Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

DEA agents executed a search warrant in Reading, Pennsylvania and arrested Bui at 1307 Lorraine Road. Bui admitted that “the only reason they purchased that house was to . . . convert it into a marijuana grow factory.” Bui was indicted on: conspiracy to manufacture more than 1,000 marijuana plants, 21 U.S.C. 846; manufacturing, and aiding and abetting the manufacturing, of more than 100 marijuana plants, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. 2; using the house to manufacture and to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 856(a)(1); and manufacturing and distributing marijuana within 1,000 feet of Hampden Park, a school district athletic field, 21 U.S.C. 860(a) and 18 U.S.C. 2. Bui pled guilty to counts one and four and stipulated that the house was within 1000 feet of Hampden Park, so that his base offense level should be increased two levels. According to Bui, he pled guilty because counsel told him he would receive a reduced sentence by doing so and told family members that Bui was eligible for a reduced sentence under the “safety valve,” 18 U.S.C. 3553. At sentencing, counsel withdrew that motion, explaining that section 3553(f) did not apply to 21 U.S.C. 860 convictions. Bui was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 120 months’ imprisonment. The district court rejected his pro se habeas petition. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that Bui’s counsel provided ineffective assistance. View "United States v. Bui" on Justia Law

Norris was arrested in 1999 for aggravated assault. Norris complained; the court appointed new counsel for post-verdict motions, but rejected claims of ineffective assistance and imposed sentence under Pennsylvania’s “three strikes” law. In 2003, Norris filed a pro se petition for collateral relief, asserting that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek dismissal on speedy trial grounds because more than three years elapsed between issuance of the criminal complaint and the trial. The state court dismissed, ruling that the issue lacked merit. On appeal, his attorney (Wolfe) abandoned that argument despite Norris’s insistence that it be included. In pro se filings, Norris presented the argument and claimed ineffective assistance. The court affirmed dismissal, holding that Wolfe had not provided ineffective assistance by declining to make the argument. Norris filed a federal habeas petition, arguing that trial and direct appeal counsel were ineffective in failing to raise the speedy trial issue. The court denied the petition because of procedural default. In 2012, Norris moved for relief from judgment invoking a 2012 Supreme Court holding that attorney error in collateral proceedings may sometimes excuse procedural default of a habeas petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim. The district court denied his motion. The Third Circuit affirmed. Norris’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was presented on initial collateral review and only waived on collateral appeal, so Martinez does not justify relief. View "Norris v. Brooks" on Justia Law

The IRS received information from French authorities concerning United States persons with undisclosed bank accounts at HSBC and issued summonses to the Chabots requesting that they appear to give testimony and produce documents about their foreign bank accounts for the period from January 1, 2006, to December 31, 2009. The Chabots’ attorney notified the IRS that the Chabots would not appear, were asserting their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and would not produce the requested documents. The IRS amended the two summonses, limiting their scope to only those documents required to be maintained under 31 C.F.R. 1010.420. The Chabots continued to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege, and the IRS filed a petition to enforce the amended summonses.The Chabots appealed the district court's grant of the petition. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that six other circuits have held that these records fall within the required records exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege. View "United States v. Chabot" on Justia Law

On June 16, Lokhande was found bleeding on a sidewalk in Independence Park. Lokhande could not recall being assaulted. Robles testified that on that night, he, Baldwin, and Santos drove into Philadelphia, using Baldwin’s sedan with a black hood that did not match the car. Santos and Baldwin exited the car. Robles remained inside, too drunk to walk. Three men joined them, talking and drinking. A man approached and asked for help finding his car. Robles then saw the man “being attacked,” with Baldwin and Santos were “around” the victim; he admitted that “any” or “all” of the men could have attacked the victim. Video surveillance tape showed a tan Ford with a black hood leaving the scene. On June 20, Santos and Baldwin returned to Independence Park and encountered Crumbock and his wife, D, in the same location. Crumbock testified that the men “surrounded” him, two jumped on his back and “punched him,” and his phone and wallet were stolen. A ranger heard D’s screams and ran after the man. Crumbock and D identified Santos. Two days later, police stopped the car with Baldwin, Santos, and Robles inside. The Third Circuit rejected challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, but vacated Baldwin’s conviction because the prosecution’s summation advocated a basis for conviction that was not charged. The court vacated one assault conviction as violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. View "United States v. Centeno" on Justia Law

Edwards was convicted of attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 21 U.S.C. 846, but was acquitted of an accompanying conspiracy charge under section 846. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that the government violated Edwards’s Fifth Amendment rights by repeatedly referring to Edwards’s post-arrest, post-Miranda silence in its case-in-chief and during closing arguments. The error was not harmless. View "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law

In 1973, Doe organized his medical practice as a “professional association,” a type of corporation doctors are permitted to form under New Jersey law. Since its creation, Doe has operated his practice through that entity. As of 2011, the entity employed six people. The government alleges that Doe entered into an illicit agreement with OTE, a blood laboratory, whereby it paid him monetary bribes for referring patients to it for blood testing. A grand jury subpoena was served on the entity’s custodian of records, directing it to turn over documents, including records of patients referred to OTE, lease and consulting agreements, checks received by it for reasons other than patient treatment, correspondence regarding its use of OTE, correspondence with specified individuals and entities, and basic corporate records. The district court denied Doe’s motion to quash. Doe persistently refused to let the entity comply; the court found it in civil contempt. Meanwhile, the entity fired its employees and hired independent contractors, tasked with “[m]aint[aining] accurate and complete medical records, kept in accordance with HIPAA and Patient Privacy standards,” and assisting with billing practices. The Third Circuit affirmed, agreeing that Supreme Court precedent indicated that corporations may not assert a Fifth Amendment privilege, and that the subpoena was not overbroad in violation of the Fourth Amendment. View "In Re: The Matter Of The Grand Jury" on Justia Law

The 1988 Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act requires producers of visual depictions of “actual sexually explicit conduct” to keep records documenting the identity and age of every performer in those depictions, 18 U.S.C. 2257(a). The 2006 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, 18 U.S.C. 2257A, extended similar requirements to producers of depictions of “simulated sexually explicit conduct.” Producers are required to examine “an identification document” for each performer and maintain records listing each performer’s name, date of birth, and any other name that the performer has previously used, and to maintain records, available for inspection “at all reasonable times.” Producers must “affix[] to every copy” of covered depictions “a statement describing where the records required . . . with respect to all performers . . . may be located.” After the district court dismissed a challenge, the Third Circuit identified viable as-applied and facial claims under the First and Fourth Amendments. On remand, the district court upheld the laws except that inspections without prior notice to examine records located in private residences violated the Fourth Amendment. The court granted only declaratory relief. The Third Circuit affirmed in part. The administrative search regime violates the Fourth Amendment as applied; the laws do not violate the First Amendment. View "Free Speech Coal. v. Att'y Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

Around midnight, 15-year old Tabitha had a severe asthma attack at her North Philadelphia home. Her mother, Vargas, called 911. Waiting for the paramedics to arrive, Vargas went outside and found Tabitha lying on the sidewalk, gasping for air. She quickly lapsed into unconsciousness. Tabitha’s cousin unsuccessfully performed CPRl. Neighbors lifted Tabitha into a car belonging to Diaz, so that Diaz could take her to the hospital. Meanwhile, Vargas and Diaz placed five frantic 911 calls between 12:08 a.m. and 12:14 a.m. In response to “a person screaming” in a call made at 12:10 a.m. officers were dispatched. Neither was aware that the call involved a medical emergency. The events following the arrival of the officers at 12:13 are disputed. The family claims the officers blocked Diaz’s car. Both officers assert that they did not. Contemporaneous dispatch records indicate that, from the time the officers noted their arrival, to the time the ambulance arrived, was just over one minute. Paramedics loaded Tabitha into the ambulance and provided CPR. She arrived at the hospital at 12:28, having suffered a severe anoxic brain injury, and died two weeks later. The district court dismissed claims against the city and officers. The Third Circuit affirmed. The undisputed facts show that the actions of the officers were reasonable in responding to a volatile situation. View "Vargas v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

In 2014 the Third Circuit decided King v. Governor of the State of New Jersey, rejecting a challenge brought by licensed counselors to the constitutionality of Assembly Bill A3371, a statute banning the provision of “sexual orientation change efforts” (SOCE) counseling to minors. A similar challenge was filed by a 15-year-old minor seeking to undergo SOCE counseling and by his parents. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal. Having decided, in King, that the statute did not violate the First Amendment rights of those wishing to “speak” the message of SOCE, the court concluded that the statute does not violate the rights of those who wish to receive that message. The court also rejected a parental rights claim. The fundamental rights of parents do not include the right to choose a specific type of provider for a specific medical or mental health treatment that the state has reasonably deemed harmful. View "Doe v. Governor of New Jersey" on Justia Law

Alvarez, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. at a young age without inspection and later adjusted to lawful permanent resident status. He married a U.S. citizen, but is now divorced; he has sons who are citizens. In 2000, while serving in the U.S. Army, he was convicted by a General Court-Martial of giving false official statements (10 U.S.C. 907), sodomy (10 U.S.C. 925), and violating the general article (10 U.S.C. 934). He served 13 months and was released in 2002. ICE agents arrested him in 2012, charging him as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for his conviction on an aggravated felony. He was ordered detained without bond under 8 U.S.C. 1226(c). The district court denied his petition for habeas corpus. The Third Circuit reversed with instructions that Alvarez must be afforded a prompt bond hearing. Beginning sometime after the six-month time-frame considered by the Supreme Court in Demore, the burdens to Alvarez’s liberties outweighed any justification for using presumptions to detain him without bond to further the goals of the statute. The statute’s goals would not have been, and will not be undermined by requiring the government to produce individualized evidence that Alvarez’s continued detention was or is necessary. View "Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York County Prison" on Justia Law