Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Heffernan joined the Paterson Police Department in 1985 and became a detective. In 2006, Spagnola, a former Paterson police chief and Heffernan’s friend, sought to unseat the incumbent mayor. Heffernan hoped that Spagnola would win, but was unable to vote for Spagnola based on his city of residence, did not work on the campaign, and did not consider himself “politically involved.” At the request of his bedridden mother, Heffernan picked up a Spagnola campaign sign, to replace one that had been stolen from her lawn. An officer assigned to the Mayor’s security staff observed Heffernan’s encounter with the Spagnola campaign manager. The next day, Heffernan was demoted to a “walking post” because of his “overt[] involvement in a political election.” Heffernan sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. His free-association claim resulted in a jury verdict of $105,000. The judge retroactively recused himself and vacated the verdict. A new judge granted the defendants summary judgment on a free-expression claim; on remand, another judge concluded that Heffernan had adequately pleaded and prosecuted his free-association claim, but found that Heffernan did not establish that he actually exercised his First Amendment rights. The Third Circuit affirmed; claims of retaliation based only on the perceived exercise of those rights are foreclosed. View "Heffernan v. City of Paterson" on Justia Law

Flora worked as Luzerne County Public Defender from 1980- 2013. He became Chief Public Defender in 2010, maintaining a private practice. His predecessor had tried to secure additional funding by submitting weekly reports concerning excessive caseloads and staffing deficiencies. Flora obtained grant funding for representing juveniles, but was not able to obtain additional money for adult offenders. Flora reported that the existing level of resources did not allow the Office to provide constitutionally adequate representation. The County was unresponsive, so Flora refused representation to those not faced with incarceration. In 2012 Flora initiated a class action lawsuit on behalf of indigent defendants and sought an injunction to prevent his firing. The state court ordered the County to provide adequate funding and prohibited refusing representation to indigent defendants. While the parties were in mediation, the County approved new positions. The funding litigation followed the “Kids for Cash” scandal. From 2003-2008, about 50% of Luzerne County juvenile offenders appeared in court without counsel. Virtually all were adjudicated delinquent. Federal investigators uncovered that judges had accepted kickbacks from for-profit juvenile detention facilities to send unrepresented juveniles to those facilities. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ordered vacatur and expungement of thousands of delinquency adjudications. Flora alleges that, in 2013, he learned that 3,000 adjudications had not been expunged and reported the matter. Flora was relieved of his duties. Flora sued, alleging retaliation for his funding lawsuit and for reporting noncompliance with the expungement order. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that, under the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision, Lane v. Franks, Flora pled facts sufficient to allege that he spoke as a citizen. View "Flora v. County of Luzerne" on Justia Law

The Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA), 49 U.S.C. 20701, provides that “a locomotive … and its parts and appurtenances” must be “in proper condition and safe to operate without unnecessary danger of personal injury.” The Federal Railroad Administration, under the authority of the Secretary of Transportation, has promulgated regulations on the governing standards of care. Canadian Pacific settled lawsuits brought by its employees who had suffered injuries as a result of defective train seats, then brought indemnification, contribution, and breach-of-contract claims against Knoedler Manufacturing, which supplied the seats, and Durham, which tried unsuccessfully to repair the seats. The district court dismissed Canadian Pacific’s claims as preempted by the LIA. The Third Circuit vacated. State law claims of breach of contract, indemnification, contribution based on the LIA are not preempted. To hold that the LIA preempts all breach-of-contract claims would allow, and perhaps encourage, manufacturers to make grand contractual promises to obtain a deal and then breach their duties with impunity. View "Del. & Hudson Ry. Co v. Knoedler Mfrs., Inc" on Justia Law

The Special Management Unit housing unit within the Lewisburg U.S. Penitentiary houses inmates identified as having violent tendencies or having a history of gang involvement while incarcerated. Inmates assigned to the SMU are confined to their cells for 23 hours a day, but can spend the remaining hour in a recreation cage. When first assigned to the SMU, inmates are interviewed by prison officials to ensure that inmates who may be hostile to each other are not housed in the same cell. Shelton, a USP inmate, filed a purported class action, alleging that the defendants have engaged in a pattern, practice, or policy of improperly placing inmates who are known to be hostile to each other in the same cell. He also claims that the defendants fail to intervene when the predictable inmate-on-inmate violence erupts, and that defendants improperly restrain inmates who refuse cell assignments with inmates who are known to be hostile to them. The district court denied Shelton’s motion for class certification and granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of a Federal Tort Claims Act claim, but vacated the denial of class certification and summary judgment as to an Eighth Amendment claim. View "Shelton v. Bledsoe" on Justia Law

To rob a Philadelphia jewelry store, Burnett obtained a gun and Hankerson borrowed a car from Adams. A store video security system captured Burnett’s face during the robbery. They fled with Hankerson driving, but got lost and drove down a dead-end street. Instead of turning around, they parked the car, placed the loot in its trunk, and left on foot. After visiting the crime scene, police received a call reporting a “suspicious black Honda” on a residential street not far from the robbery. Witnesses described the men leaving the car. Police suspected it was involved in the robbery, tried to contact Adams, had the Honda towed, and executed a warrant. They recovered the jewelry, stolen security videotape, wigs, the bloodstained gun, a wallet containing Hankerson’s identification, latex gloves, and zip ties like those used to bind the robbery victims. One glove contained the DNA of Burnett and the store owner and another contained the DNA of Hankerson and the store owner. Hankerson pleaded guilty and cooperated. Burnett challenged the vehicle search as “fundamentally unfair.” The district court held that Burnett lacked standing, as he merely was a passenger and lacked a privacy interest in the vehicle. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Burnett" on Justia Law

Dougherty, the Business Officer for Operations for the Philadelphia School District, was accountable for the Office of Capital Programs (OCP), which developed projects for School Reform Commission (SRC) approval. Dougherty reported to Nunery, who reported to Superintendent Ackerman. Ackerman directed OCP to install security cameras in “persistently dangerous” schools. Due to a short time frame, OCP could not use its bidding process and was required to select a pre-qualified contractor. Dougherty identified SDT as such a contractor, prepared a proposal, and submitted a resolution to Nunery. Under District policy, the Superintendent must approve the resolution before it is presented to the SRC. Dougherty did not receive a response from Nunery or Ackerman, nor was the resolution presented to the SRC. Ackerman allegedly rejected the SDT proposal for lack of minority participation, and directed that IBS, a minority-owned firm, be awarded the contract. IBS was not pre-qualified. SRC ratified the plan. Conflicts arose. Dougherty met with reporters, resulting in articles accusing Ackerman of violating state guidelines, and contacted the FBI, state representatives, and the U.S. Department of Education. Ackerman placed Dougherty on leave pending an investigation, which concluded that there was no unlawful motive in the contract award, but that Dougherty violated the Code of Ethics confidentiality section. SRC terminated Dougherty. In his suit, alleging First Amendment retaliation and violations of the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law, the district court denied motions for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Dougherty v. Philadelphia Sch.Dist." on Justia Law

Working for “Cali Connect,” Thompson transported cocaine from California to Pittsburgh. Cooperating witnesses named Thompson. In wiretapped phone conversations, Thompson made drug-related comments. Texas troopers on I-40 near Amarillo, a “known corridor for narcotics,” stopped his truck, traveling eastbound at 84 mph in a 70 mph zone, and ran Thompson’s criminal history, which showed dated narcotics offenses, and a firearm offense. Thompson declined to consent to a search, but accepted responsibility for anything discovered in the truck. A K-9 unit dog alerted. The officers opened the truck-bed and smelled marijuana. Beneath a tarp lay five tubs containing marijuana. After speaking with DEA investigators, troopers searched the tailgate and found six kilograms of cocaine. Thompson was charged locally for the marijuana and was not informed about the discovery of cocaine. Weeks later, DEA officers executed search warrants on residences associated with Cali Connect, including Thompson’s. Investigators recovered two kilograms of cocaine. At DEA offices, six hours later, Thompson offered information about his sources and co-conspirators. He received a written waiver of his right to prompt presentment 12 hours after his arrest. Thompson continued to cooperate the next day and was presented 48 hours after his arrest. After denial of motions to suppress, Thompson pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and conspiracy to launder monetary instruments. The Third Circuit affirmed denial of the motion to suppress the fruits of a search, finding reasonable suspicion, but vacated as to statements made while in custody, prior to being presented to a magistrate judge. View "United States v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Equinox, a wilderness-guide, displayed website photographs, including one of Franz with a wooly mammoth tusk. The Bureau of Land Management sent an undercover agent on an Equinox expedition. Franz participated and volunteered that he had gone on 14 Arctic expeditions and had tusks in his Pennsylvania house. He offered to create souvenir CDs for others. BLM obtained a search warrant for Franz’s house, describing, on attachments, the tusks, other illegal artifacts, photographs, emails, and related information on computers or electronic storage devices. The warrant, affidavit, and accompanying papers were sealed to protect cooperating witnesses and the secrecy of ongoing investigations. Agents executed the warrant and provided Franz with a copy of its face sheet. Franz did not receive copies of attachments, although he requested them. The agent mistakenly believed that, because the warrant was sealed, he could not reveal the attachments. He explained the circumstances giving rise to the warrant and described items authorized to be seized. During the search, agents saw framed photographs of young, nude girls and pamphlets containing images of nude minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Agents collected the items in plain view, examined a computer, saw indications of child pornography, and seized the computer. The FBI obtained a warrant to search the electronic storage devices. Franz pled guilty to theft of government property and conspiracy to defraud the U.S. The district court denied a motion to suppress in the prosecution for receipt of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2). Franz was convicted. The Third Circuit affirmed. The agent had no intention to wrongfully conceal the purpose of the search; withholding the attachments was a “reasonable misunderstanding.” No appreciable deterrent effect would be gained by applying the exclusionary rule. View "United States v. Franz" on Justia Law

Lagano was fatally shot in 2007, in front of an East Brunswick, New Jersey diner. In 2012 his estate filed suit against the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office (BCPO) and former BCPO Chief of Detectives Mordaga, alleging that BCPO personnel improperly revealed to members of organized crime that Lagano was an informant, which established a state-created danger in violation of his due process rights. The estate also challenged a 2004 search of Lagano’s home and seizure of his property. The district court dismissed all claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that claims based on the 2004 search were time-barred, but reversed in part. Mordaga, sued in his official and personal capacities, is amenable to suit as a “person” under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985. The allegations supported a reasonable inference that neither Mordaga nor the BCPO acted within classic investigatory and prosecutorial functions with respect to the state-created danger claim so the district court erred in viewing them as part of the state, not amenable to suit under sections1983 and 1985. The court reinstated a claim under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act and instructed the district court with respect to qualified immunity and Eleventh Amendment analysis. View "Estate Frank P. Lagano v. Bergen County Prosecutors Offi" on Justia Law

In 2008, the Borough of Shickshinny approved placement of a religious-themed sign on municipal property near the home of Tearpock-Martini . Shickshinny employees installed the sign, which reads: “Bible Baptist Church Welcomes You!” and has a directional arrow with “1 BLOCK” written on it, and depicts a gold cross and a white Bible. Tearpock-Martini installed, on her property directly in front of the church sign, a sign that read: “This Church Sign Violates My Rights As A Taxpayer & Property Owner. Residential Neighborhoods Are Not Zoned For Advertisement Signs!” Shickshinny warned Tearpock-Martini that she could be charged if she did not remove her sign. In 2012, Tearpock-Martini filed a civil rights action, alleging violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed the challenge as be time-barred. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that the constitutional challenge to a still-existing monument erected on municipal property is not time-barred, but that claims that the refusal of Shickshinny to allow Martini to erect her own sign violated her rights to free speech and equal protection of the law are barred by Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations.View "Tearpock-Martini v. Borough of Shickshinny" on Justia Law