Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Individuals who wish to carry a handgun in public for self-defense must obtain a license under New Jersey’s Handgun Permit Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4. Police evaluate applications based on criminal history, age and mental health requirements, familiarity with safe handling and use of handguns, and “a justifiable need to carry a handgun.” The meaning of “justifiable need” is: [T]he urgent necessity for self-protection, as evidenced by specific threats or previous attacks which demonstrate a special danger to the applicant’s life that cannot be avoided by means other than by issuance of a permit to carry a handgun. If the officer determines that the applicant has met all the requirements, the application is approved and sent to a judge, who “shall issue the permit to the applicant if, but only if, it is satisfied that the applicant is a person of good character and meets the statutory criteria. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of arguments that the Second Amendment secures a right to carry arms in public for self-defense; that the “justifiable need” standard was an unconstitutional prior restraint; and that the standard fails any level of means-end scrutiny. View "Muller v. Maenza" on Justia Law

In 1999, Shotts was charged with a string of burglaries. Following his arrest, Shotts offered to assist in an investigation into corruption at the county prison and the District Attorney helped secure Shotts’ release on bail. Once released, Shotts engaged in another crime spree and was charged with burglary, theft, criminal mischief, criminal conspiracy, receiving stolen property, passing bad checks, criminal trespass, aggravated assault, simple assault, reckless endangerment of another person, driving under the influence of alcohol, and with three probation violations. Because Shotts had made confessions, his attorney pursued a plea deal, but did not request discovery of police records. The Commonwealth offered a plea deal with a sentence of 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment. The judge commented that the sentence seemed high, given Shotts’ assistance with the corruption investigation. Shotts rejected the deal and entered a general guilty plea, confirming that his lawyer had explained the maximum sentences. Despite evidence of Shotts’ cooperation and his earlier statement, the judge sentenced Shotts to 30½ to 133 years. Following state collateral review, during which Shotts had five different lawyers, he filed a federal habeas corpus petition, claiming that his first attorney rendered ineffective assistance. The district court dismissed the claim as procedurally defaulted. The Third Circuit affirmed on the merits, but stated that the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s determination that Shotts’ claim was defaulted because he failed to raise it when first represented by new counsel was “an exorbitant application of an otherwise independent and adequate state rule” that cannot bar federal review. View "Shotts v. Wetzel" on Justia Law

The district court permanently enjoined enforcement of two Hazleton ordinances that attempt to prohibit employment of unauthorized aliens and preclude them from renting housing within the city. The Third Circuit affirmed in 2010. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded for reconsideration in light of Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, S. Ct. 1968 (2011). The Court later decided Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct.2492 (2012). Both address the extent to which federal immigration law preempts state laws pertaining to the treatment of unauthorized aliens. On remand, the Third Circuit again concluded that both the employment and housing provisions of the Hazleton ordinances are preempted by federal immigration law. The employment provisions in the ordinance are distinguishable from the Arizona law upheld in Whiting. The lack of minimal procedural protections in Hazleton’s ordinance conflicts with express congressional objective of minimizing undue burdens on, and harassment of, employers. The rental registration scheme serves no discernible purpose other than to register the immigration status of a subset of the city’s population. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Whiting and Arizona does not undermine a conclusion that both the employment and housing provisions are preempted. View "Lozano v. City of Hazleton" on Justia Law

Conestoga and individuals who own 100 percent of the voting shares of Conestoga and who practice the Mennonite religion, alleged that regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services, which require group health plans and health insurance issuers to provide coverage for contraceptives, violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb (RFRA) and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The Mennonite Church teaches that taking of life, including anything that terminates a fertilized embryo, is intrinsic evil and a sin against God to which they are held accountable. Plaintiffs specifically object to two “morning after” drugs that must be provided under the mandate that may cause the demise of an already conceived, unattached embryo. The District Court denied a preliminary injunction. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that a for-profit, secular corporation cannot to engage in religious exercise under the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA. Nor do the owners have viable claims; the law does not impose any requirements on them. Compliance and penalties are placed squarely on Conestoga. View "Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

On March 2, 2011, Graves was indicted for attempted possession of 500 grams or more of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(ii) and 21 U.S.C. 846. He was arraigned on March 31. The district court ordered a psychiatric examination and mental competency evaluation, 18 U.S.C. 4241(b). That evaluation was pending on June 3, 2011, three days before Graves’s trial was scheduled to begin, so the case was continued. On June 22, the Bureau of Prisons completed the report, concluding that Graves was competent to stand trial. The report was received on July 7. On September 21, 2011, the court ruled that Graves was competent to stand trial and appointed defense counsel, who moved for a continuance. The court set Graves’s trial date for February 27, 2012. Weeks after seeking the continuance, Graves moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that more than 70 days of inexcusable delay had passed since the filing of the indictment, in violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161, the Sixth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause. The district court denied the motion. Graves was convicted and sentenced to 120 months in prison. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding no speedy trial violation. View "United States v. Graves" on Justia Law

Philadelphia officers stopped and frisked men they believed to be engaged in an illegal drug transaction. One of the men, Artis, accused the officers of stealing money. When the officers returned to headquarters, they learned that a complaint had been made to the Internal Affairs Bureau, and were taken to an office. They did not feel free to leave.They were joined by other superior officers and instructed to stay in the office and not use their cell phones. The officers obeyed instructions to remove their jackets and to pull out their pockets, pull up their pant legs and pull down their socks, and open their wallets, because they feared discipline and possible loss of employment. Internal Affairs officers questioned them for 15-20 minutes, then spoke to Artis, then stated that they believed Artis and told the officers that they were not needed for anything further. When they opened their lockers, it appeared that they had been searched. About 14 months later, the officers sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Fair Labor Standards Act. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Third Circuit affirmed. When police administrators undertake employment-related, non-criminal detentions, there is no Fourth Amendment seizure; the searches were reasonable. View "Gwynn v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Brittany and Emily Morrow were subjected to threats and physical assaults by Anderson, a fellow student at Blackhawk High School. After Anderson physically attacked Brittany in the lunch room, the school suspended both girls. Brittany’s mother reported Anderson to the police at the recommendation of administration. Anderson was charged with simple assault, terroristic threats, and harassment. Anderson continued to bully Brittany and Emily. A state court placed Anderson on probation and ordered her to have no contact with Brittany. Five months later, Anderson was adjudicated delinquent and was again given a “no contact” order, which was provided to the school. Anderson subsequently boarded Brittany’s school bus and threatened Brittany, even though that bus did not service Anderson’s home. School officials told the Morrows that they could not guarantee their daughters’ safety and advised the Morrows to consider another school. The Morrows filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of their substantive due process rights. The district court dismissed, reasoning that the school did not have a “special relationship” with students that would create a constitutional duty to protect them from other students and that the Morrows’ injury was not the result of any affirmative action by the defendants, under the “state-created danger” doctrine. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Morrow v. Balaski" on Justia Law

The NLRB certified a union and ordered an election. The union won a majority. The company refused to bargain. The union claimed unfair labor practices. A three-member NLRB delegee group granted the union summary judgment. The NLRB is composed of up to five members, appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate, 29 U.S.C. 153(a) and may delegate its authority to any group of three or more members. Delegee groups must maintain a membership of three.The company unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, arguing that the group’s order was not issued until it was mailed, by which time one member had resigned and the panel had only two members. The company then argued that the reconsideration order group was improperly constituted because one panelist was a recess appointee whose term concluded at the end of the Senate‘s 2011 session, which, it contended, was 13 days before the order issued. The NLRB denied the second motion. The company next argued that the group that issued the second order included two members that were invalidly appointed under the Recess Appointments Clause while the Senate was not in recess, reasoning that if the Senate‘s session ended when it began using pro forma sessions, the term of one member had expired; if the session did not end then, the president‘s recess appointments were invalidly made while the Senate was not in recess. The NLRB denied the motion. The Third Circuit vacated, holding that the Recess of the Senate in the Recess Appointments Clause refers to only intersession breaks; the panel lacked the requisite number of members because one panel member was invalidly appointed during an intrasession break. View "New Vista Nursing & Rehab. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Since 1976, NAI has operated a flea market on 65.4 acres purchased from the Borough of Palmyra. In 2002, Palmyra began considering redevelopment, including NAI’s parcel. A site inspection uncovered the possible presence of unexploded munitions from a weapons-testing facility used by the Army during World War II. The parties entered into an access agreement, pursuant to which NAI could operate the Market on the weekends, while contractors conducted inspections and remedial work during the week. In 2008, however, an unexploded artillery shell was discovered flush with the surface of the Market’s parking lot. Because vendors often drove stakes into the ground to secure tents, this raised concerns of accidental detonation. After NAI refused to comply voluntarily, the police chief issued an emergency order, restricting access to the property. Hundreds of munitions were found on the property, both explosive and inert. NAI filed suit, claiming that the order was arbitrary under New Jersey law; violated procedural due process; and constituted a “taking” without just compensation. The Market was closed for five months before the parties entered a consent order that allowed the Market to reopen on weekends with barriers and security guards to prohibit public access to hazardous areas. The district court entered summary judgment for the borough and denied NAI attorney’s fees for its claimed victory with respect to the consent order. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Nat'l Amusements, Inc. v. Borough of Palmyra" on Justia Law

From 1990 to 1995, Thomas directed an enterprise that transported marijuana from California to Pennsylvania. Thomas’ wife was murdered in 1995. He fled to Jamaica. In 1998, he was indicted on 33 counts, based on his marijuana enterprise. In 2001, Thomas was arrested in the United Kingdom. He contested a provisional extradition warrant until 2005. He was convicted and sentenced to 420 months imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed on direct appeal and, in 2009 the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. As a federal prisoner, Thomas could move to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence within one year from denial of certiorari, 28 U.S.C. 2255(f), but during that period, Thomas was temporarily in state custody, convicted of murdering his wife. Three weeks before the section 2255 deadline, he moved (pro se) for an extension of time. The district court denied the motion. Thomas appealed, but never filed an actual 2255 motion. He sought a certificate of appealability (COA), restating that he had been in state custody without access to legal materials, and asserted “a Batson challenge … Prosecutorial Misconduct for knowingly withholding material evidence of Petitioner’s innocence … and Jury Misconduct.” The Third Circuit granted a COA, finding that the issues were worthy of review. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law