Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Sara sued the City of Newark and Police Officer Borrero, alleging that Borrero, who had an extensive disciplinary history and who was off-duty at the time, stopped Sara for alleged unsafe driving. Borrero then entered her car and attacked Sara, threatened a bystander who tried to intervene, charged Sara with attacking an officer, and held her without counsel for 12 hours. A jury found that Borrero and the city were liable and awarded $2,700,000 in compensatory damages. The district court remitted Sara’s award to $750,000 and informed her of her right to either accept the remitted award or reject it and proceed to a second jury trial, limited to the quantum of her compensatory damages. A second jury was convened and awarded $4,000,000 in compensatory damages. Instead of addressing the city’s new motion for remittitur, the court entered a final order, vacating the second jury’s verdict and the earlier order of remittitur, and reinstating the first jury’s verdict. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions that the district court should resolve the city’s motion for remittitur of the second jury’s verdict, but stating that it saw little merit to any of the arguments on appeal.View "Lesende v. Borrero" on Justia Law

Responding to a dispatch, Pennsylvania State Trooper Carroll and another trooper proceeded to the Carman home to search for a man who had stolen two loaded handguns and a car with New Jersey plates. Arriving at the Carman residence, the troopers bypassed the front door and went directly to the back of the house and onto a deck adjoining the kitchen. On the deck, a scuffle ensued between Carroll and Andrew Carman. In a suit under 42 U.S.C.1983, the Carmans challenged Carroll’s warrantless entry onto their’ property. Carroll argued that he did not violate the Carmans’ Fourth Amendment rights because he entered into their curtilage, the area immediately surrounding their home, while executing a legitimate “knock and talk” encounter. The district court denied the Carmans’ judgment as a matter of law on their unlawful entry claims; a jury found that Carroll acted reasonably. The Third Circuit reversed in part. Because Carroll proceeded directly through the back of the property and did not begin his visit at the front door, the “knock and talk” exception to the warrant requirement dd not apply. The court affirmed the jury verdict regarding the unlawful seizure claim; there was sufficient support for the jury’s finding that Carroll acted reasonably.View "Carman v. Carroll" on Justia Law

Detectives Riley and Cunningham conducted a 10-week undercover investigation of Mitchell. On five separate occasions, an informant made controlled purchases of crack cocaine from Mitchell and officers covertly tailed Mitchell to establish his residence. They followed him to various residences, including his mother’s home and a home owned by his wife and ultimately applied for a search warrant for his wife’s residence. Detectives executed the search warrant and recovered 4.5 ounces of cocaine; drug packing paraphernalia, including three plastic bags with a white powdery residue and small plastic bags commonly used for packaging crack cocaine; approximately $6,415 in cash; and, underneath the mattress, a loaded firearm. Mitchell was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924 (a)(2); possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(c); and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) and (c)(2). The district court denied a motion to suppress, holding that the detectives acted in good faith in relying on the warrant. Mitchell was convicted and the Third Circuit affirmed.View "United States v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

In 1985 the bodies of an eight-year-old boy and his seven-year-old sister were found in the basement of a New Jersey apartment building, in which Halsey, then age 24, lived with their mother. The children had been sexually assaulted and mutilated. The killer was ultimately determined to be their next-door neighbor, Hall, who had a record for attempted sexual assault. Hall asked the police whether he would be locked up, but was not considered a suspect at the time. Halsey had an arrest record, but no history of incarceration. Halsey had a sixth-grade education and was “Mildly Mentally Retarded.” Halsey, who had previously worked at the apartment building, was at his new job at another location when he learned about the murders. He returned home and was taken to the police station, where he was isolated in an interview room, accused of the murders, told he had failed a polygraph examination (he had actually passed), and confronted with false evidence. After being interrogated for several days, in a state of great fear, he signed a document purporting to be his confession, with details that investigators must have inserted because Halsey could not have known them. He was convicted, and sentenced to life. He was released 22 years later, after it was clear that he had not committed the offenses. Halsey filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law. The district court granted defendants summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity. The Third Circuit reversed. An officer who fabricates evidence to obtain a conviction violates the defendant’s constitutional right to due process. Without the false confession, there would not have been direct evidence linking Halsey to the crimes so that the prosecutor would not have had cause to prosecute Halsey. View "Halsey v. Pfeiffer" on Justia Law

After receiving a tip in 2005, the DEA began monitoring calls between a confidential informant and Velazquez, tracked co-defendants, recovered nine kilograms of cocaine, and arrested the two co-defendants. An arrest warrant issued for Velazquez in August 2005. The DEA declared Velazquez a fugitive and turned his apprehension over to the U.S. Marshals, which entered Velazquez’s information in the Warrant Information Network. An assistant U.S. attorney sent a copy of the warrant to Velazquez’s counsel, who stipulated that he received it. Neither that attorney nor Velazquez appeared at the arraignment. From November 2005 until November 2010, authorities checked the National Crime Information Center eight times to see if any agency had encountered Velazquez. A DEA agent checked with the U.S. Attorney’s Office annually to make sure the office was still willing to prosecute, ensured that the warrant was still active in the NCIC, and contacted the Marshals Service to ask if they had new information. He put Velazquez on the “Most Wanted” section of the Philadelphia DEA website, but not on the Los Angeles site, where authorities believed Velazquez was living. No law enforcement agency visited addresses identified in 2005 or returned to the home of Velazquez’s brother; no one contacted his parents, his attorney or the Los Angeles agent; and no one searched commercial or other governmental databases. Velazquez was apprehended in 2011, in California on an unrelated narcotics charge. The district court denied his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The Sixth Circuit reversed, applying the four-factor test from two Supreme Court decisions.View "United States v. Velazquez" on Justia Law

In 2009-2010, Delaware, Maryland, and New Jersey had a wave of pharmacy burglaries. The FBI joined the investigation. A suspect emerged: an electrician, Harry Katzin, had recently been caught burglarizing a pharmacy; his brothers also had histories of burglary and theft. Over the following months, the Katzins were repeatedly seen outside pharmacies where phone lines had been cut. After consulting with the U.S. Attorney, but without obtaining a warrant, the FBI affixed a “slap-on” GPS tracker to the exterior of Harry’s van. Within days, state troopers stopped the van on a Pennsylvania highway. Local police notified the troopers that the pharmacy closest to where the van had been parked had been burglarized. Inside the van, troopers found the Katzin brothers. From the outside they could see pill bottles and pharmacy storage bins. The police impounded the van and arrested the brothers. The district court suppressed the evidence found in the van. The Third Circuit initially affirmed. On rehearing, en banc, the Third circuit reversed and applied the good faith exception. While law enforcement officers may one day unreasonably rely on non-binding authority, under these facts, the agents’ conduct was not “sufficiently deliberate” that deterrence will be effective nor “sufficiently culpable” that deterrence outweighs the costs of suppression. View "United States v. Katzin" on Justia Law

Vanterpool was convicted under V.I. Code tit. 14, section 706(1) for obsessive phone calls and faxes to his ex-girlfriend Jacqueline Webster. On appeal, he argued that: Section 706 was unconstitutional under the First Amendment; that his trial counsel’s performance amounted to an ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment; and that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support Vanterpool’s multiple convictions. The Third Circuit remanded. While the First Amendment challenge would have been viable had it been raised during trial, the plain error standard precluded relief on appeal. Trial counsel’s failure to preserve the First Amendment challenge satisfied the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, but the record was insufficient regarding whether trial counsel’s performance fell below professional norms. View "Government of the VI v. Vanterpool" on Justia Law

In 2013, Governor Christie signed AB A3371 into law, providing: A person who is licensed to provide professional counseling ... shall not engage in sexual orientation change efforts with a person under 18 years of age. Plaintiffs provide licensed counseling to minor clients seeking to reduce or eliminate same-sex attractions and include providers of religious-perspective counseling. Plaintiffs describe their efforts as “talk therapy,” involving only verbal communication about potential “root causes” of homosexual behavior, such as childhood sexual trauma or a distant relationship with the same-sex parent, with discussion of “traditional, gender-appropriate behaviors and characteristics” and how the client can foster and develop those behaviors and characteristics. They challenged the law as a violation of their rights to free speech and free exercise of religion and asserted claims on behalf of their minor clients. The district court rejected the First Amendment claims and held that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring claims on behalf of their minor clients. The Third Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the statute is a regulation of professional speech that passes intermediate scrutiny. A3371 does not violate plaintiffs’ right to free exercise of religion, as it is a neutral and generally applicable law that is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. View "King v. Governor of NJ" on Justia Law

Lewis, Shavers, and White committed an armed robbery of a North Philadelphia “speakeasy” in 2005, pointing firearms at customers and employees, ordering them to the floor, and threatening to shoot. They were charged with Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), and conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery; using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and attempted witness tampering. The district court instructed the jury that Lewis was charged with “using and carrying a firearm during the crime of violence.” The jury found the three guilty of the Hobbs Act violations and the section 924(c) violation. Lewis was sentenced to 57 months on the Hobbs Act counts and 84 months’ incarceration, the mandatory minimum, on the section 924 count, for “brandishing” a firearm. The Supreme Court remanded in light of its decision in Alleyne v. U.S., concerning imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence based upon facts that were never charged or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The Third Circuit affirmed Lewis’s sentence, reasoning Alleyne error of the sort alleged here is not structural, but is subject to harmless or plain error analysis under FRCP 52. Lewis essentially conceded that the evidence supported the finding that he brandished a firearm; other testimony clearly demonstrated that Lewis went beyond “use” of a firearm. Given “overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence” in support of the brandishing element, had the jury been properly instructed, it would have found that element beyond a reasonable doubt. Any error was therefore harmless. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Pennsylvania State Police and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration worked with confidential informants and identified Beaver County cocaine distributor, Taylor, and, through wiretaps, were able to observe part of a delivery of cocaine. According to Taylor, who later testified for the government, he drove to a hotel near the Pittsburgh Airport carrying a bag full of cash. He met with the cocaine supplier, Middlebrooks from Houston, who drove to Washington County to pick up the drugs for transfer to Taylor. The DEA obtained a “roving wiretap” on Taylor’s communications, which was used to follow a second transaction between Taylor and Middlebrooks. Agents saw Middlebrooks back his vehicle up to a tractor-trailer rig, open his trunk, and then hand the bag full of packaged cash to a man (Shannon) standing beside the rig. Taylor and Middlebrooks were taken into custody. A black bag containing a large amount of cocaine was found in the trunk of Middlebrooks’s car. Shannon was arrested at the truck stop. Agents found the bag, which contained $669,340, plus $1000 in the truck’s glove compartment. The Third circuit vacated Shannon’s conviction because the government asked inappropriate questions regarding Shannon’s post-arrest silence, in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. View "United States v. Shannon" on Justia Law