Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The fathers of minor children in New Jersey challenged the state law governing child custody proceedings between New Jersey parents. In a suit against state court judges, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, they argued that the “best interests of the child” standard that New Jersey courts use to determine custody in a dispute between two fit parents is unconstitutional. The fathers alleged that their parental rights were restricted, or that they were permanently or temporarily separated from their children, by order of the New Jersey family courts without adequate notice, the right to counsel, or a plenary hearing, i.e. without an opportunity to present evidence or cross-examine and that although mothers and fathers are, in theory, treated equally in custody disputes under New Jersey law, in practice courts favor mothers. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of the suit, after holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar the suit, which was not challenging the state court judgments, but the underlying policy that governed those judgments. The court concluded that the judicial defendants were not proper defendants, having acted in an adjudicatory capacity and not in an enforcement capacity. View "Allen v. DeBello" on Justia Law

Members of the notorious Salvadoran gang, MS13, shot Serrano-Alberto's brother, leaving him paralyzed; extorted Serrano-Alberto , an acclaimed professional soccer player; and, when he ceased to pay, shot Serrano-Alberto, his nephew, and a neighbor, killing the neighbor and leaving the others in serious condition. Police refused to take a report because Serrano-Alberto did not know the names of the shooters. Fearing reprisal, Serrano-Alberto twice attempted to flee but was returned by Mexican authorities. In 2009-2012, Serrano-Alberto was imprisoned in El Salvador on extortion charges; he was ultimately absolved. Gang members continued to search for him. They shot another his brothers for refusing to divulge Serrano-Alberto’s whereabouts. In 2012, Serrano-Alberto escaped harm in a drive-by shooting by diving under a car. Serrano-Alberto moved multiple times. His mother warned that gang members were continuing to pursue him. In 2014, Serrano-Alberto observed apparent gang members in his new neighborhood and fled to the U.S.He was apprehended and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. At his hearing, the IJ was “confrontational, dismissive, and hostile, interrupting and belittling Serrano-Alberto’s testimony, time and again cutting off his answers to questions, and nitpicking immaterial inconsistencies.” She ordered removal. The BIA denied relief. The Third Circuit vacated and urged reassignment on remand. The Fifth Amendment protects the liberty of all persons within U.S. borders, including aliens in immigration proceedings who are entitled to a meaningful opportunity to be heard. View "Serrano-Alberto v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Vickers punched his victim once but the victim suffered a fractured skull, brain hemorrhaging, and was in a coma for four days. Pennsylvania law provides that for a criminal case to be tried without a jury, “[t]he judge shall ascertain from the defendant whether this is a knowing and intelligent waiver, and such colloquy shall appear on the record. The waiver shall be in writing, made a part of the record, and signed by the defendant, the attorney for the Commonwealth, the judge, and the defendant’s attorney.” Those procedures were not followed in Vickers’s case. The judge found Vickers guilty. Vickers sought state post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. Because Vickers’s private attorney had been replaced by a public defender, the attorney was unaware that the process had not been followed, but recommended that Vickers pursue a bench trial for strategic reasons and thought that Vickers wanted a bench trial. The court concluded that Vickers “freely, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his jury trial rights.” Vickers sought habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Third Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of relief. The proper prejudice inquiry is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for his counsel’s deficient performance, Vickers would have exercised his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. He failed to make that showing. View "Vickers v. Superintendent Graterford SCI" on Justia Law

Officers executed sealed search warrants at the home and office of Fattah. More than two years later, a grand jury indicted Fattah on 23 counts relating to bank fraud and tax evasion. Before the indictment, the press learned about the investigation; reporters waited at Fattah’s home to report the story. At Fattah’s trial, an FBI agent admitted that he had disclosed confidential information to a reporter in exchange for information pertinent to the investigation. Fattah argued that the agent’s conduct violated the Sixth Amendment because the pre-indictment press caused him to lose his job, which rendered him unable to retain the counsel of his choice, and that the agent’s conduct violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process. The Third Circuit affirmed Fattah’s convictions, noting that Fattah’s claim to unrealized income was contradicted by his statements and actions and that the FBI agent’s actions were not “so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction.” View "United States v. Fattah" on Justia Law

A Harrisburg, Pennsylvania ordinance prohibits persons to “knowingly congregate, patrol, picket or demonstrate in a zone extending 20 feet from any portion of an entrance to, exit from, or driveway of a health care facility.” Individuals purporting to provide “sidewalk counseling” to those entering abortion clinics claimed that the ordinance violated their First Amendment rights to speak, exercise their religion, and assemble, and their due process and equal protection rights. The court determined that the ordinance was content-neutral because it did not define or regulate speech by subject-matter or purpose, so that intermediate scrutiny applied, and reasoned that it must accept as true (on a motion to dismiss) claims that the city did not consider less restrictive alternatives. The claims proceeded to discovery. In denying preliminary injunctive relief, the court ruled that plaintiffs did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. The Third Circuit vacated. In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs normally bear the burden of demonstrating likelihood of prevailing on the merits. In First Amendment cases where the government bears the burden of proof on the ultimate question of a statute’s constitutionality, plaintiffs must be deemed likely to prevail for purposes of considering a preliminary injunction unless the government has shown that plaintiffs’ proposed less restrictive alternatives are less effective than the statute. View "Reilly v. City of Harrisburg" on Justia Law

Roquet, is a psychologist at the Avenel Special Treatment Unit (STU), where Oliver, a sexually violent predator, has been civilly committed for treatment. At least annually, the Treatment Progress Review Committee (TPRC) interviews each detainee and considers a range of materials to formulate a recommendation about whether the patient should progress to the next step in the program. Roquet, a member of the TPRC, wrote a report that recommended that Oliver not advance in treatment. The Report recognized that this was “not consistent” with Oliver’s treatment team's recommendation, but concluded that Oliver “had not fully met the treatment goals,” provided a detailed overview of Oliver’s sexual and non-sexual offenses, diagnostic history, and clinical treatment, and summarized the results of Oliver's interview, including that “it appears that he denies, minimizes or justifies much of his documented offense history,” and that “[h]e did not demonstrate remorse for his crimes or empathy for his victims.” Oliver sued, alleging retaliation for his First Amendment-protected participation in legal activities on behalf of himself and other STU residents. The Third Circuit concluded that Roquet was entitled to qualified immunity, reasoning that Oliver pleaded facts reflecting that Roquet based her recommendation on the medically-relevant collateral consequences of his protected activity, but has not sufficiently pleaded that the recommendation was based on the protected activity itself. View "Oliver v. Roquet" on Justia Law

Counsel was ineffective in failing to object to jury instruction concerning eyewitness testimony, using the words “may not” rather than “need not.” Bey was convicted of murder, attempted murder, and possessing an instrument of crime, based on a nonfatal shooting and a fatal shooting that took place in 2001. Philadelphia Police Officer Taylor was in the parking lot during the shooting: his identification of Bey as the shooter was consistent and unequivocal. However, in statements to Bey’s then-defense counsel, the surviving victim said that his shooter was not Bey. Defense counsel requested a “Kloiber” jury instruction. In instructing the jury, the court changed a word, telling jurors that they “may not” receive an identification with caution rather than instructing them that they “need not” receive the identification with caution. Defense counsel did not object. In his unsuccessful petition for state post-conviction relief, Bey raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on the Kloiber instruction, but failed to highlight the “may not” language. The federal district court held that, to the extent that Bey’s ineffective assistance claims were not procedurally defaulted, Bey could not show prejudice because “there was overwhelming evidence of guilt.” The Third Circuit reversed, based on the Kloiber claim, finding cause to excuse Bey’s procedural default. View "Bey v. Superintendent Greene SCI" on Justia Law

Pretrial detainee’s due process rights were not violated by placement in administrative segregation and restriction of phone privileges pending investigation of misconduct. While Steele was a pretrial detainee at New Jersey’s Middlesex County Adult Correction Center, officials received credible information that Steele was threatening other detainees in order to coerce them into using Speedy Bail Bond Service and was receiving compensation from Speedy. After interviewing Steele and advising him of the allegations, officials placed him in administrative segregation while they investigated. Steele’s telephone privileges were restricted to legal calls only. Steele filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violations of his due process rights when the defendants transferred him to administrative segregation and restricted his phone privileges, interfering with his ability to find a co-signer for his own bail. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for all defendants. Defendants’ limitation of Steele’s phone privileges did not “shock the conscience.” Steele has not met his heavy burden of showing that defendants exaggerated their response to the genuine security considerations that actuated his move. Steele’s transfer was for institutional security reasons rather than for discipline or punishment and he was accorded the required level of process. View "Steele v. Cicchi" on Justia Law

In 2008, the Delaware correctional system was facing scandal for its handling of inmate releases. One inmate committed suicide in his cell on the day he was supposed to be—but was not—released. Dozens of others had either been released too early or too late. Reform consisted of establishment of a new Central Offender Records office within the Delaware Department of Corrections. Inmates who were over-detained sued top correctional officials in a putative class action, claiming that Delaware’s problems with over-detentions have, if anything, gotten worse since 2008. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court noted that “hard, reliable data about the number of over-detentions occurring each year is more or less missing from the record.” To survive summary judgment on an allegation of deliberate indifference, the plaintiffs needed more than speculation connecting any increase in over-detentions with the COR policies they deem ineffective. View "Wharton v. Danberg" on Justia Law

Brandon, convicted of burglary, was sentenced to 16–48 months’ imprisonment. During intake, Brandon informed mental health staff that he had attempted suicide, had recently engaged in self-harm, and had plans about how to kill himself. Brandon was diagnosed with serious mental disorders, identified as a “suicide behavior risk,” and placed on the mental health roster. During his incarceration at Pennsylania's SCI Cresson, Brandon reported suicidal thoughts. Brandon did not receive counseling or evaluation; any mental health interviews were conducted “through the cell door slot in the solitary confinement unit.” Brandon was repeatedly subjected to solitary confinement. Most SCI Cresson incidents of self-harm occurred in solitary confinement. During Brandon’s incarceration, the U.S. Department of Justice investigated allegations that SCI Cresson provided inadequate mental health care, failed to adequately protect prisoners, and subjected them to excessive periods of isolation. Ultimately, the DOJ reported “systemwide failure” to consider mental health issues appropriately, a “fragmented and ineffective” mental healthcare program, insufficient staffing, poor recordkeeping, screening and diagnostic procedures, deficient oversight and lack of training in the proper response to warning signs by mentally ill prisoners. Brandon, age 23, committed suicide while in solitary confinement. The Third Circuit reversed dismissal of his parents’ civil rights claims. Their allegations support an inference that, despite knowing of Brandon’s vulnerability and the increased risk of suicide in solitary confinement, the defendants disregarded that risk and permitted Brandon to be repeatedly isolated in solitary confinement. View "Palakovic v. Wetzel" on Justia Law