Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2000, cab driver DeJesus suffered multiple fatal gunshot wounds during a robbery while his taxi was parked at a Harrisburg intersection. After a joint trial with Eiland and Mitchell Court, a Pennsylvania jury convicted Eley of second-degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery. Eley was unsuccessful in direct appeal and seeking post-conviction relief in state courts. The district court denied his petition for habeas relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that his non-testifying co-defendants’ confessions were admitted against him in violation of the Confrontation Clause under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). The court rejected an argument that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions in violation of the Due Process Clause. View "Eley v. Erickson" on Justia Law

In 2000 Ross was convicted of first degree murder in Franklin County, Pennsylvania, and sentenced to life imprisonment. Ross was unable to obtain a state appellate court review due to extraordinary circumstances attributable to his attorney’s extreme neglect of his case, including missing deadlines for filing document, failure to communicate with Ross, and the attorney’s misleading statements when he did communicate with Ross. The court denied his motion for appointment of a new attorney. Ross’s mental health issues, limited education, and limited cognitive ability magnified his problems and his status as an inmate placed structural obstacles in his path. Ross subsequently brought this habeas corpus case, charging that because his attorney wrongfully abandoned him, he lost his appellate rights in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Although the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d), statute of limitations barred the action as untimely, the district court found that equitable tolling of the running of the statute was warranted because Ross had been diligent in pursuing his state court appellate remedies but that extraordinary circumstances beyond his control frustrated this attempt. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Ross v. Varano" on Justia Law

Former Superior Court Judge Kendall enforced an oral plea agreement that the prosecution had attempted to withdraw; Kendall believed that the defendants could not obtain a fair trial, due to prosecutorial misconduct. The Virgin Islands Supreme Court reversed and issued a writ of mandamus. Kendall published an opinion chastising the mandamus decision and recusing himself from the case due to alleged prosecutorial misconduct. The Justices cited Kendall for criminal contempt and found him guilty because his opinion, in their view, obstructed the administration of justice and because his recusal was a pretextual effort to avoid complying with the writ of mandamus. The Third Circuit reversed the judgment and vacated the contempt conviction, finding that the First Amendment protects a sitting judge from being criminally punished for his opinion unless that opinion presents a clear and present danger of prejudicing ongoing proceedings. Kendall’s opinion did not pose such a threat. There was insufficient evidence that his recusal was pretextual. View "In Re: Kendall" on Justia Law

K.A., a fifth-grade student, attempted to distribute, before the start of class, an invitation to a children’s Christmas party at her church. Students were normally allowed to distribute invitations to birthday parties, Halloween parties, and similar events during non-instructional time. The teacher told K.A. that the principal would have to approve the flyer. The principal later notified K.A.’s father that the superintendent had not approved the flyer, based on a policy concerning events not related to the school. Her father filed suit, alleging that the school district had violated K.A.’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court, applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Tinker v. Des Moines (1969), and finding no evidence that distribution of the invitations would threaten a “substantial disruption‖ of the school environment or interfere with the rights of others,” granted preliminary injunctive relief. The Third Circuit affirmed, stating that the original policy and subsequent revisions were broader than allowed under Tinker and its progeny, which state that student expression can be regulated only if it causes disruption or interferes with the rights of others, or if it falls into a narrow exception. View "K. A. v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Byrd, an inmate at SCI-Frackville, filed a pro se 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint against the prison’s Superintendent, Corrections Health Care Administrator, two nurses, and the Chief Grievance Officer, alleging that they showed deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs by failing to provide him with prescription eye drops for his glaucoma. Byrd proceeded in forma pauperis (IFP). The district court ruled in favor of all defendants. Byrd moved to proceed IFP on appeal. The clerk’s office notified Byrd that he had “three strikes” under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g) and had to show that he was in imminent danger of serious physical injury in order to be eligible for IFP status. The Third Circuit denied his petition, noting that Byrd’s three potential strikes included two cases that were “clearly” dismissed for failure to state a claim and that the other was an appeal that was dismissed by the Third Circuit under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B) as “without merit.” Byrd did not file a motion alleging imminent danger, but submitted a response arguing that the clerk’s office made a mistake in determining that he had three strikes. The court held that non-IFP dismissals can count as “strikes.” View "Byrd v. Shannon" on Justia Law

Montone was an officer with the Jersey City Police Department from 1981 until 2010, when she retired as a sergeant. Plaintiffs are present or former sergeants in the JCPD. The plaintiffs claim that retaliation for exercise of First Amendment rights and discrimination, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and New Jersey state law, was the basis of their failure to be promoted from the rank of sergeant to lieutenant during Healy’s tenure as mayor and Troy’s tenure as police chief. Healy’s mayoral campaign was heated and personal. Plaintiffs claim that all promotions from sergeant to lieutenant were halted by Healy and Troy to penalize Montone for her support of Healy’s opponent. Each plaintiff had passed the civil service examination required to be promoted to the rank of lieutenant. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that genuine issues of material fact remained concerning defendants’ motivations for their decisions. View "Montone v. City of Jersey City" on Justia Law

Judge Kendall contends that the Daily News and Blackburn defamed him while reporting on his decision to grant bail to Castillo, who subsequently murdered a child; his decision to use house arrest for Williams, who was subsequently involved in a police standoff; and his decision to retire. After a jury verdict awarded $240,000, the trial court awarded the defendants judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Virgin Island Supreme court affirmed after denying Kendall’s motion for recusal based on its previous contempt proceedings against him. The Third Circuit affirmed without reaching the issue of recusal. Judge Kendall could not establish actual malice as necessary in a public-figure libel action. View "Kendall v. Daily News Publ'g Co." on Justia Law

Gilliam was fatally shot outside a Pittsburgh bar in 1997. Grant was convicted on the testimony of one witness, who based his identification on clothing. The witness was apparently granted leniency with respect to a parole violation in exchange for testimony; the criminal history of the witness was not disclosed to or discovered by the defense. Others, who had been present and who stated that Grant was not the shooter, were not called as witnesses. There was no physical evidence tying Grant to the crime. The state court denied Grant’s petition for an evidentiary hearing on trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, holding for the first time that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should generally be raised in the first instance in post-conviction proceedings. Grant then filed an unsuccessful pro se petition under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9541. The federal district court denied his habeas petition. The Third Circuit remanded, directing the court to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus on the ineffective assistance claim.View "Grant v. Lockett" on Justia Law

Denny, an inmate at the Fairton, New Jersey, Federal Correctional Institution, was punished with 60 days of disciplinary segregation and forfeiture of 40 days of good time credit after a “shank” was found in a vent between the cell he shared with another inmate and another cell. The Disciplinary Hearing Officer found that Denny possessed weapons in violation of a prison regulation. Denny sought a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2241 arguing that prison officials violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court sua sponte dismissed the petition. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting the affirmative responsibility, of which the inmates were on notice, that they were to keep their “area” free from contraband. The mere discovery of contraband in a shared cell constitutes “some evidence” that each prisoner in that cell possessed the contraband. View "Denny v. Schultz" on Justia Law

Interstate requested approval for nine outdoor advertising signs along U.S. Interstate-295, a major transportation corridor. The township then adopted an ordinance prohibiting billboards. The district court dismissed a constitutional challenge. The Third Circuit affirmed. A reasonable fact-finder could not conclude that there was an insufficient basis for the township’s conclusion that its billboard ban would directly advance its stated goal of improving the aesthetics of the community. The fact that Interstate will not be able to reach the distinct audience of travelers that it desires to target does not mean that adequate alternative means of communication do not exist. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that complete billboard bans may be the only reasonable means by which a legislature can advance its interests in traffic safety and aesthetics. View "Interstate Outdoor Advertising, L.P. v. Zoning Bd., Twp of Mount Laurel" on Justia Law