Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Association of New Jersey Rifle and Pistol Clubs alleged that the Port Authority enforced state gun laws against its non-resident members at Newark Airport. The district court held that 18 U.S.C. 926A does not create a right enforceable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that, in enacting the amended section 926A, Congress did not intend to confer the right upon the plaintiff. Section 926A confers protection upon those who wish to engage in the interstate transportation of firearms: Notwithstanding any other … law … any person who is not otherwise prohibited by this chapter from transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm shall be entitled to transport a firearm for any lawful purpose from any place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm to any other place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm if, during such transportation the firearm is unloaded, and neither the firearm nor any ammunition being transported is readily accessible or is directly accessible from the passenger compartment of such transporting vehicle…. The court concluded that Congress did not intend the amended section 926A to benefit those who wish to transport firearms outside of vehicles. View "Ass'n of NJ Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v.Port Auth. of NY & NJ " on Justia Law

Figueroa joined the Camden police force in 2003. In 2008, he was transferred to a new Special Operations Unit created to target guns, drugs and violence with his regular partner, Bayard. In 2011, Figueroa and Bayard were charged with a series of civil rights violations concerning falsification of evidence in drug cases. Convicted under 18 U.S.C. 241 and 242, Figueroa was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the district court erred by admitting the out-of-court statement of co-defendant Bayard; by excluding, as cumulative, police reports that Figueroa offered into evidence; by allowing improper expert opinion testimony from a prosecution fact witness on issues of constitutional law; and by refusing to give the jury a requested instruction concerning specific intent. The court properly applied the drug distribution sentencing guideline to the civil rights violations after finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Figueroa was involved in distribution of narcotics. View "United States v. Figueroa" on Justia Law

In 1998 Keitel was convicted of first degree murder, third degree murder, aggravated assault, and five counts of recklessly endangering another person. His aggregate sentence was life imprisonment plus 35-70 years of imprisonment. Keitel’s appeals of the conviction and sentence were unsuccessful, as were his efforts to seek relief under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act. The federal district court denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254. While an appeal was pending, Keitel died. His family wanted to pursue the appeal to clear his name. The Third Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot, View "Keitel v. Mazurkiewicz" on Justia Law

Small, a New Jersey state prisoner, is paraplegic and confined to a wheelchair. He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting 14 incidents involving use of excessive force, denial of medical treatment, and confiscation of his personal wheelchair and its replacement with one without leg rests. He claims that without his personal chair he was unable to brush his teeth, shower, and sometimes left to lie for days in his own excrement. The district court dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies by filing grievances, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Third Circuit affirmed in part, holding that a judge may resolve factual disputes relevant to the exhaustion issue without participation of a jury and that that Small knew of, and was able to access, the prison’s grievance procedures, but that Small did adequately exhaust remedies with respect to two incidents. View "Small v. Whittick" on Justia Law

A 2010 fire at an apartment in Erie, Pennsylvania took the lives of a tenant and her guest. The third-floor bedroom purportedly lacked a smoke detector and an alternate means of egress, both of which are required under the Section 8 housing choice voucher program (42 U.S.C. 1437f) in which Richardson participated. The district court rejected a defense of qualified immunity in a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 by the estates of the deceased. The Third Circuit reversed. State officials’ approval and subsidization of the apartment for the Section 8 program, even though the apartment allegedly failed to comply with Section 8’s standards, did not constitute a state-created danger toward the apartment’s tenant and her guest in violation of their constitutional substantive due process rights. View "Henry v. City of Erie" on Justia Law

Quinn, charged with aiding and abetting Johnson in an armed bank robbery, claimed that when he drove Johnson to the bank, he did not know that Johnson intended to rob a bank teller at gunpoint. Johnson, who was awaiting sentencing, refused to testify. The district court refused Quinn’s request to immunize Johnson so he could testify. His statement to police that Quinn was not aware of the planned robbery was excluded as hearsay. Quinn was convicted and sentence to 147 months. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of prosecutorial misconduct by postponing sentencing to induce Johnson not to testify. Quinn also argued that the court erred by not exercising its authority to immunize Johnson’s testimony. Rejecting that claim, the court stated that courts lack that authority, as immunity is a statutory creation reserved to the Executive Branch. If the accused can show a due process violation, a court has authority to vacate a conviction. View "United States v. Quinn" on Justia Law

Ball, an inmate in the Restricted Housing Unit at the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution, sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming deliberate indifference to her medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Ball, pro se, asked to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Third Circuit determined that she is not eligible for IFP status and denied her motion for appointment of counsel, citing the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 110 Stat. 1321 Ball had accrued three “strikes” under the PLRA and was not in imminent danger of serious physical injury. View "Ball v. Famiglio" on Justia Law

Washington’s friend, Taylor, worked at Dollar Express in 2000. Taylor observed that manager Ritterson routinely arrived at 5:00 a.m. and would smoke a cigarette on the loading dock with the door open before starting work and that the store contained a safe, but no guards, cameras, or other security measures. Washington, Johnson, Waddy and Taylor met at Waddy’s home to plan the robbery. Johnson carried the gun; Washington drove the group to the store. Washington and Taylor remained in the car while Waddy and Johnson entered, carrying tools to open the safe, and confronted Ritterson and another employee. Johnson shot them. Washington heard the shots, ran into the store, and helped remove $750 from the safe. Waddy filled a bag with items to sell. When the others returned to the car, Taylor did not take any money. After learning that police had designated him a person of interest, Taylor surrendered and agreed to testify in exchange for a sentence of 55 to 110 years. Waddy also gave a statement. Johnson, Waddy, and Washington were tried together. Washington was convicted of second-degree murder, robbery, and criminal conspiracy for his participation as the driver. After exhausting state remedies, Washington obtained a conditional federal writ of habeas corpus, based on his argument that introduction of a jointly-tried nontestifying coconspirator’s confession violated his Confrontation Clause; the redacted confession replaced Washington’s name with “someone I know” or “the driver.” The Third Circuit affirmed; no reasonable reading of Supreme Court Confrontation Clause jurisprudence would permit introduction of the redacted confession. View "Washington v. Sec'y PA Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Philadelphia officers were patrolling an area where drug deals are common. They spotted a Jeep with Davis and Blackshear inside; the engine was running. Davis and Blackshear reached toward each other with “body motions [that] were consistent with the exchanging of narcotics in a narcotics transaction.” Seeing the officers, Davis and Blackshear had “expressions of shock,” and tossed something into the backseat. They exited the Jeep and quickly walked away without closing a door. The officers stopped the men and patted them down for weapons, but found wads of cash in their pockets. An officer saw a handgun through the open door. They arrested Davis and Blackshear, returned to the Jeep, and spotted a shopping bag in the backseat. It was open and contained a white substance. A drug-detection dog alerted to the presence of drugs. The officers obtained a warrant and recovered 10 cell phones and shopping bags with 740 grams of cocaine distributed among smaller Ziploc bags. As evidence that Davis recognized the cocaine in the Jeep, the government proved that he had two prior cocaine convictions. The Third Circuit vacated Davis’s conviction for possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), noting that the government never proved that the cocaine from his past was similar in appearance, quantity, or form. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Keep A Breast Foundation educates young women about breast cancer and believes that negative body image inhibits awareness. To “start a conversation about that taboo in a lighthearted way” and break down inhibitions keeping young women from performing self-examinations, the Foundation began its “I [heart] Boobies!” initiative, which included selling bracelets emblazoned with that motto, KEEP A BREAST” and “check yourself!” The School District banned the bracelets. The district court issued a preliminary injunction against the ban. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that Supreme Court precedent does not sustain the ban. Under those decisions plainly lewd speech, which offends for the same reasons obscenity offends, may be categorically restricted regardless of whether it comments on political or social issues; speech that does not rise to the level of plainly lewd but that a reasonable observer could interpret as lewd may be categorically restricted if it cannot plausibly be interpreted as commenting on such issues; and speech that does not rise to the level of plainly lewd and that could plausibly be interpreted as commenting on such issues may not be categorically restricted. The bracelets are not plainly lewd and comment on a social issue. The District did not show that the bracelets threatened to substantially disrupt school. View "B.H. v. Easton Area Sch. Dist." on Justia Law