Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Thomas was in custody pending trial for shoplifting and failing to pay fines. He was assigned to a small unit with an upper level open to the lower level, housing minimum and medium security detainees. The facility has four or five fights reported every day; 20-30 are estimated to be unreported. Thomas had a reputation as a bully, known for stealing food. One day Thomas found about 12 angry inmates outside of his upper level cell. A verbal dispute ensued. Officer Martinez was with the crowd; Officer Wilde was on the lower level. Martinez said something about locking everybody down. The inmates laughed, but did not disperse. Inmate Santiago yelled, “come down here and take stuff from me.” Thomas began to walk to the lower level. Within seconds after he arrived, Santiago struck Thomas. Martinez restrained Santiago, but another inmate struck Thomas. Martinez was immediately next to Thomas yelled for everyone to lock down. The inmates complied. Three to four minutes had passed between the beginning of the argument on the upper level and the violence on the lower level. Inmates stated that the officers could and should have stopped the argument. Thomas suffered a concussion and loss of sight in one eye. Thomas sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, The district court granted the county summary judgment. The Third Circuit vacated, finding genuine issues of material fact concerning deliberate indifference to the need for pre-service training in conflict de-escalation and intervention and whether the lack of such training had a causal relationship to Thomas’s injuries.View "Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty." on Justia Law

Cooper was convicted of rape in Oklahoma in 1999 and paroled in 2006, before enactment of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. 2250; 42 U.S.C. 16901. He complied with sex offender registration laws in effect at the time. After enactment of SORNA, Cooper moved to Delaware in 2011. He did not register in Delaware, nor did he inform authorities of his new address. He was convicted of failing to comply with SORNA sex offender registration requirements. On appeal, he challenged the constitutionality of the provision of SORNA in which Congress delegated to the Attorney General the authority to determine the applicability of registration requirements to pre-SORNA sex offenders. The Third Circuit affirmed his conviction, stating that it found “delegation of this important decision curious at best,” but not an unconstitutional abdication. View "United States v. Cooper" on Justia Law

New Jersey enacted the 2002 Off-Track and Account Wagering Act, N.J. Stat. 5:5-127, providing for establishment of 15 off-track wagering (OTW) facilities. The Act authorized a license for the N.J. Sports and Exposition Authority, conditioned upon NJSEA entering into a participation agreement with other entities that held horse racing permits in 2000 (ACRA and Freehold). NJSEA, ACRA, and Freehold entered into an agreement, allocating permit rights. By 2011, only four facilities had opened. NJSEA had leased control of its tracks to the New Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen’s Association (NJTHA) and another. The 2011 Forfeiture Amendment provided that permit holders would forfeit rights to any OTW not licensed by 2012, unless they demonstrated “making progress” toward establishing an OTW; forfeited rights would be available to other “horsemen’s organizations” without compensation to the permit holder. NJTHA qualified for forfeited rights. The 2012 Deposit Amendment extended the forfeiture date and allowed a permit holder to make a $1 million deposit for each OTW facility not licensed by December 31, 2011, retaining the “making progress” exception. The Pilot Program Act allowed installation of electronic wagering terminals in some bars and restaurants, by lessees or purchasers of NJSEA-owned racetracks, who could exchange unused OTW licenses to install electronic terminals. NJTHA secured such a license. ACRA and Freehold submitted challenged the constitutionality of the amendments under the Contracts, Takings, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses. The Commission determined that both ACRA and Freehold had made progress toward establishing their unlicensed OTW facilities and absolved them of the obligation to submit deposits. The district court dismissed a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988 on Younger abstention grounds. Subsequently, the Supreme Court decided Sprint Communications v. Jacobs, (2013), clarifying the Younger abstention doctrine. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that the action does not fit within the framework for abstention. View "Acra Turf Club, LLC v. Zanzuccki" on Justia Law

The Winkelman brothers, have a “long and protracted litigation history” involving challenges to the constitutionality of their sentences, which they brought while in custody, and which were filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Sixth Circuit denied certificates of appealability. The current motion, to reinstate their direct appeals, argued that their sentences are unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s 2013 holding, Alleyne v. U.S. that “any fact that increases the mandatory minimum [sentence] is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury” and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Third Circuit denied the motion, which it characterized as “successive.” A successive section 2255 motion is authorized only if it is based on “newly discovered evidence,” or on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” The Supreme Court may have announced a new rule of law in Alleyne, but note that “a new rule is not ‘made retroactive to cases on collateral review’ unless the Supreme Court holds it to be retroactive.” View "United States v. Winkelman" on Justia Law

Galarza, a U.S. citizen, was working at a construction site. The contractor sold cocaine to an undercover detective, Correa, who arrested the contractor, Galarza, and other employees for conspiracy to deliver cocaine. Galarza had a wallet, containing his Pennsylvania driver’s license, his Social Security Card, a debit card, and his health insurance card. The complaint listed Galarza’s place of birth as Perth, N.J. and contained his Social Security Number and date of birth. Correa called ICE and provided Galarza’s information. Galarza claims that, by making the call, Correa indicated that she suspected Galarza had given false identification information. Galarza was detained and went through booking; officials took his wallet and its contents. ICE Agent Szalczyk, acting on information relayed by Correa, filed an immigration detainer that described Galarza as a suspected “alien” and citizen of the Dominican Republic. The detainer was not accompanied by a warrant, an affidavit of probable cause, or a removal order. A surety company posted bail, but Galarza was told that he would not be released. Galarza had not been interviewed by ICE nor provided with a copy of the detainer. Three days after his arrest, a counselor told Galarza about the detainer. Galarza protested and urged the counselor to retrieve his wallet. The counselor refused. Galarza later met with ICE officers. The detainer was removed and Galarza was released about three days after his arrest. Galarza was acquitted and filed complaints under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 346(b). The district court dismissed the complaint against Lehigh County, holding that it could not be held responsible for Galarza’s detention because it was compelled to follow the detainer. The Third Circuit vacated. Immigration detainers do not compel a state or local law enforcement agency to detain suspected aliens subject to removal.View "Galarza v. Szalczyk" on Justia Law

Airport customs officers intercepted a UPS package containing heroin. The address handwritten on the package was “18 Walnut St. Union Town PA.” The electronic manifest gave the address as “59 Millview Dr. Uniontown.” When the two conflict, UPS delivers to the electronic address. Agents repackaged the heroin, using the Millview address and enclosing a beeper to indicate when the package was opened. They obtained an anticipatory search warrant for the Millview address, the home of the mother of Dutrieville’s child, to be executed once the package was inside the home. An undercover agent delivered the package to Dutrieville. Two minutes later the beeper activated. Agents announced their presence, and, receiving no response, entered the home. They took Dutrieville into custody and searched. In a bedroom, agents found the heroin. In the master bedroom, they found the empty package, the beeper, Dutrieville’s cell phone and overnight bag, and unused stamp bags (often used to package heroin). They found digital scales and other drug paraphernalia in the living room. Dutrieville admitted that he had been staying at the home with consent, although he was the subject of a Protection From Abuse Order that could not be overridden by consent. Dutrieville was charged with attempted possession with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of a substance containing heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). After denial of his motion to suppress, Dutrieville entered a conditional guilty plea. The Third Circuit affirmed that, because he was prohibited from entering the home, he lacked standing to challenge the search. View "United States v. Dutrieville" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs involved in, or wishing to be involved in the “death care industry” challenged Pennsylvania’s Funeral Director Law, 63 Pa. Stat. 479.1 provisions that: permit warrantless inspections of funeral establishments by the state Board of Funeral Directors; limit the number of establishments in which a funeral director may have an ownership interest or practice the provision; restrict the capacity of unlicensed individuals and certain entities to hold ownership interests in a funeral establishment; require every funeral establishment to have a licensed full-time supervisor; require funeral establishments to have a “preparation room”; prohibit service of food in a funeral establishment; prohibit use of trade names by funeral homes; govern the trusting of monies advanced under pre-need contracts for merchandise; and prohibit payment of commissions. The district court found several provisions unconstitutional. The Third Circuit reversed: invalidation of the warrantless inspection scheme; holdings on dormant Commerce Clause challenges to certain provisions; conclusions that disputed provisions violate substantive due process; a ruling that the Board’s actions unconstitutionally impair private contractual relations with third parties; and invalidation of the ban on payment of commissions to unlicensed salespeople. The court affirmed that the ban on the use of trade names in the funeral industry violates First Amendment protections. The court noted that antiquated provisions are not necessarily unconstitutional. View "Heffner v. Murphy" on Justia Law

A postal inspector intercepted a parcel on suspicion of narcotics trafficking because the return address was fictitious. The inspector knew that drug traffickers often bring narcotics from Mexico into Arizona and mail them to the east coast. A trained narcotics canine detected the presence of narcotics in the parcel. Agents gathered information about the recipient address and obtained a warrant. The parcel contained 20 pounds of marijuana. The agents held the parcel for four days and planned a controlled delivery of a reconstructed parcel, containing a GPS locator. Golson identified himself by the false name given on the parcel’s address and accepted the package. After receiving a signal that the package had been opened, agents conducted a search of the house pursuant to an anticipatory search warrant and found several guns and ammunition, 704 packets of heroin packaged for distribution, 40 grams of raw heroin, a cutting agent, packaging material consistent with drug distribution, a heat sealer, heat sealable bags, a scale, rubber examination gloves, and masks. The district court rejected a motion to suppress. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that there was probable cause for the anticipatory warrant, that the delay was reasonable, and that the search was a state search so that FRCP 41(b) did not apply.View "Unted States v. Golson" on Justia Law

Collins, a Pennsylvania prisoner convicted in 1993 of first-degree murder, appealed the district court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus. The court certified two questions for appeal: whether Collins was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel “inadequately prepared for trial and completely failed to conduct any investigation, including into the ballistics evidence” and whether trial counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance, combined with alleged errors of the trial court, cumulatively caused him prejudice. The Third Circuit affirmed, while expressing “serious doubt that trial counsel conducted an adequate investigation.” In light of the uncontroverted evidence presented against Collins at trial, the state court’s determination that Collins failed to show he suffered prejudice was not an unreasonable application of the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Strickland v. Washington, which sets the standard for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Collins also did not exhaust his claim of cumulative error, which was, therefore, procedurally defaulted. View "Collins v. Sec'y, PA Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Sharif, an inmate housed in the Restrictive Housing Unit, punched a corrections officer. Sharif claims that C.O. Picone punched Sharif first. Picone testified that once he was struck, he attempted to protect himself and that C.O. Potance, who was helping Picone retrieve dinner trays, attempted to restrain Sharif. Sharif asserted that once Picone began to hit him, Potance and C.O. Pinto entered his cell and joined in the attack by choking him. Following the altercation, Sharif was handcuffed and moved to a “suicide cell.” He continued to cause commotion and was moved to a restraint chair. Sharif contends that while he was in the restraint chair, he was punched repeatedly by unnamed corrections officers, observed and permitted by Lieutenant Kospiah. Sharif was charged with aggravated assault, entered a plea of nolo contendere, and was convicted as charged. Sharif filed an excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and moved to exclude evidence of his nolo contendere plea under Rule 410. The court admitted the evidence when Sharif took the stand and denied wrongdoing. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded, noting that Sharif’s credibility was already “suspect” and that the plea was, therefore, of minimal relevance.View "Sharif v. Picone" on Justia Law