Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Evankavitch executed a mortgage against her property and fell behind on her payments. The mortgagee’s rights were assigned to Green Tree. Green Tree and Evankavitch talked about the loan several times. Evankavitch initiated one discussion by calling Green Tree from her daughter’s (Cheryl) cell phone. Green Tree recorded Cheryl’s number and called Evankavitch at both Evankavitch’s and Cheryl’s numbers. Evankavitch instructed Green Tree to stop using her daughter’s number. Green Tree continued to call both numbers, left messages on Cheryl’s voicemail, and began calling Evankavitch’s neighbors. After learning of these communications, Evankavitch brought suit. Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692, a debt collector is liable to a consumer for contacting third parties unless the communication falls under a statutory exception. One exception covers communication “for the purpose of acquiring location information about the consumer.” That exception prohibits more than one such contact “unless the debt collector reasonably believes that the earlier response of such person is erroneous or incomplete and that such person now has correct or complete location information.” The Third Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of Evankavitch, finding that the debt collector has the burden to prove that the challenged communications fit within the exception. View "Evankavitch v. Green Tree Servicing LLC" on Justia Law

In earlier litigation, Teva challenged the validity and enforceability of GSK’s patents on lamotrigine, Lamictal’s active ingredient. Teva was first to file an FDA application, alleging invalidity or nonenforceability, and seeking approval to produce generic lamotrigine tablets and chewable tablets for markets alleged to be annually worth $2 billion and $50 million,. If the patent suit resulted in a determination of invalidity or nonenforceability—or a settlement incorporating such terms—Teva would be statutorily entitled to a 180- day period of market exclusivity, during which time only it and GSK could produce generic lamotrigine tablets. After the judge ruled the patent’s main claim invalid, the companies settled; Teva would end its patent challenge in exchange for early entry into the chewables market and GSK’s commitment not to produce its own, “authorized generic” Lamictal tablets. Plaintiffs, direct purchasers of Lamictal, sued under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1 & 2, claiming that the agreement was a “reverse payment” intended to induce Teva to abandon the patent fight and eliminate the risk of competition in the lamotrigine tablet market for longer than the patent would otherwise permit. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit vacated, citing Supreme Court precedent, holding that unexplained large payments from the holder of a drug patent to an alleged infringer to settle litigation of the patent’s validity or infringement (reverse payment) can violate antitrust laws. View "King Drug Co of Florence Inc, v. Smithkline Beecham Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased Restaurant.com gift certificates, substantially all of which display restaurant-specific conditions and Restaurant.com’s standard conditions, including expiration one year from date of issue, “except in California and where otherwise provided by law,” and that the certificate is “[v]oid to the extent prohibited by law.” Plaintiffs filed a purported class action, alleging violations of the New Jersey Gift Certificate Statute, prohibiting gift certificates from expiring within 24 months of the date of sale; Consumer Fraud Act, creating a cause of action for violations of the Statute; and Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty, and Notice Act, prohibiting notice to a consumer or offering any written consumer contract that violates any clearly established consumer right or seller responsibility; any notice or consumer contract that states that any of its provisions may be void in some jurisdictions must also specify “which provisions are or are not void, unenforceable or inapplicable within the State of New Jersey.” After the Third Circuit certified questions to the Supreme Court of New Jersey, it vacated dismissal of the TCCWNA count. On remand, the district court dismissed, reasoning that retroactive application was inappropriate because the state court decision established a new rule of law and because the plaintiffs did not have “non-theoretical damages.” The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded for entry of judgment solely in favor of the named plaintiffs, noting that their efforts brought about the new rule. View "Bohus v. Restaurant.Com Inc" on Justia Law

Aaron’s stores sell and lease residential and office furniture, consumer electronics, and appliances. Byrd leased a laptop computer from Aspen, an Aaron’s franchisee. Although Byrd asserts that she made full payments, an Aspen agent came to repossess the laptop, claiming that the payments had not been made. The agent allegedly presented a screenshot of a poker website Byrd had visited as well as a picture of Byrd taken by the laptop’s camera. Aspen obtained the picture and screenshot through spyware named “PC Rental Agent” that can collect screenshots, keystrokes, and webcam images from the computer and its users. Between November 16, 2010 and December 20, 2010, the Byrds alleged that this spyware secretly accessed their laptop 347 times on 11 different days. According their putative class action, alleging violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2511, 895 customers had surveillance conducted through PC Rental Agent. Concluding that the proposed classes were not ascertainable, the district court denied class certification. The Third Circuit reversed. The court erred by: misstating the rule governing ascertainability; engrafting an “underinclusive” requirement; finding that an “overly broad” class was not ascertainable; and improperly applying precedent to the issue of whether “household members” could be ascertainable. View "Byrd v. Aaron's Inc" on Justia Law

Kaymark defaulted on a mortgage held by Bank of America (BOA). On behalf of BOA, Udren Law Offices initiated foreclosure proceedings. The body of the Foreclosure Complaint listed not-yet-incurred fees as due and owing, which, Kaymark alleged, violated state and federal fair debt collection laws and breached the mortgage contract. The Third Circuit reversed dismissal of claims that the disputed fees constituted actionable misrepresentation under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692, but affirmed dismissal of all other claims. By attempting to collect fees for legal services not yet performed in the mortgage foreclosure, Udren violated FDCPA section 1692e(2)(A), (5), and (10), which imposes strict liability on debt collectors who “use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt,” and section 1692f(1) by attempting to collect “an[] amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” The court analogized to similar claims in a debt collection demand letter. View "Kaymark v. Bank of America NA" on Justia Law

SEB distributes household products under several brand names, including electric steam irons sold under the Rowenta brand name. Euro-Pro distributes household appliances under the Shark brand name. The Shark packaging states: “MORE POWERFUL STEAM vs. Rowenta®†† at half the price.” The “††”refers to a fine-print footnote on the package’s bottom, stating that the claim is “††[b]ased on independent comparative steam burst testing to Rowenta DW5080 (grams/shot).” The packaging also asserts “#1 MOST POWERFUL STEAM*” with a fine-print reference on the bottom stating it “*[o]ffers more grams per minute (maximum steam setting while bursting before water spots appear) when compared to leading competition in the same price range, at time of printing.” SEB directed its internal laboratory to conduct tests, which showed that the Rowenta performed the same as the Shark. SEB commissioned an independent laboratory to conduct tests, which showed that the Rowenta outperformed the Shark. SEB claimed false advertising under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), and unfair competition under Pennsylvania common law. The Third Circuit affirmed entry of an injunction, agreeing that the packaging’s definition of a claim term applies to the claim’s explicit message and that the court properly disregarded consumer survey evidence offering alternative meanings. View "Groupe SEB USA Inc v. Euro Pro Operating, LLC" on Justia Law

McLaughlin had a mortgage. As a result of an error, the mortgage company believed that he was in default and referred the matter to a law firm, PHS, which sent McLaughlin a letter about the debt that he claims violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692 by referring to attorneys’ fees and costs that McLauglin claims had not yet been incurred. The district court dismissed certain claims because McLaughlin did not ask PHS to validate the debt before he filed suit. The Third Circuit reversed, concluding that he was not required to request validation. The court affirmed imposition of sanctions against PHS for its failure to produce certain documents during discovery. View "McLaughlin v. Phelan Hallinan & Schmieg, LLP" on Justia Law

Quest provides diagnostic and clinical testing. In general, it tests a patient’s specimens upon the request of a referring physician. Once Quest bills a patient’s insurance provider, the provider reviews the claim and sends Quest an Explanation of Benefits (EOB) or an Electronic Remittance Advice (ERA), which informs Quest of the amount, if any, that the patient is responsible for paying. Quest then sends the patient a bill, and, if no response is received, it may turn the bill over to a collection agency. Plaintiffs in a putative class action claimed that Quest billed patients in excess of the amount stated on the EOB or ERA. The district court denied certification as to all four proposed classes and granted summary judgment against an individual plaintiff, as to her state law claims of consumer fraud and unjust enrichment. The Third Circuit affirmed. The court properly found that individual inquiries would be required to determine whether an alleged overbilling constituted unjust enrichment for each class member. View "Grandalski v. Quest Diagnostics Inc." on Justia Law

Douglass received a letter from Convergent regarding a debt that Douglass allegedly owed T-Mobile. Convergent used an envelope with a glassine window, through which were visible: Douglass’s name and address; a sequence of numbers representing Douglass’s account number with Convergent that does not refer or relate to her T-Mobile account; a Postal Service bar code; a QR code, which, when scanned by a smart phone, revealed the same information as displayed through the glassine window; and a monetary amount corresponding to Douglass’s alleged debt. A putative class action on behalf of recipients of similar letters alleged that disclosure of the account number on the envelope and embedded in the QR code, violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692f(8), which prohibits “using any language or symbol” other than a debt collector’s name and address on an envelope. Convergent argued that the account number qualified as “benign language.” The district court granted summary judgment to Convergent, reasoning that a strict interpretation of section1692f(8) would contradict Congress’s true intent: barring markings that would reveal the letter to pertain to debt collection or harass or humiliate a consumer. The Third Circuit vacated, stating that the account number could identify Douglass as a debtor and its disclosure was not benign.View "Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing" on Justia Law

In 1989, Seamans received a Federal Perkins Loan of $1,180.00 from Temple University. The first payment was due in 1992. The loan was declared delinquent the following month. Nonths later, Temple notified Seamans that the account had been placed for collection. In 2010, Seamans enrolled at Drexel University. He sought a Pell Grant, but Drexel refused to provide with financial assistance until Seamans repaid the Temple Loan. In 2011, Seamans repaid that loan in full. Seamans then noticed a “trade line” on his credit report. The trade line may or may not have appeared on his credit report when the account was in default. Seamans formally disputed some of the information by contacting the credit reporting agency. Temple, had its loan servicer investigate, but resubmitted information virtually unchanged. Seamans again contacted Temple and credit agencies, to dispute the trade line. After a second investigation, Temple modified certain elements, but still did not report various details. There was evidence that Temple treated other disputes in a similar manner. Seamans sued, alleging that Temple negligently or willfully violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681–1681x. The district court granted Temple summary judgment, finding that the Higher Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1001–1155, exempted Temple from FCRA compliance because the credit instrument was a Perkins Loan. The Third Circuit vacated, stating that Seamans’s dispute appears to have merit and that failure to report the dispute may constitute a material inaccuracy on his credit report. View "Seamans v. Temple University" on Justia Law