Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1995, Range pleaded guilty to making false statements about his income to obtain $2,458 of food stamp assistance. His conviction was classified as a misdemeanor punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment. Range was sentenced to three years’ probation. Three years later, Range attempted to purchase a firearm but was rejected by the instant background check system. Range’s wife subsequently bought him a deer-hunting rifle. Years later Range learned that he was barred from purchasing and possessing firearms because of his welfare fraud conviction. He sold his rifle to a firearms dealer and sought a declaratory judgment that 18 U.S.C. 922(g) violated the Second Amendment as applied to him. The section prohibits firearm ownership by any person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year—the federal definition of a felony.In 2022, the Third Circuit affirmed the rejection of the suit, reasoning that “the people” constitutionally entitled to bear arms are “law-abiding, responsible citizens,” and that even if Range fell within “the people,” the government demonstrated that its prohibition is consistent with historical tradition.On rehearing, en banc, the Third Circuit reversed. Despite his false statement conviction, Range remains among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment. The government did not carry its burden of showing that the Nation’s history and tradition of firearm regulation support disarming Range. View "Range v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Garcia-Vasquez, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, came to the U.S. illegally. In 1999, he was convicted of conspiring to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. After serving his prison sentence, he was removed. Garcia-Vasquez returned to the U.S. illegally. He was subsequently convicted in state court for distributing heroin and other drug offenses. New Jersey released him to immigration authorities. Garcia-Vasquez pleaded guilty to reentering the country illegally after having been convicted of an aggravated felony and removed, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a), (b)(2). Based on his 1999 cocaine-conspiracy conviction the government advocated a 16-level enhancement under Sentencing Guideline 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i). The Guideline’s Application Note 5 extends that enhancement to inchoate crimes like conspiracy. Garcia-Vasquez argued that application notes may not extend the reach of the Guideline’s text and that, under the categorical approach, his federal conspiracy conviction did not count as a generic conspiracy because its elements did not require an overt act.The district court applied the enhancement, sentencing him to 46 months’ imprisonment, the bottom of the enhanced range. The Third Circuit affirmed. Garcia-Vasquez argued that his 1999 conviction was only for conspiring to traffic drugs, not actually trafficking them; only Application Note 5 names inchoate crimes expressly. The court rejected the argument. The plain meaning of “drug trafficking offense” includes drug-trafficking conspiracies so it is not necessary to resort to the application notes. View "United States v. Garcia-Vasquez" on Justia Law

Somerset County officers were patrolling in response to recent gang-related crimes and shootings. Detective Gambino recognized a vehicle he had seen earlier parked in front of a known meeting place for the Bounty Hunter Bloods. Gambino followed the car, saw it turn without signaling, and radioed his supervisor, Sergeant Brown, to pull the car over for a traffic violation. Brown, driving with two other officers, initiated the traffic stop. Gambino arrived and shined his flashlight by the car's left rear door. Dowdell, whom Gambino knew from prior arrests to be a member of the Bloods, was sitting in the back seat. Gambino opened the left rear car door to “have a conversation.” Gambino saw a bulge in Dowdell’s jacket, ordered Dowdell out of the car, patted him down, and discovered a fully loaded semi-automatic firearm.Dowdell, charged as a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), argued that Gambino violated his Fourth Amendment rights by “physically intruding on” the car door. The Third Circuit affirmed an order granting Dowdell’s motion to suppress evidence, rejecting the government’s arguments that the district court abused its discretion in finding that it had waived any argument that existing precedent should be extended to justify opening the car door and, alternatively, in not excusing the waiver. The government’s sole legal theory was that reasonable suspicion justified opening the door. View "United States v. Dowdell" on Justia Law

Simmons pleaded guilty to Transportation with Intent to Engage in Criminal Sexual Activity and was sentenced to 210 months of imprisonment and a lifetime of supervised release. After beginning his supervised release, Simmons choked, punched, and threatened to throw hot grease at his mother. Simmons held both his mother and his girlfriend against their will as he trashed his mother's apartment and threw hot grease. The next day, Simmons’ mother was at the home of a friend. Simmons arrived wearing a mask and fired a gunshot through the front door into an occupied room. A home security camera captured video and audio, including Simmons stating, “Next time I’m going to kill everybody.” Simmons’ mother told his probation officer that Simmons did not live with her, despite him having listed her address as his own with Pennsylvania’s sex offender registry.The U.S. Probation Office alleged four violations of his supervised release: the two violent incidents, failure to update his address with the sex offender registry, and possession of a firearm. The district court found Simmons violated the terms of his release and sentenced him to 21 months’ imprisonment followed by a reimposed life term of supervised release. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting Simmons’s arguments that the court violated 18 U.S.C. 3583(h) by not subtracting the 21 months from his life term of supervised release and that the imposition of a life term of supervised release was substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Simmons" on Justia Law

In 2008, Jenkins pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(e). He was sentenced to the 15-year mandatory minimum under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because he had three prior convictions “for a violent felony or a serious drug offense.” including two prior drug convictions and a conviction for aggravated assault under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 2702(a)(3). Section 2702(a)(3) applies to one who “attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury” to certain persons “in the performance of duty.”In 2015, the Supreme Court, in “Johnson," held that ACCA’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. As a result, Jenkins’s Section 2702(a)(3) conviction for a non-enumerated offense would qualify as a predicate violent felony only if it satisfied the elements clause. Jenkins moved to correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that because Section 2702(a)(3) can be violated without the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force, it is not a “violent felony” under ACCA’s elements clause. The Third Circuit agreed and granted relief. A violation of Section 2702(a)(3) can be committed by a failure to act. The court acknowledged the “bizarre result” required by the categorical approach in analyzing Pennsylvania’s aggravated assault laws. View "United States v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

In 2010, Harris pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(e), which typically carries a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment. Harris’ PSR concluded that Harris qualified for a sentence enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because his criminal record included three predicate offenses: one serious drug conviction and at least two violent felony convictions. Based on this determination, the district court imposed a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years.In 2016, Harris moved to correct his sentence (28 U.S.C. 2255) following the Supreme Court’s Johnson decision, claiming the statutes underlying his prior convictions criminalize reckless conduct. In 2021, the Supreme Court (Borden) held crimes that could be committed with a mens rea of recklessness do not qualify as violent felonies under ACCA’s element of force clause. Borden eliminated some of Harris’ prior convictions as predicate offenses.Before the Borden decision, the Third Circuit (Mayo) held a Pennsylvania conviction for first-degree aggravated assault does not require physical force as understood within the context of ACCA. Based on Mayo, the Third Circuit vacated Harris’ sentence; his aggravated assault conviction is stricken as a predicate, and he no longer has the three violent felony convictions necessary to justify the enhancement. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

Upshur and Thompson operated a trust; people wired fees to Upshur and allowed the defendants to file tax forms representing that the Trust had withheld income tax on their behalf, hopefully yielding sizable refunds. The defendants themselves also participated. Though this scheme was largely unsuccessful, the IRS issued one $1.5 million refund but, realizing, its mistake, froze the payment. In another scheme, they made large fraudulent tax overpayments, hoping to generate refunds. This scheme apparently did not generate any payments from the IRS, but the two schemes, together, resulted in over $325 million in fraudulent tax claims.Upshur was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States and eight counts of aiding and assisting in the preparation of false tax returns, 18 U.S.C. 371, 26 U.S.C. 7206(2). The court recognized there was no actual loss to the U.S. Treasury, and calculated Upshur’s base offense level under U.S.S.G. 2T1.4 using the intended-loss figure of $325 million, for a Guidelines range of 324-348 months. The Third Circuit affirmed his 84-month sentence. The court acknowledged its 2022 “Banks” holding that for theft offenses, absent Guideline text extending “loss” to intended loss, U.S.S.G. 2B1.1’s loss table reached only actual loss. However. the texts of sections 2T1.1 and 2T1.4, applicable to tax fraud, indicated that 2T4.1’s loss table covers the loss the perpetrator intended. View "United States v. Upshur" on Justia Law

Nucera was charged with committing a hate crime, depriving another of his civil rights, and making false statements to the FBI, arising from actions he took as a police officer arresting Stroye. His jury engaged in heated deliberations with racial tensions playing a major role. Credibility determinations were crucial, and jurors were deeply divided over whom and what to believe.The Third Circuit rejected Nucera’s claims of jury misconduct. Nucera offers only post-verdict affidavits from jurors who say they experienced racial vitriol, intimidation, and other misconduct that occurred during the jury deliberations. When parties challenge a verdict, Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) bars a court from considering a juror’s statement or affidavit unless it satisfies either an exception in the Rule or a constitutional exception created by the Supreme Court (Peña-Rodriguez, 2017), for evidence of racial bias. The latter exception is narrow and specific: it requires a clear statement that a juror voted for a conviction based on racial animus toward, or stereotypes about, the defendant. None of Nucera’s evidence satisfies the Rule 606(b) exceptions nor does it fit the Peña-Rodriguez exception. The court also affirmed a ruling that limited Nucera’s use of the victim’s out-of-court statement and the court’s jury instructions about unanimity. The court vacated Nucera’s sentence; the district court erred in applying the Sentencing Guidelines. View "United States v. Nucera" on Justia Law

Corsica, Pennsylvania, with 357 residents and two businesses, is governed by a seven-person Council that meets once a month. In 2009, the Council hired Laird as secretary/treasurer—the Borough’s only paid staff position— at $12.50 per hour. Laird was the point person for Borough audits; only Laird and the Council President were authorized to sign Borough checks. Though two signatures were required, the President “common[ly]” provided Laird with signed blank checks. Between 2009-2017, Laird wrote unauthorized checks from the Borough’s bank account to herself and her husband. She paid her personal expenses by electronically transferring Borough funds and used the Borough’s credit card to purchase personal items. Laird embezzled $345,600.79. The Borough had to double property taxes to recoup some of its losses.Laird pleaded guilty to 26 counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, without a plea agreement. The PSR recommended a two-level increase under U.S.S.G 3B1.3 for Laird’s abuse of a position of trust and a 12-level increase under section 2B1.1(b)(1)(G) for loss between $250,000-$550,000. After decreasing three levels for Laird’s acceptance of responsibility, the PSR calculated a Guidelines sentencing range of 27-33 months’ imprisonment. The district court concluded that Laird’s legitimate salary did not reduce the total loss below $250,000 and applied the abuse-of-trust enhancement. The Third Circuit affirmed Laird’s 21-month sentence and a $266,050.79 restitution order. View "United States v. Laird" on Justia Law

Diaz was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine and was sentenced to 33 months’ incarceration followed by 36 months’ supervised release. During that period of supervised release, Scranton Police Officers responded to a report of a physical, domestic incident involving Diaz’s then-girlfriend, Fernandez. Other violations of supervised release included possessing and using marijuana. During a probable cause and detention hearing, Magistrate Saporito heard testimony from Fernandez that she was not scared of Diaz. Saporito imposed a no-contact condition. Fernandez's testimony in the detention hearing was proven false. Diaz had called Fernandez and persuaded her to recant her statements to the police. Saporito ordered Diaz to be detained until his final revocation hearing.At the final supervised release violation hearing, Judge Mannion sentenced Diaz to the statutory maximum of 24 months’ incarceration followed by another two years’ supervised release. Mannion reimposed the no-contact order to apply during Diaz’s incarceration and his new term of supervised release. The Third Circuit vacated in part. The district court lacked either statutory or inherent authority to impose the custodial no-contact order. The court upheld the condition of Diaz’s second period of supervised release as narrowly tailored and sufficiently connected to the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. View "United States v. Santos Diaz" on Justia Law