Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Philadelphia police officers entered a private residence without a warrant because they believed the house to be abandoned. Upon searching the house, they found Harrison sitting in a recliner with a gun, scales, pills, and cocaine base on the table next to him. The police took Harrison into custody, seized the gun, and obtained a warrant to seize the rest of the items. Harrison was charged with possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base and moved to suppress the physical evidence. The district court denied the motion; although Harrison, a tenant, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the house, the police officers were operating under the mistaken but reasonable belief that the house was abandoned. The Third Circuit affirmed. A house can be abandoned for Fourth Amendment purposes; the officers did not make a mistake of law. Their mistake of fact was reasonable, based on their observations over several months that the house appeared unfit for human habitation. There was trash strewn about, the lawn was overgrown with weeds, and windows on both levels were either boarded up or exposed. The front door was left open, and the lock may have been broken. View "United States v. Harrison" on Justia Law

Mitchell was convicted on charges related to his possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Mitchell’s motion to strike Juror 97, a police department employee, because the law does not categorically impute bias to coworkers of key witnesses in a trial. Under the circumstances, Mitchell’s right to trial by an impartial jury was protected adequately by inquiry for actual bias, and that inquiry yielded no evidence of actual bias. The court remanded for additional fact-finding with respect to Juror 28, a “close cousin” of the prosecutor. The law presumes bias in jurors who are close relatives of the parties in a case and the court did not elicit sufficient information on the nature of the relationship between the prosecutor and Juror 28. View "United States v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Based on DNA evidence found on furniture, McBride was charged with the murder of his wife 16 years after her disappearance. He was convicted and exhausted Pennsylvania state court appeals. The district court denied his habeas corpus petition. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting McBride’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object to certain references to his silence, in violation of his constitutional right to remain silent. There was at least a reasonable argument that trial counsel’s actions were within the “wide range of professionally competent assistance.” View "McBride v. Superintendant Houtzdale" on Justia Law

Booker participated in a bank robbery with co-conspirators. After being arrested on unrelated charges, he provided incriminating statements to the police. Booker moved to suppress these statements as violations of his Miranda rights. The district court denied his motion. Before trial, Booker requested that he be allowed to proceed pro se. The court conducted a hearing and warned him of the consequences of self-representation. While articulating the potential sentences facing him, the district court erred and misstated one of the relevant mandatory minimums (stating it was five years and not 25 years). Booker was convicted of all charges. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded for a new trial. In light of the court’s error, Booker’s waiver of counsel was not voluntary and knowing. View "United States v. Booker" on Justia Law

The Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith was founded by Johnson in 1919. In 1947, Johnson established a non-profit corporation to hold and manage the assets of the Church. Following a 1992 schism, two factions claimed authority over the Church and ownership of church assets. In 2000 Pennsylvania courts concluded that Kenneth Shelton was the rightful General Overseer of the Church. Askew was a member of the faction loyal to Roddy Shelton. He does not accept Bishop Kenneth Shelton as the General Overseer of the Church. On multiple occasions since the schism, Bishop Shelton declared all followers of Roddy Shelton nonmembers of the Church. Asserting claims on behalf of himself as a church member and derivatively on behalf of the Church, Askew sued, alleging that Bishop Shelton and officers of the affiliated Board of Trustees misappropriated church assets and breached their fiduciary duties to the Church. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that as a nonmember, Askew lacked standing and that First Amendment non-entanglement principles shields membership decisions from civil court review. View "Askew v. Trs., Gen. Assembly Church" on Justia Law

Seven states sought to recover proceeds of matured but unredeemed U.S. savings bonds from the Treasury, asserting that Treasury has possession of approximately $16 billion worth of matured but unredeemed savings bonds, of which persons whose last known addresses were within the plaintiff states own $1.6 billion. The states contended that their respective unclaimed property acts obliged Treasury to account for and deliver the proceeds of these bonds to the states for reunification with their owners. The district court dismissed, reasoning that sovereign immunity and intergovernmental immunity barred the action and that federal law and regulations preempted the states’ statutory authority to obtain the proceeds of the savings bonds. The Third Circuit affirmed. Although the federal government has waived sovereign immunity (5 U.S.C. 702), states may not directly regulate the federal government’s operations or property and federal law is sufficiently pervasive so as not to leave room for the enforcement of the unclaimed property acts to achieve the result that the states seek. View "Treasurer, State of NJ v. U.S. Dept of Treasury" on Justia Law

Figueroa admits that he sold heroin to an undercover officer, who returned later and purchased cocaine and heroin. During the second purchase, the officer saw what appeared to be a gun tucked into Figueroa’s waistband. It was dark and he only saw a few inches of the object. Officers then stopped the car driven, and owned, by Figueroa’s girlfriend. Figueroa was in the front passenger seat. Officers removed both from the car, opened the glove compartment, and recovered a handgun. Both occupants denied knowledge of the firearm. No forensic evidence connected either to the firearm. The jury convicted on the drug counts, but was split on the charge of carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1). After releasing the jury, the judge changed courses, asked that the jury be held, and had them deliberate a charge of possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(e). The jury convicted and Figueroa was sentenced to 180 months, the statutory minimum for possession by a felon. The Third Circuit affirmed. Reconvening after declaring a mistrial on Count III did not violate Double Jeopardy or subject the jury to outside influences. View "United States v. Figueroa" on Justia Law

In 1993 Vasquez was sentenced to 262 months for heroin offenses. In 1996, he was sentenced to 14 months, to run consecutively, for possession of a prohibited object. His projected release date is October, 2012. The Second Chance Act, which applies, increases a federal prisoner’s eligibility for pre-release placement in a halfway house from 6 to 12 months, and requires the Bureau of Prisons to make individual determinations that ensure that placement is of sufficient duration to provide the greatest likelihood of success and to provide incentives for participation in skills development programs. Vasquez’s team recommended a 151-180 day placement in a Residential Re-entry Center. Vasquez had not regularly participated in educational programs during his incarceration. He filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing that the BOP failed to comply with the reentry initiative and improperly added a factor to trick inmates into thinking that they have been considered for incentives that were never properly implemented. The district court rejected the petition. Vasquez was not merely challenging construction of the Second Chance Act or implementation of the reentry initiative; exhaustion of administrative remedies was required. There was no abuse of discretion in how the factors were balanced with goals of the Act. View "Vasquez v. Strada" on Justia Law

Cardona was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute over 100 kilograms of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) & 846; conspiring to possess with intent to distribute less than 100 grams of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) & 846; possession with intent to distribute over 100 kilograms of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B); and possession with intent to distribute over 100 grams of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(C). He was sentenced to 480 months and eventually was referred to the special management unit, which limits contact with other prisoners and access to personal property. An inmate is allowed to reintegrate, by demonstrating potential for positive interaction. Between his sentencing and SMU referral, Cardona filed multiple lawsuits challenging his conviction and conditions of confinement. He believes that SMU referral was punishment for the litigation, although the notice referred to narcotics-related infractions. He filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 224. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the SMU did not affect the fact or duration of incarceration. The Third Circuit affirmed, agreeing that Cardona must file a civil rights action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents to seek redress. View "Cardona v. Bledsoe" on Justia Law

Rolan was convicted in 1984 of murder and possession of an instrument of crime for a 1983 shooting death involving a drug sale. He obtained habeas corpus relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel. After a retrial, the jury convicted Rolan of murder again. After exhausting appeals, he again sought habeas corpus. The district court denied the petition. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of prosecutorial misconduct that was based on closing argument statements about the reliability of an alibi witness. The court properly allowed reading of a transcript of testimony by a witness, who died before retrial. View "Rolan v. Coleman" on Justia Law