Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2014, a sniper attacked Pennsylvania State Troopers at the Barracks, killing one and severely injuring the other. The next day, Troopers received a report that a man (DeLade) with a rifle was walking down a highway 15 miles from the Barracks. Trooper Cargan ran DeLade’s name through a criminal-history database and learned that the Escambia County, Florida sheriff’s department had issued a warrant for DeLade’s arrest, with a “no extradition” status. Cargan called and requested that the department change the status of the warrant to “full extradition.” The department complied. Troopers arrested DeLade, alleging that he had been charged with a crime in Florida. DeLade remained in pretrial detention for five days awaiting his extradition hearing—his first court appearance. Escambia County indicated that it would not extradite DeLade, so the Commonwealth dropped the arrest-prior-to-requisition charge. Another complaint was filed, charging him with being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm; the court released him on bail. DeLade later pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct. A court sentenced him to 12 months’ probation.DeLade filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that Cargan violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause by fabricating evidence to support the arrest-prior-to-requisition charge. The district court granted Cargan summary judgment on DeLade’s Fourth Amendment claims, finding that probable cause existed to justify charging DeLade as a prohibited person in possession of a firearm but declined to grant summary judgment or qualified immunity to Cargan on DeLade’s Fourteenth Amendment claim. The Third Circuit reversed in part. A claim alleging unlawful arrest and pretrial detention before a detainee’s first court appearance sounds in the Fourth Amendment, not the Due Process Clause. View "Delade v. Cargan" on Justia Law

In April 2020, a Pennsylvania district court ordered the release of 22 immigration detainees because of the COVID-192 pandemic, by granting a temporary restraining order without affording the government an opportunity to be heard. The Petitioners had filed a joint petition, alleging they were at risk of serious harm from COVID-19, although they vary in age from 28-69, have divergent health conditions, have unique criminal histories, and have diverse home and family situations.The Third Circuit vacated those orders, stating that exigent circumstances do not empower a court to jettison fundamental principles of due process or the rules of procedure. Considering all the responsive measures implemented to detect and to prevent the spread of the virus, the challenges of facility administration during an unprecedented situation, and the purposes served by detention, the petitioners did not show a substantial likelihood of success on their claim that the conditions of their confinement constitute unconstitutional punishment and did not establish that the government was deliberately indifferent toward their medical needs. The court too readily accepted the all-or-nothing request for immediate release and erred in not considering as part of the balancing of harm practical difficulties involved in locating and re-detaining the petitioners should the government ultimately prevail or should a petitioner abscond, commit a crime, or violate another term of release. View "Hope v. Warden Pike County Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

In 2004, Starnes, an Allegheny County Probation Officer, met Doerr, the President Judge of the Butler County Court. Doerr repeatedly called Starnes to ask her to meet him at his chambers. Starnes eventually visited his chambers after hours. Doerr insisted on having sex, telling Starnes that it would be a ‘business relationship.’” Doerr exercised authority over hiring probation officers. Starnes wished to return to Butler, her hometown; Doerr made sure she was hired. After Starnes started working in Butler County, Doerr began summoning her to his chambers for sexual relations. After their sexual relationship ended in 2009, Doerr continued asking her to film herself performing sexual acts, flirting with her from the bench, and threatening to "help her return to her previous job.” In 2010, Starnes began dating the man she later married, another Probation Officer. He was harassed and pushed into retirement. Starnes was denied her own office, overtime, training, and other opportunities she alleges her male counterparts had. Within days of telling her supervisors of her intention to file EEOC charges, Starnes was placed on a “performance improvement plan.” Weeks earlier, Starnes had received a positive evaluation with no noted performance issues.The Third Circuit held that accepting her allegations as true, Starnes stated plausible claims for sex discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a hostile work environment under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and that Doerr violated her First Amendment freedom of expression and right to petition the government. Because the law is clearly established that this conduct is actionable discrimination, the district court did not err in denying Doerr qualified immunity. The court reversed the denial of qualified immunity on Starnes’s intimate association claim. View "Starnes v. Butler County Court of Common Pleas" on Justia Law

In 2004, Abreu was convicted in Pennsylvania of 22 drug-related counts and was sentenced to 27-54 years’ imprisonment, to run consecutively to a federal sentence Abreu was already serving. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed. Abreu later unsuccessfully sought relief under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). In 2015, Abreu filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, claiming that his PCRA counsel’s assistance was ineffective in failing to assert that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. The district court rejected his claims.The Third Circuit granted a certificate of appealability as to claims that trial counsel performed ineffectively by failing to challenge the admission of grand jury testimony and by failing to seek to strike a police officer’s testimony recounting statements made by others. While Abreu’s appeal was pending, he was released on early parole, subject to a federal removal order, and then removed to the Dominican Republic. His federal conviction (not at issue) permanently bars his reentry. The Third Circuit directed the district court to dismiss Abreu’s petition as moot. Without a collateral consequence of Abreu’s state conviction that can be redressed by a favorable decision on his petition, there is no case or controversy under Article III. View "Abreu v. Superintendent Smithfield SCI" on Justia Law

Sharkey worked as a special educator and assistant principal at Susquehanna Township High School in 2013. He and M.S., a 16-year-old female student, began a sexual relationship. Weeks later, students began spreading rumors. The District launched an investigation, which included numerous interviews with M.S., Sharkey, and others; review of Sharkey’s telephone records, and examinations of texts, emails, and photos on M.S.’s telephone and on Sharkey’s district-issued telephone. M.S. and Sharkey denied the rumors. Not finding any evidence of wrongdoing, the superintendent ended the investigation.At the beginning of the next school year, the rumors resurfaced. The District contacted the police and placed Sharkey on administrative leave. M.S. still denied having a sexual relationship with Sharkey but officers informed her that they planned to get a search warrant for her phone. The next day, M.S. and her parents met with the police; M.S. provided details about her relationship with Sharkey. Sharkey was criminally charged. The District informed Sharkey that it intended to terminate his employment and obtained his resignation.M.S. sued the District, alleging a hostile educational environment in violation of Title IX, violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, and state-law claims. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the District. Sharkey’s knowledge of his own wrongdoing is irrelevant to the District’s actual knowledge of the sexual harassment. No other appropriate person at the District had actual knowledge of the sexual relationship until days before Sharkey resigned. View "M. S. v. Susquehanna Township School District" on Justia Law

Mack, a practicing Muslim, was an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution in Loretto, Pennsylvania, and worked for pay at the prison’s commissary. Mack alleges that he was harassed, based on his religion, by correctional officers Roberts and Venslosky, who supervised the inmates working in the commissary. Mack alleges that he raised these issues with their supervisor, Stephens; that upon overhearing Mack’s oral complaint to Stephens, Roberts told Mack, “[y]ou are not going to be here long”; and that Venslosky fired Mack less than two weeks later. The district court denied the government’s motion for summary judgment on Mack’s First Amendment retaliation claim.The Third Circuit reversed. The court noted that no statute provides a damages remedy for constitutional claims brought against federal officials. Although the Supreme Court recognized an implied damages action for such claims under the Fourth Amendment in 1971 (Bivens), the Court has since recognized an implied damages remedy in only two other instances. In 2017, the Supreme Court cautioned against creating additional implied damages remedies and explicitly declared expansion of Bivens a “disfavored judicial activity.” The Third Circuit declined to expand Bivens to create a damages remedy for Mack’s First Amendment retaliation claim. View "Mack v. Yost" on Justia Law

Downey has long struggled with glaucoma, which can lead to blindness if left uncontrolled. His condition worsened while he was imprisoned at the State Correctional Institution at Waymart, Pennsylvania. Doctors recommended that Downey have surgery expeditiously to save his eyesight. Nothing happened for almost a year, although he repeatedly reached out to prison staff. Surgery came too late; Downey is now blind. Downey sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1999. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment, concluding that he failed to exhaust available administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a)..The Third Circuit reversed in part. Downey’s claims for monetary relief are not procedurally defaulted. Under the prison’s procedures, a prisoner dealing with an emergency or an urgent situation is not bound by the ordinary procedures specified in the grievance policy; he only needs to alert the closest staff person. The court rejected the prison’s “efforts to downplay the urgency” of Downey’s situation and found that Downey complied with the policy. The court affirmed the dismissal of claims against the Department of Corrections and its officials on state sovereign immunity grounds, although that defense was not raised before the district court. View "Downey v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Two counties sued Sherwin-Williams in state court, seeking abatement of the public nuisance caused by lead-based paint. Anticipating suits by other counties, Sherwin-Williams sued in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Sherwin-Williams claimed that “[i]t is likely that the fee agreement between [Delaware County] and the outside trial lawyers [is] or will be substantively similar to an agreement struck by the same attorneys and Lehigh County to pursue what appears to be identical litigation” and that “the Count[y] ha[s] effectively and impermissibly delegated [its] exercise of police power to the private trial attorneys” by vesting the prosecutorial function in someone who has a financial interest in using the government’s police power to hold a defendant liable. The complaint pleaded a First Amendment violation, citing the company’s membership in trade associations, Sherwin-Williams’ purported petitioning of federal, state, and local governments, and its commercial speech. The complaint also argued that the public nuisance theory would seek to impose liability “that is grossly disproportionate,” arbitrary, retroactive, vague, and “after an unexplainable, prejudicial, and extraordinarily long delay, in violation of the Due Process Clause.”The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Sherwin-Williams failed to plead an injury in fact or a ripe case or controversy because the alleged harms hinged on the County actually filing suit. View "Sherwin Williams Co. v. County of Delaware" on Justia Law

Rejecting a challenge to Pennsylvania’s ballot laws under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the district court concluded that enforcing the signature requirement, in combination with the Governor’s Orders issued to address the COVID-19 pandemic, imposed only a moderate burden. The court found that the plaintiffs had sufficient time and means to meet the signature requirements under Pennsylvania law, which were reduced by more than 90% in a 2018 suit and that the August 3 deadline for collecting signatures did not constitute a “severe burden” requiring strict scrutiny.The Third Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly applied the Supreme Court’s balancing test and the law survives intermediate scrutiny because it serves the Commonwealth’s legitimate and sufficiently important interests in “avoiding ballot clustering, ensuring viable candidates, and the orderly and efficient administration of elections.” View "Libertarian Party of Pennsylvania v. Governor of Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

A York, Pennsylvania officer reported a shooting and said the suspects fled in a vehicle. Other officers pursued the vehicle, which crashed. Officers pursued the driver and a passenger on foot. An officer found a spent .38 caliber shell casing inside the vehicle. Officers observed Williams and Scott running and ordered them to get on the ground. Scott complied but Williams ran and was eventually apprehended. Williams claims the officers were very rough with her and disregarded her complaints. According to three officers, Williams “was kicking, flailing around, being disorderly, and yelling.” At one point, she tripped on an unidentified officer’s foot. She was transported to City Hall where she continued to refuse to cooperate. Williams claims that an unidentified officer “approached her, twisted her arm, threw her against the wall, and threatened if she did not give him her arm, he would break it.”Williams, found not guilty of disorderly conduct, sued the city and the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied the officers qualified immunity. The Third Circuit reversed. A plaintiff alleging that one or more officers engaged in unconstitutional conduct must establish the personal involvement of each named defendant to survive summary judgment and district courts must specify those material facts that are and are not subject to genuine dispute and explain their materiality. Reviewing the actions attributable to identified officers, the court concluded that the officers did not violate clearly established law. View "Williams v. City of York" on Justia Law