Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Young, a Pennsylvania prisoner with a long history of mental illness, filed suit, alleging violation of his Eighth Amendment rights by securing him in a four-point restraint chair, naked, for 14 hours, although he did not pose a threat to himself or others. Since childhood, Young has been diagnosed with various forms of mental illness, including bipolar disorder and schizo-affective disorder. Since his detention in solitary confinement, consisting of isolation for 23 hours per day and one hour of recreation time in a solitary pen on weekdays, for several years, Young’s symptoms of mental illness have intensified, including visual and auditory hallucinations, paranoid thoughts, throwing and smearing his own feces, episodes of self-harm, and suicidal impulses. The Third Circuit vacated summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Applying the use of excessive force test, analyzing the record under the criteria identified in Supreme Court precedent, and drawing all inferences in favor of Young as the non-moving party, there were genuine disputes as to material facts. View "Young v. Martin" on Justia Law

Munroe was an English teacher, generally considered to be effective and competent. The District granted Munroe tenure in 2010. In 2009, Munroe began a blog, using the name “Natalie M.” She did not expressly identify where she worked or lived, the name of the school or the names of her students. According to Munroe, her blog was meant to be viewed by friends that she had asked to subscribe. There were fewer than 10 subscribed readers, but no password was required for access. Most of the blog posts were unrelated to her school or work. Some postings included complaints about students, her working conditions, and related matters. The District administration first learned of Munroe’s blog in February 2011 when a reporter from a local newspaper began to ask questions; students apparently were commenting on social media.” Munroe was placed on paid suspension and, later, fired. The District had no regulation specifically prohibiting a teacher from blogging on his or her own time. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of Munroe’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit; under the Pickering balancing test, Munroe’s speech, in both effect and tone, was sufficiently disruptive so as to diminish any legitimate interest in its expression, and did not rise to the level of constitutionally protected expression. View "Munroe v. Central Bucks Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The government obtained a warrant to search the email account of Fattah, a U.S. Congressman, who is the subject of an investigation involving federal criminal laws relating to fraud, extortion, and bribery. Fattah alleged that he used the “gmail” account for both personal matters and official business relating to his congressional duties and challenged the unexecuted search warrant on Speech or Debate Clause grounds. The court declined to invalidate the unexecuted search warrant. The Third Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Because an unexecuted search warrant is not separate from the merits of the case and is reviewable on appeal, if a defendant is convicted, it does not qualify for review under the collateral order doctrine. View "In the Matter of the Search of Elec Commc'ns" on Justia Law

Taylor, working at Dollar Express in 2000, observed that manager Ritterson routinely arrived at 5:00 a.m. and would smoke a cigarette on the loading dock with the door open before starting work and that the store contained a safe, but no other security measures. Washington, Johnson, Waddy and Taylor planned a robbery. Johnson carried the gun; Washington drove. Washington and Taylor remained in the car while Waddy and Johnson entered and confronted Ritterson and another employee. Johnson shot them. Washington then ran into the store and helped remove $750 from the safe. Waddy filled a bag with merchandise. When the others returned to the car, Taylor did not take any money. Taylor surrendered and agreed to testify. Waddy also gave a statement. Johnson, Waddy, and Washington were tried together. Washington was convicted of second-degree murder, robbery, and criminal conspiracy. After exhausting state remedies, Washington obtained conditional federal habeas corpus relief, based on his argument that introduction of a jointly-tried non-testifying coconspirator’s confession violated his Confrontation Clause rights. The redacted confession replaced Washington’s name with “someone I know” or “the driver.” The Third Circuit affirmed; no reasonable reading of Supreme Court Confrontation Clause jurisprudence would permit introduction of the redacted confession. Following remand for consideration under the Supreme Court’s decision in White v. Woodall (2014), the Third Circuit again affirmed. View "Washington v. Sec'y PA Dept. of Corrs." on Justia Law

Bar Admission Rule 204 allows an attorney to join the Pennsylvania bar by motion, without taking the state bar exam, if the attorney has graduated from an accredited law school, has either passed the bar exam or practiced law for the “major portion” of five of the preceding seven years in a reciprocal state, remains a member in good standing of every bar to which the attorney has been admitted, obtains a favorable moral character determination in Pennsylvania, achieves a sufficient score on the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam, and has not previously failed the Pennsylvania bar exam. Pennsylvania allows attorneys admitted in any state to apply for pro hac vice admission, limited to a particular case; 38 states and the District of Columbia have reciprocity agreements with Pennsylvania. An organization dedicated to extending reciprocal bar admission to additional states argued that Rule 204 violates the Equal Protection and Privileges or Immunities Clauses, the First Amendment, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, and the Dormant Commerce Clause. The district court and Third Circuit upheld the rule, which does not classify attorneys based on residency, but rather, their state of bar admission, and it does not erect a barrier to migration. View "Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Multijurisdictional Practice v. Castille" on Justia Law

WICO was founded as a coal bunkering business before the U.S. acquired the Virgin Islands (VI) in 1917 and grew to serve as “Port Agent” for cruise lines that visit the port of Charlotte Amalie and to manage the port's Havensight Mall. In 1986, WICO began dredging St. Thomas harbor, leading to public opposition and litigation. In 1993, the VI Government purchased all of the shares of WICO. The purchase was approved by the VI Legislature. The Act stated that “the Company is hereby granted the status and authority of a public corporation and governmental instrumentality … and shall be deemed to be a public entity operating on behalf of the Government, rather than a private corporation.” All WICO shares were transferred to the VI Public Finance Authority, a public corporation and governmental instrumentality. Two former WICO employees filed suit, alleging violations of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed, finding that “WICO cannot be considered a purely public entity,” and that its employees are not public employees, so its conduct could not be considered to have been “under color of state law” for purposes of liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit reversed in part, applying the 1995 Supreme Court decision, Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, to hold that WICO is a government entity for the purposes of Sprauve’s and Smith’s constitutional claims. View "Gershwain Sprauve v. West Indian Company Limited" on Justia Law

Lee’s daughter, Ji, suffered severe mental illness, with suicidal and homicidal ideation. One morning in 1989 police found Lee in the street, retrieving items that Li had thrown out the window. Officers entered the house and found Ji in a manic state, but observed no evidence of violence. At the suggestion of his pastor, Lee took Ji the same day to a religious retreat. Upon arrival, she took a walk and jumped into a body of water; she became agitated and had to be physically restrained. During the night, a fire began in their cabin. Lee escaped, but his daughter died. Lee was charged with arson and murder, based on fire-science and gas-chromatography evidence. The defense argued suicide. Lee was convicted. On appeal, state courts received evidence about developments in fire science that “provided ample reason to question the reliability of the arson investigation,” but denied Lee’s claims. In 1995 Lee filed a pro se post-conviction petition. The Commonwealth did not respond; the petition remained pending. An attorney submitted an amended petition in 2005, claiming newly discovered, exculpatory scientific evidence, and that appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to raise that claim. State courts rejected the argument. Lee filed a federal habeas petition. The Third Circuit reversed a 2010 denial and ordered the district court to grant discovery. On remand the court found that “admission of the fire expert testimony undermined the fundamental fairness of the entire trial” and that the Commonwealth failed to show other “‘ample evidence’ of guilt.” The Third Circuit affirmed the grant of relief. View "Lee v. Superintendent Houtzdale SCI" on Justia Law

Temporary civil commitment at New Jersey psychiatric hospitals is subject to regular review; patients have the right to counsel, to be present at the hearing, to present evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses. In a challenge to the state’s “Rennie process” for forcible medication, the Third Circuit held, in 1984, that civilly committed psychiatric patients “have a qualified constitutional right to refuse antipsychotic medication” in nonemergency situations and the process accommodated that right consistent with the Due Process Clause. A 2010 challenge alleged that the Rennie process violated the Constitution, the Americans With Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act, and demanded that the state “provide patients who refuse the non-emergency administration of psychotropic medication with meaningful due process protections—including legal counsel, notice and a hearing before a judicial decision-maker.” The state replaced the Rennie process with policies for forcible treatment in emergencies (AB 5:04A), which were not challenged, and nonemergent situations (AB 5:04B). The nonemergency policy permits longer-term forcible medication of a patient, involuntarily committed, who, as a result of a diagnosed mental illness, poses a substantial risk of serious harm to self, others, or property “within the reasonably foreseeable future” if psychotropic medication is not administered. Patients who satisfy the substantive requirements may be forcibly medicated only pursuant to procedures that stop short of prior judicial review. The Third Circuit affirmed that AB 5:04B is valid, except as to patients who have been not to require continued commitment but who remain in custody pending transfer. View "Disability Rights N.J., Inc. v. Comm'r N.J. Dep't of Human Servs." on Justia Law

Fazio, a permanent resident alien, was charged with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. Fazio pleaded guilty to the lesser-included offense of conspiring to distribute more than 200 grams but fewer than 300 grams of cocaine, waiving the right to take a direct appeal from his conviction or sentence, except if the government appealed from the sentence or the sentence exceeded the applicable statutory limits or unreasonably exceeded the Sentencing Guidelines range. Fazio waived the right to move to vacate sentence (28 U.S.C. 2255) and the right to file any other collateral proceeding attacking his conviction or sentence. The plea agreement stated: Fazio recognizes that pleading guilty may have consequences with respect to his immigration status … no one, including his own attorney or the district court, can predict to a certainty the effect of his conviction on his immigration status. The court reviewed the waiver in detail at the hearing. The Third Circuit affirmed denial of Fazio’s subsequent 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his sentence, in which he argued that counsel was ineffective in failing to warn Fazio properly of the immigration consequences of his plea, as required by the Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky, 2010. View "United States v. Fazio" on Justia Law

In February 2009, Santini was working at his family’s Harmony Township, New Jersey dairy farm, when a fight broke out. Santini and 10 others witnessed the fight. About 20 local and state police officers arrived after the fight ended. Santini, standing outside of the milk house, spoke with a Greenwich Township officer about what he had witnessed. According to Santini, State Trooper Fuhrmann yelled at Santini to take his hands out of his pockets. Santini maintains that he complied and explained that his hands were cold because he had been working all day milking cows. Fuhrmann responded: “I don’t care. Keep them where I [can] see them.” Santini continued to try to warm his hands and Fuhrmann continued to object. Santini told Fuhrmann that he was going to return to work because he had already told the other officers his story and began to walk away. Santini claims he was kicked, punched, and held on the ground, then was sprayed with pepper spray and handcuffed. His medical records from the incident reveal no lasting injuries. The Troopers’ story differs from Santini’s. The district court rejected Santini’s civil rights suit on summary judgment. The Third Circuit vacated, finding material issues of fact as to whether Santini’s constitutional rights were violated. View "Santini v. Fuentes" on Justia Law