Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After pleading guilty to illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. 1326) the defendants challenged their sentences, claiming that their Fifth Amendment rights were violated as a result of the Department of Justice "fast-track" programs that allow a departure from sentencing guidelines in return for a guilty plea and waiver of right of appeal. Such programs have been implemented in several areas, but not in any district within the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the program is rationally related to, among others, the goals of allocating prosecutorial resources and enforcing the immigration laws. The sentences imposed on the defendants were reasonable.

The plaintiffs were subjected to raids as part of "Operation Return to Sender," implemented to apprehend fugitive aliens. The complaint included "Bivens" claims: unreasonable home entries, unreasonable searches; unreasonable seizures, all in violation of the Fourth Amendment; a Fourth Amendment claim for excessive force by four individuals; a Fifth Amendment substantive due process claim involving three individuals; and a Fifth Amendment equal protection claim by one individual. The district court denied a motion to dismiss. The Third Circuit reversed on qualified immunity grounds. The plaintiffs did not allege that the defendants, high-level federal Immigration enforcement supervisors, participated in the raids, adopted an unconstitutional policy, or had legally sufficient notice of the unconstitutional conduct of subordinates. They did not identify what defendants should have done differently with respect to training or other matters, that would have prevented the unconstitutional conduct. The plaintiffs may pursue official capacity claims for injunctive relief against any further intimidation or unlawful entry. The court did not address individual capacity claims for damages against the lower-ranking agents

A student created a fake profile of his high school principal on a social networking internet web site, using his grandmother's computer. Some students saw the profile from school computers before the school disabled them. The student was suspended for 10 days, required to finish the school year at an alternative school, and banned from extra-curricullar activities and the graduation ceremony. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the student on his First Amendment (42 U.S.C. 1983) claim. The Third Circuit affirmed, but vacated for rehearing en banc, following which it again affirmed. The school district response to the conduct transcended the protection of free expression guaranteed by the First Amendment. Student expression may not be suppressed unless school officials reasonably conclude that it will materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school. The school district could not establish a sufficient nexus between the speech and disruption of the school environment. The student's attempt to use a picture from the district website did not establish such a connection, nor did the use of school computers, by other students, to access the site.

The Bureau of Prisons denied the inmate's request to choose his own cellmate. The district court and Third Circuit affirmed, finding the claim without merit.

A student reported to her aunt, a member of the school board (plaintiff), that she had seen a teacher hugging another student. The investigation ended because the teacher and minor student denied the incident and the plaintiff raised concerns about the reporting student's credibility. More than a year later, a police officer saw the teacher and the minor student in a sexual encounter and the teacher was arrested. A copy of the report on an investigation that followed, containing plaintiff's assertions about her niece's credibility, was leaked to the press during a school board election. The district court dismissed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that there is no Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy with respect to the information at issue. Plaintiff may not have intended wide-dissemination of her opinion but she volunteered it to others and it did not concern autonomy and independence in personal decision-making.

Arrested in 1986 for sex crimes against children and terrorist threats and incarcerated since then, the defendant was granted a new trial by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1992. He was sentenced to 10 to 20 years imprisonment by Northampton County, with credit for time served, and 10 to 20 years by Lehigh County, to be served concurrently. The Lehigh court stated that he would be given "credit ⦠as required by law for all time spent in custody." The Lehigh commitment form effectively granted credit by designating the date of the sentence as 1986. The designation violated state law because credit had already been applied in Northampton County. Recognizing that the defendant was not entitled to double credit, in 2005 the Department of Corrections changed the release date from 2006 to 2011. State courts rejected the defendant's challenges. The federal district court granted a petition for habeas corpus. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded. Rejecting due process claims, the court stated that the state made record-keeping mistake and then corrected it, which is not "conscience-shocking." The defendant's expectation of being released on a particular date did not amount to a constitutionally-protected liberty interest.

The petitioner, convicted in 1982 of murdering a police officer and sentenced to death, exhausted state appeals. The U.S. Supreme Court denied a habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction and subsequently remanded the Third Circuit's grant of relief on the sentence. On remand, the Third Circuit held that the death sentence must be vacated because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court incorrectly applied Supreme Court precedent (Mills v. Maryland). The verdict form and jury instructions, particularly a statement that â[w]e, the jury, have found unanimously . . . one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances,â created a substantial probability the jury believed it was precluded from finding a mitigating circumstance that had not been unanimously agreed upon. The court noted that the form has been amended since the petitioner's conviction.

The defendant accepted a guilty plea on charges of intent to distribute cocaine; the government agreed not to file an information to increase the penalty based on prior conviction (18 U.S.C. 851). The Third Circuit affirmed the sentence of 248 months. Although the Miranda warning, as recited to the defendant, did not explicitly refer to the defendant's right to stop the interrogation and obtain counsel at that time, it adequately conveyed the substance of the defendant's rights. The government did not breach the plea agreement. The defendant argued for application of the sentencing guidelines for powder cocaine offenses, but was properly sentenced within the range for crack cocaine and as a career offender.

The governor terminated two public employees. The district court ordered reinstatement. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded. After examining the law of the U.S. Virgin Islands, the court determined that the employees were "career service," not exempt employees, but were not "regular" employees and, therefore, did not have a protected property interest in their jobs.

A police officer was suspended for his handling of another officer's complaint against superior officers in violation of policies governing use of the computer system. A union grievance resulted in an award of back pay and benefits to the date of the award. The Office of the Inspector General issued a report several months after the incident and scheduled a hearing, which resulted in termination. After filing another union grievance, the officer was reinstated without back pay. The district court rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed, first holding that the defendants were protected by qualified immunity. Under Pennsylvania law, the officer had a protected property interest in his job and, absent extraordinary circumstances, was entitled to a pre-suspension hearing, but that right was not clearly established. Prior case law could have been interpreted as indicating that the post-suspension union grievance hearing was adequate. The notice of the termination hearing was adequate, despite not identifying the specific rules allegedly violated.