruled and rejected on appeal in state court.The district court concluded that a “Bruton” violation occurred and that the violation was not harmless, and granted Freeman habeas relief. The Third Circuit reversed. A Bruton violation occurred. When a statement is redacted— whether by substituting the codefendant’s name with a neutral pronoun, a blank space, or a symbol—in such a manner that “[a] juror … need only lift his eyes to [the codefendant], sitting at counsel table” to understand who is being implicated, the introduction of that statement is a Sixth Amendment violation. However, there was ample other evidence against Freeman, and the violative statement was largely duplicative of other evidence; there is no “grave doubt about whether [the error] had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” The error was harmless. View "Freeman v. Superintendent Fayette SCI" on Justia Law

Rivera, a Newark police officer from 1993-2018, collected $78,941 in bribes from three brothel owners in exchange for protecting the owners from arrest, using law enforcement resources to assist them, and making things difficult for competing brothels. Rivera did not report the income from the bribes, for which he should have paid $17,408 in federal taxes. He was indicted on 14 counts. Rivera pleaded guilty to accepting corrupt payments with the intent to be influenced and rewarded, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B)–(2), and aiding and assisting in the preparation of false tax returns, 26 U.S.C. 7206(2). The government agreed to dismiss the remaining counts if Rivera pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 46 months. The plea agreement included an appellate waiver that Rivera attested he read and fully understood.Nine months after the court “conditionally” accepted his plea, Rivera moved to withdraw his plea, claiming the court had deferred acceptance of it until the sentencing, which had not occurred. He argued Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d) permitted him to withdraw his plea “for any reason or no reason.” The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of Rivera’s motion. The district court stated that while it had deferred acceptance of the plea agreement, it had accepted the plea itself, which could not be withdrawn absent “a fair and just reason.” The Third Circuit enforce the waiver of Rivera’s right to appeal. View "United States v. Rivera" on Justia Law

In 2013, three armed men in ski masks entered a Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Cracker Barrel restaurant, robbed the victims at gunpoint, and stashed $8,000 in a bag. A victim hiding in the bathroom called 911. The robbers fled but were arrested nearby. Police discovered a loaded handgun approximately 10 feet from where Stoney was found. The cash and two other guns were also recovered.Stoney admitted his involvement and identified his co-defendants. Stoney was charged with Hobbs Act robbery and the Use of a Firearm During a Crime of Violence, 18 U.S.C. 2; 1951; 924(c)(1)(A). The firearm charge referenced the Hobbs Act robbery as the predicate offense, based on two theories of liability: Pinkerton and aiding and abetting. The indictment did not specify a completed Hobbs Act robbery but Stoney pled guilty, admitting to a completed gunpoint robbery.The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of Stoney’s successive motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255, rejecting arguments that his conviction should be treated as an attempted Hobbs Act robbery, which fails to qualify as a 924(c)(3)(A) predicate crime of violence or that his conviction, based on Pinkerton liability and aiding and abetting, does not qualify as a crime of violence. There is no question that Stoney personally committed a completed Hobbs Act robbery View "United States v. Stoney" on Justia Law