Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioners, citizens of Mexico, entered the U.S. unlawfully in 1993 and 1998, respectively. Since 2000, husband has been seeking employment-based permanent residency. An individual who would not ordinarily qualify for lawful permanent residency because he entered without inspection, may apply as the beneficiary of a labor certification application or a visa petition filed on or before April 30, 2001, 8 U.S.C. 1255(i). According to the court, petitioners' former attorney provided incompetent, and at times ethically questionable, representation throughout the visa petition process, missing filing deadlines and sending associates to hearings without adequate information about the case, so that an IJ granted voluntary departure and the BIA affirmed denial of a motion to reopen. The Third Circuit denied review. The Due Process Clause does not guarantee an alien effective assistance of counsel in preparing, filing, and appealing a labor certification application and a visa petition before the start of removal proceedings. By the time removal proceedings began, petitioners had accrued more than one year of unlawful presence and would have been ordered removed regardless of counsel's actions.View "Contreras v. Attorney Gen. of U.S." on Justia Law

Defendants came to the FBI's attention because of a video taken to a store for copying; it depicted defendants shooting weapons and shouting jihad slogans. At trial, the government presented evidence of a plot to attack military bases: recorded conversations; testimony by confidential informants and agents who coordinated the 16-month investigation; videos of training in the Poconos; propaganda videos advocating violent jihad, including attacks against service members; and video of defendants purchasing automatic weapons. Defendants were convicted of conspiring to murder U.S. military personnel, 18 U.S.C. 1114 and 1117 and of firearm offenses. The Third Circuit affirmed most of the convictions, rejecting evidentiary and other challenges to the conduct of the trial. The court rejected a constitutional challenge to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (50 U.S.C. 1801) as amended by the Patriot Act, under which evidence was procured. The "significant purpose" standard of the Act reflects a balance between legitimate needs of government for intelligence information and protected rights of citizens. The court properly admitted certain out-of-court statements against a defendant under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. The court vacated one conviction of attempted possession of firearms in furtherance of a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)). View "United States v. Duka" on Justia Law

The ordinance prohibits posting signs on utility poles, streetlights, sign posts, and trees in a public right-of-way. At the time their actions were brought, plaintiffs were both candidates for political office in an area of the city that contains "a classic urban landscape of row house neighborhoods, where most homes have no front yard." They claimed that, given their limited funds, they would have ordinarily relied heavily on signs posted on street poles to spread their political messages. Several political candidates received numerous tickets. The district court ruled in favor of the city. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the ordinance violated the First, Fourteenth, and Twenty-Fourth Amendments. Plaintiffs conceded that the ordinance is content-neutral. It is narrowly tailored to serve significant governmental interests and leaves open ample alternatives for communication. View "Johnson v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

In 1984, petitioner was sentenced to death following his convictions in Pennsylvania state court for first-degree murder, robbery, conspiracy to commit murder, and conspiracy to commit robbery. After exhausting state court remedies, he filed a petition for habeas corpus. The district court denied relief on guilt phase claims, but granted the writ as to the death sentence, finding that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate or introduce expert mental health testimony and institutional records in mitigation. Petitioner then filed, and the court denied, an FRCP 59(e) motion to amend the judgment based on alleged newly discovered evidence of prosecutorial misconduct during the guilt phase of trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, first holding that a timely Rule 59(e) motion is not a second or successive petition, whether or not it advances a claim; such a motion lies outside jurisdictional limitations that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2244(b) imposes upon multiple collateral attacks. The district court was within its discretion in finding that the evidence submitted was not newly discovered, since petitioner had possession of it many months before the District Court denied habeas relief. Trial counsel's performance was inadequate and petitioner can show prejudice. View "Blystone v. Horn" on Justia Law

The District, which operates six elementary schools and two very highly-rated high schools set goals for redistricting, including: equalizing enrollment of the high schools and middle schools; operating elementary schools at or under capacity; not increasing the number of buses required; giving 2010 graduates the choice to either follow the redistricting plan or stay at the high school of their previous year; and basing decisions on current and expected future needs, not on past practices. The district court concluded that the plan required strict scrutiny because race was a factor in the formation of the plan, but concluded that the plan is constitutional because it does not use race impermissibly. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that strict scrutiny did not apply, simply because decision-makers discussed race. The plan neither classifies on the basis of race nor has a discriminatory purpose. The plan met the rational basis test.View "Student Doe 1 v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

To revitalize the Conshohocken waterfront, the Redevelopment Authority of Montgomery County filed a declaration of condemnation of plaintiffs' property in 1996, which had the effect of transferring title to the property, which housed a successful steel processing business. A state court invalidated the taking and awarded attorneys' fees and expenses. Because the Authority held title to the property throughout the state court action, plaintiffs filed a claim in federal court, seeking just compensation. The district court rejected the claim, because they had never asked the Authority whether it would give them “just compensation.” The state court determined that plaintiffs had obtained all the relief to which they were entitled. The district court dismissed their case, holding that plaintiffs should have brought their federal claims as part of their second action in state court. The Third Circuit reversed. Because title passed, this was a per se taking and the claim was not time-barred. Rejecting a claim of issue preclusion, the court stated that the parties never actually litigated the federal constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Eminent Domain Code. View "R&J Holding Co. v. Redevelopment Auth.of the Cnty of Montgomery" on Justia Law

Petitioner, was convicted in Pennsylvania state court of first-degree murder, reckless endangerment, and possession of an instrument of crime, for a drive-by shooting. The court rejected his evidence of misidentification and alibi. He exhausted state court remedies. The district court granted a habeas petition. The Third Circuit reversed. The district court erred in granting an evidentiary hearing, which was essentially a new trial. The purpose of the Antitterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254 is to channel prisoners' claims first to the state courts. Defendant did not establish that his attorney's failure to develop his alibi prejudiced his trial; the prosecution had physical evidence and eyewitness testimony. View "Brown v. Wakefield" on Justia Law

Plaintiiff, a deputy serving a bench warrant, entered a garbage-filled residence. She and her partner discovered that they were covered with fleas and were directed to proceed to an Emergency Management Building. They were told to stay inside their cruiser until a superior officer arrived. About 20 minutes later, superior officers arrived and began to film plaintiff for a training video. Despite the heat and biting insects, plaintiff was told to remain in the car. Plaintiff alleges that officers laughed at her and filmed her in a semi-nude state at the hospital, taunted her because of a tattoo, and showed the video to other officers.The district court dismissed her 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. The Third Circuit affirmed in part, with respect to unreasonable search and seizure and failure to train claims, but reversed with respect to a Fourteenth Amendment privacy claim. Plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the decontamination area, particularly with respect to members of the opposite sex. A dispute of material fact exists as to which of her body parts were exposed to members of the opposite sex or filmed while she was in that area. View "Doe v. County of Luzerne" on Justia Law

Delaware's death penalty statute calls for lethal injection but does not mandate use of a particular drug, Del. Code tit. 11 sec. 4209(f). Death row inmates challenged, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a 2011 change in the protocol, brought about by nationwide shortage of sodium thiopental. The district court declined to reopen a challenge to a previous protocol and to stay a pending execution. The Third Circuit affirmed. The purpose of the protocol is to render the inmate unconscious before execution and there was no affirmative evidence that pentobarbital, used under the 2011 protocol, fails to do so. The court was not required to consider the comparative risks of known and available alternatives.The district court acted within its discretion in finding that the use of pentobarbital did not create a demonstrated risk of severe pain.

Defendant boarded a plane in New York City and flew to Hamburg. Six months after his arrival in Germany, he sexually molested a 15-year-old boy. After serving 19 months in a German prison, defendant returned to the United States and was convicted of engaging in noncommercial illicit sexual conduct in a foreign place (18 U.S.C. 2423(c) and (f)(1)) and sentenced to 30 years in prison. The Third Circuit affirmed. The offense began when defendant boarded a plane, but the bulk of the offense was not committed in any district in the United States, so venue was proper in the Delaware district where the arrest occurred. Rejecting a facial challenge to the statute, the court stated that the statute is within the authority of Congress under the Foreign Commerce Clause.