Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Rinaldi, a Lewisburg inmate, alleged that he had been assaulted by Cellmate 1. His informal and subsequent formal "Assault Requests" were denied. The following day, Rinaldi was transferred. According to Rinaldi, Counselor Baysore had warned Rinaldi that unless he stopped filing requests, she would have him placed with a cellmate who was known for assaulting his cellmates. Officer Gee allegedly told Rinaldi he was being moved was because he “didn’t listen.” Cellmate 2, Rinaldi alleges, threatened to kill Rinaldi. Rinaldi claims he “suffered cuts and bruises and emotional distress” from altercations with Cellmate 2. Rinaldi allegedly was concerned about further retaliation and did not file an informal resolution with Lewisburg. He filed his “Retaliation Request” with the Regional Director, where it was rejected with directions to file it at Lewisburg. Separately, Rinaldi sought relief for the assault by Cellmate 2. The Regional Director responded: [T]here is no record of you being assaulted by your previous or current cellmate. . . your appeal is denied." Rinaldi’s further appeal to the General Counsel was denied on the merits. The Third Circuit vacated, in part, the dismissal of RInaldi’s claims. Rinaldi’s Assault Request was denied at the highest level on the merits and was properly exhausted under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). Rinaldi’s Retaliation Request satisfies the objective test for unavailability. Accepting his allegations as true, “a reasonable inmate of ordinary firmness and fortitude” would be “deter[red] . . . from lodging a grievance.” A Federal Tort Claims Act claim was properly dismissed as concerning discretionary functions. View "Rinaldi v. United States" on Justia Law

Jutrowski was involved in a single-car accident while intoxicated. During his subsequent arrest, Jutrowski was kicked in the face, breaking his eye socket. Two Riverdale Police Officers and two New Jersey State Troopers involved in the arrest and their employers acknowledge that an officer kicked Jutrowski. Each officer asserts he neither inflicted the blow nor saw who did so. Jutrowski, whose face was pinned to the pavement when the kick occurred, cannot identify his assailant. Jutrowski brought excessive force and conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court, relying on Third Circuit precedent that a civil rights action defendant must have “personal involvement” in the alleged wrongs, determined that Jutrowski’s inability to identify his attacker defeated his claims and granted the defendants summary judgment. The Third Circuit affirmed as to Jutrowski’s excessive force claim but reversed and remanded his conspiracy claim. Despite the unfortunate situation created for plaintiffs who are unable to identify their attackers through no fault of their own, a plaintiff alleging that one or more officers engaged in unconstitutional conduct must establish the “personal involvement” of each named defendant to survive summary judgment. Nonetheless, where a plaintiff adduces sufficient evidence of an after-the-fact conspiracy to cover up misconduct, even of an unidentified officer, he may be able to state a claim for the violation of the due process right of access to the courts. View "Jutrowski v. Township of Riverdale" on Justia Law

Workman, one of two people to shoot Hunt in 2006, was convicted of first-degree murder in Pennsylvania on a theory of transferred intent. His trial counsel, pursuing “a unique theory of criminal liability,” did not meaningfully test the Commonwealth’s case, having told Workman that he could not be convicted of murder because Hunt was already dead when he was struck by Workman’s bullet. Based on this representation, Workman declined a plea bargain for a 20-year term of imprisonment. Workman’s post-conviction counsel failed to make a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on failure to present a cogent defense. The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of his habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254. Although his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was procedurally defaulted in state post-conviction relief proceedings, that default should be excused because his state post-conviction counsel rendered ineffective assistance. On the face of the record, trial counsel’s assistance was manifestly ineffective, having included calling no witnesses, presenting no evidence, and arguing inconsistently with the testimony in evidence. View "Workman v. Superintendent Albion SCI" on Justia Law

Brown, a federal prisoner. filed his “Kemmerer” complaint, alleging that prison officials had injured him by placing him in restraints; he successfully moved to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which waives fees if the prisoner demonstrates that he cannot afford the fees. Under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), the “three strikes rule,” a prisoner cannot proceed IFP if he has on three or more prior occasions, brought an action that was dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim. Brown later filed his “Sage” complaint, alleging that prison employees were deliberately indifferent to his serious mental health issues. Brown again sought to proceed IFP. Brown subsequently filed an explanation that he had been informed that he had three strikes and would invoke section 1915(g)’s “imminent danger” exception. The court denied Brown’s motion in Sage, concluding that he did not qualify for the exception, and vacated its Kemmerer IFP decision. Brown then filed his third Bivens action, claiming that a prison physician assistant denied him treatment for burns after he spilled hot water on himself. The court again held he did not meet the exception and dismissed the case. In consolidated appeals, the Third Circuit reversed, concluding that it must use its own precedent to evaluate whether prior cases are strikes, rather than that of the Circuit from which the potential strikes emanated. Brown's third "strike" did not qualify because the case was closed for failure to state a claim without having actually been filed in the district court. View "Brown v. Sage" on Justia Law

A shooting death occurred during a 2000 fight between the victim, Preston, and Preston’s brother Leonard. Leonard took the stand at his own trial and was convicted of third-degree murder. Preston was later convicted and is serving a 20-40-year sentence for third-degree murder. Preston sought habeas relief based on an alleged violation of his Confrontation Clause rights. Faced with Leonard's invocation of the Fifth Amendment (his appeal was pending) the trial court had allowed the Commonwealth to use Leonard’s police statement and his prior testimony. The prosecutor read aloud portions of those statements, occasionally stopping to ask Leonard if he remembered making them. Leonard largely replied “no comment.” The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Preston’s petition. While the use of the prior statements against Preston violated the Confrontation Clause, Preston’s Confrontation Clause claim was procedurally defaulted. Rejecting Preston’s argument that counsel’s failure to raise an objection at trial provided cause to excuse the procedural default, the court stated that Preston failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was constitutionally ineffective under the two-pronged "Strickland" test. Preston cannot show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure, which was objectively unreasonable, given the cumulative evidence against him. Even absent Leonard’s testimony, the jury would have concluded that Leonard was the shooter. View "Preston v. Superintendent Graterford SCI" on Justia Law

The Church’s Deacons recommended Lee as pastor under a 20-year agreement, subject to for-cause early termination. If the Church removed Lee without cause, it would be required to pay Lee salary and benefits for the unexpired term. The agreement specified that Lee could be terminated for cause if he “commits any serious moral or criminal offense” or if he became incapacitated; it allowed either party to terminate upon “material breach.” During a 2013 congregation meeting, Lee stated that “just cause” would occur if the Church was "not growing ... stagnant, ... not a better place,” and that “if [he did not] perform [his] duties well, [he would be] out.” Based on these statements, the congregation approved the agreement. In December 2014, Church leaders recommended voiding the employment contract, reporting that from 2013-14, there was a 39% decline in offerings, a 32% drop in Sunday worship attendance, a 61% decrease in registered members, a doubling of expenditures, and a decline in the quality of community outreach. Lee had scheduled but cancelled several meetings to discuss these issues. The congregation voted to terminate Lee’s employment. Lee sued, alleging breach of contract due to termination without cause, seeking $2,643,996.40 in damages. The Third Circuit affirmed rejection of the suit on summary judgment. Adjudication of Lee’s claim would impermissibly entangle the court in religious doctrine in violation of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. View "Lee v. Sixth Mount Zion Baptist Church of Pittsburgh" on Justia Law

Edison, New Jersey, Police Officer Bradley and his partner saw a minivan on the road at night without headlights, while its driver was using a mobile phone and had an obstructed view. They pulled over the van, driven by Roberts; Clark was a passenger. The traffic stop lasted about 23 minutes from the time Officer Bradley arrived at the driver-side window until he discovered a handgun and a marijuana cigarette on Clark. The district court concluded that the traffic stop was impermissibly extended so that evidence seized after the stop should have ended may be suppressed, citing the Supreme Court’s 2015 “Rodriguez” holding. The Third Circuit affirmed the suppression of the evidence. Given the information confronting Bradley when he confirmed through the computerized check that Roberts was authorized to drive the vehicle, and when there was no fact calling that authority into doubt, Bradley no longer could have reasonably questioned it. Bradley’s inquiry into Roberts’ criminal history was not tied to the traffic stop’s mission, and, at that point, “tasks tied to the traffic infraction . . . reasonably should have been . . . completed.” The questions therefore impermissibly extended the stop. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania State Police employed Conard for 17 years as a 911 dispatcher. Conard left her employment in 2002 to move with her husband, who was on active military deployment. She had “outstanding personnel evaluations” but her supervisors, Tripp and Hile, had disagreements with Conard, arising from Conard’s earlier lawsuit. Conard returned to Pennsylvania in 2004 and reapplied for her position. The Police told Conard that she would be hired subject to a background check but ultimately did not offer her employment. Conard alleges that she was told that Hile and Tripp caused rejection of her application. Conard filed an administrative charge of gender discrimination, then filed her initial civil rights action, alleging retaliation. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal. Conard alleges that in the following years, she was unable to obtain employment because the defendants gave prospective employers “negative, false, and defamatory” statements in response to reference requests and stated that “[she] was not eligible to return.” The district court held that most of Conard’s claims were barred, having been adjudicated in her prior action, and dismissed her retaliation claim. The Third Circuit reversed as to Conard’s First Amendment retaliation claim. The framework for First Amendment claims brought by government employees against their employers does not apply to Conard’s claim, because the speech which Conard alleges triggered the retaliation—filing administrative complaints and a lawsuit—occurred after she had left her employment. While significant time passed between Conard’s earlier complaint and the alleged retaliation, there is no bright-line rule for the time that may pass between protected speech and actionable retaliation. View "Conard v. Pennsylvania State Police" on Justia Law

In 2006, Geness lived at McVey's Uniontown Pennsylvania assisted living facility for intellectually disabled people. Another resident, Fiffik, fell from the porch, sustaining serious injuries. Fiffik was discharged from the hospital that day but returned that evening. His condition deteriorated, resulting in his death weeks later. Three contemporaneous records from the day of the incident indicated that Fiffik merely fell in an accident. Despite these reports by Fiffik and his wife, once Fiffik was on life support, his daughter reported that her father might have been shoved. Officer Cox conducted a one-day investigation, speaking to Fiffik’s daughter, hospital personnel, and McVey. With a possible lawsuit looming, McVey reported for the first time that immediately before Fiffik’s fall he heard Geness scream “shut up” and then saw Geness walk quickly to his bedroom. Cox reported that after Geness signed a Miranda waiver, he provided a confession closely tracking McVey’s account. Geness was charged with murder. Cox claims he subsequently did not have an active role in the prosecution. Between Fayette County Prison and a locked-down mental institution, Geness remained incarcerated for nine years without further investigation, a habeas hearing, or a trial. Charges were eventually dropped. Geness sued, claiming reckless investigation, false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, 42 U.S.C. 1983, due process violations, and violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C 12131. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of several section 1983 claims as time-barred, but reversed for Geness to amend his complaint and for reinstitution of his due process and ADA claims against the Commonwealth. View "Geness v. Cox" on Justia Law

After a 2001 joint trial with co-defendants, Eley and Eiland, a jury convicted Mitchell of second-degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery for the shooting death of a Harrisburg taxi driver. He is serving a sentence of life imprisonment. Mitchell and Eley had unsuccessfully moved to have their cases severed. After unsuccessful state court proceedings, Mitchell sought federal habeas relief (28 U.S.C. 2254), arguing that the admission of testimony by jailhouse informants concerning Eiland’s out-of-court statements violated his Confrontation Clause rights. The district court concluded that Eiland’s statements to the informants were nontestimonial under Supreme Court precedent (Crawford (2004)) so their admission did not violate his rights even though he could not cross-examine Eiland. Mitchell argued that the Supreme Court decided Crawford after the last state court proceeding dealing with the Sixth Amendment issue so that Crawford principles were not “clearly established” at the time. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Mitchell, by focusing narrowly on the “clearly established Federal law” language of 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) and by relying on the law in effect at the time of his proceedings, misstates the standard applicable to habeas corpus review of a state court conviction. Relief is available “only on the ground that [a prisoner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Mitchell is not in custody pursuant to what is now recognized as a Sixth Amendment violation. View "Mitchell v. Superintendent Dallas SCI" on Justia Law