Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Lewis, Shavers, and White committed a 2005 armed robbery of a North Philadelphia “speakeasy,” pointing firearms, ordering people to the floor, and threatening to shoot. They were charged with Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a); conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery; using and carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and attempted witness tampering. The court instructed the jury that Lewis was charged with “using and carrying a firearm during the crime of violence.” The jury found the three guilty. Lewis was sentenced to 57 months on the Hobbs Act counts and 84 months’ incarceration, the mandatory minimum, on the section 924 count, for “brandishing” a firearm. The Supreme Court remanded in light of its decision in Alleyne v. U.S., concerning imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence based upon facts that were never charged or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The Third Circuit initially affirmed, finding harmless error, but subsequently vacated and remanded. Lewis was sentenced for brandishing, but was convicted of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, which has a shorter mandatory minimum sentence. Lewis was never indicted for brandishing. The error contributed to the sentence and was not harmless. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

J.B., age 12, got into a fight and brandished a homemade knife over a neighborhood girl, stating that could kill her. A parent called the state police. J.B. admitted to threatening to break a girl’s arms and to holding the knife. J.B.’s father was told that charges of terroristic threats and summary harassment would be filed. Three weeks later, a juvenile allegation was filed. J.B. was transported to the Lancaster County Youth Intervention Center, processed, and subjected to a strip search pursuant to LYIC policy to look for signs of “injuries, markings, skin conditions, signs of abuse, or further contraband.” J.B. stood behind a curtain so that only the officer conducting the search could observe him, removed his pants and underwear for approximately 90 seconds, and was asked to bend over, spread his buttocks, and cough. J.B. was detained for three days. He ultimately entered into a consent decree with an opportunity to have his record expunged. In his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for false arrest, unreasonable search and seizure, false imprisonment, and violations of due process, the Third Circuit concluded that defendants were entitled to partial summary judgment. The Supreme Court holding in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, that all arrestees committed to general population of a detention center may be subject to a close visual inspection while undressed, applies to juvenile offenders admitted to general population in a juvenile detention center. View "J. B. v. Fassnacht" on Justia Law

Saranchak entered open plea of guilty to murdering his grandmother and uncle and was convicted on two counts of first-degree murder following a non-jury degree-of-guilt hearing. A jury found that Saranchak should be sentenced to death for his crimes. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed Saranchak’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Saranchak then sought state post-conviction relief, asserting that his attorney, Watkins, had been constitutionally ineffective. The same judge who had presided over both phases of his trial denied relief under the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 9541–9546, The PCRA court—the same judge who presided over both phases of Saranchak’s trial. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. The district court denied Saranchak’s federal habeas petition. The Third Circuit affirmed in part, rejecting an argument that the degree-of-guilt phase of his trial was suffused with prejudice from the cumulative errors arising out of his counsel’s performance at trial. The Third Circuit reversed with respect to the death sentence, finding that the court did not adequately evaluate mitigation evidence concerning Saranchak's childhood and mental health. View "Saranchak v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Young, a Pennsylvania prisoner with a long history of mental illness, filed suit, alleging violation of his Eighth Amendment rights by securing him in a four-point restraint chair, naked, for 14 hours, although he did not pose a threat to himself or others. Since childhood, Young has been diagnosed with various forms of mental illness, including bipolar disorder and schizo-affective disorder. Since his detention in solitary confinement, consisting of isolation for 23 hours per day and one hour of recreation time in a solitary pen on weekdays, for several years, Young’s symptoms of mental illness have intensified, including visual and auditory hallucinations, paranoid thoughts, throwing and smearing his own feces, episodes of self-harm, and suicidal impulses. The Third Circuit vacated summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Applying the use of excessive force test, analyzing the record under the criteria identified in Supreme Court precedent, and drawing all inferences in favor of Young as the non-moving party, there were genuine disputes as to material facts. View "Young v. Martin" on Justia Law

Munroe was an English teacher, generally considered to be effective and competent. The District granted Munroe tenure in 2010. In 2009, Munroe began a blog, using the name “Natalie M.” She did not expressly identify where she worked or lived, the name of the school or the names of her students. According to Munroe, her blog was meant to be viewed by friends that she had asked to subscribe. There were fewer than 10 subscribed readers, but no password was required for access. Most of the blog posts were unrelated to her school or work. Some postings included complaints about students, her working conditions, and related matters. The District administration first learned of Munroe’s blog in February 2011 when a reporter from a local newspaper began to ask questions; students apparently were commenting on social media.” Munroe was placed on paid suspension and, later, fired. The District had no regulation specifically prohibiting a teacher from blogging on his or her own time. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of Munroe’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit; under the Pickering balancing test, Munroe’s speech, in both effect and tone, was sufficiently disruptive so as to diminish any legitimate interest in its expression, and did not rise to the level of constitutionally protected expression. View "Munroe v. Central Bucks Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The government obtained a warrant to search the email account of Fattah, a U.S. Congressman, who is the subject of an investigation involving federal criminal laws relating to fraud, extortion, and bribery. Fattah alleged that he used the “gmail” account for both personal matters and official business relating to his congressional duties and challenged the unexecuted search warrant on Speech or Debate Clause grounds. The court declined to invalidate the unexecuted search warrant. The Third Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Because an unexecuted search warrant is not separate from the merits of the case and is reviewable on appeal, if a defendant is convicted, it does not qualify for review under the collateral order doctrine. View "In the Matter of the Search of Elec Commc'ns" on Justia Law

Taylor, working at Dollar Express in 2000, observed that manager Ritterson routinely arrived at 5:00 a.m. and would smoke a cigarette on the loading dock with the door open before starting work and that the store contained a safe, but no other security measures. Washington, Johnson, Waddy and Taylor planned a robbery. Johnson carried the gun; Washington drove. Washington and Taylor remained in the car while Waddy and Johnson entered and confronted Ritterson and another employee. Johnson shot them. Washington then ran into the store and helped remove $750 from the safe. Waddy filled a bag with merchandise. When the others returned to the car, Taylor did not take any money. Taylor surrendered and agreed to testify. Waddy also gave a statement. Johnson, Waddy, and Washington were tried together. Washington was convicted of second-degree murder, robbery, and criminal conspiracy. After exhausting state remedies, Washington obtained conditional federal habeas corpus relief, based on his argument that introduction of a jointly-tried non-testifying coconspirator’s confession violated his Confrontation Clause rights. The redacted confession replaced Washington’s name with “someone I know” or “the driver.” The Third Circuit affirmed; no reasonable reading of Supreme Court Confrontation Clause jurisprudence would permit introduction of the redacted confession. Following remand for consideration under the Supreme Court’s decision in White v. Woodall (2014), the Third Circuit again affirmed. View "Washington v. Sec'y PA Dept. of Corrs." on Justia Law

Bar Admission Rule 204 allows an attorney to join the Pennsylvania bar by motion, without taking the state bar exam, if the attorney has graduated from an accredited law school, has either passed the bar exam or practiced law for the “major portion” of five of the preceding seven years in a reciprocal state, remains a member in good standing of every bar to which the attorney has been admitted, obtains a favorable moral character determination in Pennsylvania, achieves a sufficient score on the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam, and has not previously failed the Pennsylvania bar exam. Pennsylvania allows attorneys admitted in any state to apply for pro hac vice admission, limited to a particular case; 38 states and the District of Columbia have reciprocity agreements with Pennsylvania. An organization dedicated to extending reciprocal bar admission to additional states argued that Rule 204 violates the Equal Protection and Privileges or Immunities Clauses, the First Amendment, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, and the Dormant Commerce Clause. The district court and Third Circuit upheld the rule, which does not classify attorneys based on residency, but rather, their state of bar admission, and it does not erect a barrier to migration. View "Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Multijurisdictional Practice v. Castille" on Justia Law

WICO was founded as a coal bunkering business before the U.S. acquired the Virgin Islands (VI) in 1917 and grew to serve as “Port Agent” for cruise lines that visit the port of Charlotte Amalie and to manage the port's Havensight Mall. In 1986, WICO began dredging St. Thomas harbor, leading to public opposition and litigation. In 1993, the VI Government purchased all of the shares of WICO. The purchase was approved by the VI Legislature. The Act stated that “the Company is hereby granted the status and authority of a public corporation and governmental instrumentality … and shall be deemed to be a public entity operating on behalf of the Government, rather than a private corporation.” All WICO shares were transferred to the VI Public Finance Authority, a public corporation and governmental instrumentality. Two former WICO employees filed suit, alleging violations of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed, finding that “WICO cannot be considered a purely public entity,” and that its employees are not public employees, so its conduct could not be considered to have been “under color of state law” for purposes of liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit reversed in part, applying the 1995 Supreme Court decision, Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, to hold that WICO is a government entity for the purposes of Sprauve’s and Smith’s constitutional claims. View "Gershwain Sprauve v. West Indian Company Limited" on Justia Law

Lee’s daughter, Ji, suffered severe mental illness, with suicidal and homicidal ideation. One morning in 1989 police found Lee in the street, retrieving items that Li had thrown out the window. Officers entered the house and found Ji in a manic state, but observed no evidence of violence. At the suggestion of his pastor, Lee took Ji the same day to a religious retreat. Upon arrival, she took a walk and jumped into a body of water; she became agitated and had to be physically restrained. During the night, a fire began in their cabin. Lee escaped, but his daughter died. Lee was charged with arson and murder, based on fire-science and gas-chromatography evidence. The defense argued suicide. Lee was convicted. On appeal, state courts received evidence about developments in fire science that “provided ample reason to question the reliability of the arson investigation,” but denied Lee’s claims. In 1995 Lee filed a pro se post-conviction petition. The Commonwealth did not respond; the petition remained pending. An attorney submitted an amended petition in 2005, claiming newly discovered, exculpatory scientific evidence, and that appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to raise that claim. State courts rejected the argument. Lee filed a federal habeas petition. The Third Circuit reversed a 2010 denial and ordered the district court to grant discovery. On remand the court found that “admission of the fire expert testimony undermined the fundamental fairness of the entire trial” and that the Commonwealth failed to show other “‘ample evidence’ of guilt.” The Third Circuit affirmed the grant of relief. View "Lee v. Superintendent Houtzdale SCI" on Justia Law