Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The ordinance prohibits posting signs on utility poles, streetlights, sign posts, and trees in a public right-of-way. At the time their actions were brought, plaintiffs were both candidates for political office in an area of the city that contains "a classic urban landscape of row house neighborhoods, where most homes have no front yard." They claimed that, given their limited funds, they would have ordinarily relied heavily on signs posted on street poles to spread their political messages. Several political candidates received numerous tickets. The district court ruled in favor of the city. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the ordinance violated the First, Fourteenth, and Twenty-Fourth Amendments. Plaintiffs conceded that the ordinance is content-neutral. It is narrowly tailored to serve significant governmental interests and leaves open ample alternatives for communication. View "Johnson v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

In 1984, petitioner was sentenced to death following his convictions in Pennsylvania state court for first-degree murder, robbery, conspiracy to commit murder, and conspiracy to commit robbery. After exhausting state court remedies, he filed a petition for habeas corpus. The district court denied relief on guilt phase claims, but granted the writ as to the death sentence, finding that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate or introduce expert mental health testimony and institutional records in mitigation. Petitioner then filed, and the court denied, an FRCP 59(e) motion to amend the judgment based on alleged newly discovered evidence of prosecutorial misconduct during the guilt phase of trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, first holding that a timely Rule 59(e) motion is not a second or successive petition, whether or not it advances a claim; such a motion lies outside jurisdictional limitations that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2244(b) imposes upon multiple collateral attacks. The district court was within its discretion in finding that the evidence submitted was not newly discovered, since petitioner had possession of it many months before the District Court denied habeas relief. Trial counsel's performance was inadequate and petitioner can show prejudice. View "Blystone v. Horn" on Justia Law

The District, which operates six elementary schools and two very highly-rated high schools set goals for redistricting, including: equalizing enrollment of the high schools and middle schools; operating elementary schools at or under capacity; not increasing the number of buses required; giving 2010 graduates the choice to either follow the redistricting plan or stay at the high school of their previous year; and basing decisions on current and expected future needs, not on past practices. The district court concluded that the plan required strict scrutiny because race was a factor in the formation of the plan, but concluded that the plan is constitutional because it does not use race impermissibly. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that strict scrutiny did not apply, simply because decision-makers discussed race. The plan neither classifies on the basis of race nor has a discriminatory purpose. The plan met the rational basis test.View "Student Doe 1 v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

To revitalize the Conshohocken waterfront, the Redevelopment Authority of Montgomery County filed a declaration of condemnation of plaintiffs' property in 1996, which had the effect of transferring title to the property, which housed a successful steel processing business. A state court invalidated the taking and awarded attorneys' fees and expenses. Because the Authority held title to the property throughout the state court action, plaintiffs filed a claim in federal court, seeking just compensation. The district court rejected the claim, because they had never asked the Authority whether it would give them “just compensation.” The state court determined that plaintiffs had obtained all the relief to which they were entitled. The district court dismissed their case, holding that plaintiffs should have brought their federal claims as part of their second action in state court. The Third Circuit reversed. Because title passed, this was a per se taking and the claim was not time-barred. Rejecting a claim of issue preclusion, the court stated that the parties never actually litigated the federal constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Eminent Domain Code. View "R&J Holding Co. v. Redevelopment Auth.of the Cnty of Montgomery" on Justia Law

Petitioner, was convicted in Pennsylvania state court of first-degree murder, reckless endangerment, and possession of an instrument of crime, for a drive-by shooting. The court rejected his evidence of misidentification and alibi. He exhausted state court remedies. The district court granted a habeas petition. The Third Circuit reversed. The district court erred in granting an evidentiary hearing, which was essentially a new trial. The purpose of the Antitterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254 is to channel prisoners' claims first to the state courts. Defendant did not establish that his attorney's failure to develop his alibi prejudiced his trial; the prosecution had physical evidence and eyewitness testimony. View "Brown v. Wakefield" on Justia Law

Plaintiiff, a deputy serving a bench warrant, entered a garbage-filled residence. She and her partner discovered that they were covered with fleas and were directed to proceed to an Emergency Management Building. They were told to stay inside their cruiser until a superior officer arrived. About 20 minutes later, superior officers arrived and began to film plaintiff for a training video. Despite the heat and biting insects, plaintiff was told to remain in the car. Plaintiff alleges that officers laughed at her and filmed her in a semi-nude state at the hospital, taunted her because of a tattoo, and showed the video to other officers.The district court dismissed her 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. The Third Circuit affirmed in part, with respect to unreasonable search and seizure and failure to train claims, but reversed with respect to a Fourteenth Amendment privacy claim. Plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the decontamination area, particularly with respect to members of the opposite sex. A dispute of material fact exists as to which of her body parts were exposed to members of the opposite sex or filmed while she was in that area. View "Doe v. County of Luzerne" on Justia Law

Delaware's death penalty statute calls for lethal injection but does not mandate use of a particular drug, Del. Code tit. 11 sec. 4209(f). Death row inmates challenged, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a 2011 change in the protocol, brought about by nationwide shortage of sodium thiopental. The district court declined to reopen a challenge to a previous protocol and to stay a pending execution. The Third Circuit affirmed. The purpose of the protocol is to render the inmate unconscious before execution and there was no affirmative evidence that pentobarbital, used under the 2011 protocol, fails to do so. The court was not required to consider the comparative risks of known and available alternatives.The district court acted within its discretion in finding that the use of pentobarbital did not create a demonstrated risk of severe pain.

Defendant boarded a plane in New York City and flew to Hamburg. Six months after his arrival in Germany, he sexually molested a 15-year-old boy. After serving 19 months in a German prison, defendant returned to the United States and was convicted of engaging in noncommercial illicit sexual conduct in a foreign place (18 U.S.C. 2423(c) and (f)(1)) and sentenced to 30 years in prison. The Third Circuit affirmed. The offense began when defendant boarded a plane, but the bulk of the offense was not committed in any district in the United States, so venue was proper in the Delaware district where the arrest occurred. Rejecting a facial challenge to the statute, the court stated that the statute is within the authority of Congress under the Foreign Commerce Clause.

Petitioner was detained for 1,072 days pursuant to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. 1226(c), which requires that any person who is removable from this country because he has committed a crime involving moral turpitude or a crime involving a controlled substance be taken into custody and does not provide for release on bond. Petitioner, a citizen of Senegal, apparently had a state conviction for possessing a controlled substance. The district court concluded that the detention was lawful. The Third Circuit construed the pro se petition as seeking habeas corpus and reversed. The statute authorizes only detention for a reasonable period of time, after which the Due Process Clause requires that the government establish that continued detention is necessary to further the purposes of the detention statute. Detention of petitioner for nearly three years without further inquiry into whether it was necessary to ensure his appearance at the removal proceedings or to prevent a risk of danger to the community, was unreasonable.

After being told, by children, that defendant, a teacher, had touched them inappropriately and kept a notebook of information about students, an officer applied for a warrant to search defendant's home for child pornography. The affidavit established only probable cause to believe that she would find evidence of sexual assaulted on children; it did not allege any direct evidence that defendant possessed child pornography or any connection between the two crimes. The search turned up incriminating documents relating to the alleged assaults, but no child pornography. The district court suppressed the documents. The First Circuit affirmed. A probable cause affidavit must set forth all the facts upon which the affiant seeks to rely; the affidavit in this case omitted the linchpin allegation on which any reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause must have depended. The government cannot draw an inference from facts not stated in the affidavit or rely on the affiant's personal knowledge.