Justia U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

SEB distributes household products under several brand names, including electric steam irons sold under the Rowenta brand name. Euro-Pro distributes household appliances under the Shark brand name. The Shark packaging states: “MORE POWERFUL STEAM vs. Rowenta®†† at half the price.” The “††”refers to a fine-print footnote on the package’s bottom, stating that the claim is “††[b]ased on independent comparative steam burst testing to Rowenta DW5080 (grams/shot).” The packaging also asserts “#1 MOST POWERFUL STEAM*” with a fine-print reference on the bottom stating it “*[o]ffers more grams per minute (maximum steam setting while bursting before water spots appear) when compared to leading competition in the same price range, at time of printing.” SEB directed its internal laboratory to conduct tests, which showed that the Rowenta performed the same as the Shark. SEB commissioned an independent laboratory to conduct tests, which showed that the Rowenta outperformed the Shark. SEB claimed false advertising under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), and unfair competition under Pennsylvania common law. The Third Circuit affirmed entry of an injunction, agreeing that the packaging’s definition of a claim term applies to the claim’s explicit message and that the court properly disregarded consumer survey evidence offering alternative meanings. View "Groupe SEB USA Inc v. Euro Pro Operating, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2008, the Borough of Shickshinny approved placement of a religious-themed sign on municipal property near the home of Tearpock-Martini . Shickshinny employees installed the sign, which reads: “Bible Baptist Church Welcomes You!” and has a directional arrow with “1 BLOCK” written on it, and depicts a gold cross and a white Bible. Tearpock-Martini installed, on her property directly in front of the church sign, a sign that read: “This Church Sign Violates My Rights As A Taxpayer & Property Owner. Residential Neighborhoods Are Not Zoned For Advertisement Signs!” Shickshinny warned Tearpock-Martini that she could be charged if she did not remove her sign. In 2012, Tearpock-Martini filed a civil rights action, alleging violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed the challenge as be time-barred. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that the constitutional challenge to a still-existing monument erected on municipal property is not time-barred, but that claims that the refusal of Shickshinny to allow Martini to erect her own sign violated her rights to free speech and equal protection of the law are barred by Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations.View "Tearpock-Martini v. Borough of Shickshinny" on Justia Law

Erdely was investigating online distribution of child pornography when he discovered a computer on a peer-to-peer network sharing 77 files that he suspected contained child pornography. With information available to anyone, he found the Internet protocol address (IP address) through which it connected to the internet. Searching publicly available records, Erdely determined that the IP Address was registered to a Comcast subscriber and obtained a court order. Comcast gave Erdely the Neighbor’s name and Pittsburgh address. Erdely executed a warrant. None of the Neighbor’s computers contained child pornography or the file-sharing software; his wireless router was not password-protected. Erdely deduced that the computer sharing child pornography was connecting without the Neighbor’s knowledge. With the Neighbor’s permission, Erdely connected a computer to the router for remote access. Later, while working in Harrisburg, Erdely learned that the computer was again sharing child pornography on the Neighbor’s IP address. Erdely determined the mooching computer’s IP address and MAC address, which belonged to an Apple wireless card. Erdely had not discovered any Apple wireless devices in the Neighbor’s home, so he decided to use a “MoocherHunter” mobile tracking software tool, which can be used by anyone with a directional antenna. Not knowing which residence the signal was coming from, Erdely proceeded without a warrant. From the sidewalk the MoocherHunter’s readings were strongest when aimed at Stanley’s apartment. Erdely obtained a warrant for Stanley’s home. When officers arrived, Stanley fled, but returned and confessed that he had connected to the Neighbor’s router to download child pornography. Erdely seized Stanley’s Apple laptop and recovered 144 images and video files depicting child pornography. Stanley was charged with possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a). The district court denied a motion to suppress. The Third Circuit affirmed. Use of the MoocherHunter was not a search under the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Stanley" on Justia Law

Vanterpool was convicted under V.I. Code tit. 14, section 706(1) for obsessive phone calls and faxes to his ex-girlfriend Jacqueline Webster. On appeal, he argued that: Section 706 was unconstitutional under the First Amendment; that his trial counsel’s performance amounted to an ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment; and that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support Vanterpool’s multiple convictions. The Third Circuit remanded. While the First Amendment challenge would have been viable had it been raised during trial, the plain error standard precluded relief on appeal. Trial counsel’s failure to preserve the First Amendment challenge satisfied the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, but the record was insufficient regarding whether trial counsel’s performance fell below professional norms. View "Government of the VI v. Vanterpool" on Justia Law

In 2013, Governor Christie signed AB A3371 into law, providing: A person who is licensed to provide professional counseling ... shall not engage in sexual orientation change efforts with a person under 18 years of age. Plaintiffs provide licensed counseling to minor clients seeking to reduce or eliminate same-sex attractions and include providers of religious-perspective counseling. Plaintiffs describe their efforts as “talk therapy,” involving only verbal communication about potential “root causes” of homosexual behavior, such as childhood sexual trauma or a distant relationship with the same-sex parent, with discussion of “traditional, gender-appropriate behaviors and characteristics” and how the client can foster and develop those behaviors and characteristics. They challenged the law as a violation of their rights to free speech and free exercise of religion and asserted claims on behalf of their minor clients. The district court rejected the First Amendment claims and held that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring claims on behalf of their minor clients. The Third Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the statute is a regulation of professional speech that passes intermediate scrutiny. A3371 does not violate plaintiffs’ right to free exercise of religion, as it is a neutral and generally applicable law that is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. View "King v. Governor of NJ" on Justia Law

The Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), an incorporated collective bargaining organization that represents the approximately 6,600 active police officers employed by the Philadelphia, operates a political action committee, COPPAC, for purposes of distributing contributions to candidates for local and state office. FOP, COPPAC, and four police officers challenged the constitutionality of section 10-107(3) of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, which prohibits employees of the Philadelphia Police Department from making contributions “for any political purpose,” 351 Pa. Code 10.10-107(3). The provision was enacted in 1951, based on Philadelphia’s history of political patronage. As interpreted by its implementing regulation, employees of the police department cannot donate to COPPAC because it uses some of its funds for partisan political purposes. The Charter ban applies only to the police, and does not proscribe political donations made by Philadelphia’s other 20,000 employees, the vast majority of whom are organized interests. The Third Circuit reversed summary judgment upholding the ban. Despite its valid concerns, the city did not explain how the ban serves in a direct and material way to address these harms. Given the lack of fit between the stated objectives and the means selected to achieve it, the Charter ban is unconstitutional. View "Lodge No. 5 of the Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Apple introduced the iPad in 2010. To send and receive data over cellular networks (3G), customers had to purchase a data contract from AT&T and register on an AT&T website. AT&T prepopulated the user ID field on the login screen with customers’ email addresses by programming servers to search for the user’s Integrated Circuit Card Identifier to reduce the time to log into an account. Spitler discovered this “shortcut” and wrote a program, the “account slurper,” to repeatedly access the AT&T website, each time changing the ICC-ID by one digit. If an email address appeared in the login box, the program would save that address. Spitler shared this discovery with Auernheimer, who helped him to refine the account slurper, which collected 114,000 email addresses. Auernheimer emailed the media to publicize their exploits. AT&T fixed the breach. Auernheimer shared the list of email addresses with Tate, who published a story that mentioned some names of those whose email addresses were obtained, but published only redacted email addresses and ICC-IDs. Spitler was in California. Auernheimer was in Arkansas. The servers t were physically located in Texas and Georgia. Despite the absence of any connection to New Jersey, a Newark grand jury indicted Auernheimer for conspiracy to violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2)(C) and (c)(2)(B)(ii), and identity fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(7). The Third Circuit vacated his conviction. Venue in criminal cases is more than a technicality; it involves “matters that touch closely the fair administration of criminal justice and public confidence in it.”View "United States v. Auernheimer" on Justia Law

AAOS is a voluntary professional organization for orthopaedic surgeons, which has adopted professional standards, including member grievance procedures. Most orthopaedic surgeons are members of the AAOS, but it is not a licensing authority. AAOS member Dr. Meller initiated a grievance against another AAOS member, Dr. Graboff, claiming that Graboff wrote an inaccurate report based on incomplete information that was used against him in a civil malpractice case. After determining that Graboff’s testimony violated the AAOS’s Standards of Professionalism, which require members to provide honest and accurate testimony when serving as expert witnesses, the AAOS suspended Graboff from membership for two years and published a description of the proceedings in AAOS Now, its newsletter. Graboff sued, alleging that the AAOS article was defamatory and a false-light invasion of privacy because it selectively recounted the circumstances of the grievance proceedings to imply that he had testified falsely. A jury awarded Graboff $196,000 in damages for “false light” invasion of privacy. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that, as a matter of law, the jury’s finding that the AAOS had not made false statements foreclosed the possibility that it could be liable on the false-light claim. View "Graboff v. Colleran Firm" on Justia Law

Elonis’s wife left their home with their children. Elonis began experiencing trouble at work at an amusement park, reportedly leaving early and crying at his desk. An employee Elonis supervised, Morrissey, claimed sexual harassment. In October Elonis posted on Facebook a photograph taken for his employer’s Halloween Haunt. The photograph showed Elonis in costume holding a knife to Morrissey’s neck. Elonis added the caption “I wish.” Elonis’s supervisor saw the posting and fired Elonis. Days later, Elonis began posting statements on Facebook about having “keys for the fucking gates … sinister plans for all my friends,” and, concerning his wife, “would have smothered your ass … dumped your body … and made it look like a rape and murder” that their son “should dress up as matricide for Halloween … head on a stick” and “I’m not going to rest until your body is a mess, soaked in blood and dying from all the little cuts.” Following issuance of a state court protective order, Elonis posted statements concerning shooting at his wife’s house, using explosives, and “I’m checking out and making a name for myself … hell hath no fury like a crazy man in a kindergarten class.” After being visited by federal agents, he posted statements about blowing up SWAT members. Elonis was convicted of transmitting in interstate commerce communications containing a threat to injure the person of another, 18 U.S.C. 875(c). The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that he did not subjectively intend his Facebook posts to be threatening. A 2003 Supreme Court decision, Virginia v. Black, did not overturn its prior holding that a statement is a true threat when a reasonable speaker would foresee the statement would be interpreted as a threat. View "United States v. Elonis" on Justia Law

Stock was indicted for transmitting a threat in interstate commerce 18 U.S.C. 875(c) after he posted a notice on Craig‟s List: i went home loaded in my truck and spend the past 3 hours looking for this douche with the expressed intent of crushing him in that little piece of shit under cover gray impala hooking up my tow chains and dragging his stupid ass down to creek hills and just drowning him in the falls. but alas i can’t fine that bastard anywhere . . . i really wish he would die, just like the rest of these stupid fucking asshole cops. so J.K.P. if you read this i hope you burn in hell. i only wish i could have been the one to send you there.” The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss, stating that it was satisfied that the government included sufficient context in the indictment that a reasonable jury could find that Stock’s statement expressed intent to injure in the present or future. View "United States v. Stock" on Justia Law