Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Dougherty, the Business Officer for Operations for the Philadelphia School District, was accountable for the Office of Capital Programs (OCP), which developed projects for School Reform Commission (SRC) approval. Dougherty reported to Nunery, who reported to Superintendent Ackerman. Ackerman directed OCP to install security cameras in “persistently dangerous” schools. Due to a short time frame, OCP could not use its bidding process and was required to select a pre-qualified contractor. Dougherty identified SDT as such a contractor, prepared a proposal, and submitted a resolution to Nunery. Under District policy, the Superintendent must approve the resolution before it is presented to the SRC. Dougherty did not receive a response from Nunery or Ackerman, nor was the resolution presented to the SRC. Ackerman allegedly rejected the SDT proposal for lack of minority participation, and directed that IBS, a minority-owned firm, be awarded the contract. IBS was not pre-qualified. SRC ratified the plan. Conflicts arose. Dougherty met with reporters, resulting in articles accusing Ackerman of violating state guidelines, and contacted the FBI, state representatives, and the U.S. Department of Education. Ackerman placed Dougherty on leave pending an investigation, which concluded that there was no unlawful motive in the contract award, but that Dougherty violated the Code of Ethics confidentiality section. SRC terminated Dougherty. In his suit, alleging First Amendment retaliation and violations of the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law, the district court denied motions for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Dougherty v. Philadelphia Sch.Dist." on Justia Law

Working for “Cali Connect,” Thompson transported cocaine from California to Pittsburgh. Cooperating witnesses named Thompson. In wiretapped phone conversations, Thompson made drug-related comments. Texas troopers on I-40 near Amarillo, a “known corridor for narcotics,” stopped his truck, traveling eastbound at 84 mph in a 70 mph zone, and ran Thompson’s criminal history, which showed dated narcotics offenses, and a firearm offense. Thompson declined to consent to a search, but accepted responsibility for anything discovered in the truck. A K-9 unit dog alerted. The officers opened the truck-bed and smelled marijuana. Beneath a tarp lay five tubs containing marijuana. After speaking with DEA investigators, troopers searched the tailgate and found six kilograms of cocaine. Thompson was charged locally for the marijuana and was not informed about the discovery of cocaine. Weeks later, DEA officers executed search warrants on residences associated with Cali Connect, including Thompson’s. Investigators recovered two kilograms of cocaine. At DEA offices, six hours later, Thompson offered information about his sources and co-conspirators. He received a written waiver of his right to prompt presentment 12 hours after his arrest. Thompson continued to cooperate the next day and was presented 48 hours after his arrest. After denial of motions to suppress, Thompson pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and conspiracy to launder monetary instruments. The Third Circuit affirmed denial of the motion to suppress the fruits of a search, finding reasonable suspicion, but vacated as to statements made while in custody, prior to being presented to a magistrate judge. View "United States v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Equinox, a wilderness-guide, displayed website photographs, including one of Franz with a wooly mammoth tusk. The Bureau of Land Management sent an undercover agent on an Equinox expedition. Franz participated and volunteered that he had gone on 14 Arctic expeditions and had tusks in his Pennsylvania house. He offered to create souvenir CDs for others. BLM obtained a search warrant for Franz’s house, describing, on attachments, the tusks, other illegal artifacts, photographs, emails, and related information on computers or electronic storage devices. The warrant, affidavit, and accompanying papers were sealed to protect cooperating witnesses and the secrecy of ongoing investigations. Agents executed the warrant and provided Franz with a copy of its face sheet. Franz did not receive copies of attachments, although he requested them. The agent mistakenly believed that, because the warrant was sealed, he could not reveal the attachments. He explained the circumstances giving rise to the warrant and described items authorized to be seized. During the search, agents saw framed photographs of young, nude girls and pamphlets containing images of nude minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Agents collected the items in plain view, examined a computer, saw indications of child pornography, and seized the computer. The FBI obtained a warrant to search the electronic storage devices. Franz pled guilty to theft of government property and conspiracy to defraud the U.S. The district court denied a motion to suppress in the prosecution for receipt of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2). Franz was convicted. The Third Circuit affirmed. The agent had no intention to wrongfully conceal the purpose of the search; withholding the attachments was a “reasonable misunderstanding.” No appreciable deterrent effect would be gained by applying the exclusionary rule. View "United States v. Franz" on Justia Law

Lagano was fatally shot in 2007, in front of an East Brunswick, New Jersey diner. In 2012 his estate filed suit against the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office (BCPO) and former BCPO Chief of Detectives Mordaga, alleging that BCPO personnel improperly revealed to members of organized crime that Lagano was an informant, which established a state-created danger in violation of his due process rights. The estate also challenged a 2004 search of Lagano’s home and seizure of his property. The district court dismissed all claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that claims based on the 2004 search were time-barred, but reversed in part. Mordaga, sued in his official and personal capacities, is amenable to suit as a “person” under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985. The allegations supported a reasonable inference that neither Mordaga nor the BCPO acted within classic investigatory and prosecutorial functions with respect to the state-created danger claim so the district court erred in viewing them as part of the state, not amenable to suit under sections1983 and 1985. The court reinstated a claim under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act and instructed the district court with respect to qualified immunity and Eleventh Amendment analysis. View "Estate Frank P. Lagano v. Bergen County Prosecutors Offi" on Justia Law

In 2008, the Borough of Shickshinny approved placement of a religious-themed sign on municipal property near the home of Tearpock-Martini . Shickshinny employees installed the sign, which reads: “Bible Baptist Church Welcomes You!” and has a directional arrow with “1 BLOCK” written on it, and depicts a gold cross and a white Bible. Tearpock-Martini installed, on her property directly in front of the church sign, a sign that read: “This Church Sign Violates My Rights As A Taxpayer & Property Owner. Residential Neighborhoods Are Not Zoned For Advertisement Signs!” Shickshinny warned Tearpock-Martini that she could be charged if she did not remove her sign. In 2012, Tearpock-Martini filed a civil rights action, alleging violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed the challenge as be time-barred. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that the constitutional challenge to a still-existing monument erected on municipal property is not time-barred, but that claims that the refusal of Shickshinny to allow Martini to erect her own sign violated her rights to free speech and equal protection of the law are barred by Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations.View "Tearpock-Martini v. Borough of Shickshinny" on Justia Law

Reyes was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery of a grocery store, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a)1; using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)t. He appealed only his Hobbs Act conviction. The Third Circuit affirmed. After unsuccessfully petitioning the Supreme Court for certiorari, Reyes filed a pro se habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court appointed counsel and conducted an evidentiary hearing. Before the court ruled, Reyes sought to amend his petition, to add claims under the Supreme Court’s 2013 Alleyne decision. In Alleyne, the Court clarified that, under the Sixth Amendment, “‘any facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed’ are elements of the crime” and must be found beyond a reasonable doubt. The district Court denied Reyes’ petition and his request to amend. While appeal was pending, the Third Circuit decided United States v. Winkelman, finding that the new rule of criminal procedure announced by the Supreme Court in Alleyne does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. View "United States v. Reyes" on Justia Law

Erdely was investigating online distribution of child pornography when he discovered a computer on a peer-to-peer network sharing 77 files that he suspected contained child pornography. With information available to anyone, he found the Internet protocol address (IP address) through which it connected to the internet. Searching publicly available records, Erdely determined that the IP Address was registered to a Comcast subscriber and obtained a court order. Comcast gave Erdely the Neighbor’s name and Pittsburgh address. Erdely executed a warrant. None of the Neighbor’s computers contained child pornography or the file-sharing software; his wireless router was not password-protected. Erdely deduced that the computer sharing child pornography was connecting without the Neighbor’s knowledge. With the Neighbor’s permission, Erdely connected a computer to the router for remote access. Later, while working in Harrisburg, Erdely learned that the computer was again sharing child pornography on the Neighbor’s IP address. Erdely determined the mooching computer’s IP address and MAC address, which belonged to an Apple wireless card. Erdely had not discovered any Apple wireless devices in the Neighbor’s home, so he decided to use a “MoocherHunter” mobile tracking software tool, which can be used by anyone with a directional antenna. Not knowing which residence the signal was coming from, Erdely proceeded without a warrant. From the sidewalk the MoocherHunter’s readings were strongest when aimed at Stanley’s apartment. Erdely obtained a warrant for Stanley’s home. When officers arrived, Stanley fled, but returned and confessed that he had connected to the Neighbor’s router to download child pornography. Erdely seized Stanley’s Apple laptop and recovered 144 images and video files depicting child pornography. Stanley was charged with possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a). The district court denied a motion to suppress. The Third Circuit affirmed. Use of the MoocherHunter was not a search under the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Stanley" on Justia Law

Sara sued the City of Newark and Police Officer Borrero, alleging that Borrero, who had an extensive disciplinary history and who was off-duty at the time, stopped Sara for alleged unsafe driving. Borrero then entered her car and attacked Sara, threatened a bystander who tried to intervene, charged Sara with attacking an officer, and held her without counsel for 12 hours. A jury found that Borrero and the city were liable and awarded $2,700,000 in compensatory damages. The district court remitted Sara’s award to $750,000 and informed her of her right to either accept the remitted award or reject it and proceed to a second jury trial, limited to the quantum of her compensatory damages. A second jury was convened and awarded $4,000,000 in compensatory damages. Instead of addressing the city’s new motion for remittitur, the court entered a final order, vacating the second jury’s verdict and the earlier order of remittitur, and reinstating the first jury’s verdict. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions that the district court should resolve the city’s motion for remittitur of the second jury’s verdict, but stating that it saw little merit to any of the arguments on appeal.View "Lesende v. Borrero" on Justia Law

Responding to a dispatch, Pennsylvania State Trooper Carroll and another trooper proceeded to the Carman home to search for a man who had stolen two loaded handguns and a car with New Jersey plates. Arriving at the Carman residence, the troopers bypassed the front door and went directly to the back of the house and onto a deck adjoining the kitchen. On the deck, a scuffle ensued between Carroll and Andrew Carman. In a suit under 42 U.S.C.1983, the Carmans challenged Carroll’s warrantless entry onto their’ property. Carroll argued that he did not violate the Carmans’ Fourth Amendment rights because he entered into their curtilage, the area immediately surrounding their home, while executing a legitimate “knock and talk” encounter. The district court denied the Carmans’ judgment as a matter of law on their unlawful entry claims; a jury found that Carroll acted reasonably. The Third Circuit reversed in part. Because Carroll proceeded directly through the back of the property and did not begin his visit at the front door, the “knock and talk” exception to the warrant requirement dd not apply. The court affirmed the jury verdict regarding the unlawful seizure claim; there was sufficient support for the jury’s finding that Carroll acted reasonably.View "Carman v. Carroll" on Justia Law

Detectives Riley and Cunningham conducted a 10-week undercover investigation of Mitchell. On five separate occasions, an informant made controlled purchases of crack cocaine from Mitchell and officers covertly tailed Mitchell to establish his residence. They followed him to various residences, including his mother’s home and a home owned by his wife and ultimately applied for a search warrant for his wife’s residence. Detectives executed the search warrant and recovered 4.5 ounces of cocaine; drug packing paraphernalia, including three plastic bags with a white powdery residue and small plastic bags commonly used for packaging crack cocaine; approximately $6,415 in cash; and, underneath the mattress, a loaded firearm. Mitchell was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924 (a)(2); possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(c); and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) and (c)(2). The district court denied a motion to suppress, holding that the detectives acted in good faith in relying on the warrant. Mitchell was convicted and the Third Circuit affirmed.View "United States v. Mitchell" on Justia Law