Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Officer Grenier was notified by radio of multiple calls reporting shots fired near the intersection of East 23rd and Crosby Streets, a well-known drug trafficking location. The dispatcher reported that there was a white vehicle heading east on East 23rd Street toward Madison Street. The dispatcher did not further describe the vehicle, its passengers, the identity of the callers, or when the shooting reportedly occurred, but Grenier interpreted the dispatcher’s use of priority tone to indicate that the shooting was in progress. Driving on Madison Street in his marked police car, Grenier observed a white vehicle, driven by West, coming from the location of the reported shooting. Grenier stopped the car. West unsuccessfully moved to suppress a firearm found during a subsequent search. The Third Circuit affirmed his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, finding the stop constitutional. View "United States v. West" on Justia Law

Michtavi, a prisoner, had an operation to treat his prostate performed by Dr. Chopra, who is not a Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employee. After surgery, Michtavi noticed that the quantity of his ejaculate had reduced. He was diagnosed with retrograde ejaculation. Dr. Chopra advised that Psuedofel be prescribed to close the hole that was opened during the laser surgery, to prevent ejaculate from leaking into the bladder. Michtavi was concerned that without treatment, he might become impotent. The BOP did not provide the medication because “[i]t is the Bureau of Prison’s position that the treatment of a sexual dysfunction is not medically necessary, and . . . medical providers are not to talk to inmates about ejaculation, since it is a prohibited sexual act.” The district court stated that “prisoners retain a fundamental right to preserve their procreative abilities for use following release from custody” and, because Michtavi had alleged that retrograde ejaculation could make him sterile, held that his Eighth Amendment claims should survive summary judgment. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because a prisoner’s right to treatment of retrograde ejaculation, infertility, or erectile dysfunction is not clearly established. View "Michtavi v. Scism" on Justia Law

Bare Exposure operates “Atlantic City’s Only All Nude Entertainment.” HMS, a private corporation, leases expressway service plazas from the South Jersey Transportation and New Jersey Turnpike Authorities to operate restaurants and convenience stores. The Authorities are not involved in day-to-day operations or management, but only perform long-term maintenance to parking areas, building exteriors, and lobbies. HMS entered into a contract, allowing CTM to install and service brochure display racks in plaza lobbies. HMS “must approve all brochures or publications” before placement. The Authorities were not a party to the CTM contract. HMS discovered a Bare Exposure brochure in a CTM display rack. HMS instructed CTM to remove all Bare Exposure brochures. HMS did not consult with or receive any direction from the Authorities and did not consider the New Jersey Administrative Code. The Authorities never directed HMS to take any actions regarding the brochures. Bare Exposure contends that the Authorities placed government signs and photographs in lobbies and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that HMS violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of HMS. HMS did act not “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State,” absent direct involvement by state authorities either in the decision to remove the brochures or in general plaza operations. View "P.R.B.A. Corp. v. HMS Host Toll Roads, Inc." on Justia Law

A former inmate claimed that correctional officers violated her constitutional rights when, without proper authorization, they took her from one place of confinement to another where they denied her potable water, clothing, and sanitary napkins and related medications and subjected her to an unlawful body cavity search. The district court granted three defendants summary judgment and dismissed remaining claims against the other defendants, finding that she did not demonstrate that there were issues of material fact and that the complaint did not allege facts constituting a cause of action. The Third Circuit affirmed as to the former New Jersey Attorney General, New Jersey Commissioner of Corrections, and a Correctional Sergeant, but reversed dismissal of cruel and unusual punishment claims against unnamed defendants with respect to: the alleged denial of potable water and sanitary napkins and related medications; the inmate being required to go to the shower or otherwise be exposed while naked in the presence of male prison personnel and inmates; body cavity search claims. View "Chavarriaga v. NJ Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs claim that, since January 2002, the New York City Police Department has conducted a secret program “to monitor the lives of Muslims, their businesses, houses of worship, organizations, and schools in New York City and surrounding states, particularly New Jersey.”.The claim that NYPD mounts remotely-controlled surveillance cameras on light poles, aimed at mosques and sends “undercover officers” into mosques, student organizations, businesses, and neighborhoods that “it believes to be heavily Muslim.” Plaintiffs allege that the program is based on the false and stigmatizing premise that Muslim religious identity “is a permissible proxy for criminality, and that Muslim individuals, businesses, and institutions can therefore be subject to pervasive surveillance not visited upon individuals, businesses, and institutions of any other religious faith or the public at large.” The district court dismissed their suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. The Third Circuit reversed. The allegations “tell a story in which there is standing to complain and which present constitutional concerns that must be addressed and, if true, redressed.” The court analogized the situation to that faced by Jewish-Americans during the Red Scare, African-Americans during the Civil Rights Movement, and Japanese-Americans during World War II. View "Hassan v. City of New York" on Justia Law

In 2000 the Port Authority signed a 30-year lease for the largest marine terminal at Port Elizabeth (445 acres including structures and berthing) with Maher, which handles cargo. The Lease requires “Basic Rental,” (in 2012, $50,413 per acre, totaling $22,433,612) plus “Container Throughput Rental,” based on the type and volume of cargo at Maher’s terminal. For eight years, Maher was exempted from Throughput Rental. Since 2008 the first 356,000 containers are exempted; for containers 356,001 to 980,000, Maher paid $19.00 per container in 2012; and for each additional container, Maher paid $14.25. Maher must handle a minimum amount of cargo to maintain the Lease and pay an annual guaranteed minimum Throughput Rental. Maher paid $12.5 million in Throughput Rental in 2010, and expected the 2012 amount to be $14 million. Maher claims the Port Authority profits from the Lease and uses the revenue to fund harbor improvements and projects unrelated to services provided to Maher or vessels. In 2012 Maher sued, alleging violations of the Constitution’s Tonnage Clause; the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act, 33 U.S.C. 5(b); and the Water Resources Development Act, 33 U.S.C. 2236. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal, agreeing that Maher lacked standing to bring its Tonnage Clause and RHA claims because it was not a protected vessel and did not adequately plead that fees imposed on vessels were not for services rendered. Maher’s WRDA claim failed because Maher had not shown that the Authority imposed fees on vessels or cargo and because the WRDA did not prohibit use of Lease revenue to finance harbor improvements. View "Maher Terminals LLC v. Port Auth. of NY" on Justia Law

In 2000, Bronowicz was charged with crimes ranging from terroristic threats to driving under the influence. He entered a negotiated plea, served his term of imprisonment, and was released. A complicated sequence of probation revocation and sentencing proceedings allegedly had the cumulative effect of unlawfully imposing additional penalties for criminal judgments that had already been satisfied. Bronowicz successfully appealed his additional prison sentence in state court and then filed a federal suit, seeking damages for wrongful incarceration under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed his claims as barred by the 1994 Supreme Court decision, Heck v. Humphrey. The Third Circuit reversed in part, holding that an order from the Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacating a sentence imposed by a court of common pleas constitutes a favorable termination of the proceedings against a plaintiff within the meaning of Heck v. Humphrey, notwithstanding the fact that the order failed expressly to address the inmate’s specific legal challenges to the sentence, so that any section 1983 claims stemming from the invalidated sentence are not barred by Heck. View "Bronowicz v. County of Allegheny" on Justia Law

Lewis, Shavers, and White committed a 2005 armed robbery of a North Philadelphia “speakeasy,” pointing firearms, ordering people to the floor, and threatening to shoot. They were charged with Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a); conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery; using and carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and attempted witness tampering. The court instructed the jury that Lewis was charged with “using and carrying a firearm during the crime of violence.” The jury found the three guilty. Lewis was sentenced to 57 months on the Hobbs Act counts and 84 months’ incarceration, the mandatory minimum, on the section 924 count, for “brandishing” a firearm. The Supreme Court remanded in light of its decision in Alleyne v. U.S., concerning imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence based upon facts that were never charged or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The Third Circuit initially affirmed, finding harmless error, but subsequently vacated and remanded. Lewis was sentenced for brandishing, but was convicted of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, which has a shorter mandatory minimum sentence. Lewis was never indicted for brandishing. The error contributed to the sentence and was not harmless. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

J.B., age 12, got into a fight and brandished a homemade knife over a neighborhood girl, stating that could kill her. A parent called the state police. J.B. admitted to threatening to break a girl’s arms and to holding the knife. J.B.’s father was told that charges of terroristic threats and summary harassment would be filed. Three weeks later, a juvenile allegation was filed. J.B. was transported to the Lancaster County Youth Intervention Center, processed, and subjected to a strip search pursuant to LYIC policy to look for signs of “injuries, markings, skin conditions, signs of abuse, or further contraband.” J.B. stood behind a curtain so that only the officer conducting the search could observe him, removed his pants and underwear for approximately 90 seconds, and was asked to bend over, spread his buttocks, and cough. J.B. was detained for three days. He ultimately entered into a consent decree with an opportunity to have his record expunged. In his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for false arrest, unreasonable search and seizure, false imprisonment, and violations of due process, the Third Circuit concluded that defendants were entitled to partial summary judgment. The Supreme Court holding in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, that all arrestees committed to general population of a detention center may be subject to a close visual inspection while undressed, applies to juvenile offenders admitted to general population in a juvenile detention center. View "J. B. v. Fassnacht" on Justia Law

Saranchak entered open plea of guilty to murdering his grandmother and uncle and was convicted on two counts of first-degree murder following a non-jury degree-of-guilt hearing. A jury found that Saranchak should be sentenced to death for his crimes. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed Saranchak’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Saranchak then sought state post-conviction relief, asserting that his attorney, Watkins, had been constitutionally ineffective. The same judge who had presided over both phases of his trial denied relief under the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 9541–9546, The PCRA court—the same judge who presided over both phases of Saranchak’s trial. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. The district court denied Saranchak’s federal habeas petition. The Third Circuit affirmed in part, rejecting an argument that the degree-of-guilt phase of his trial was suffused with prejudice from the cumulative errors arising out of his counsel’s performance at trial. The Third Circuit reversed with respect to the death sentence, finding that the court did not adequately evaluate mitigation evidence concerning Saranchak's childhood and mental health. View "Saranchak v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law